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CHANGE OF EDITOR

ONE of the most interesting activities of Chatham House is the editorial board of *The World Today*, which meets each month to discuss the tendency of international affairs. The board is not so much concerned with the day's crisis, since this is prominently featured in the national press, as with the problems which are developing and the topics about which the general public is insufficiently briefed. If the readers of *The World Today* have found their appetite for information on these questions satisfied they have owed it to Miss Muriel Grindrod who retired in April after nearly twelve years as editor and as chairman of the editorial board.

A graduate of Cambridge, and an acknowledged expert on Italian affairs in particular,[1] Miss Grindrod has spent thirty-five years at the Royal Institute of International Affairs. She has worked as a research assistant in several departments—at one time under Dr Arnold Toynbee—and has been mainly responsible for the two journals, *International Affairs* and *The World Today*, during recent years. The contacts which were necessary for covering this wide field came easily to Muriel Grindrod whose wit and kindly humour ensured for her a host of friends.

The new editor of *The World Today* is Mrs Margaret Cornell.

[1] Author of *The New Italy* (1947) and *The Rebuilding of Italy* (1955).

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Notes of the Month

India and Goa

LAST October a seminar on the Portuguese colonies was organized by the Indian Council for Africa. At the opening meeting the Indian Prime Minister said that the approach of his country to the problem of Goa was the result of practical considerations and was not entirely guided by any theoretical attachment to non-violence. India, following Gandhi's lead, would like to solve the problem without leaving any trace of bitterness or hatred. Some of Mr Nehru's listeners appeared by their applause to interpret his remarks as suggesting that he might advocate the use of force, for he stressed that efforts to liberate Portuguese colonies 'would always be by pressure and activities other than war'.

At the big mass meeting in Bombay at the close of the seminar Mr Nehru spoke again. India, he said, had not given up the right to use military methods to free Goa and would abandon the peaceful approach when the time came. During and after the seminar there had been talks on freeing Goa from colonial rule, freedom being equated in the Indian mind with absorption by the Indian Union.

Since October there has been a steady rise in the temperature along the frontiers of Portuguese India. The impression gained in Western circles was that Portugal's embarrassment over Angola had provided a suitable opportunity for bringing the Goan question out of cold storage. Over the past few years, things had been relatively quiet in Goa. There had been the repeated cry for 'liberation' in India, 'incidents' had been reported (especially whenever India's independence anniversary came round), and the two countries had not been in direct diplomatic contact. But it was India's policy to leave the Goans to work out their own salvation and matters had quietened down to the point at which remittances of money were allowed into Goa.

The population of the areas concerned seemed content with things as they were. Theirs is a way of life different from that of a Western democracy; but while they lacked some democratic rights

—as do the people of Portugal—they had other freedoms. Freedom from the austerity concomitant with economic planning, a free port and free trade, freer relations with Pakistan than were enjoyed by their kinsmen in Bombay, freedom from the experiments of prohibitionists, advocates of linguistic changes, and other theorists—these were perhaps some compensation. Visitors from India appreciated the chance of a holiday from stream-lined progress, while even the industrialists who have put capital into Goa found the freedom from regulation very welcome.

The more vocal element among the Goans in India seemed, outwardly, to be largely in favour of expulsion of the Portuguese from the sub-continent, but many, while prudently paying lip-service to the 'freedom' movement, privately hoped that things would not change (and said so in quiet asides). A very different feeling is found among many of their kinsmen who have their homes in Pakistan, a country which has been on good terms with Portugal and to which many European women and children have been evacuated from Goa.

Two incidents last November, in which shots were fired from the Portuguese-held island of Anjadev at Indian boats, started the recent train of events. A massing of land and sea forces by both India and Portugal followed and a clash became inevitable. That Portugal should go out of her way to invade Indian soil was most unlikely. Her forces were inferior in strength and she aimed only to keep what she had held for centuries. On the other hand, Mr Nehru's speeches suggested that he was preparing to swerve from the non-violent path. In language reminiscent of other aggressors he declared that his patience was exhausted. Portugal's offer to allow international observers to visit Goa did not appease him. Britain and the United States expressed their concern that force should not be used, while the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations appealed for an attempt to find a solution through that organization. But, as it has turned out, all was in vain.

What was the reason for the sudden militancy on India's part? The answer is provided by—among others—an old colleague of Mr Nehru's, Mr C. Rajagopalachari, former Governor General of India and now a leader of the rival Swatantra Party. Speaking at Kanpur on 8 December he said that action in Goa on the eve of the coming general elections in India was intended to divert the attention of the people from the grave happenings on the Tibetan border. Goa had been in existence throughout the fifteen years of Indian

independence. In the past whenever the question came up Mr Nehru had said, 'We are believers in non-violence and we must be patient.' 'Suddenly,' Rajagopalachari went on, 'just before the general elections, as they are coming nearer and nearer, especially in North Bombay, and when the Chinese have crossed further into Indian territory and are advancing their positions, the Government of India concentrates on Goa. They propose to attack the Goa villagers but do not want to do anything against the Chinese who are sitting tight in the Himalayas.'

The same point was made strongly by a writer on the editorial page of the *Hindustan Times* of Delhi,[1] who described the move on Goa as a rather theatrical effort on the part of the Indian Government to show, after enduring years of Chinese aggression, that it was capable of some action. The writer ridiculed the lack of proportion shown in concentrating large forces on Goa, warned the Government that there was no easy kudos to be won in Goa, and concluded that 'it must expect the world to throw some of its earlier profundities on peace back into its face.'

Peace-loving people everywhere must regret deeply that Mr Nehru has sacrificed his reputation as a man of peace, by resorting to force in a case where India's security was not endangered, purely as an electioneering stunt. The pressures on him inside India were great, but his international stature cannot but be seriously damaged.

U.S. Difficulties in Latin America

FOREIGN Ministers from countries of the Organization of American States are due to meet in conference on 10 January to consider 'threats to the peace and the political independence' of its members. In order to understand the background to this conference it is necessary to appreciate the extent to which the United States outlook is influenced by fear of the Communist 'bogy'. At a meeting of the O.A.S. in Caracas in 1954, Mr Foster Dulles succeeded in pressing through, in the face of considerable opposition, a 'declaration of solidarity for the preservation of the political integrity of the American States against international Communist intervention'. At a later meeting of the O.A.S., in August 1960 at San José, Costa Rica, a resolution similar in intent was again pressed through by the United States, incidentally causing the Venezuelan Foreign Minister to resign in protest. These resolutions, by which the U.S.

[1] *Hindustan Times*, 7 December 1961.

appears to set such store, have, like Canute, been unable to stem the oncoming tide, as witness developments in Cuba. Moreover, the tactics required to push through the resolutions may well have increased the fears, already acute among the countries of Latin America, of United States interference in their affairs. For this, and not Communism, is the Latin American 'bogy'.

These fears are compounded of past history and recent experience. Latin America, in theory at least, has a legal safeguard in the O.A.S. treaty of Bogotá of 29 April 1948. Article 15 of this treaty says: 'No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State.' Yet in Guatemala in 1954 and in Cuba in April 1961 Latin America saw a clear contravention of this treaty by the United States. In recent weeks the U.S. has gambled heavily in sending warships to stand just outside the territorial waters of the Dominican Republic. By doing so she prevented relations of the hated dictator, Trujillo, from carrying out a *coup* designed to overthrow President Balaguer who had held office under the dictator but who, since Trujillo's assassination, had been trying to introduce reforms. This initial success brought the cry of 'Viva Yankee' from the crowds in Santo Domingo, a welcome but rare sound in Latin America today. Unfortunately it was short-lived. Having lifted the lid of a witches' cauldron of discontent with the dictatorship, the pot shows every sign of boiling over. Should the lid be clamped back by a military *coup*, delay is only likely to accentuate the eventual eruption. The U.S., having put her shirt on Balaguer, is now faced with a situation where Dr Viriato A. Fiallo, leader of the National Civic Union, whose programme is likely to be far more radical than that of Balaguer, appears to have the support of the crowds who have more recently been shouting anti-U.S. slogans. On the one hand the Communists, as usual, have been trying to fish in troubled waters, and on the other General Echevarría, the principal military figure, may try to introduce another dictatorship. His methods of dealing with the demonstrating crowds are all too reminiscent of those of Trujillo. In short, the situation may yet turn sour, and neighbours to the south who were at first prepared only to raise an eyebrow at the use of U.S. warships may now feel very differently about an action which may result in the suppression, after all, of a majority view.

Sensitivity towards intervention is so strong in Latin American countries that it is unfortunately bedevilling much of what the U.S.

is at present trying to do to help them by her Alliance for Progress programme. Brazil, who by virtue of her size and potentialities has great influence in the rest of Latin America, recently passed a Bill, the effect of which, in the words of a *New York Times* correspondent, would be 'to so penalize foreign investment as to gradually cripple what is already here and make future capital injections insane'. It was hoped that Brazil would prove a key success of the Alliance for Progress programme and provide a launching-pad for the scheme to reach the rest of Latin America. Owing to Janio Quadros's sudden abdication of his responsibilities as President, the hopes that were centred in him have been dashed: the country is now in a parlous state politically and economically and success there for the Alliance for Progress at present seems a forlorn hope. At the Punta del Este conference in Uruguay which launched the Alliance for Progress programme last August there was a marked lack of enthusiasm for the self-imposed reforms suggested by the U.S. as the recipients' contribution towards the programme. Such measures, admirable and essential though they undoubtedly are, when proposed by an outside Power in the position that the U.S. occupies could scarcely fail to arouse some degree of resentment.

In some ways the period through which the U.S. has been going *vis-à-vis* Latin America resembles that of Great Britain and the Middle East after Suez. Few, if any, of her actions appear right in some Latin American eyes, and however good her intentions they are liable to misrepresentation. It is possible that the best course for the U.S., as for Britain then, would be to pull out from all commitments that might lead to the charge of interference in the hope, perhaps forlorn, that in time absence might make the heart grow fond. It is indeed tragic that at a time when the U.S. is so anxious to help Latin America the area has reached a psychological state of touchiness that makes help so difficult to give. Perhaps an important element in the situation is the awareness in Latin America that the reason for the help now being given is fear of the spread of Communism, and not simply that poverty exists. That is why the cynical Latin American attributes the Alliance for Progress programme to Castro.

It would be unfair to give the impression that the U.S. is entirely without friends in Latin America. Such well-known figures as Rául Prebisch and Pedro Beltrán have thrown themselves heart and soul behind the Alliance for Progress programme and, with a growing realization of what Castroism is likely to mean to moderate

Governments, there is increasing support among these for what the U.S. is trying to do. The Venezuelan Government of President Betancourt and the Colombian Government of President Lleras Camargo are examples. But the closely guarded streets of Caracas during President Kennedy's recent visit give some indication of the difficulties to be overcome by the U.S. in transforming her image from the Colossus of the North to that of Father Christmas.

Communists in Congress: The Economic Angle

PROGRESS OF THE SEVEN-YEAR PLAN

THE 22nd Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which opened in Moscow on 17 October 1961, gave pride of place to political affairs,[1] an emphasis that was heightened by the open conflict with Albania over de-Stalinization. Yet it is as a doctrine of plenty that Communism has presented itself in the Third Programme of the C.P.S.U., and it is from this aspect as much as from the political controversies that the Programme and the Congress fall to be judged.

Economic affairs were discussed primarily during the first two sessions of the Congress. On the first day Mr Khrushchev delivered a progress report on the current Seven-Year Plan covering the years 1959–65. With ebullient confidence he announced substantial over-fulfilments of Plan output in basic products and laid down new and higher target figures for 1965 in iron, steel, rolled products, oil, electric power, and machine building. He claimed a growth of industrial production in the first three years (1959–61) of 10 per cent annually as against the planned 8·3 per cent, but did not mention that the rate of over-fulfilment was falling off. Mr Khrushchev stressed the need for flexibility in allocating resources, an understandable emphasis against the general background of overstrain on the economy. Rates of economic growth may be gleaned from the following table.

ANNUAL RATES OF GROWTH (%)*

	1960 Actual	*1961 Forecast*	*1956–60 (5-Year Plan)*	*1959–65 (7-Year Plan)*	*1961–70 (10-Year Forecast)*	*1961–80 (20-Year Forecast)*
Gross Industrial Production	10·0	(9·0)	10·5	8·6	10·2	9·7
Producer Goods (Group A)	11·0	n.a.	11·3	9·2–9·4	10·6	10·2
Consumer Goods (Group B)	7·0	n.a.	9·9	7·1–7·4	9·2	8·5
National Income	8·0	n.a.	9·9	7·1–7·4	9·6	8·4
Capital Investment	11·5	(10·0)	10·8	8·6	n.a.	(10·5)
Labour Force (non-agricultural)	9·8	n.a.	2·8	2·8	n.a.	1·8
Productivity (industrial) per head	5·0	(4·0)	8·5	5·9	7·2	7·4
Real Wages (industrial) per head	5·0	n.a.	5·4	4·9	7·2	6·5
Agricultural Incomes in collectives per head	n.a.	n.a.	7·0	4·9	7·2	7·3
Retail Trade Turnover	11·0	n.a.	8·5	6·7–7·1	9·6	8·4
Agricultural Production	2·3	n.a.	5·7	7·9	9·6	6·5

* These rates are not necessarily comparable since the Soviet definitions change from time to time. n.a. = not available.

[1] See 'Communists in Congress: The 22nd Meeting in Moscow', in *The World Today*, December 1961.

Much detail was given by Mr Khrushchev and other speakers concerning ways in which the Soviet economy is overloaded. Some are clearly due to human factors such as wastefulness with materials and the tendency of managements to cling to tried production methods. In other directions the physical sinews are lacking. There are, the Congress was told, shortages of pipes, tyres, paper, agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and building materials. Funds and materials are dispersed over more than 100,000 building sites. This results in delays in completion of two, three, or more years. Hence the need to apply the brake through the year's moratorium on new projects announced by Mr Khrushchev.

The overloading of the economy is a permanent feature of Soviet life. That it is still so acute shows that the decentralization of control to Regional Economic Councils has not, so far, had the results that Mr Khrushchev hoped for. He attacked Republican governments for 'parochialist grabbing' and adjured Councils to do better in co-ordinating regional plans. From now on they will be increasingly responsible for ensuring supplies of materials to enterprises, one of the toughest problems. Control of decisions on technical policy and major new projects will clearly remain in Moscow.

In dealing with agriculture Mr Khrushchev's tone was generally confident and ambitious. Certainly he did not announce the raising of any agricultural targets for 1965, and his admission of the meat shortage came as close to an apology as a Soviet politician can achieve, but the impact of this and such other unpleasant facts as the disappointing harvest in the New Lands of Kazakhstan was lost in the flow of reassuring verbiage. Mr Khrushchev painted a picture of all-round successful development, especially in grain. Livestock numbers and deliveries of animal products had also risen, though they had not kept pace with the demands of a better-off and increasing population. His claim of an increase in gross agricultural output of 43 per cent, as between 1956–60 and 1951–5, was undoubtedly a considerable exaggeration, as is indicated by the smaller claimed rise in cattle population of 29 per cent. Mr Khrushchev's further claim that collective and State farms are now overwhelmingly the most important suppliers of meat and milk may also mean no more than that there has been a large-scale transfer of livestock, nominally voluntary, from private plots to public ownership. What is beyond dispute, on the showing of the Congress and of Mr Khrushchev's subsequent agricultural tour in Central Asia and Siberia, is the existence of widespread mismanagement on the

farms allied with general indifference amongst the rank and file.

In speaking of consumer goods his tone was again optimistic, but various failures of Soviet light industry were highlighted and improvement was promised. Mr Khrushchev announced, in particular, that additional quantities of clothing and footwear would be forthcoming, having first scathingly remarked that the trade network was choked with unsaleable shoes. Promises have been made which cannot lightly be put aside if things go wrong.

Large claims were made at the Congress about progress in housing the urban population, but Mr Khrushchev went on to confound his own boasts by blandly stating that by 1965 the town population would be greater by 15 million persons than had been expected. (In 1960 there were 104 million town dwellers.) There was no discussion of the immense economic and social implications of this unforeseen development, which shows the ineffectiveness of Soviet manpower planning and renders somewhat suspect the claim that 70 per cent of increased industrial output since 1959 has been due to higher productivity. Mr Khrushchev's consequent promise to speed up house building bodes ill for efforts to ease the strain on the construction industry.

The emphasis in the Congress proceedings on the need to curb the unthinking pursuit of output for its own sake was very marked. Speakers returned constantly to the themes of labour productivity, technical innovation, profitability, balanced development, and proper economic analysis of capital projects. The last exhortation will mean little until the Programme's promise of 'constant improvements' in the price system is implemented. A review of producer goods prices, at present unrealistically low, is to be put in hand—for 1963.

THE TWENTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE

What of the long-term economic prospects of Soviet man? These are set out, with crushing verbosity, in the Programme which was submitted for discussion in July 1961 and endorsed, virtually unamended, by the 22nd Congress. They are in the form of a twenty-year 'perspective' up to 1980, and, as with the political sections, these economic parts of the Programme are strikingly lacking in theoretical content. One is confronted with a kind of inflated company prospectus in which the repetitions are relieved only by ponderous invective. Even as a prospectus the Programme commands limited belief. It is a declaration of faith and a statement of intent,

not an articulated economic plan. The expression 'twenty-year plan' is not used: the text refers simply to the two decades from 1961. Only a few specific production targets are stated. Various crucial indicators are lacking. Specific targets in the consumption sector are conspicuous by their absence. Some gaps, but certainly not all, were filled in at the Congress.

The chief economic aim of Party and people in the next two decades is defined as 'creating the material and technical base of Communism'.[1] This means, first, bringing the Soviet economy to the highest technical level in the world, combining this process with full employment of the entire able-bodied population. Secondly, the development of heavy industry must be continued. Thirdly, there must be a speedy rise in the production of consumer goods. Fourthly, there is to be a great expansion of the communal services provided from public funds; and, finally, agriculture must be developed and living standards equalized between town and country. The figures given below show the very large increases envisaged in output of basic materials.

INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(million physical units)

	1958 Actual	*1959 Actual*	*1960 Actual*	*1961 Actual**	*Revised 1965 Plan*	*1970 Forecast*	*1980 Forecast*
Coal (tons)	496·1	506·6	513·0	513·0	606·0	693	1,190
Oil (tons)	113·2	129·6	148·0	166·0	240·0	390	700
Electric Power (000 kWh)	235·4	265·1	292·3	327·0	520·0	950	2,850
Gas (000 m.^{3})	29·9	37·2	47·0	59·5	150·0	318	700
Pig Iron (tons)	39·6	43·0	46·8	51·1	72·5	n.a.	n.a.
Crude Steel (tons)	54·9	60·0	65·3	71·0	96·0	145	250
Rolled Metal (tons)	43·1	47·0	50·9	55·0	73·7	n.a.	n.a.
Cement (tons)	33·3	38·8	45·5	51·0	78·0	122	234
Mineral Fertilizers (tons)	12·4	12·9	13·9	n.a.	31·0	77	130

*Provisional

The carrying out of the Programme is seen as depending on a variety of means. The chief hope of the Soviet planners lies in the application of advanced technology. This, combined with universal mechanization and electrification, is to produce an unprecedented rise in labour productivity both in industry and in agriculture. The quality of output is to be raised. Capital investments are to be more rigorously screened. Industry is to be re-sited and rationalized to economize labour and transport and ensure the most effective use of natural resources.

In dealing with the material benefits that will flow from these

[1] *Pravda*, 2 November 1961.

advances, the most far-reaching claim is that the Soviet Union will achieve the highest *per capita* output of goods in the world, thus preparing the way for the 'transition to full Communism'. By 1980, it is declared, real income *per capita* will have increased above the 1961 level by more than three and a half times. The Soviet working week will be the shortest in the world, its productivity the highest. There will be no heavy manual toil. The countryside will overcome its age-old backwardness and rural life will be assimilated to that of the town, as envisaged in the Communist Manifesto. From the cornucopia of scientific mechanized agriculture there will flow an abundance of produce, three and a half times the present output.

Public services in the broadest sense will by the end of the two decades account for about half the total volume of personal income. They will include free medical treatment, free gas, water, and heating, free education at all levels, free local transport, rent-free flats, and various other welfare facilities, some of which have already been achieved, wholly or partially, in the West. A great housing drive is promised to provide every family with a well-appointed flat by 1980.

The perspective thus described in the Programme is no leap forward into the unknown. The immense growth planned has as its springboard the second most powerful country in the world. It is something more, on the other hand, than a mere projection of the targets of the current 1959–65 Plan. The difference lies in the expressed belief that the present generation of Soviet citizens will live under Communism. In this paradisal, if still vaguely defined, state there will be such an abundance of goods and services that it will be possible to replace the present 'socialist' principle of remuneration according to work by the Communist principle of remuneration according to need. The new Soviet man will labour as a voluntarily accepted social duty.

Thus the Programme offers the prospect of an apocalyptic future, within the grasp of those living, as a spur to continued effort. In other respects its roots are the same as those of previous economic plans and reflect the harsher aspects of Soviet reality. First and foremost, there is the continued emphasis on the importance of strengthening heavy industry. Output of producer goods is scheduled to rise by 540 per cent by 1980, that of consumer goods by about 400 per cent. The declared object is twofold: to strengthen the military power of the Soviet State and, *after* military needs have been met, to raise the supply of goods to the population through the

development of light industry. In this the Programme differs from earlier plans only in the more explicit recognition of the need to satisfy basic consumer needs here and now. It therefore represents a retreat from Mr Khrushchev's reported remark in May 1961 that 'light industry and heavy industry will develop at the same pace', but these words stood in isolation and may well have been no more than an indiscretion. What does stand out is the realization that there is a political limit to the extent to which current consumption can be sacrificed for future benefits. The Programme, with what Mr Khrushchev describes as its 'considerable convergence' of growth rates for producer and consumer goods, will reduce the hitherto widening gap between them.

A major omission in the Programme is that no figure is given for the total value of industrial investment to be undertaken in the twenty-year period. At the Congress Mr Khrushchev confined himself to an estimate of 2 billion rubles to cover all types of investment during that time. This figure implies an annual average rate of in- increase in investment of 10·5 per cent as against the rate of 8·6 per cent originally scheduled for 1959–65 and the 11 per cent claimed by Mr Khrushchev for the past three years. In other words, investment growth out of higher national income is to be held at about the present high level. The satisfaction of the population's current needs could be reasonably generous even at this rate of saving provided the other assumptions of the Programme, notably those concerning labour productivity and agricultural growth, are met on time.

FEASIBILITY OF THE TARGETS

On the feasibility of the industrial targets of the Programme an unequivocal verdict cannot be expressed. Predictions covering twenty years have only limited value, whether made by Communist programme writers or outside commentators. Inasmuch as the targets represent projections of present rates of growth, they may well mostly turn out to be within the range of the possible. The two specific targets mentioned in the programme itself—those for electricity and steel—look capable of fulfilment. The electric power target for 1980 is an almost exact projection of growth in the decade 1951–60. This rate of expansion seems on the low side relative to projected industrial growth and domestic electrification and may imply heavier direct reliance on fuels such as natural gas. Similarly, the projected steel smelting capacity for 1980 of 250 million tons is not out of scale with a forecast 500 per cent rise in industrial output.

Other production targets laid down at the Congress imply rates of growth over the two decades somewhat below those envisaged by the current Plan. Cement, mineral fertilizers, oil, and gas fall within this category.

There is thus evidence of realism in setting the basic targets. Their attainment will depend mainly on achieving the planned increases in industrial labour productivity, which are expected to account for nine-tenths of the 400 per cent increase in national income to be achieved by 1980. To maintain an annual rate of growth of over 9 per cent in industrial output over a period of twenty years is a target demanding a sustained performance even higher than the 8⅗ per cent annual growth envisaged by the 1959–65 Plan and little below the 10 per cent claimed for the first three years of it. The ability of the Soviet economy to achieve great progress through the ruthless application of technology should not be underestimated. The trend of productivity of labour in industry has been one of accelerating growth. Nevertheless, comparison of the demands made by the current Plan with actual performance shows the size of the task facing Soviet industrial managers. In 1959, 18 per cent of all enterprises subject to the control of Regional Economic Councils failed to fulfil their labour productivity plans. Yet the new programme demands an annual increase in output per worker of more than 7 per cent, whereas the 1959–65 Plan requires an increase of between 5·4 and 5·9 per cent.

In any event there will have to be a radical improvement in planning methods and less waste and dispersion of effort. If serious difficulties are encountered, it may be taken as certain that the planners will resort to the usual crisis measures. Production of 'leading link' key materials will be maintained at the expense of other goods, quality will be cut, more overtime worked, imports increased, and statistics manipulated. That difficulties, and serious ones, will arise is certain if only because of the manifest unreality of the agricultural targets discussed below.

The comparative sobriety of the industrial aims is forgotten when the Programme turns to agriculture. Here fantasy takes over, perhaps in reaction to past—and present—disappointments. Not only is agricultural output to multiply by two and a half times over the next ten years, but the even less credible forecast is made that the productivity of labour in agriculture will rise faster than in industry. Mr Khrushchev seems to believe, against all past experience, that technology will yield the greatest gains in the field where

human resistance to the Soviet system has been most intense. There is little in the panaceas prescribed in the Programme—mechanization, irrigation, more fertilizers—to support this hope. Indeed the whole approach to agriculture is dominated by the belief that larger inputs of capital and improved technique plus greater incentives for the collective farmer *must* provide spectacular increases in yield. During his tour last November of agricultural areas in the East, Mr Khrushchev showed some perception of the basic difficulty of enlisting what he called 'human wit' (otherwise rank-and-file enthusiasm) on the side of collectivized farming, but no radical solutions were offered.

The Programme assumes an equal rate of growth of industrial and agricultural output over the first ten years—by two and a half times. This is highly unrealistic. Historically, industrial output in the Soviet Union has risen very much faster than agricultural. Indeed there has been little relationship between agricultural plan targets and actual achievements at any period in Soviet history. The current Seven-Year Plan is no exception to this rule. Over the Plan period output is scheduled to rise by 70 per cent, or by 7·9 per cent annually. On present form this target will not be attained. What chance, then, does Soviet agriculture stand of maintaining an annual 9·6 per cent increase over the decade 1961–70? For the following decade a much more modest rate of growth of 3·4 per cent per annum is postulated, but this sharp falling off in the rate of expansion is in its way equally unrealistic.

In face of Mr Khrushchev's unredeemed and unmentioned promise that the Soviet Union would by 1961 surpass the United States in the *per capita* consumption of meat and dairy products,[1] it is not surprising that great emphasis is laid on the development of 'a stable fodder base' for communal livestock breeding through the growing of maize, beans, peas, and sugar-beet. Fallows are to be reduced, incompetent functionaries dismissed, and the pace of mechanization and electrification is to be quickened. A long-term irrigation plan is to be worked out. The New Lands, menaced by falling yields, are to be put under proper crop rotations.

There is some vagueness on the controversial topic of the conversion of collective into State farms. Emphasis is on the need to raise the efficiency of collective farms to that of the best State farms (which are not themselves particularly efficient). Mr Khrushchev

[1] See 'Communists in Congress: The 22nd Meeting in Moscow', in *The World Today*, December 1961.

remarks that both types are 'socialist' and not to be regarded as opposed theoretical models. The Soviet planners know that new State farms must consume more capital per unit of output than the collectives with their still primitive living conditions.

LIVING STANDARDS

Real wages, inclusive of services provided from 'social funds', are scheduled to rise by 200–250 per cent over twenty years. Collective farmers' incomes will gain relatively to other incomes. There is in progress some levelling out of the highest rewards (not, we are warned, to be confused with egalitarianism) and a widespread upgrading of workers on to new wage scales. The ending of direct taxation by 1965 is promised. This concession is more apparent than real since indirect taxation is a far heavier burden.

Much play is made in the Programme with the projected expansion in communal services financed from social funds. These, it is said, will account for half the total volume of personal income by 1980. The figure is impressive, but Soviet welfare services are poor in comparison with many in the West although, according to Soviet sources, they already absorb between one-third and 40 per cent of personal income. The obverse of this expansion is the studied vagueness of the Programme concerning increases in the supply of industrial consumer goods. It is clear in any event that the Soviet Union does not yet seek to emulate the West in either the quantity or the variety of consumer goods. The mass ownership of cars, for example, has been specifically rejected. On the other hand, a high degree of electrification in the home is promised.

To the Soviet consumer, unaccustomed to the Western problem of choosing between a multiplicity of goods, the benefits of a well-organized network of 'free' mass-consumption services and amenities may seem attractive even if the provision of these reduces his own disposable income. He at the same time expects, and has been promised, a better choice of goods over the counter. The provision of a flat for each family, as promised for 1980, would in itself amount to a revolution for the perennially overcrowded population, still living at an average of more than three persons to a room in towns.

One aspect of the programme's emphasis on the expansion of communal services deserves mention. By varying the rate of expenditure on these services it will be possible for the authorities to vary the proportion of the national income going into consumption in the broadest sense without directly interfering with wage scales,

salaries, or prices. As the proportion of income going into the communal services rises with rising population, so will the authorities' scope for manœuvre in this way increase.

The greater leisure resulting from the introduction of a working day which, the Programme claims, will be the shortest as well as the most highly paid in the world, is greeted as an unmixed benefit, though it is hard to believe that the Soviet leadership does not perceive potential dangers in idleness. It seems that the objective of a thirty-four- to thirty-six-hour week by 1970 and an even shorter week subsequently is conceived primarily as something in which the Soviet Union can overtake the West quickly and at relatively small cost. The crucial question is whether productivity can rise at the planned rate. If it does not, the shorter working week is likely to be forgotten along with many other promises.

TRADE AND AID

The comparative lack of attention paid to foreign trade in the Programme and at the Congress reflects the ideal of self-sufficiency which has governed Russian economic planning since the Revolution. Foreign trade, because of its dependence on world prices and its implication that there exist common interests between all economic systems, is regarded only as a residual of Soviet planning. Thus the Programme confines itself to the vaguest of generalities concerning international trade. There is nothing to indicate an expansion of Soviet foreign trade much beyond its present low figure of under 3 per cent of the gross national product. It may possibly fall below this. It can be expected that Soviet trade will continue to be confined within the framework of bilateral government-to-government agreements.

Much more noteworthy is the Programme's soft-pedalling of the theme of economic aid. No concrete promises of assistance are made either to the non-aligned nations or to other countries of the Communist camp. In such a propagandist document the omission is remarkable. At the Congress Mr Khrushchev merely said that the Soviet Union would 'continue to help' less developed countries. It may be that the Soviet leaders are reluctant to mention figures for fear of being outbid by the West.

NEW FRONTIER?

In nothing is the theoretical barrenness of the Programme more depressing than in its refusal to grapple in specific terms with the

conditions of the 'transition to Communism' even though this is to occur during the lifetime of the present generation. For the next two decades the Programme reaffirms with brutal frankness Lenin's dictum that the building of Communism must rely on the principle of 'material interestedness'. Altruistic toil is for the future. As things are, managers must manage and workers obey. There is no suggestion of a softening of the regime towards anything that in the West would be recognized as industrial democracy. In the whole document one perfunctory paragraph is devoted to the trade unions, a just estimate of their actual importance in Soviet society. It is equally evident that there is no prospect of the State apparatus beginning to wither away before 1980.

Beyond that date the Programme gives no guidance except the statement that 'with the transition to a single, general Communist form of property and to a Communist system of distribution, the goods–money relationship will economically outlive itself and wither away.'[1] No speaker at the Congress was bold enough to enlarge on these opaque words. There was no guidance to be had from Marx or Lenin, nor, apparently, from Khrushchev. The people of the Soviet Union are left to contemplate a vista of twenty years during which living conditions will ease, the welfare activities of the State will be widely extended, and there will be no reversion to Stalinist methods of rule. Thereafter nothing is clear except the certainty of the present rulers that Communism will not mean anarchistic freedom for the individual.

R. M. P.

Recent Developments in the High Commission Territories

IN common with other British dependencies, the High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Swaziland, and the Bechuanaland Protectorate have made considerable constitutional progress in the last few years and it has been officially confirmed that the British Government wishes them to develop into self-governing political

[1] *Pravda*, 2 November 1961.

units, able to stand on their own feet both economically and politically.

Until recently the High Commission Territories were the responsibility of the Commonwealth Relations Office, and the U.K. High Commissioner in South Africa held the additional position of High Commissioner for these Territories. However, with South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth in May 1961, a new situation arose. To meet it, new arrangements were brought into effect and on 1 December 1961 the Colonial Office assumed the responsibility for the Territories. For the time being Sir John Maud, who is now Britain's Ambassador to the Republic of South Africa, will continue to fulfil the dual role of High Commissioner for the Territories.

This somewhat anomalous position reveals the serious problem with which the British Government is faced in these three Commonwealth outposts. On the one hand there is the wish and commitment to develop them as viable entities on a non-racial basis, in line with Commonwealth principles and policy—an objective which is, in any case, made difficult by the familiar circumstances prevailing in under-developed countries which have few resources of their own. On the other hand there is, in the case of the High Commission Territories, the additional complicating factor that these three Territories, in many aspects of their life, are almost wholly dependent upon South Africa. Geographically they are practically enclosed by the Republic: Basutoland has no other outside borders, while Bechuanaland's border with the Rhodesias is not of a nature to facilitate international communication. Probably the only effective international boundary is that of Swaziland and Mozambique. Until recently, the capital of the Bechuanaland Protectorate was actually inside the Cape Province at Mafeking.

Politically, development in the High Commission Territories has been distinct from the Republic of South Africa, and no question of incorporation arises today. Economically, however, they have been a virtual extension of South Africa. They share South Africa's currency system, make use of South Africa's communications, and have a customs union with South Africa in terms of which goods can move freely in and out of the Territories and the South African customs pay over to the Territories a proportion of the revenue they collect. An even stronger link has been the fact that South Africa has offered virtually the only source of employment for inhabitants of the Territories—particularly in the South African gold mines. It

has been estimated that on an average 150,000 Basutos are to be found in the Republic in gainful employment at any particular time. Workers from Bechuanaland and Swaziland also migrate to the Republic to seek work in considerable numbers.

The mineworkers are recruited as contract labour, but other work-seekers are likely to suffer disabilities in the Republic, where they are regarded as 'foreign natives'. The South African Prime Minister, Dr H. F. Verwoerd, was reported as saying at the National Party Congress recently that relations with the High Commission Territories would now have to be put on the basis of relations with a foreign State.[1]

Interference with this flow of labour would probably not be in the interests either of South Africa or of the High Commission Territories, and it will be convenient if some arrangement can be made between the British and South African Governments for its continuation. The same applies to the customs union. On the other hand, it is obviously necessary that the economies of the three Territories should be developed as rapidly as possible in order to keep pace with the constitutional development which has already begun to take place. Before considering plans for economic development, however, it may be useful to note briefly the main features of political development in the three Territories.

Basutoland, with a population of 641,674, of which approximately 2,000 are non-African, is politically the furthest advanced of the Territories. A new Constitution was introduced in 1960 which provides for a Legislative Council (the Basutoland National Council) composed of eighty members, one half of whom are elected from members of district councils. The district councillors are elected on a common role franchise. Seventy-six of the eighty members of the Legislative Council are African, and fourteen of the non-elected members are nominated by the Paramount Chief. Others sit *ex officio* as chiefs and four senior officials of the Administration are also members. There is also an Executive Council which consists of these four officials (including the Resident Commissioner) and four unofficial members of the Basutoland National Council. The Paramount Chief retains important executive functions; ultimate legislative authority is vested in the High Commissioner. Recently, the Basutoland National Council resolved to ask the High Commissioner to review the Constitution with a view to introducing a greater measure of self-government.

[1] *The Times*, 8 September 1961.

The Bechuanaland Protectorate has a population of 292,755, of which about 3,000 are non-African. Under a new Constitution introduced in 1961, elections for a Legislative Council were held in May. The Council has ten African and ten European elected members and one Asian member, in addition to nominated members and officials. Seretse Khama, former Chief of the Bamangwato, received the greatest number of votes in the voting for African seats. Two Africans, of whom Seretse Khama is one, also sit in the ten-member Executive Council. Elections to the Legislative Council are on a pyramidal system and direct elections have not yet been envisaged. The first meeting of the Legislative Council took place on 20 June 1961.

Swaziland, with a population of 264,300, of which approximately 10,000 are non-African, is at present the least advanced of the three Territories from a constitutional standpoint. The Resident Commissioner, who is responsible to the High Commissioner, is advised by a European Advisory Council of ten elected members, and the (African) Swaziland National Council. The Paramount Chief of the Swazi nation, Sobhuza II, has considerable authority and powers over his African people.

A new Constitution is now planned for Swaziland, and in November 1961 the appointment of Sir Charles Arden Clarke, former Governor-General of Ghana, as Constitutional Adviser was announced by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations. The Swaziland Progressive Party, which is a political party representing progressive African opinion in the Territory, asked Professor Denis Cowen, the South African constitutional lawyer who advised the Basutos on their Constitution, to draft proposals for submission on their behalf to the Constitutional Committee. It is understood that both Sir Charles and Professor Cowen have now completed their reports.

It was confirmed in the House of Commons on 23 November that it is the policy of the British Government that Swaziland shall move forward to a new Constitution on an entirely non-racial basis.[1] A number of racially discriminatory laws have been repealed by Proclamation, and further steps of this kind are being considered.

In the economic sphere, progress in the Territories has been rather uneven. A mission was appointed by the High Commissioner in mid-1959, in consultation with the International Bank for Recon-

[1] Hansard. Vol. 649, No. 18, cols. 1518–20.

struction and Development, to investigate possibilities of economic development. It was headed by Professor Chandler Morse of Cornell University and reported in July 1960,[1] advocating an acceleration and expansion of the existing development programme.

Of the three Territories, Swaziland is the best equipped with natural resources; Basutoland and Bechuanaland are chiefly pastoral economies. The export of cattle to South Africa is the mainstay of the Bechuanaland economy: the value of such exports in 1959 was £3½ million. The Morse Mission recommended water conservation schemes to overcome the serious lack of water in most parts of the Territory and also the development of the livestock industry. It stressed the need for the scientific application of new techniques in marketing, transport, etc., and for improved communications. Foot-and-mouth disease is a serious problem for Bechuanaland's cattle industry. A potential source of future revenue could be mineral deposits, and geological surveys are being conducted by several mining companies.

Basutoland exports wool and other primary products—again mainly to the Republic of South Africa. The value of its exports in 1959 was £1½ million. Soil conservation and better land use were recommended by the Morse Mission, as in the case of Bechuanaland, as well as improved communications and a programme of agricultural research. There has been a useful development of agricultural co-operative societies in Basutoland and the Morse Mission recommended that this movement should be encouraged.

Swaziland has a good climate and generally adequate rainfall. Afforestation is undertaken on a commercial basis by the Colonial Development Corporation (C.D.C.), and the Usutu Pulp Company, jointly owned by the C.D.C. and Courtaulds Limited, produces and exports unbleached pulp to markets in the United Kingdom. Swaziland also has important mineral deposits. Asbestos has been worked at the Havelock Mine for some years, and a project is now under way for the development of the considerable iron ore deposits at Ngwenya, some thirteen miles north-west of Mbabane, the capital. The Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company Limited has signed a contract with Japanese iron and steel companies for the sale of 12 million long tons of high-grade ore from Ngwenya over the next ten years. The value of this contract is in the region of £40 million, and the company is a joint project of the Anglo-American Corporation of South Africa and Guest, Keen and

[1] *Economic Survey Mission Report*, London, H.M.S.O., 1960.

Nettlefold Ltd. The C.D.C. is also to participate in the equity of the company.

The opening up of these iron-ore deposits has been made possible by the decision to build a new railway through Swaziland linking it with the Portuguese territory of Mozambique. An announcement from the Commonwealth Relations Office in September stated that the Portuguese Government had agreed to extend the existing railway from Goba to the Mozambique-Swaziland border, thus providing a through rail link to the port of Lourenço Marques. It is hoped that the line will be open for traffic in 1964. The major share of the necessary capital for the Swaziland portion of the railway—which is planned to run from Ngwenya south-east to Siphofaneni and then north-east to the Portuguese border—will be provided by the C.D.C. and the Anglo-American Corporation. The cost is estimated at £8 million. The railway is to be managed by a Swaziland Railway Board, to be established by proclamation.

In addition to timber and mining industry, there is considerable cultivation of such crops as cotton, rice, tobacco, and vegetables, often on a cash basis, and irrigation schemes are being put into effect. The new rail link and the development of industry which it will make possible should open up important new avenues of employment not only to Africans in Swaziland but possibly also to those from the other Territories, and the economic prospects for Swaziland would appear very bright.

From 1945 to 1961 the United Kingdom advanced nearly £10½ million to the High Commission Territories from Colonial Development and Welfare Funds. The Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations announced on 6 July that authority was being given to the High Commissioner to incur development expenditure up to £1·2 million in the period ending 31 March 1963, over and above that already authorized under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. This means that the High Commissioner will dispose of nearly £6 million from 1961 to March 1963 for existing and new schemes. The possibility of finance from international organizations, and particularly the International Development Association, is also being investigated.

All this economic progress is most welcome, but it is clear that much more will be needed, particularly in Basutoland and Bechuanaland, before the High Commission Territories can be said to have a fair chance of survival as independent units. In particular, educational facilities in all three Territories need to be rapidly im-

proved and expanded, and technical training schemes instituted—questions on which the Morse Mission was definite in its recommendations.

The crux of the problem, however, is the need to arrive at a satisfactory basis of co-existence with South Africa, with the Territories preserving their own independence and non-racial structure of society.

G. V. D.

De-Stalinization in the Italian Communist Party

A SORT of Council of Trent took place in the Headquarters of the Italian Communist Party in the second week of November. The Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party met to discuss the implications of taking Stalin out of the Communist shrine and erasing his name from cities, factories, farms, and streets, and removing his effigies and photographs from a thousand places, in Russia and in other countries.

A summary of the speeches made on this occasion was printed in twenty-seven columns of the Italian Communist daily, *Unità*, and the extracts here quoted are taken from that source. Other quotations are referred to their sources. Many articles and speeches, communiqués and press conferences, as well as TV debates followed, but the November meeting of the Central Committee remains the clearest evidence of the travail through which the largest Communist Party in Western Europe is now passing, and of the two or more trends now visible in its Central Committee for and against holding an extraordinary Congress to discuss the questions raised by the C.P.S.U.'s 22nd Congress in Moscow. Unlike the Council of Trent, this gathering seems never to have been quite sure about what positions were to be defended, or about exactly who the enemy now was. No figure half as interesting or vigorous as a Paolo Sarpi has yet emerged. That nineteenth Oecumenical Council of the Church sat on and off for eighteen years. This week-end explosion of the Italian Communist Party may be regarded as the first fireworks in a vast dump of ideological debris, which some

Italian Communists would like to bulldoze and others would prefer to cover up.

The men of the Central Committee are foundation members of the Italian Communist Party,[1] like Togliatti, Terracini, Scoccimarro, and Secchia; pre-war converts like Giorgio Amendola and Alicata, who joined the party in 1938 and 1940 respectively; and post-war converts from Fascism and from other political movements like Napolitano (1945) and other younger men. One member, Robotti, suffered imprisonment in Russia for 'deviation' under Stalin, and another (Vidali) was a figure in international Communism in Mexico, Spain, and, since 1944, in Trieste. Many of the Central Committee members have been in prison under Fascism, some for as long as seventeen years (Terracini and Scoccimarro), some for eleven years, like Secchia. Amendola was condemned to ten years' imprisonment, but like many other political prisoners of Fascism found freedom with the liberation of Italy in 1943, after serving four years.

We begin with the two speakers who have had long and personal experience of Soviet Communism. First, *Robotti*:

> Why then didn't we speak out, we who knew by experience what the situation really was? Because that was the task of the Soviet comrades... we couldn't join in the howls of the anti-Communists . . . but I would have you remember how socialism was built... 25,000 Communists were sent into the countryside to work among the peasants and only 10,000 returned alive. 'The barbarous violence' of the enemy, as Lenin defined it, demanded repressions which then became an illegal method inside the party, once success had turned their heads. . . On top of this came the ideological errors: theoretically, anti-Communism was held to increase in proportion to the increase in Communist successes; confession was regarded as proof, and this was elevated into a juridical principle.
>
> How should the accused behave? Many resisted and refused any confessions and were condemned on the basis of other people's confessions. Others said it was better to confess anything (*confessare qualsiasi cosa*) and go right ahead and involve as many people as possible so as to arouse public opinion and stir the party to insist on a revision of the preliminary investigations. It wasn't easy to discover the right behaviour...

Robotti said that the head of the factory where he worked in Russia and the workers welcomed him back warmly when he came out of prison.

[1] The Italian Communist Party was founded in Leghorn as a split-away group from the Italian Socialist Party on 21 January 1921, following upon the Second Congress of the Communist International in Moscow, at which the only Italian representative, G. M. Serrati, editor of the Socialist *Avanti*, had disagreed with Lenin about the evils of 'revisionism'.

About the future Robotti said: 'Let us not forget that alongside the guilt there was the heroism of those old cadres which Khrushchev brought to judgment at the Congress, who never faltered and kept their faith.' The Italian C.P. must engage now 'in a constant ideological education of the militant elements' and 'the new programme of the Soviet Communist Party is a formidable instrument in our hands to give a new urge to our struggle.'

Next, *Vidali*:

> The young in our [Trieste] assemblies, especially, are passionately looking for answers to the questions that arise... Certainly Stalin's responsibility was tremendous. But the origins of these grave errors and crimes are political: they lie in the false theory that the class struggle increases as socialism advances . . . probably, and desirably, the work of analysis will go on and go deeper, to the point where the famous trials will be re-examined.

Vidali agreed with the attacks on the Albanian leaders, but objected to the way they had been made: 'Let no one repeat the mistakes made in regard to Yugoslavia.' He added that he objected to the alteration in the name of Stalingrad. Concerning the future, he gave his 'full support to the development of the elaboration of an original and autonomous policy by the Italian Communist Party'.

We now come to the foundation members of the Italian Communist Party. *Palmiro Togliatti*, sixty-eight-year-old leader of the party, opened the meeting with a very long-winded speech (twenty-two columns all to himself in *Unità*, 11 November 1961). On the question of de-Stalinization, which he left to the very end, one might summarily say that he wanted both to eat his hat and wear it, at the same time freezing any too wild attempts by anyone else to perform the same feat. Politically he was in a topsy-turvy position, since twenty-five years of his life as a Communist leader had been spent in the closest association with Stalin in Russia itself, and later (after the second World War) in regular visits to Moscow. Two quotations must suffice to illustrate the necessity for eating the hat.

Speaking in the Italian Chamber of Deputies on 6 March 1953 on the death of Stalin, Togliatti said:

> The mind is overcome by anguish at the departure of the man who, more than all others, was venerated and loved, and by the loss of the Master, the comrade, the friend. Joseph Stalin was a giant in action. A whole century will be called by his name. . . Let us honour him as

Italians. . . The heritage which he leaves in doctrine and in political action, the traces which he has imprinted upon the minds and the hearts of men, are too deep ever to disappear.

Writing in *Pravda* on 14 March 1953, he said:

Stalin's work lives and triumphs. Those who just now are predicting a possible deviation from his teaching and his commandments in the subsidized columns of the imperialist press are stupid and miserable provocateurs.

At the November 1961 meeting of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party, he said:

In any case the political substance of the attacks on the so-called anti-party group is quite clear to us, and we share it without hesitation, especially as we too in former years have had to take our stand frankly against dried-up dogmatism and the fear of new things. . . The violations of legality and the crimes committed at the apex of the party, of the armed forces, and of the State under Stalin's responsibility constitute a terrible tragedy which hangs over the mind of old and new generations, and from which we are not yet free . . . I continue to find . . . the blaming of everything on the negative personal qualities of Stalin not altogether satisfactory. Anyway Lenin had discovered and denounced these already. Stalin was surrounded by other people, we now know, who collaborated with him in violating the law: and then how can one explain the way in which the party chose to ignore Lenin's warning which was given in one of its congresses?

In relation to the future, Togliatti said it was unwise to rename Stalingrad, as the name represented the turning-point in the last war for millions of comrades. He maintained that he had been among the first to explain to the Soviet comrades that today there could no longer be a leader state or a leader party, 'and this is now accepted by everyone'. He wanted closer links with the French Communist Party and explained how it had come about that Yugoslavia had been treated 'as an enemy'; friendly contacts there must also be developed. 'We are engaged in seeking contacts with the social democrats: it would be strange if during this process we were to give offence to the Yugoslav Communists.'

Scoccimarro said he would prefer not to speak 'because I would have too much to say . . . about the new way in which relations between Communist parties must now be developed and about the internal democracy of the party'. He was against any proposal to call an extraordinary Congress of the Italian C.P. and thought that the Central Committee had enough authority to decide on the immediate needs of the party.

Terracini, who was present in Moscow at the 22nd Congress, stated:

The 22nd Congress quite unexpectedly transformed the work as proposed in its programme on to a different plane, that of the problems of the anti-party group and the Albanian party. . . It is perplexing and worrying to note how the proportion was upset, and how these two problems turned the equilibrium of the congress. . . The question arises, even if it is not formulated, whether further denunciations will not be made, perhaps in the end involving comrade Khrushchev himself. Of course one must acknowledge that comrade Khrushchev was in fact in the governing group round Stalin and shared all the responsibility with him. But Khrushchev is also the comrade who, inside that group, saw the need to break it up by denouncing and refusing its odious heritage. He resolutely and courageously entered the risky and mortal struggle necessary to the carrying out of this deliberate intention to renew the system radically. . .

Terracini had no special suggestions to make about the future, only a warning to beware of letting the Albanian dispute or indeed the disputes of the 22nd Congress 'degenerate on to any plane that was not ideological or political'.

Secchia commented:

We can't just repeat what the Soviet comrades say, in our present situation. We have masses of young people and workers who don't know history and we can't just offer them a list of crimes as Communist history, without telling them what our party and the Soviet party and the U.S.S.R. were and are. . . The executions didn't just happen suddenly in 1934 or 1937 but were the fruit of previous conditions when holders of minority views were forbidden expression, were put into isolation, suspected, and finally expelled and imprisoned. . . Now it is necessary to re-create the alternation of governing groups in a normal and dialectic way.

He said the Italian Communist Party had always enjoyed 'internal democracy' and it was not just by chance that so many old founders of the party were still in the Central Committee. He made no special suggestions for the future.

Speculation about the future leader of a Communist party is always rife when the existing leader becomes elderly. In Italy, before the 22nd Congress of the Soviet Communist Party took place, there was said to be much enthusiasm gathering round Giorgio Amendola (son of the liberal Giovanni Amendola who died as a result of being beaten up by the Fascists), on the one hand, and round Alicata on the other. We therefore give extracts from the speeches of these two.

Amendola said:

The removal of Stalin's body and the renaming of Stalingrad may disturb us, but we must accept them as the expression of the will to destroy a myth which has weighed on the life of the Soviet Union. Millions of Soviet citizens want these changes... Then there must be the satisfaction of all those who personally suffered or whose relatives suffered unjustly, and who ask for justice now... Polycentrism has now become necessary. It won't weaken internationalism. . . We Italian Communists must take part in the discussion of every question and express our autonomous judgment on the policies of other parties, on the causes of their successes and of their failures. . . We in Italy were proud of the themes at our 8th Congress, but let us remember that they were really relegated to the background and dogmatic forces compelled us to discuss internal Italian questions... Now the whole of our party wants to take part in international discussions. Discussion with all the other Communist parties of Europe is of fundamental importance to us. We cannot accept the advertisement of dissent by another party any more, or to be faced with accomplished facts... Thus the 22nd Congress marks the end of a fictitious unanimity . . . even inside our party discussion must go on, even if it results every now and then in majority and minority views on certain problems.

Concerning the future, he said: 'We cannot advance much in Italy without a revival throughout the world of workers' movements.'

Alicata was not satisfied with the Soviet programme as outlined at the 22nd Congress, where it was concerned with 'general strategy'. By stating that there was only one road to socialism 'the national roads were again put in jeopardy'. There was no dividing line between the struggle for democracy and the struggle for socialism, the point was to study 'revolutionary development inside peaceful co-existence'. He did not mention the word Stalin. As to the future, the debate must go on and not deteriorate into ideological tussles.

The rejection of the Soviet Union or the Soviet C.P. as the 'guiding state' or the 'guiding party' was echoed by many speakers, as was the hint that it was now time for the Italian C.P. to take a prominent part in all European Communist party matters, and to work very closely with the French party.

Santarelli (like Alicata) said that Italian Communists thought of peaceful coexistence merely as tactics, whereas 'it is really the basis of a new revolutionary strategy.' 'We must aim at more mobile co-ordination in conformity with the present new situation which is polycentrism.'

Reichlin, who is the editor of the Rome edition of *Unità*, like all the younger speakers wanted a vigorous autonomous Italian Communist policy,

> an original contribution to a revolutionary strategy for the whole of Western capitalism, *dialectically linked with the struggles of the socialist* states and the under-developed countries. The capture of power in the West must develop by means of a new historical bloc, well articulated, a new system of political and social alliances. . . We can't just say what reforms we want: we must say how we will get them. Our programme of economic reforms must not simply be a means of attracting the masses into a political formation which will then be used for other aims: here and now we must modify Italian society.

Serri pursued this theme, as follows: 'We must explain the Italian way to socialism. Most important is the relation between the institutions of middle-class democracy which we intend to preserve, such as parliament and the parties, and the new forms of direct democracy.'

Trombadori (the young art critic) did not much like the Soviet programme either, and thought material gains and class relationships alone were insufficient. The whole cultural level was important, and 'the false notion of a purely pedagogical function of art in the U.S.S.R. is harmful to research, to experience, and to creation. . .'

Several speakers noted that 'the revolution in colonial countries is no longer in Communist hands', and one attributed this to the great delay in the arrival of 'polycentrism'.

The language of all the speakers was, as always, immensely tortuous and difficult, liberally dotted with old and new 'isms' and the desire to get everything well labelled and docketed into Marxist pigeon holes. Any Communist 'search for truth' is a tremendously tortuous procedure, on this very account. Nevertheless, compared with 1956, when Togliatti gave a very cautious interview to Moravia's monthly *Nuovi Argomenti* on Khrushchev's 'secret' report to the 20th Congress, this debate reveals a first attempt to assert a national Communist policy, and a bid for Italian Communist primacy and revolutionary strategy-making in Western Europe. Registered members of the Communist Party in Italy are said to number about 1,750,000, compared with 1,788,000 a year ago. Some older Communists are said to be passing over to Nenni's Socialist Party, but new young members are however still joining.

SYLVIA SPRIGGE

Efforts for Economic Co-operation in Asia and the Far East

The Experience of ECAFE[1]

THE demand for equality of opportunity with other peoples was an important element in the Asian nationalism which liberated vast numbers of subject peoples from colonial rule after the second World War. It is in this revolution of rising expectations, as it has been aptly called, that the real roots of economic co-operation in the ECAFE region are to be found.

During the war thoughtful persons, especially in China, North America, and Oceania, saw that the application to post-war Asia of the declared war aims of the Allies and the principles of the Atlantic Charter would call for new forms of international economic collaboration and regional organization.[2] It was, however, a burgeoning Asian political consciousness, as demonstrated, for example, at the Asian Relations Conference held at Delhi in March 1947, that provided the real impetus to regional organization. The idea of the Conference, Mr Nehru said, arose in many minds and in many countries of Asia because there was a 'widespread awareness that the time had come for us peoples of Asia to meet together, to hold together and to advance together'. As European domination receded so 'the walls that surround us fall down and we . . . meet as old friends long parted'.[3] On almost the same day that Mr Nehru spoke these words the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) passed the resolution setting up ECAFE.

The timing of the ECOSOC decision was largely dictated by the determination of the few Asian members[4] of the General Assembly in December 1946 to secure from the U.N. a tangible recognition that the economic problems of Asia were as important and urgent as those of Europe. European members and the United States

[1] The United Nations Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. Acknowledgment is due in this paper to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for permission to draw upon a larger study of ECAFE which the author has made under its auspices.

[2] See, e.g., the proceedings of the 8th Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held at Mont Tremblant, Quebec, in December 1942.

[3] Jawaharlal Nehru, *Independence and After: A Collection of the More Important Speeches from September 1946 to May 1949* (New York, John Day Co., 1950).

[4] Of the present Asian membership of ECAFE only Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, the Philippines, and Siam (Thailand) were members of the General Assembly in December 1946.

wanted an Economic Commission for Europe (E.C.E.) and did not encourage the idea of an ECAFE. The under-developed countries had a majority of votes in the General Assembly but did not control ECOSOC. An alliance between the Asians and Latin Americans was therefore formed to ensure that the General Assembly would instruct ECOSOC to create an ECAFE as well as an E.C.E.

The significance of the creation of ECAFE is not, however, explained by these political manœuvres in the General Assembly. It was clear from the Asian Relations Conference that, sooner or later, even without U.N. action, the Asian countries themselves would have set up their own regional organization.[1] The creation of ECAFE was the first important admission by the U.N. that the world includes Asia in its own right and not merely as a responsibility of a few colonial Powers. It was a tangible recognition of the political renaissance of Asia.

Only rather slowly and variably, however, did a sense of ECAFE's relevance to the economic problems of the region develop. In the first place ECAFE was not, at the outset, a predominantly Asian organization; only four of the ten founder members were Asian countries.[2] Consequently, a large part of its proceedings for the first few years was devoted to a political effort by its Asian members to make it more representative of Asian peoples and wishes. Only fully independent Asian countries that were members of U.N. could become members of the Commission with voting rights; Pakistan and Burma became full members without difficulty, so did New Zealand. The real struggle centred on the question of how countries still under colonial rule could participate in ECAFE's work. The solution adopted by the preponderant votes of the non-Asian members, the outside Powers, permitted colonial territories, on the initiative of the colonial Power, to be admitted as associate members without voting rights.[3] Under this formula, Cambodia, Ceylon, Hong Kong, Laos, the Malayan Union, and British North

[1] The Asian Relations Conference agreed to establish an Asian Relations Organization, with Mr Nehru as President of its Provisional Council, to organize a similar conference in China within two years. The Civil War in China prevented the convening of a second conference.

[2] The original members were Australia, China, France, India, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Siam (Thailand), the United Kingdom, the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R.

[3] Independent Asian countries not members of U.N. could apply for associate membership on their own initiative. Japan (1952), Korea (1949), and Nepal (1948) were admitted first as associate members. Deadlock between the West and the Soviet Union in the Security Council over the admission of new U.N. members prevented those countries and those that achieved complete independence from becoming full ECAFE members until 1954.

Borneo were admitted in 1947 and South Vietnam, not without some Asian misgivings, in 1949. Nevertheless, not until the Republic of Indonesia, after a long-drawn-out battle, became a full member in 1950 did the Asians have a voting majority in the Commission. The policy and attitude of the Western Powers towards ECAFE had given the Asians good grounds for thinking that any worth-while future for ECAFE depended upon this shift in the balance of voting power.

From the beginning, Asian countries set great store on using ECAFE to prise out of the Western Powers an Asian Recovery Programme similar to the Marshall Plan for Europe. The wording of the General Assembly's instructions to ECOSOC to create an ECAFE had understandably aroused their expectations.[1] Within two years of its creation, however, the United States had given them an uncompromising refusal. The Soviet Union was, in fact, the only outside Power to favour ECAFE elaborating an aid programme for Asia. It might be argued that Soviet membership gave the West sufficient reason for not channelling aid through ECAFE. But the West proposed no alternative channel. The Asians were advised instead to practise the virtues of a sound currency, expanding exports, and adequate incentives to private foreign investment. Not surprisingly, they became momentarily disillusioned about the value and purpose of ECAFE. In the process they lost, and have never recovered, the belief that more could be obtained from the West by acting together rather than singly. The overwhelmingly bilateral character of the aid subsequently given by the Western Powers, including that with a Colombo Plan label, underlined this lesson.

A further opportunity to use ECAFE as a channel for aid came with the inauguration of the U.N. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in 1949. It was not so much a question of giving ECAFE technical assistance funds to allocate among its Asian members. The distribution of these funds was a delicate political matter, best settled at U.N. Headquarters. But all the important administrative procedures and decisions regarding the programme were also centralized in New York. Despite the lip-service paid to using the experience and resources of the regional economic commissions, no significant tasks were given to them. The Western Powers, who donated the bulk of the funds, favoured a high degree

[1] General Assembly Resolution 46 (I) '. . . recommends that in order to give effective aid to countries devastated by war, the Economic and Social Council give prompt and favourable consideration to the establishment of . . . an Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East'.

of centralization, and so, in consequence, did a number of Asian countries.[1] Technical assistance was the first tangible benefit that the under-developed countries obtained from the U.N. The failure to give ECAFE any important role in the programme confirmed the view of the sceptics within Asian Governments that the Commission was a mere talking-shop and of little practical value. Another big opportunity had been missed of fostering an attachment to the idea of regional economic co-operation and of introducing an element of cohesion and common purpose at a time when the spread of the cold war to the region was threatening to produce new political divisions.

Economic co-operation through ECAFE, the Asians learned, would have to be an extended exercise in self-help. Even so, the Western Powers, notably Britain and the United States, continued to maintain a negative attitude towards proposals for extending its functions beyond those of collecting information and publishing studies. The Asians were particularly anxious for ECAFE to provide them with guidance on their industrial development plans. They tended to equate industrialization with heavy industry. The Western Powers, with a misconception of their own economic self-interests, were opposed to the development of heavy industry in Asia. They emphasized instead the importance of surveys, agriculture, cottage industries, trained manpower, trade promotion, domestic savings, and private foreign capital—the preconditions, in other words, of industrialization. The advice was not wrong-headed; it was merely unimaginative. Asian countries grew wise to the importance of these factors from their own experience. At the time, however, the Western position appeared to them to shut the door on their aspirations for industrial development. The Soviet Union, on the contrary, preached to them at length on the importance of developing heavy industry. Worse still, the Western Powers used their superior voting power and not the art of persuasion to gain endorsement for their views. Not everything proposed by the Executive Secretary, Dr Lokanathan, and the Asian members of ECAFE was wise, practical, or opportune; nor was ECAFE always the proper body to do what they wanted. It was also true that the economic map of the ECAFE region had only begun to be charted; much data had still to be assembled and analysed. Asian

[1] Largely on the insistence of the new African members, a strong wind is now blowing in favour of a substantial decentralization of U.N. technical assistance operations. As a result ECAFE will almost certainly be much more closely associated with the programme in the future.

countries did not properly know their own, let alone each other's, economic problems; they hardly knew each other. Nevertheless, they were clear that, if ECAFE was to be of practical use, it needed to create subsidiary bodies in which government representatives could pool their experiences and difficulties and formulate useful guidance on special problems of economic development. This was the way to bring greater realism into ECAFE's work. Yet only under the strongest pressure did the Western Powers agree to the creation in 1949 of an omnibus Committee on Industry and Trade and a Sub-Committee on Iron and Steel.

During the same year the important ECAFE Bureau on Flood Control was started and a programme of work mapped out in inland transport problems. The Asian members were becoming more realistic, confident, and assertive. They spoke out more against the domination of ECAFE by the Western Powers and of the 'cold war' atmosphere introduced into its proceedings by their constant political clashes with the Soviet Union. They identified ECAFE with Asian prestige: it was their body. Their growing impatience with the negative and highly political role of the outside Powers finally boiled over at the Lahore session of the Commission in 1951. On the Executive Secretary's initiative, and despite a show of opposition from Britain, the Commission agreed, in the form of a statement written into the record, that the outside Powers would abstain from using their votes to defeat an Asian majority on economic proposals that predominantly concerned the region. In determining whether such an Asian majority existed the views of the associate members would be included. The Lahore Agreement or Convention, as the statement was called, has never had to be invoked. It was the spirit of the Agreement that was important. Even so, formidable obstacles still lay in the path of any rapid development in the substance and scope of regional economic co-operation.

The ECAFE region itself was not an easy one to organize compared with Europe or Latin America. Stretching from Tokyo to Teheran, it is, in fact, an artificial creation of ECOSOC.[1] With large contrasts in levels of development and in the capacity of government administrations to make good use of ECAFE, it has not been easy to select problems and formulate guidance of practical relevance to most Asian countries. For long isolated from one another, their mutual economic ties are weak. Their traditional links have been with the developed countries who dominated their economies. The

[1] Afghanistan was admitted in 1954 and Iran in 1958.

international communications of the region were also adapted to this matrix of enforced bilateralism. This situation of mutual isolation could not be changed easily or rapidly. The task of ECAFE has been as much to bring about new economic relations as to organize existing ones more rationally.

Yet no sooner had Asian countries gained control of ECAFE than their political solidarity was eroded by the cold war. On issues such as the credentials of the Chinese representatives in ECAFE, the inclusion of mainland China within the scope of the Secretariat's economic research, and membership for North Korea and North Vietnam, the Asians became hopelessly divided. The creation of SEATO in 1954 hardened the lines of division. The voting pattern on many important economic proposals began to reflect with predictable regularity the opposed positions of the SEATO members and the politically non-aligned countries.

Despite these formidable obstacles the catalogue of useful things done through ECAFE steadily lengthened. In addition to setting up Committees on Industry and Natural Resources, Inland Transport, Trade, and the Lower Mekong Basin, with Sub-Committees on Iron and Steel, Mineral Resources Development, Electric Power, Railways, Highways and Waterways, and a Bureau of Flood Control and Water Resources Development, ECAFE has convened over the years an increasing number of working parties and seminars to deal with a wide range of special topics such as the mobilization of domestic capital; the financing of economic development; budget reclassification and management; economic development and planning; intra-regional trade and payments; small-scale and cottage industries; the management of public enterprises; the preparation of a regional geological map; hydrologic data; earthworks construction; highway safety; housing and building materials; community development; and agricultural finance, credit, and prices. Some of those activities have been pursued jointly with other U.N. bodies such as the F.A.O. and the I.L.O. Large regional conferences have been held on trade promotion; statistics; flood control and water resources development; mineral and petroleum resources; and pulp and paper. ECAFE has produced scores of reports and studies, made countless recommendations, and given much advice to many countries on a variety of problems.

It is worth noting that in all this activity ECAFE has no serious rival in Asia. At Bandung, for example, the general consensus of Asian opinion was in favour of making greater use of ECAFE.

Again, although the Manila Pact defined a basis of economic co-operation, no rival programme to that of ECAFE has been developed within SEATO. The Colombo Plan, which has acquired unusual prestige by not doing any planning, complements the work of ECAFE. How then should a balance sheet of regional economic co-operation through ECAFE be drawn?

First, as a result of the work of ECAFE we know a great deal more about the economic contours, problems, and potentialities of its region. The barely perceptible economic profile that existed in 1947 has been filled out immeasurably. More important, Asian countries know a great deal more about themselves and each other. Through a mounting number of meetings ECAFE has brought together, often for the first time, many kinds of experts to pool common experiences and formulate useful guidance. For a number of specialist groups it has acted as their own regional professional association. It has also been a means of giving young administrators, who may be future leaders, a greater breadth and maturity of outlook and more self-assurance, thereby helping to make them better committee men in their own national administrations. In these ways ECAFE has helped not only to deepen a sense of regional economic consciousness but also to temper the danger of chauvinism in Asian nationalism.

Secondly, ECAFE has performed the function of technical adviser by making available knowledge of more advanced techniques and encouraging their application. These have ranged from statistics and economic programming to single-line railway working, building low-cost roads, telecommunications, making iron without metallurgical coke, aerial surveying, the silting up of rivers, measuring hydro-power potential, and a host of other problems. Asian members emphasized increasingly the value of this technical work.

ECAFE has been more than a body of inquiry and advice; it was designed also to carry out practical tasks and there have been some significant examples of such co-operation. Asian countries have themselves completed and financed the production of the first regional geological map. Malaya and Thailand have made, and North Borneo and Indonesia are proposing to make, a joint survey of their border areas. In the field of international communications some encouraging progress can be reported about international highways. Much interest has been aroused by the work to create an integrated network of Asian highways stretching from Saigon and

Singapore to the Turkish border. To date the effort has been concentrated on agreeing on the route and defining acceptable technical specifications for the highways, bridges, road signs, and signals. There is no question of constructing a completely new highway but rather of raising the standard of designated roads within each country's own development plan up to the specifications required of an international highway. External finance will be required only for some missing links, especially in the border between Burma and East Pakistan.

An ECAFE Code of Recommended Customs Procedures has been drafted for countries to indicate whether they generally endorse it and which, if any, parts of it they cannot accept. It seeks to bring about by moral persuasion a more liberal treatment of traders and travellers whom customs authorities have tended in the past to harass unduly. In the broader field of mutual trade relations, ECAFE has organized regular annual trade-promotion talks. For some time the proposal to hold such talks aroused deep misgivings and suspicions among the Asian members of SEATO, who appear to have feared they might become a back-door entry for Communist China. Only by the exclusion of the outside Powers, and on the understanding that trade policy with Communist China would not be discussed, was agreement on them reached. Once again a purely Asian gathering has been provided with a forum to explore the problems and possibilities of improving the countries' mutual trade relations. The practical results, in the sense of increased trade, are harder to assess. It is not, in any case, easy for most Asian countries to build up quickly new trading connections and habits. Nevertheless, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Japan, the Philippines, South Vietnam, and Thailand have reported practical results in terms of trade and travel impediments lifted or reduced, contracts placed, and trade agreements concluded.

Work on geological mapping, international highways, and trade promotion marks real progress in the direction of encouraging mutual confidence among Asian countries by bringing those countries alone together on practical tasks. But undoubtedly the most important illustration of this effort and the one for which ECAFE has gained most fame is the Mekong Project.

In 1951 ECAFE decided to make a study of flood control problems on the Lower Mekong. Operations were suspended during the French war in Indo-China and on their resumption the investigation broadened into a study of the problems and possibilities of a

multi-purpose development of the river, to include its hydro-power and navigation potential, as well as flood control and irrigation. The American International Co-operation Administration (I.C.A.), however, sent a field team into the river basin before ECAFE. Indeed, the United States and U.N. Headquarters were strongly opposed to ECAFE organizing its own field team. In resisting these pressures Dr Lokanathan showed political courage and wisdom, for the American team, when it completed its report, was unable to bring together the four riparian countries, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and South Vietnam, to discuss the next steps. ECAFE, on the other hand, had built up a fund of trust and confidence in these countries which enabled it, on completion of its own field survey, to bring them together in a Committee for the Co-ordination of Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin. A largely technical operation was thus begun under ECAFE for essentially political reasons. In the process, and through the work of the Co-ordinating Committee, a unique method has been evolved for channelling bilateral aid in support of a multilateral operation.[1] By March 1961 this operation consisted of twenty-eight sub-projects, emanating from and financed by eleven different countries and ten different U.N. agencies, to the tune of over $9 million. The technical investigations necessary to the planning and construction of dams, barrages, locks, irrigation works, and other structures to exploit this mighty resource are well under way. The economic potentialities and implications of the project have been glimpsed and are beginning to be investigated in detail.

It still remains true, however, that the potentialities for regional co-operation through ECAFE have barely been exploited. Especially is this true in the fields of economic development, planning, and trade. On the one hand, economic progress and planning in the ECAFE region have been repeatedly frustrated by serious fluctuations in the volume and value of its exports of primary products. On the other hand, the domestic markets of ECAFE countries are not big enough to support the range of industries that would provide a greater diversification of their economies and more rapid economic growth. Even India has a rather small market economically. Regional co-operation offers a way out of this dilemma between dependence on the vicissitudes of world markets and the limitations of

[1] It is worth noting in this connection that, unlike the Indus Waters agreement, negotiated under the auspices of the World Bank, which provides for a separate sharing of the Indus waters by India and Pakistan, the Mekong Project postulates a joint exploitation of the river.

a narrowly nationalistic approach to economic development.[1] For reasons already mentioned Asian countries have been slow to seek this way out.

In the early years of ECAFE one or two Asian Governments saw the danger that all Asian countries might try to establish the same range of industries or expand too much the same industry. They saw, in other words, the desirability of promoting international specialization in the region's industrial development. The Secretariat pointed out that by comparing their projects, furnishing assistance to each other, and taking account of each other's advantages they could make more rapid progress both in using their own resources and in persuading foreign lenders that their projects will succeed.[2] The predominant end, however, was the other way, towards narrowly nationalist economic planning and a refusal to accept the notion that ECAFE had a role to play beyond disseminating information about these plans in its economic publications and advising countries on specific projects.

In 1955 Dr Lokanathan proposed a new programme of work on problems of regional economic co-operation. Amongst other things he suggested that some degree of co-ordination of development plans would be necessary to avoid a wasteful use of resources and difficulties in marketing. Rice and textile surpluses, and the problems that might arise in fertilizers or in engineering products if countries making similar plans intended to export part of the output of these new industries, were the dangers he had in mind. The Secretariat could first make a preliminary examination of the regional implications of national plans and place the findings before a body of government experts. In due course, at a Ministerial-level meeting, the plans might be co-ordinated and adjusted on a reciprocal basis. Most Asian countries, however, still thought the time not yet ripe for regional economic planning. Pakistan expressed the extreme view in saying that it was not for ECAFE to sit in judgment on national development plans. What emerged instead was a new Working Party on Economic Development and Planning, a somewhat academic body as it turned out, and a more extensive Secretariat research programme on the problems and techniques of economic planning.

Asian antipathy towards regional planning was also demon-

[1] Cf. David L. Gordon, 'Regional Approaches to Economic Development', a paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York, September 1960.

[2] *U.N. Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1949*, pp. 448–9.

strated forcibly at this time at another very different conference. On the initiative of Mr Stassen, the head of the Foreign Operations Administration, the United States President, in April 1955, included in his recommendations to Congress on the Mutual Security Programme for 1956 a proposal to set aside $200 million for the creation of a President's Fund for Asian Economic Development to promote regional economic co-operation. At the invitation of India, the Asian members of the Colombo Plan met at Simla in May 1955 to discuss how the Fund might be used. India made the mistake of not instructing her diplomatic representatives to sound out the Governments first before issuing invitations. The United States State Department failed to back Mr Stassen and by its silence left the impression that it was indifferent to the idea of regional economic co-operation. Burma was not interested in the proposal on any conditions and did not attend the conference. Neither did Ceylon, who did not see why India should interpose herself between Ceylon and the United States as regards American aid. Pakistan had no need to foster suspicions about the Indian initiative: they already existed. At the conference the majority of Asian countries were opposed to the setting up of any regional organization by strengthening, for example, the Secretariat of the Colombo Plan Bureau and to the interposing, in fact, of any new level between them and the source of aid. On the contrary, country programmes of technical and financial assistance should be strengthened. The notion that in matters of aid and trade the bargain to be struck had to be a bilateral one with a rich outside Power had become deep rooted in the ECAFE region.[1]

The narrowly nationalist approach of Asian countries to economic development has not been the only limiting trend in their future prospects for growth. The gap between their export earnings and the volume of imports needed to maintain a reasonable rate of economic growth is widening. Except for a few commodities such as oil, rubber, and minerals, the prospects for raising these earnings are bleak.[2] The severity of this deepening problem of foreign

[1] What, one wonders, would have been the outcome if a President's Fund for Asia, on a scale similar to President Kennedy's Alliance for Progress programme for Latin America, had been proposed a few years earlier and before the creation of SEATO? As it turned out, the I.C.A. had some difficulty in finding regional projects and in spending the Fund.

[2] 'On any reasonable assumption as to the desirable rate of growth of their national product, it appears . . . that hardly any country of the region can look forward to an economic development in which the growth of exports of primary products to the industrial countries plays the leading role.' *Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1959*, p. 96.

exchange shortage could, however, be eased by a further intensification of import substitution of producer and consumer goods. Such a policy would, in turn, be much facilitated by greater intra-regional trade and by preferential trading arrangements which promote a better international division of labour and permit economies of scale, thus keeping down cost differentials between regionally produced and imported goods. The trend in the ECAFE region since the war, however, has been towards economic and political fragmentation. As the Western countries organize their own common market and aid-donors club, the bargaining power of Asia must deteriorate still further; and not only against the developed countries. The Latin Americans have taken fundamental steps towards the ultimate creation of a common market for their own continent. The new African nations have decided to press for a common market for themselves.

There have been signs in recent years within ECAFE, especially at meetings of its Working Party on Economic Development and Planning, that government experts recognized what needed to be done to meet this situation and prospect. But it was not until the 1960 Commission session that Asian countries woke up in some alarm[1] and registered their mood of concern in a comprehensive resolution giving the Commission and its Secretariat a broad mandate to explore all possible forms of economic integration from specific joint projects to a common market. A conference of Asian Economic Planners which was held in Delhi from 26 September to 3 October 1961 accepted the necessity for ECAFE to study the regional implications of national development plans. In addition, the Executive Secretary has convened a group of experts to examine the feasibility of various forms and methods of economic integration.

Asian countries realize that the formation of something like a common market in the ECAFE region would be immensely difficult. Profound differences in their political alignments and levels of economic development, their heavy dependence on customs revenues, their need for convertible currency, the inadequacy of international communications, are among the more obvious problems. They recognize, in short, that the economic and political profile of Asia is very different from that of Western Europe or Latin America. They believe in a modest and empirical approach to the problem of how best to promote a greater measure of econo-

[1] Which the analysis of the problem contained in the ECAFE *Economic Survey* for 1959 undoubtedly helped to arouse.

mic integration of the region. That they are prepared to explore in a thoughtful, realistic manner a problem which only a few years ago they were not even willing for ECAFE to discuss, may be counted a significant advance in the spirit and scope of regional economic co-operation. Perhaps the new mood has been induced more by a defensive reaction to trade blocs being formed in other regions than by a positive enthusiasm for stronger mutual economic ties among themselves. But it is no bad thing if economic compulsions begin to soften the lines of political division.

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Notes of the Month

The Dispute over British Honduras

THE long-standing dispute between Britain and Guatemala over British Honduras may have entered a new phase: it was announced on 17 January that Guatemala had agreed to talks next April.

In the seventeenth century the swampy rivers of the Spanish Main along the Bay of Honduras—till then an unprofitable no-man's-land on the marshes of the Captaincies-General of Yucatán and Guatemala occupied only by native peoples—became a convenient retreat for English and other soldiers of fortune who cut and shipped logwood as an alternative to buccaneering. Tradition, unsupported by evidence, dates the first occupation at Belize back to 1638. Under Anglo-Spanish treaties of 1763, 1783, and 1786 the logwood cutters were permitted to occupy their 'Settlement' between the Rivers Belize and Hondo, extended southwards to the River Sibun by the 1786 treaty, exclusively for the purpose of cutting wood. Spanish sovereignty remained intact, and commissioners from Yucatán supervised the execution of the treaties.

The status of the Settlement in relation to Great Britain was anomalous, but from 1786 official Superintendents were appointed by the British Government. The last protest by Spain against infringements of the treaties occurred in 1816. Though the British Government continued to take the view that sovereignty *de jure* resided with Spain, it found it more and more necessary to exercise sovereignty *de facto*. Meanwhile the settlers, who were now cutting more mahogany than logwood, encroached farther and farther to the west and south, meeting with no Spanish opposition or even occupation, and were within fifteen miles of the present southern boundary by 1821.

In 1823 the short-lived confederation of the Central American States achieved independence; Guatemala was one of its successors. The new republic, invoking the *uti possidetis* principle, according to which Latin American States were entitled to all the territory comprised in the colonial administrative areas from which they originated, lost no time in asserting its rights over the Settlement. The *uti possidetis* principle is unknown to international law and the

British Government has always maintained that Latin American States only have a right to land actually occupied by them at the time of independence; from the first it was careful to avoid compromising the status of the Settlement in any of its dealings with Guatemala. In 1835 Great Britain asked Spain to make a formal cession of sovereignty, but received no reply.

In 1859 an Anglo-Guatemalan boundary Convention, unquestionably constituting recognition of a pre-existing frontier and a pre-existing sovereignty, was signed and ratified. As an inducement to Guatemala, however, the British plenipotentiary, on his own responsibility, added a seventh article to the Convention, providing for Anglo-Guatemalan co-operation in establishing road or river communication between Guatemala City and 'the fittest place on the Atlantic Coast, near the Settlement of Belize'.

In 1862, quite independently of the Convention, the Settlement of British Honduras was declared a Colony. Difficulties had already arisen over the fulfilment of the Convention. The only possible routes between Guatemala City and the Atlantic coast were likely to do more harm than good to British Honduras by diverting trade instead of bringing it. A route to Izabal on the Golfo Dulce was surveyed, but estimates of its cost were higher than had been foreseen; and conflicting interpretations of a verbal agreement between the British and Guatemalan negotiators as to how the expense should be shared led to protracted arguments, and to ever-increasing demands from Guatemala, and corresponding reluctance on the part of Great Britain to induce Parliament to vote £50,000 for a project of doubtful value to British interests. When Guatemala failed to ratify an Additional Convention of 1863, the British Government considered itself released from all obligations under Article 7. Diplomatic exchanges continued for some years—one abortive suggestion being the construction of a railway from Belize into the Guatemalan province of El Petén—but, after 1901, nothing was heard of the dispute for thirty years.

In 1933, however, Guatemala once more raised the question of the fulfilment of Article 7; and in 1939 she declared that the 1859 Convention was no longer valid, and that all the territory 'ceded' by it should be 'restored'. Since then this claim has several times been reasserted, most recently in the form that British Honduras should not be incorporated into Guatemala but autonomously associated with her. Attempts to gain support inside the Colony have not had much success, except that the anti-colonial People's United Party

was, for a time, attracted by the idea of association with Central America as a whole, and that some form of economic association with that region might still be preferred to federation with the West Indies.

Guatemala proposed recourse to arbitration, first in relation to the non-fulfilment of Article 7, and then, in 1940, in relation to the whole question of sovereignty. Britain proposed settlement through the Hague Court. Guatemala, however, in 1946, insisted on a settlement in equity (possibly through lack of confidence in her legal position). Since then neither party has renewed its declarations on the method of settlement it would accept.

The fact that British statesmen extricated themselves distinctly unhandsomely from the awkward position in which an ill-negotiated agreement had put them does not however affect the question of sovereignty over British Honduras. There is no foundation for the Guatemalan allegation that the 1859 Convention was really a treaty of territorial cession, disguised in order not to provoke American opposition. Nor has any British Government ever admitted any Guatemalan claim to have inherited sovereignty from Spain. On grounds of prior occupation, Guatemala has no claim at all; during the colonial period, in fact, Spanish sovereignty over the Settlement was exercised through the authorities not of Guatemala but of Yucatán.

The Bantustans: Needs for Development

IT is widely expected that the future development of South Africa's Bantu areas will be in the forefront of topics for consideration during the 1962 session of the Republic's Parliament. These so-called Bantustans comprise some 58,000 square miles reserved for African occupation and have a population of 3,600,000. In the past little was done to develop them either politically or economically, and they have remained largely backward peasant communities. The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act[1] gave statutory expression to the long-cherished Nationalist ideal of separate development of all races by providing for the gradual creation of Bantu national units.

Little has, however, been done to lend substance to these ideals. In the political sphere the Government may be finding itself in something of a quandary. Progress in setting up Bantu authorities with limited local autonomy within the existing tribal structure has

[1] See 'The Statutory Background of Apartheid', *The World Today*, May 1960.

been slow, but the example of recent political progress in the nearby High Commission Territories may well act as a spur to the granting of wider local powers, though it hardly seems likely that anything approaching substantial autonomy is being considered at the moment. White public opinion, hardened by events in the Congo, is becoming less inclined to favour anything which suggests the creation of autonomous African States within the Republic's borders. The continuance of the state of emergency in part of the Transkein territories and reports of African demands for complete self-government there suggest that politically, at least, the inhabitants themselves are far from being satisfied with the implementation of the Bantu authorities.

Whatever shape the political solution may take, it is generally agreed that the economic development of the areas is long overdue and that in their present state they constitute a serious obstacle to the economic progress of the country as a whole. The 1952 Tomlinson Commission set up by the Nationalist Government to report on 'a comprehensive scheme for the rehabilitation of the Native areas with a view to developing within them a social structure in keeping with the culture of the native' looked upon the development of the areas not only as a necessary prerequisite to the implementation of separate development but as essential for the very survival of the white man in South Africa. Nevertheless, in spite of these gloomy forebodings, the Government has so far shown little willingness to spend the £105 million which the Commission suggested would have to be invested in the areas over a ten-year period.

Meanwhile the economic situation is becoming more acute. With a mounting pressure of population and increasing demand for the available land, the traditional communal tribal structure is proving incapable of maintaining the inhabitants of the reserves at subsistence levels and the threat of starvation has consequently increased. To many Africans a solution was found in earlier years by migrating as family units to the urban areas or by squatting on the farms of nearby whites, but the weight of authority has gradually brought such movements to a virtual end and attempts are now being made, notably in the Cape, to return settled urban dwellers to the reserves. To the majority of Africans, however, the only way of warding off starvation is to rely on the earnings of adult males who migrate to the urban areas as workers either on the mines or in industry and commerce for periods of six months or longer. The migratory system, the evils of which are well known, has therefore become

essential to the maintenance of subsistence levels in the reserves.

The Tomlinson Commission recommended that about half the existing population, comprising about 300,000 families and totalling about 1,800,000 persons, should be removed from farming and other avenues of employment created for them. The Government intends to achieve this by establishing industrial projects in the reserves. The financing of such projects is, however, likely to be the main problem at the moment. The country is short of capital and overseas investment has virtually ceased. The Government is furthermore reluctant to allow 'white' capital or 'white' entrepreneurship to participate in these developments and for this reason created the Bantu Investment Corporation in 1959. This body is severely undercapitalized and without a substantial increase in its resources it is likely to be of little consequence. Purely African saving is largely non-existent, and any large-scale development will have to be met through increased taxation or from Government borrowing abroad—a thin prospect at the moment, though mention has been made of a possible approach to the International Bank.

Meanwhile non-agricultural villages designed to absorb the displaced agriculturalists are being set up in the reserves. There is little to suggest, however, that these are achieving more than the creation of new pockets of poverty whose inhabitants are without even the meagre livelihood of the subsistence plot. In one village investigated in the Ciskei, in December 1960, it was found that out of fifty-three families only one could be regarded as being comfortably off, while six were near starvation point and thirty-three were having difficulty in making ends meet.[1] At the same time the average monthly income in the area was around £5 19s. 6d., against an average monthly expenditure of £7 14s. 6d. The deficit was made up out of remittances from absent migrants or money accumulated from the compulsory sale of cattle upon entry to the non-agricultural villages where the holding of livestock is prohibited.

It remains to be seen whether the South African Government will, in present circumstances, be able to cope satisfactorily with the many development problems accumulating in the reserves. Piecemeal and often inadequate planning is the unavoidable result of the Government's determination to graft improvements upon outmoded tribal institutions and their unwillingness to allow greater flexibility in the economy as a whole.

[1] D. Hobart Houghton, 'Land Reform in the Bantu areas and its effect upon the urban labour market', *South African Journal of Economics*, September 1961.

Canada, Britain, and the Common Market

A Canadian View

FROM the reports reaching them from London, Canadians have recently been made aware that their country is less popular in Britain than it has been for a number of years. The reason for this cooling in the normally amicable relations between the United Kingdom and the senior Dominion is, of course, the British decision to apply for membership in the European Economic Community and Canada's reaction to that decision. Harsh words were spoken by the Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce, Mr George Hees, at the Commonwealth Economic Conference at Accra in September; Canada's High Commissioner in London is said to have deliberately shunned a briefing held in November to acquaint Commonwealth countries of developments between Britain and the Six; and there was the mysterious episode of the 'leak' of Mr Heath's speech, which caused Ottawa's Minister of Finance, Mr Donald Fleming, to wax indignant when according to British reports he had a copy of the statement in his pocket all along. In consequence, the London newspapers have composed some remarkably acrimonious editorials about Canada in general and the abovenamed members of the Canadian Cabinet in particular. As one of the milder critics observed in *The Sunday Times* (12 November 1961), 'No one wants to quarrel, but nobody seems able to keep on terms with the Canadian Government.'

British annoyance with the Canadian attitude has been the greater because Canada seems to be liable to less damage than most Commonwealth members should the United Kingdom decide to join the Common Market. Her exports to Britain represent no more than one-sixth of total Canadian foreign trade, compared with over one-half in the case of Nigeria or New Zealand and close to one-third in that of Australia, India, or Ceylon. Moreover, most of this trade is accounted for by six products, wheat, aluminium, lead, zinc, wood pulp, and newsprint paper, on the last five of which Mr Heath has noted the British Government's intention to press for the removal of the Community's common tariff. British authorities appear to feel that Canada is making an undue fuss about a relatively minor difficulty and their patience is obviously wearing thin.

Many Canadians are generally in sympathy with this feeling of

irritation. Their Government's approach to the possibility of British participation in the most exciting economic and political adventure of the post-war period has, they believe, been such as could only cause antagonism. Yet even this element of opinion is inclined to feel that the British are glossing over a number of real difficulties and showing little appreciation of the background to Ottawa's obstructive tactics. In this respect Whitehall has been abetted by the remarkable unanimity of view on the Common Market question that has recently come to prevail among nearly all sections of articulate opinion in Britain. This new solidarity has given rise to a tendency to echo the Government's comfortable assurances that Commonwealth interests can and will be safeguarded. Canadians would be happier with the position if they were not expected to remain quite so uncritically trustful of British good intentions, which they may suspect are highly subject to Mr Macmillan's need to gain admission to the Community at almost any cost.

Nevertheless, so far as the specific points of detail are concerned, it can be argued that Canada has exaggerated the probable effects of the proposed development on her trade. Sales of wheat, of which Britain takes one-third (and the Six another quarter) of Canada's total exports, may well be placed in jeopardy if the Community's agricultural policy should militate strongly in favour of European farmers at the expense of outside suppliers, but this eventuality cannot be anticipated until the policy is settled. In any case the special milling qualities of the hard Prairie grain should preserve its market to some extent—unless, that is, consumers can ultimately be coaxed into accepting a different type of loaf. The position is less hopeful for other farm products, such as barley, flax seed, soya bean oil cake and meal, and tobacco, all of which (unlike wheat) have enjoyed a substantial preference in the British market and in most cases will be subject to a tariff or levy in the Community, but which do not have any particular qualities to recommend them in preference to European-grown produce. However, all these latter commodities combined account for only 10 per cent of Canada's exports to the United Kingdom, or less than 2 per cent of total Canadian trade.

Of the metals and other minerals, which are another large item in Canada's exports to Britain, copper, nickel, iron ore, uranium, and asbestos will be unaffected by British adherence to the Community. All the metals named have entered the United Kingdom

CANADIAN EXPORT TRADE, 1960

($ million)

	All countries	United Kingdom	E.E.C.
TOTAL EXPORTS	5,264	915	436
Agricultural and Vegetable Products	831	269	140
Wheat and flour	472	158	109
Metals	1,828	370	183
Aluminium and products	269	80	53
Copper and products	223	71	27
Nickel and products	258	68	33
Iron and products	605	73	52
Asbestos	121	9	25
Forest Products	1,592	180	22
Newsprint	757	60	2
Wood pulp	325	32	13
Planks and boards	346	53	4
Chemicals and Allied Products	238	34	36

Source: Dominion Bureau of Statistics.

duty-free and without preference and the Common Market external tariff has also been set at zero. Asbestos is in the same position, except that Canadian shipments have enjoyed a 10 per cent preference over non-Commonwealth material, but since Canada produces about three-quarters of the total free world output of this commodity (and most of the remainder comes from Commonwealth countries in Africa) the loss of this advantage should not cause much difficulty.

The principal problems for Canada among the minerals lie in aluminium, lead, and zinc, each of which (except unalloyed aluminium) has had a preference in the British market but will face a tariff in the Community. The position is complicated by the existence of duty-free or low tariff quotas for certain of the Six which do not produce these metals; however, it seems fair to assume that such quotas would be withdrawn if production within the Community should be sufficiently expanded. The prospect that this may occur is not too great in the case of lead and zinc, but the possibilities for increased output of aluminium, not only in France but in such potential new members as Norway and Austria, and ultimately in the associated overseas territories of West and Central Africa, are a source of worry to Canada. Aluminium, like wheat, is a commodity which finds an unusually large proportion of its markets in Europe, one-third of total exports going to the United Kingdom and a further one-fifth to the Six. Thus the Canadian

industry is deeply concerned to obtain continued access to the Community for this product and endorses wholeheartedly the British Government's desire to have the Common Market tariff eliminated.

The outlook for wood pulp and newsprint is somewhat similar to that for aluminium. Both products, which have previously entered the British market duty-free, are to be subjected to a tariff in the Community—the former of 6 per cent, the latter of 7 per cent. And again there is a large potential for increased production in Europe, this time mainly in the Scandinavian countries, which are likely to become associated with the Community if Britain joins. Despite this prospect, and its anxiety to see the tariffs reduced, the Canadian pulp and paper industry has adopted a positive attitude to the development, apparently feeling that economic integration may help to boost European living standards and thus raise paper consumption towards the North American level. The idea of a market in Europe even approaching the $1,000 million annual purchases of Canadian pulp and paper by the United States (Europe's current intake is worth just over $100 million) is enough to create optimists throughout this, Canada's largest export industry.

On the remaining forest products the situation is mixed, ranging from a prospect of virtual elimination of sales to Britain of types of paper other than newsprint (which will lose handsome British preference and face stiff tariffs in the Community) to a more promising outlook for most lumber and timber items. Even on the latter some loss will undoubtedly occur if Norway and Sweden enter the Community, but this danger is at the moment less acute than in the case of pulp and paper owing to the generally low tariffs set on most of these products by the Common Market.

Finally, there is a wide variety of manufactured goods, from bulk chemicals to consumer durables. The high prices of most Canadian manufactures, resulting from a combination of the relatively small domestic market and a cost structure strongly influenced by the United States, has meant that Canada could export few finished goods, and many of the items in the manufactured category have in fact been only partly processed. For some of these, such as synthetic rubber, continued sales may very well be possible, despite the loss of preference in Britain. On the other hand, there has been a small but expanding market in the United Kingdom for more fully processed articles, often of 'American' styling, which sold only because the preference protected them from the competition of

non-Commonwealth countries. Exports of these products will for the most part be effectively curtailed in the event of British accession to the Community. However, annual sales of goods of this latter type are probably worth not much more than about $50 million—that is, 5 per cent of total Canadian shipments to the United Kingdom, or less than 1 per cent of Canada's global exports.

From this brief assessment, it would seem that Canada has indeed something to fear from the prospect of British membership in the Common Market. For some industries the damage may well be serious. But the analysis has taken no account of the benefits to Canadian industry of terminating the Canadian side of the British preference system, as must of course be expected; nor has it more than hinted at the (admittedly arguable) possibility that European integration may create as well as divert trade. Allowing for these factors, the potential losses do not appear to be such as would critically damage a mature industrial nation, and hardly seem to justify the commotion that occurred in Accra and London or the forecasts of dire emergency that have emanated from Ottawa. British and other observers may be forgiven for believing that Canadians are being either childishly intransigent or inordinately reactionary to create such disturbance in defence of the *status quo*.

But in truth the picture is by no means as simple as that. The real problem is that Canada is at present faced with economic difficulties of impressive dimensions, to which her traditional policies seem to offer no adequate solution. It is, in fact, probably no exaggeration to say that the country has reached a turning-point in its economic—and perhaps even political and cultural—affairs, and is searching desperately for a new formula that will enable it to regain its sense of direction and purpose. In these circumstances the machinations of Messrs Fleming and Hees should be seen more as the bewildered gropings of men who have lost their bearings than as an attempt to undermine Britain's ambitions for closer association with Europe.

In order to provide the necessary perspective to this situation, it is desirable to recall some of the basic facts of Canada's existence. As a consequence of historical events that are well enough known, Canada occupies a portion of North America which, for reasons of geography and climate, is able to sustain a population only one-tenth as great as that of the United States. In attempting to pursue an independent destiny on the doorstep of this huge, dynamic neighbour, the country has throughout its history been obliged to

fight against the economic and cultural forces that have tended always to drag it into the U.S. orbit. The results have varied from occasional instances of a foolishly bellicose anti-Americanism to fairly consistent attempts to offset the pull from the south by two principal means: one, the maintenance of close links with other parts of the world, notably through the Commonwealth connection; and the other, the development of Canadian institutions and enterprises, where necessary with Government support. A prominent example of the former is the British preference trading sytem, established by the Ottawa Agreements of 1932, while the latter is exemplified (along with the railway networks, the C.B.C., and Trans-Canada Air Lines) in the complex of manufacturing industries that have been built up under tariff protection over the past hundred years.

By and large, these arrangements have worked reasonably well, and Canada has evolved a stable and prosperous society with which the majority of her inhabitants have apparently been fairly well content. However, the edifice has rested throughout on a delicate balance. Every artificial device to turn trade away from its logical direction, or to foster a domestic industry that was not internationally competitive, has provided its political benefit at an appreciable economic cost. It is some measure of that cost that Canadian living standards are about 25 to 30 per cent below those in the United States. And while this cost may be generally acceptable as contributing to Canadian sovereignty, experience has shown that it cannot be allowed to rise too high without provoking large-scale desertion to the better wages and cheaper goods south of the border. Canadians are patriots, but even patriotism, it seems, has a price.

For some years now, it has recently become evident, the Canadian balancing act has been growing increasingly shaky. On the one hand, the attempt to maintain economic links with countries outside North America has proved less and less successful. The proportion of Canadian exports going to the United States amounted to approximately 60 per cent in the 1950s, compared with 40 per cent between the two World Wars and 30 per cent at the turn of the century, while imports from that country accounted for over 70 per cent of the total in the past decade as against 65 and 60 per cent respectively in the earlier periods. Moreover, the United States has provided a constantly rising share of Canada's investment capital and with that investment has acquired an ever larger measure of control of Canadian economic life.

On the other hand, many of Canada's manufacturing industries have been suffering since about 1956 from mounting difficulties, compounded of a slow-down in the rate of growth in demand, increasing foreign competition, and an embarrassing gap between capacity and output. Some of these problems derive simply and directly from the less vigorous pace of expansion in North America in the past few years. Others, at least until last June, could be traced to the high exchange value of the Canadian dollar,[1] which in turn resulted from the heavy inflow of United States capital into Canada. But there are also indications of more deep-seated troubles—of structural maladjustments that have complex origins based, perhaps, on the somewhat exaggerated view of Canadian prospects that obtained in the golden years of the late 1940s and early 1950s. Although no exact documentation of these excesses has been made, it is widely felt that the prevailing enthusiasm during that period caused some rather inappropriate capital investments to be made by Canadians and foreigners, and encouraged those who set tariffs to assist the establishment of industries that showed little long-term competitive strength.

Reflecting these problems, the level of real gross national product per head of population has not risen since 1956, unemployment has averaged between 6 and 7 per cent in the past four years, and, while immigration has slowed to a crawl, the rate of emigration to the United States (especially of skilled and professional workers) is again giving cause for alarm.

Seen in this context, the current misgivings about Britain's overtures to the Common Market are perhaps more easily understood. A reduction in the level of Canadian exports to Britain, if of relatively minor significance to the country's total trade position, would still further erode the policy of maintaining overseas markets as an offset to the economic influence of the United States. At the same time, the impending consolidation of the whole of Western Europe into a single trading bloc appears to herald an era in which the world's principal industrial Powers will be concentrated into very large units with potential markets running into hundreds of millions of people, an outlook that offers little promise to Canada's carefully nurtured, generally high-cost manufacturing industries oriented towards a population of 18 million. Looked at from either

[1] In the federal Budget of June 1961 the Government adopted a number of measures which have had the effect of reducing the value of the Canadian dollar from U.S.$ 1.02 (it had been as high as U.S.$ 1.05 in 1957 and 1959) to the current level of U.S.$ 0.96.

point of view, the prospect is of an acceleration in the collapse of the policy that has guided Canadian economic affairs over more than a century.

Faced with this predicament, the Government's first instinct has been to try to stop the rot. Leaving her real fears largely unvoiced, Canada has emphasized to the United Kingdom the importance of the Commonwealth as a bond between the uncommitted Afro-Asian countries and the West, and the folly of furthering the establishment of trade zones rather than throwing its weight behind the campaign for multilateral tariff liberalization. In private conversations Ottawa has even been so presumptuous, it is reported, as to warn London against overestimating the beneficial effects of economic integration. Yet, although some of these arguments may have been valid, there is no indication that they have altered Britain's determination to get into the Community if she can. The futility of its criticisms has been growing ever more apparent to the Canadian Government in recent months, and the evidence is increasing that it is now preparing painfully for the large-scale investigation of alternative policies that has become necessary.

These alternatives are few in number but massive in their implications. Some Canadians might include among them a retreat into economic isolation and protectionism, but such a policy is out of the question in a country that is so large an exporter (and thus highly vulnerable to retaliation by its foreign customers) and that must avoid, as has been noted, any deterioration in its living standards too far below those in the United States. The practical possibilities all seem to lie, therefore, along the lines of increasing Canada's industrial efficiency and competitiveness, so as to place manufacturing industry on a sounder basis, and of endeavouring to reach a new accommodation with the nation's trading partners.

The obvious—and fashionable—means of achieving both these objectives is for Canada herself to participate in some kind of economic alignment, a proposition that is being strenuously expounded in many quarters. There is a good deal of disagreement, however, on which bloc would be best, the politically attractive idea of an association with Europe involving many economic snags (apart from being apparently of little interest to Europeans), while the economically more logical course of integration with the United States seems hardly likely to be acceptable politically.

Although either of these lines of action may look much more feasible to Canadians in a few years' time, when they have really

begun to feel the effects of the rapid changes in their economic environment, it seems probable that some less straightforward solution will ultimately be found. In part, it may consist of using the removal of the preferences that Britain has enjoyed in Canada as a bargaining counter to obtain improved access to other markets. Or it may derive from enjoyment of a generally more liberal trading world as a result of the new initiative on the part of the United States Administration. Either way, these changed external relationships may be expected to have their complement in alterations in the structure of Canadian industry, which will probably conclude the process of adjustment as a more specialized and homogeneous entity than before, concentrating heavily on certain activities in which Canada has particular advantages and relying largely on imports of other items. In plotting this transformation, the attempt may well be to pattern the economy on that of such countries as Sweden or the Netherlands, rather than to create a small-scale version of the United States as has hitherto been the tendency. And if the reorientation is not to be too traumatic, more organized action to plan and co-ordinate developments in each sector, along the lines of the French design, may have to be taken.

Already there are signs that the national psychology is beginning to adapt to a changing world. It is being recognized that, although as yet small in absolute size, the most rapidly expanding of Canada's foreign markets in recent years have been the Six and Japan, while sales to the traditional markets, the United States and Britain, have grown disappointingly slowly. Industrialists who have never questioned the popular idea that Canada can compete internationally only in primary products (unless assisted by special tariff preferences) are finding that certain types of Canadian manufactured goods are the equal—in quality and price—of any in the world. The economic press, from the financial newspapers to the learned university quarterlies, is full of appraisals of Canada's opportunities in various international trading alignments. Even the prospect of economic planning, so long anathema to North American business men, is being discussed in Rotary Clubs and Chambers of Commerce, and scarcely a week passes without some captain of industry advocating an economic council or planning bureau.

This evidence of revolution in public and business thinking is matched by a number of systematic appraisals by the Government, official bodies, and independent research organizations. All of these projects are directed towards the isolation of factors crucial to a

reformulation of national economic policy, and most of them, significantly, stress long-term considerations rather than the problems of the next five to ten years.

If the attempt to shake off traditional attitudes in favour of a recognition of future developments should appear at all familiar to the British reader, this is perhaps not altogether surprising, for the United Kingdom has herself just concluded such an exercise. Indeed the parallels between the current Canadian reaction to Britain's intention to join the Common Market, and the British response to the formation of the Community in 1957, are really rather striking. Then, too, there was a belief that traditional markets were more important than the rising trade with new areas; again, political and emotional considerations tended to cloud the issue; and, interestingly enough, British tactics in the face of this challenge aroused just as much irritation among the Six as Canada's are now causing in Britain.

There, no doubt, the similarity ends. The solution to the Canadian dilemma is likely to be different from (and possibly less simple than) that of applying for membership in the European Economic Community. However, the comparison may make it easier for British observers—who not so long ago were shocked to hear their country's efforts to protect its interests branded in Europe as the double-dealing of 'perfidious Albion'—to appreciate a little better the crisis that has given rise to Canada's present curious behaviour. Seeing the problem in this light, they may feel inclined to temper their criticisms with some consideration of the way in which the current difficulties can be resolved to the mutual advantage of both Canada and Britain.

ROY A. MATTHEWS

Ecuador's Politics: President Velasco's Fourth Exit

IT is not due to any personal preference of the writer's that this article, just like a previous one on Ecuador,[1] deals largely with the same man. Dr José María Velasco Ibarra has in fact dominated the

[1] 'The Political Scene in Ecuador', in *The World Today*, March 1953.

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political scene in this small republic on the west coast of South America for over three decades. Four times elected or proclaimed President of Ecuador, he has only once been able to complete the constitutional four-year term. His fourth regime was brought to an abrupt end on 7 November 1961, after several weeks of unrest, in the course of which about a hundred people were killed or severely wounded. This time, Velasco had stayed in office only a little over fourteen months.

As usual, he went immediately into voluntary exile while announcing that he had not resigned. This left a door open for his return, to make good his frequently uttered boast that, with nothing but a balcony at his disposal, he would be re-elected again and again. His oratory is indeed his chief support for his popularity. Should Ecuador now abide by the Constitution, however, Dr Velasco could not present himself again as a candidate before 1968. He would then be seventy-six years of age, too old perhaps even for so durable a personality.

Velasco's recent fall came as a surprise even to many of his opponents. Over three-quarters of a million voters (out of a total population of about 4·3 million) had gone to the polls on 5 June 1960, and of these, 373,377—i.e. nearly half the total—voted for Dr Velasco Ibarra. His chief opponents were Liberal ex-President Galo Plaza, running on a combined list of progressive parties (175,000 votes) and Conservative Dr Gonzalo Cordero Crespo (172,655). The last of the candidates, Dr Antonio Parra Velasco, Rector of Guayaquil University, had been sponsored by left-wing groups. The fact that he obtained a mere 44,401 votes is indicative both of the numerical weakness of the Communists and of the preference of the radicals for Velasco, if only because his past history was a guarantee that he would create trouble.

Dr Velasco is that typical Latin American politician, the fiery orator who has no faith in old-established parties and finds it unnecessary to stick to principles or to any one side. In fact, his very power derives from his readiness to pick up ideas as he goes along, only remaining true to the aggressiveness so beloved by the masses in the under-developed countries where grievances abound.

One of Dr Velasco's long-time opponents, José María Plaza, brother of ex-President Galo Plaza, gave the following critical analysis of Dr Velasco's personality in a political weekly:[1]

[1] *La Calle*, 24 November 1961.

An intellect difficult to measure, since it always manifests itself through an evidently psychic abnormality . . . a rather superficial culture which, except in philosophical questions, is based on the last book read rather than on disciplined studies; a patriotism partaking of the enjoyment of power rather than leading to patriotic sacrifice; a total absence of political sagacity—of any knowledge of economics—of the gifts of an internationalist—of administrative capacity; a conception of austerity limited to personal honesty without any concern about maladministration or squandering: this is the man whom Dr Ponce Enríquez [Minister of the Interior during Dr Velasco's third regime and afterwards his successor as President of the Republic] compared to Simón Bolívar, the Liberator. Neither perversity nor Machiavellianism nor deliberate iniquity. Just a mediocrity moved by a reckless obsession with power. Here we have the myth unveiled.

Thus even the disdainful critic admits the existence of the myth. It could not be otherwise. How else could Dr Velasco's hold on the masses be explained? But the myth requires his physical presence, the constant din of his speeches, his accusing index finger. As soon as Dr Velasco is gone, people start forgetting about this man who lives by politics alone. The country returns quickly and not without a sigh of relief to normalcy every time he is removed from the scene, with only a few of his faithful followers endeavouring to keep his memory alive, mainly by adapting his aggressiveness for their own political policy.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF THE 'HAVE-NOTS'

The abrupt change of last November brought to an end a period begun in 1948 during which Ecuador had developed a pride in complying with a basic principle of democracy: the peaceful transfer of presidential power after free elections. Three Presidents in a row finished their normal four-year terms, including Dr Velasco. The latter's luck this time was due more to the national desire for tranquillity than to any change in Dr Velasco. Several times he was on the brink of being overthrown, but managed to regain his always precarious balance.

As soon as possible after handing over the insignia of office to Dr Camilo Ponce Enríquez, Velasco went abroad into his self-imposed exile (he finds the air of Ecuador unbreathable unless he is in power). One of the worst accusations he could raise against his successor was that Dr Ponce was maintaining 'a Franciscan peace', and Dr Velasco's election campaign in 1960 was designed to end this intolerable state of affairs. Whereas in the past he and his small group of intimate collaborators had addressed themselves to the

people in general, now the emphasis was on what they themselves called their 'beloved *chusma*', a term originally designating galley slaves and now more often applied to the *Lumpenproletariat*.

That the latter should suddenly come so much to the fore was entirely in agreement with the spirit of the times. Close to half the population is still illiterate. However, even the illiterate can shout at public meetings, take part in demonstrations and street fights, and even vote if the election officials are sufficiently condescending. The Constitution defines as a citizen any Ecuadorian man or woman above the age of eighteen who knows how to read and write. For all such men, voting is an obligatory civic duty, while the women may do as they please. But little control, if any, is exercised in compiling lists of voters, and generally the ability to write one's name is considered sufficient proof of literacy. Undoubtedly the atmosphere of violence prevailing during the 1960 elections weakened restrictions at the polls.

Yet up to the last moment nobody suspected the extent of Dr Velasco's majority. The middle class—small landowners, professionals, civil servants, members of the army—voted mainly for either Galo Plaza or the Conservative Cordero Crespo. This, of course, meant a dangerous division, all the more since the middle class in Ecuador, as in any under-developed country, is relatively small. In addition, rumours started by the Velasquistas that there would be armed clashes on Election Day caused many middle-class women to stay at home.

As if to revenge himself on those who had dared to oppose him or whom he suspected at least of not being entirely on his side, President Velasco initiated his regime on 1 September 1960 by putting on the retired list forty-eight top-ranking officers of the Armed Forces (more than seventy were similarly removed by him on taking over in 1952). The Civil Service Career Law, introduced under his predecessor after years of opposition, including that of Dr Velasco, was immediately torn to shreds. The *chusma* literally invaded the Presidential palace and Government offices, its spokesmen clamouring that only Velasquistas should hold office henceforth, whether in the Cabinet, as humble doorkeeper, or as policeman.

Chaos and corruption were the immediate results. With President Velasco insisting in almost daily hour-long speeches on his intention to 'moralize' the country (in 1952, he had offered to 'save' it), his great and small followers set about creating havoc.

So violent was the stampede towards jobs and positions that even Velasquistas were no longer safe. It was not unusual for a man to knock at the door while his predecessor was still waiting to be sworn in. Along with the heads of lesser people those of the Cabinet members began to roll. Altogether, in his fourteen months in office, Dr Velasco appointed two Ministers each of Defence, Foreign Affairs, Economics, and the Treasury, while all records were beaten as regards the Minister of Interior. Eight men in all held the proud title, which gave an average of less than two months to each.

THE ATTACK ON THE SUCRE

One of the most fateful changes was that of the General Manager of the Central Bank, effected at the outset of the regime: Dr Guillermo Pérez Chiriboga, who had held the position for sixteen years, tendered his resignation. Previous experience had taught him what to expect from President Velasco (who had bitterly complained on assuming office in 1952 that there was no point in having a healthy currency while the people were sick). Dr Pérez had gained an international and much envied reputation because of his extraordinary skill in defending the stability of the sucre, Ecuador's monetary unit. Ever since 1951, the official rate of exchange had been maintained at 15 sucres per U.S. dollar. As a result, the cost of living in Quito (1951 = 100) by the end of 1960 had risen only to 110·6 for the middle class and 108·6 for the working class, with figures less favourable for Guayaquil, Ecuador's principal port and commercial centre, reaching 114·1 there for the working class. Nevertheless, the overall increase was negligible in a continent where most of the countries were, or still are, beset by inflation.

With Dr Pérez out of the way, the road was free for the most reckless gamble with the currency which Ecuador had ever experienced. A series of contradictory measures finally led to what was to all intents and purposes a devaluation, with the new official rate fixed at 18 sucres per U.S. dollar and the free market rate soaring to over 22 sucres. By the end of the year, the average rate was 21.50, as against 17.50 before Dr Velasco had taken over in 1960. The worst of the matter was that the change had either purposely or incidentally benefited a small group of people, especially from Guayaquil, a group already identified by the Opposition as the oligarchy surrounding Velasco'. Millions of dollars were sent

abroad in a capital flight that reduced the nation's reserves to far below the danger point.

Contrary to Dr Velasco's campaign promises to better the fate of the masses and to make the rich pay taxes in proportion to their income, a series of emergency decrees issued by the executive introduced almost daily further indirect taxes and financial measures which created increasing unrest. Some were said to be indispensable in order to augment the pay of the army, police force, and teachers, others in order to balance the budget. Bewildered Chambers of Commerce, of Industries, and of Agriculture protested in vain.

Political parties, economists, and journalists who dared to point out the ruinous consequences became the targets of the President's scorn and anger. A political weekly published a list of over thirty of his favourite invectives, among which 'shameless traitors' was used almost daily. Organized and often paid gangs of the *chusma* were set in motion to break windows, explode primitive bombs, and generally to threaten representatives of the Opposition.

Things became worse after the annual session of Congress started on 10 August. Congress now occupies a large modern building the construction of which had been speeded up so that it might house the eleventh Inter-American Conference to which Ecuador was to have been host (this has been repeatedly postponed, and no final date has been fixed for it yet). It had been hoped that the elegant surroundings would lend special dignity to Congressional procedures. As it turned out, galleries open to the public were occupied by the same *chusma*, whose pro-Velasco ardour was increased by small amounts of money from secret funds, and by government employees, police force cadets, guards of the Alcohol Monopoly, and members of the Quito fire brigade, all depending for their jobs on the goodwill of their Velasquista superiors. The rain of insults and pebbles from the gallery, kept up for most of the ninety days of the session, was too much even for some of the Velasquista deputies. They formed the 'deliberating' wing and joined the Opposition. The rest of the Velasquistas remained 'obedient'.

During his ceaseless trips around Ecuador, to open schools, inaugurate bridges, and so on, President Velasco tried to pacify the growing unrest by the rather odd means of abusive speeches. The Opposition, which, he said, embraced every party from the extreme right to the extreme left, had no other purpose but to ruin the country, in a futile endeavour to prevent the Velasquistas from

governing for the next two centuries. As the months went by, the figure was gradually lowered to forty years, while the number of votes obtained by Velasco the previous year was arbitrarily augmented in the same speeches to 400,000.

FOR THE THIRD TIME UNLUCKY

The Communist-influenced Confederation of Ecuadorian Workers at first backed Velasco because of his pro-Fidel Castro foreign policy. But after a few months of enacting the role of one of Castro's greatest friends in Latin America, Dr Velasco effected one of his usual policy switches and, although still insisting on 'non-intervention' in Cuban affairs, now spoke hopefully of financial help from the U.S.A. Unfortunately for him, the U.S.A. did not respond to these overtures with the desired speed. The only immediate effect of Dr Velasco's changed mood was the displeasure of the Workers' Confederation (C.T.E.). Ably manœuvring, the C.T.E. leaders, assiduous visitors behind the Iron Curtain, now became the mouthpiece of the hard-pressed masses and, rallying even the Catholic labour unions and other middle-of-the-road people to their flag, threatened a general strike unless the emergency decrees and the devaluation of the sucre were torn up and revoked.

Finally, the C.T.E. called for a twenty-four-hour general standstill to take place on 4 October. There is no doubt that from then on Dr Velasco began to lose control of the country. The strike was only partly successful and might have passed off without further consequences had the President not called out the army and police. The display of armed force for several days without martial law provoked the population and led to serious incidents. Several provincial capitals accused the Government of having taken no positive measures to improve the rapidly worsening economic situation in their particular regions. Impulsively as ever, and regardless of warnings, the President insisted on visiting first one, then another of the provincial capitals, making his entry under the protection of submachine-guns. The people's stones were answered by bullets. When a protest march of high-school boys in Guayaquil left several teenagers dead, most of the country was ready to declare that it had had enough.

Obviously Quito, both as capital of Ecuador and as the seat of Congress, could no longer stay on one side. Vice-President Dr Carlos Julio Arosemena, whose office includes that of President of Congress, accused the Government of repeated violations of the

Constitution and declared Congress its guardian from then on. Dr Velasco interpreted this as an attempt by Dr Arosemena to take over the Presidency of the country and had him and several congressional leaders put in prison.

There followed two days of confusion. While one group of army officers tried to prevail on Dr Velasco to resign, another thought it best to declare the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, Dr Camilo Gallegos, interim-President until new elections could be held within ninety days. A third army group, backed by rapidly increasing numbers of civilians, among them the university students who had first adhered to Dr Gallegos, now rallied to Dr Arosemena, who was still in prison. If Dr Velasco's role was played out, his logical successor according to the Constitution could only be the Vice-President. (Thus a situation arose which was almost identical with that in Brazil a few months earlier.) In defence of the constitutional theory rose a battalion of army engineers quartered on the outskirts of Quito. They were attacked, in war style, by troops still loyal to the generals backing Dr Gallegos, and by the time truce was declared over a dozen soldiers lay dead or wounded.

Dr Arosemena had meanwhile re-established himself in Congress and begun to appoint his Cabinet. For almost a day Ecuador had three Presidents simultaneously. Then things began to sort themselves out. Dr Gallegos abdicated, Dr Velasco took refuge in the Mexican Embassy, and the generals ordered the tanks surrounding Congress to be withdrawn, partly in response to the arrival of jet fighter planes from the coast, where the air force had meanwhile declared Dr Arosemena to be the 'only constitutional President of Ecuador'.

THE NEW PRESIDENT

It is characteristic of our times that people have come to expect the worst. Thus the first reactions abroad and in democratic circles of Ecuador herself were highly unfavourable to Dr Arosemena: another Fidel Castro, it was said, to open the door to the Communists. The pessimism fed on the fact that, while still Vice-President, Dr Arosemena, together with several Congressmen, had visited countries behind the Iron Curtain. On his return, he had been enthusiastically received by the extreme Left, including the general secretary of the Workers' Confederation. Dr Arosemena responded to their homage by declaring at an open-air meeting immediately after his arrival that unless Dr Velasco got rid of the 'oligarchy'

surrounding him the Velasquistas, far from lasting forty years, would be out, and President Velasco himself would be unable to complete his constitutional four.

This was indeed a declaration of war, and President Velasco was understandably hurt. Dr Arosemena, an upper-class lawyer from Guayaquil who is only forty-two years old, owed his rapid ascent, from Deputy to President of the Lower Chamber and—for a brief period—Minister of Defence during Dr Velasco's third regime, to the latter's habit of raising young men almost overnight to important positions. Dropped from favour as quickly as most of his predecessors, Dr Arosemena remained nevertheless loyal to Velasco; he became one of his chief propagandists and subsequently his campaign manager and running mate in 1960.

Having shown himself previously as moody, proud, explosive, and unpredictable, the new President still keeps people guessing at where he stands. However, the Cabinet he appointed was a firm gesture towards national conciliation. It includes outstanding representatives of all the political parties except the extreme Left. Only two 'fellow-travellers' have so far been given important positions. Some assert that Dr Arosemena's ambition is to follow in the footsteps of his deceased father, a Liberal banker who also, by a curious coincidence, took over the Presidency from an abruptly departing Dr Velasco, in 1947. Arosemena Sr went down in history as fair-minded, tranquil, and progressive.

Yet, assuming Arosemena Jr to be a true democrat, will the Communists and their friends, who claim a large share in the recent change, permit him to keep a centre line? They have already staged a rally in Quito of some 12,000 landless, poverty-stricken Indian farmers, and another rally of equally poor mestizo farmers on the coast, to clamour for agrarian reform, ironically insisting that the land be given to those who till it. President Arosemena himself walked at the head of these processions and addressed both meetings in his customary brief style, promising them an agrarian reform law and a fair tax reform during his term of office. Significantly, he pointed out that Ecuador would not permit any outside interference and that, though a friend of the U.S.A., he was equally a friend of Soviet Russia. Was the cloven foot emerging, or was he merely attempting to pacify the Communist organizers of the rally? The basic question, needless to say, is how much longer Indians and mestizos will wait. It cannot be too difficult to get them marching again, the next time perhaps in a not so humble mood. And the

landless farmers are not the only ones who are beginning to clamour for better conditions.

ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REALITY

Ecuador, as far as economic development is concerned, still occupies a place near the bottom on the list of Latin American Republics. Its *per capita* income for 1960 was calculated at an equivalent of $166, far below the Latin American average. Since 1950, the *per capita* income has crept upward at an annual average of merely 1·7 per cent. Even these depressing figures give too favourable an impression because of the extremely uneven distribution of income. Thus hundreds of thousands if not over a million people, that is, the majority of Indians living in the Andean valleys and on the steep mountain-sides, only occasionally have a few sucres in cash to call their own.

Economic expansion is desperately slow. The increase of the gross national product from 1959 to 1960 has been estimated at 6 per cent, while the population increase over the same period was probably again, as in previous years, a little above 3 per cent, one of the highest in the world.

Considering these facts, it is not surprising that capital formation per inhabitant showed no substantial improvement over the 1950–60 decade. The latest annual report (1961) of the General Manager of the Central Bank explains: 'The structural faults from which the national economy is suffering—that is to say, the anachronistic land tenure system and labour relations in agriculture, the clumsiness of administrative mechanisms, the rigidity and other deficiencies of the tax system, together with the unfavourable trade relationship with industrialized countries, are factors which, among others, exercise considerable influence to prevent a more accelerated process of capital formation and economic development.'

Ecuador continues to rely almost exclusively on agricultural production for export. It is particularly unfortunate that only three products constitute the main proportion of export values. In 1960, bananas still represented 44·27 per cent (a slight drop from the previous year's all-time high of 45·75 per cent), coffee 21·39 per cent, and cacao (until early this century Ecuador's number one crop) 20·63 per cent, i.e. together over 86 per cent of total export values. Falling world market prices for coffee and cacao had to be compensated for by the export of increased quantities, with the income from these two sources always below that of 1954.

Over half of the economically active part of the population works on the land, but agriculture in 1960 contributed only 36 per cent to the gross national product. Even so, agriculture is still the outstanding provider. Industry in 1960 contributed barely 15·7 per cent, which, percentagewise, even means a small decline since 1950.

In these circumstances, the use of land and its distribution are of primary importance. The only available figures, those of the first Agricultural Census of 1954, compiled by the sampling method, indicate that almost 82 per cent of the agricultural production units had to be satisfied with a mere 14·4 per cent of the total available land, while at the other end of the scale a little over ½ per cent of the units were so large that they covered 54·4 per cent of the land. More than two-thirds of the units did not exceed twelve acres each. In a country suffering in the mountain areas from severe erosion, and in most parts of the coast from either drought or excess of rains, twelve acres are not sufficient to maintain a family.

Since the Government nationalized church property at the end of the last century, it has been the biggest landowner in Ecuador, holding at present seventy-seven haciendas all along the Andes, which altogether cover 328,000 acres. For some time now the argument has been that the agrarian reform could start by parcelling out these haciendas. However, from their income all kinds of hospitals and public welfare institutions are being maintained—the very institutions which benefit the poor. Moreover, much of the land in question, because of centuries of careless exploitation, produces little, and that only if cultivated by extensive methods. Distribution among small farmers for intensive use would mean only the perpetuation of their misery. Considerable investment for irrigation and other improvements, in addition to the education and agricultural training of the farmers, are prerequisites for success. Similar statements could be made about development of the still available virgin lands, but they also require extensive road construction since they are remote from civilization. Where is Ecuador to find the money for all this? Both President Velasco and President Arosemena have continued to insist that they inherited nothing but debts from their predecessors and, like so many others, turned hopefully to the U.S.A.

Special mention should be made of the *huasipungo* system, a remnant from feudal times. The Indian is granted the usufruct of a small plot of land on condition that he works at least four days a week for the landowner. His pay is supposed to be half the normal

wage of the 'free' farm labourer, but is generally arbitrarily fixed and only in exceptional cases paid in cash since the *huasipunguero* is always in debt to the landowner. He may also graze a fixed number of domestic animals on poor hacienda land, gather firewood, and water his animals at hacienda ditches. Everybody is now agreed upon the speedy abolition of this system, but not on how to do it without hurting the interests of one or the other side and creating more harm than good. However, the Government is obviously willing to cut the Gordian knot, if no other way remains, before the year is over.

As for the United States, the general climate is, of course, favourable for the granting of development aid to Latin America, especially since President Kennedy proclaimed the 'Alliance for Progress' policy. But they insist that the countries applying for such aid must contribute their share and fulfill certain other conditions. Obviously, Dr Velasco's action in first flirting with Castro and then permitting the dangerous interference with the sucre and large-scale corruption had the result that the U.S.A. lent a less willing ear to Ecuador than to countries of the Hemisphere which had shown a more co-operative spirit from every point of view. President Arosemena was quick to realize that special measures were necessary to overcome the initial distrust against him. One of his first steps was therefore to send ex-President Galo Plaza, highly respected in the United States, as his special envoy to Washington.

Still, many Velasco appointees have not been removed from important positions, among them several that involve the handling of large amounts of money. Though these gentlemen may well be most honorable, a certain amount of suspicion still clings to them. And, in any case, Washington demands very precise projects and plans, and even after getting them the wheels of its financial bureaucracy turn all too slowly.

Meanwhile, President Arosemena is expected to solve the country's innumerable problems, find work for hundreds of thousands now hanging about unemployed or under-employed in the cities, build houses for equally large numbers of families at present living in hovels, stamp out the close to 50 per cent illiteracy, ease the tax burden of the poor yet not encourage the rich to go on sending their money abroad—all this and much more, with a time bomb under his presidential chair.

It is indicative of the general confusion that the remaining Velasquistas are busily spreading rumours. They insist on the fact that

ex-President Velasco never formally resigned from office. The latest story is that Dr Velasco, once more in self-imposed exile in Argentina, will return to Ecuador on 1 April. One can only hope that the date was chosen for being 'All Fools' Day', but, as the saying goes: '*Quién sabe?*—Who knows?'

LILO LINKE

An Interview with some Hungarian Churchmen

EARLY in November, almost exactly five years after the Hungarian rising of 1956, a party of eighteen Italian journalists visited Hungary at the invitation of the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The programme arranged for them had not included any contact with Church officials, but at the journalists' request the Ministry organized a meeting between them and a number of leading ecclesiastics.

The report on this meeting, printed below, may be compared to a set of snapshots which cannot, of course, claim to present a comprehensive picture of the situation of the Roman Catholic Church in Hungary. Some of them are fairly sharp, a few are distorted or out of focus, and the main features are missing. The details—erratic but often revealing—should be viewed against the following background.

Two-thirds of Hungary's population are Roman Catholics. (The Greek Catholic community comprises 2½ per cent of the population.) The Church, under the militant leadership of the Primate, Cardinal Mindszenty, was from 1945 to 1948 a formidable factor in the resistance against the Communist scheme to transform a broadly based coalition system into a Communist dictatorship. The Cardinal's arrest, show trial, and imprisonment, however, crushed the political power of the Church, which ceased to play the role in Hungary's public life which it does to this day in Poland. The Cardinal's successors, notably the late Archbishop Groesz, Chairman of the Bench of Bishops, who died last October, concentrated their efforts on preserving freedom of worship and were compelled to sacrifice independence and administrative autonomy.

An agreement concluded on 30 August 1950 between the Bench of Bishops and the Government provided for State subsidies to the Church for eighteen years. Its estates having been nationalized, the Church thus became financially dependent on the State and was compelled to bargain periodically on the rate of the broadly defined 'decreasing scale' of the subsidies.

Under the agreement—not a formal Concordat—the Bench of Bishops promised co-operation with the regime under the auspices of 'peaceful co-existence' between Church and State, supported the 'Peace Movement' as well as the Five-Year Plan, and accepted guarantees for 'complete freedom of religion' under the Constitution of the People's Republic. Eight of the 2,797 Roman Catholic schools, nationalized in 1948, were restored to the Church.

The period between the agreement and the Revolution of 1956 was characterized by harsh measures of intimidation such as the trial and imprisonment of Archbishop Groesz within one year of his signing the agreement, by covert suppression of religious instruction (optional in the nationalized schools), by the dissolution of monastic orders, and by the predominant role of the National Peace Committee of Catholic Priests, the regime's fifth column within the clergy.

Cardinal Mindszenty, during his brief reappearance upon the scene in the autumn of 1956, liquidated the 'Peace Movement' of the collaborator-priests and relieved them of their ecclesiastical offices. But the open warfare between the Church and the new regime did not last long. The Kadar Government at an early stage of its consolidation—in May 1957—established a compromise with the Bench of Bishops on the same lines as had been reached by its predecessor in 1950. The Bench of Bishops once again 'recognized' the regime, declared their support for the 'Peace Movement', and, jointly with the National Peace Council and its new Catholic Committee, sponsored the creation of 'Opus Pacis', a synthesis of all Catholic elements including the 'Peace Priests' whose separate organization was dissolved.

Apart from the *modus vivendi* with the regime, symbolized by the amalgamation of the former organization of the collaborator-priests with a body promoted by the Bench of Bishops, the main feature of the present situation of the Church in Hungary is the system of ecclesiastical appointments, transfers, and dismissals. They require the previous approval of the Presidential Council of the People's Republic (in the case of minor posts that of the Minister of Cultural

Affairs). If the competent Church authority fails to make provisions within the statutory time limit, the State authorities 'will take the necessary measures to ensure the normal process of parish duties, Church administration, and the training of priests'. Investiture, for all intents and purposes, is the State's prerogative.

* * *

The meeting between the Italian journalists and the Hungarian ecclesiastics took place at the Theological Academy in Budapest, for centuries the fountainhead of Catholicism in Hungary. The Italian journalists represented all shades of political opinion: five from independent dailies (=*ind.*), one Communist (=*Com.*), two of the extreme Left (=*E.L.*), one Socialist (=*Soc.*), two Christian Democrats (=*C.D.*), two from Catholic Action (=*C.A.*), two from Italian Radio and Television, one from the Italian news agency Ansa, one Republican (=*Rep.*), and others from independent periodicals. They asked questions, and one of their number, Egisto Corradi, of the Milan *Corriere della Sera*, contrived to take down a virtually verbatim report, subsequently reproduced in his paper (*Corriere della Sera*, 5 November 1961).[1]

Monsignor Imre Potyondi, Rector of a seminary housed in the same building as the Theological Academy, presided and introduced the other Hungarian Catholics present: leaders of the Catholic movement, three representatives of the Catholic press, the vice-president of the Association of St Stephen, representatives of ecclesiastical administrative bodies, some teachers from the seminary, and some of the priests doing pastoral work among the faithful. They were Bela Görgény, Dean of the Faculty of Theology; Gyula Csontos, priest of Poloznok, on Lake Balaton; the episcopal vicar of Vac, Zoltàn Endrödi; the director of the episcopal office at Szeged, Kornel Pataki; Imre Timkó, a Greek Catholic, secretary of the Greek Catholic Bishop and a professor at the Academy; a priest of Budapest, György Vitány (Corradi adds that he believed he recognized the names of Vitány and Csontos as having figured in a list of 'Peace Priests'); the Papal Chamberlain Miklós Esty, vice-president of the Association of St Stephen; Balduin Pénzes, a Benedictine and a Catholic journalist; Bela Saad, editor of the review *Uj Ember*, first published in 1957; Vid Mihelics, editor of the review *Vigilia*; Monsignor Csepregi, head of the episcopal office in

[1] *Katolikus Szemle*, a prominent Catholic periodical published in Rome in the Hungarian language, printed an annotated report of the meeting in its issue No. 4, 1961.

Esztergom (Cardinal Mindszenty's bishopric); and László Semtey, Bursar of the seminary.[1]

Q. (*C.A.*): Can we have some particulars about vocations for the priesthood in Hungary today?

Potyondi: There are five regional seminaries in Hungary in addition to the one in Budapest, which is for the final stages of training. The total number of pupils at all six seminaries together is 352. Admission to the seminaries is free, and there is no restriction on numbers. The number of seminarists has fallen slightly by comparison with the pre-war period, but it is sufficient for our needs. From that point of view we are in a better position than the Western countries.

Endrödi: In our diocese of Vac about a score of young men used to enter the seminary each year before the war. This year there were nineteen entrants, last year seventeen. About three-quarters of the entrants are from peasant families and a quarter from workers' families; that is also true for Hungary as a whole.

Q. (*ind.*): What disturbances have there been in the life of the seminaries during the last fifteen years, and in particular after October 1956? Have there been expulsions or dismissals?

Potyondi: No expulsions. In 1957 some bishops asked for the recall to their own dioceses of certain pupils at the Budapest seminary, but they did not go. In 1958, before the elections, priests were given permission not to take part in election meetings. Then the bishops came to Budapest and talked to those who had refused to appear.

Q. (*ind.*): I don't quite understand.

Potyondi: Forty-two seminarists refused the Rector's invitation to take part in Communist meetings. A disciplinary measure was adopted against them, suspending them till September 1960. In that month, twenty-four of the forty-two presented themselves and continued their studies. The others resigned and left the seminary.

Q. (*C.D.*): How many priests are there in Hungary? (*From this point answers were given by various ecclesiastics and it was not always possible to note their names.*)

A.: Three thousand five hundred.

Q. (*C.A.*): The review *Informazione Cattolica* of June 1959 spoke of the arrest of Monsignor Miklós Dudás. What has happened to him?

A.: He spent a year in Switzerland for reasons of health. Then he returned. I am his secretary and am in constant touch with him. He is still a titular bishop. Unfortunately the Italian press has never published a rectification about this.

Q. (*Ansa*): How many of those here today have been in prison? Are there priests in prison? And if so, how many?

A.: None of us has been in prison. At present there is only one priest in prison from the diocese of Veszprem; he had been smuggling currency together with a Communist Party official. Altogether some eight or nine priests have been in prison.

[1] Not only Vitány and Csontos but also Endrödi, Csepregi, Semtey, and Potyondi himself are known as 'Peace Priests'.

Q. (*C.D.*): What are the present relations between the State and the Church?

A.: In 1951 the bishops signed an agreement with the Government, and relations today are based on that agreement. Yes, it's quite true that the Vatican has not ratified the agreement; but it is stated in it that the possibility of further agreements is not excluded.

Vitány: I believe that the agreement satisfies the needs of the faithful in the religious sphere.

Csontos: I am satisfied as far as my parish is concerned. In one of the two villages in my parish 83 per cent of the schoolchildren are enrolled for catechism, and 30 per cent in the other. (*But, says Corradi in parentheses, in a secondary school in Budapest only three out of 700 pupils are registered for catechism.*) Of the 1,100 Catholics in my parish, between 400 and 450 go to Mass, and every first Friday in the month I administer Communion to sixty or seventy people.

Q. (*ind.*, sarcastically): A very satisfactory picture. We ought to pray for the spread of Communism everywhere.

A.: We have given you honest answers. Just go on asking questions and we'll reply.

Q. (*ind.*): Did the Concordat[1] you mentioned envisage the atheistic propaganda that the Hungarian State is carrying on?

A.: We have three Catholic dailies, two weeklies, and a fortnightly. We hold debates with the Communist periodical *Vilagosság* (Light). At the same time we help in the building of socialism in Hungary. And besides, doesn't the Church encounter difficulties in the West? You only need to know something of Hungary's history to realize that here socialism is a necessity. We never had an industrial revolution; in 1938 we were still living under a feudal regime.

Q. (*ind.*): I asked if the principle of atheist propaganda was admitted in the Concordat.

A.: The agreement speaks of freedom of religion and gives the Church permission to propagate its own ideas.

Pataki: I preach every Sunday in Szeged cathedral. I have never encountered any difficulties because of having preached Catholic principles. In certain cases I have also spoken against materialistic ideas.

Q. (*C.A.*): The question of young people seems to me crucial. Either you let them be taught materialism or you teach them the Christian conception of life.

A.: We are a long way from affirming that the situation of Catholics here is ideal. But there are possibilities for Catholics, and it is our task to profit by them. We must distinguish between socialism as an economic way of life and as an activity of the Communist Party. We Catholics are convinced that the socialist way can be advantageous for the Church. We are against *latifundia* and feudal privileges. In Southern Italy, for example, there are situations which put the Church in a difficulty. The thing that grieves us is that it wasn't the Church that brought about economic socialism in Hungary. Here, unfortunately, we have had to put

[1] *i.e.* the agreement signed between the Bishops and the Government—see above, and also pp. 70 and 76.

up with the fact that the transformation has been carried out by a movement with atheistic aims. But we are trying to keep the Catholic spirit alive as best we can in existing conditions. Every Sunday ten or twelve thousand sermons are preached in Hungary. We trust in God and in the dialectical development of the human spirit.

Q. (C.D.): That is in contrast with the encyclical 'Mater et magistra' where it speaks of the irreconcilability of the Church and socialism. We all know that the Church of Rome prays for its brethren in the East. Do they think these prayers are superfluous, or do they think them necessary? (*At this Potyondi's lips quivered.*)

A.: We too pray for our brethren in the West. (*In a sarcastic tone*) You must not think that we do not understand your thoughts and difficulties. Some Western reviews have painted a not particularly comforting picture of what is happening in certain dioceses, such as Turin, in the matter of church attendance. I personally do not consider that the encyclicals contain infallible decisions, but merely general directives. (*The last questions and answers were given at the top of their voices. Not all the ecclesiastics seemed to agree with some of the answers given. Some of the priests appeared terribly embarrassed and at times grievously troubled. 'This is the truth,' whispered from time to time the head of the Faculty of Theology sitting opposite Corradi.*)

C.A. Journalist: Thank you for your prayers.

Vitány: We ask that you should write the truth. In an article on the death of Monsignor Groesz, the review *Témoignages Chrétiennes* completely falsified the facts. It is not true that there are only two bishops in Hungary and that the others are all either dead or in prison or living under surveillance. No bishop is in prison. We have five diocesan bishops; the others are vicars capitular not recognized by the Vatican. Then there are four Apostolic Administrators nominated by the Holy See and four auxiliary bishops. It is well that you should pray for us. But we ask you to write the truth.

Q. (*Com.*): In the West they publish false news about Hungary. I ask you, does that help religion in Hungary? I think it would be better if the Western press were to augur more favourable agreements between the State and the Church in Hungary.

A.: If our Italian colleagues write that the situation here is very unfavourable, passions will be aroused. You must bear in mind that Hungarian Catholics may suffer negative reactions in consequence.

Q. (*Com.*): Some of the questions asked have been typical of those who confuse the Church with the State. Are your difficulties greater than those of other countries governed by lay and not by clerical forces?

A.: Yes, they are. But we are trying to solve them. All the same, we have the feeling that the West is against us for political reasons. Instead, it should help us by understanding. I know certain Western countries well and I can say that we have tried, and are trying, to fit into this milieu here our conception of the world. We are convinced that this is our historical task, and we ask your help. Your help, and not your pity. (*Someone whispered: 'We do not like to be called "the Church of Silence".'*) We believe it will take two centuries before the world can emerge from

the present political crisis. Well, in that crisis our task is to struggle for peaceful coexistence, both without and within our borders. Marx's thesis is that religion must disappear. Our position is to wait and see. We are convinced that we shall win.

Vitány: It is very difficult for anyone in the West to understand our situation. It is not possible to make comparisons. The West is pursuing the traditional way, whereas here a new way is being followed. Our view is that Catholics should have faith and help us, but not with pity.

Q. (*Ansa, loudly*): Do you all of you recognize Cardinal Mindszenty as your head? (*Many went pale, others blushed scarlet.*)

Csepregi: I will speak, in my capacity as former master of ceremonies of Cardinal Mindszenty. Mindszenty has decided not to collaborate, given the present situation of the Church; and it is that decision which has been the cause of his personal tragedy. The bishops, on the other hand, have formed the opinion that the Church should find a place for itself in the present regime while at the same time Catholics continue to remain faithful to the apostolic Holy See. The bishops, in effect, have condemned only Mindszenty's opposition to the regime, and have expressed the opinion that a *modus vivendi* should be found. Or rather, a *modus existendi*. The Holy See has installed an Apostolic Administrator at the head of the archdiocese of Esztergom. It has installed him for the period while Mindszenty is impeded . . . (*i.e. from carrying out his normal duties*).

Q. (*ind.*): An Apostolic Administrator has only administrative functions. We should like to have a simple answer to the question, do you regard Cardinal Mindszenty as your spiritual head? We would like you to answer yes or no. That's all. (*Great embarrassment. Two priests put their fingers to their collars and looked round as if in search of help. Others consulted feverishly together.*)

Vitány: Legally we recognize him as our head. In practice, not.

Q. (*ind.*): How many of you have been in Rome since 1956? How many of you belong to the so-called 'Peace Priests' organization?

A.: Only one of us has been in Rome since 1956, and he went as a tourist. He was received by the Pope as a private person.

Potyondi: The term 'Peace Priests' does not exist here. Instead we have the *Opus Pacis*, which was instituted by the Hungarian bishops. There are five bishops on the central committee of *Opus Pacis*, which functions in every diocese under the chairmanship of the bishop. I, like the rest of us, belong to *Opus Pacis*.

Q. (*ind.*): Has any of you special duties within *Opus Pacis*?

Potyondi: No.

In ending the interview, *Potyondi* said: 'You have had a picture of the situation. We have our difficulties, but we hope that God will help us. . . In the future Catholics and socialists will find a meeting point. . . Socialism too will find that it is possible to build socialism on bases that are not only Marxist but also Catholic. These ideas must be diffused by the press and the radio. I give you my best wishes for your stay in Hungary.'

The above interview calls for some comment on points of detail.

An inaccuracy which is, no doubt, due to some misunderstanding concerns the date of the agreement between the Bench of Bishops and the Government, which was concluded in 1950, not in 1951 when Archbishop Groesz, who as Chairman of the Bench signed the agreement, was in prison. Oddly enough, the 1957 Declaration of the Bishops which revived the agreement does not seem to have been mentioned at the meeting. Nor was it mentioned, in connection with the six seminaries in the country, that since the war the regime had closed down another six. And the figures referring to the Catholic press in Hungary are even more inaccurate. There is no daily Catholic paper except for a news-sheet which is not published for the public at large, and there is only one weekly journal, *Uj Ember*, whose editor was present at the meeting and should know the situation. Vitány's statement that 'no bishop is in prison' is incomplete without a reference to the fact that three bishops, removed from their respective sees, are confined to forced residence. Another combination of half-truth and inaccuracy was in Potyondi's statement that the term 'Peace Priest' 'does not exist here'. The 'Peace Priests' movement, as an independent organization, was in fact merged into the *Opus Pacis*, but the term—a rather derogatory one—still exists in popular usage.

In contrast to inaccuracies of this kind, the remarks that 'at present there is only one priest in prison' and 'altogether some eight or nine priests have been in prison' are simply nonsensical untruths. Last summer wide publicity was given to the trial of eleven Catholics, eight of them priests, who were given prison sentences ranging from two and a half to twelve years. At the time of their arrests it was unofficially reported that some 1,200 suspects, 700 priests among them, had been rounded up. How many are still detained? 'It is difficult to know the truth,' the *Osservatore Romano* remarked at the time, 'but one thing is sure: the number is much higher than eight.'

The Italian journalists seem to have missed the mark when they failed to follow up Potyondi's explanation about disturbances in 1958 at the Budapest seminary. In the spring of 1959 there were several reports in the Catholic press—in both Rome and Hungary—about the temporary closure of the seminary and some seventy-three expulsions (or dismissals, recalls, or resignations) in connection with the students' refusal to attend political meetings. The facts were never accurately ascertained. Potyondi's present version, no matter how confusing, leaves no doubt about the essentials. It is

rather extraordinary that, after priests had been given permission not to take part in political meetings, the Rector of the seminary should 'invite' the student priests to attend such meetings and that he should adopt disciplinary measures against those who refused. Moreover, in July 1957, the Vatican forbade priests to take an active part in Hungary's political life and in March 1958 three priests were excommunicated for their disobedience.

Another example of casual remarks which, in their proper context, reflect the situation are those about vicars capitular 'not recognized by the Vatican'. How can they function without recognition by the Holy See unless the right of Investiture is exercised by the State? This highly important feature was also glossed over during the interview.

With regard to Cardinal Mindszenty's status Vitány's answer was quite correct when he said that 'legally we recognize him as our head, but not in practice.' The alleged embarrassment was out of place, for the Vatican, in 1959, did in fact appoint an Apostolic Administrator for the Diocese of Esztergom, thus recognizing, *de facto*, that the Cardinal was 'impeded'.

PAUL KATONA

The European University

A European Communities Project

'THE reasons which bring the European Communities to create a new University scarcely differ, basically, from those which—at least since the Reformation—have been at the origin of most universities: the promoters of a political movement seek a sort of apotheosis and a symbol in the foundation of an institution of culture and research; they hope thus for a sort of spiritual consolidation of their political achievements.'

These words are taken from a report presented by Herr Hugo Geiger, himself a university professor, to the European Parliamentary Assembly. Significantly, it was this most ardently 'European' of the institutions of the Community which took the initiative in calling for the creation of the European University, which is due to receive its first students in Florence in the autumn of 1962. The

idea had indeed been put forward by the Government of one of the Six countries during the Messina Conference in 1955, but although it was accepted it was not then considered of major importance. It was only after the Conference of Ministers of the Six in Venice in 1956 that the University came to be talked of as one of the most important means of furthering the 'relaunching' of the European idea. It was in a resolution passed unanimously on 14 May 1959 that the Assembly urged the founding by the Communities of a University which would provide 'tangible evidence of the desire of the Six countries to promote the European idea and the building of a united Europe'.

Various passages in the Geiger Report, which the Assembly adopted in July 1960, show clearly the role that the University should play, in the eyes of the 'Europeans', in contributing to European unification. Thus—

> the mere fact of its having been created by the Community will mean that the European University is fulfilling a political mission. It is a symbol of the desire of the peoples of the countries concerned to advance at the same time both on the front of economic and political integration, and on that of *rapprochement* in the field of thought. . . But the university will not only symbolise the regrouping of the moral force of Europe; it will contribute to it by its activity . . . it will help to bring the peoples of Europe, who have gradually lost the awareness of their historical role, back on to the road of Western unity.

On the other hand, Herr Geiger denied that the creation of the University by the Communities would signify any undue intrusion of political motives into the academic sphere. Quoting a remark of Karl Jaspers—'the notion of the university is a Western one; the universities as institutions are public establishments, and even if they were privately founded they are nevertheless the patrimony of the nation. The university is the expression of a people'—he concluded that throughout the history of Western Europe 'the universities were one of the main instruments enabling the new national and cultural units to blossom to the full.'

In less metaphysical terms, perhaps, the idea that the process of economic integration needed a corollory in the cultural field was undoubtedly at the root of the decision of the Councils of Ministers of the European Economic Community (E.E.C.) and Euratom, of 14 October 1959, setting up an Interim Committee for the European University and defining its mandate. That mandate, besides the creation of the University, also covered the granting of 'European' status to centres of research and higher learning, and the

establishment of equivalence of degrees and diplomas amongst the Six countries. The Councils' decision was based, rather shakily, on the terms of Article 9, para. ii of the Euratom Treaty, which reads:

> An institution at university level shall be set up; the particulars of its operation shall be settled by the Council acting by means of a qualified majority vote on a proposal from the Commission.

It was firmly maintained in some quarters that this clause referred only to the creation of an institute of atomic research at the European level; but others maintained equally firmly that what the authors of the Treaty had intended was indeed the foundation of a full university covering other faculties besides atomic research.

On a smaller scale, the University which the Councils had decided to found already had its forerunners. Most interesting of them is the College of Europe, set up in Bruges as the result of an initiative taken at the Hague Conference of 1948, from which the Council of Europe also sprang, and with very similar ideas underlying it as were now to be applied on the more restricted level but on a larger scale by the Six countries. Independent of any national university, the College of Europe receives each year some forty post-graduate students from all over Western Europe, who live together as a close-knit community; it provides them with specialized instruction on the historical background and economics of European integration and the working of the European institutions, and enables them to carry out research from the European angle in their own particular field of study. Another institution on somewhat similar lines exists in Turin, though without the community life which is a major aspect of the Bruges experiment. Several universities, among them Nancy and Strasbourg, have institutes of European studies attached to them, but subordinate to the university. All these various enterprises, and in particular that of the College of Europe, were useful as 'pilot schemes' for the new undertaking.

THE WORK OF THE INTERIM COMMITTEE

The Interim Committee set up by the Councils was composed of representatives of the member countries and the Community institutions, under the chairmanship of the President of the Euratom Commission, M. Hirsch. It took until May 1960 to prepare its report, overcoming in the process a series of major obstacles or disagreements. The work was mostly done by five working parties, the first dealing with the nature and structure of the proposed University itself, the second with legal problems, the third with ad-

ministration and finance, and the other two with institutes of hig learning and equivalence of diplomas respectively.

One major difficulty into which the first group ran arose from t fact that the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germar entrusts the Governments of the Länder with responsibility fo cultural affairs. These Governments maintained that it was not within the competence of the Federal Government to take part in the creation of the University; and the problem was only solved when the central Government formally declared itself competent on the ground that the decisions to be taken were of an organizational rather than a purely cultural nature. The strongest opposition to the idea of the University in academic circles also came from within Germany, where the university authorities maintained that it would detract from the prestige of the national universities and attract their best scholars and teachers. In general, however, the academic opponents of the scheme were won over.

Objections of a different kind came from the Dutch, who, playing their traditional role of holding open the door of the Communities, raised the question of the 'open' character of the University. They suggested that, rather than making the proposed European Council for Higher Learning and Research subject to the Council of Ministers of the Communities, it would be preferable to create a separate Council, of Ministers of Education, in which other countries could participate. This point was left undecided by the Interim Committee. The Dutch moreover backed their view by maintaining that on purely legal grounds Article 9 (ii) of the Euratom Treaty could not be taken as a basis for the University. The report of the Interim Committee was finally drawn up in May 1960 on the basis of the five working parties' conclusions. A series of texts was drafted for presentation to the Ministers, including a draft Statute for the University, and a decision was expected in June. It was assumed that the University would come into being in the autumn of 1961. Then, almost overnight, the whole project was called in question.

THE UNIVERSITY IN THE POLITICAL BALANCE

At the meeting of the E.E.C. and Euratom Councils on 20 June 1960, the French representative quite unexpectedly announced a complete reversal in his country's position: he stated that, instead of being set up by the Communities, the University should be established under a system of inter-governmental co-operation among the Six in the cultural field; the Communities should make no

financial contribution to it; and it should no longer even be called a university, but rather 'l'Institut européen d'études supérieures'.

The move was patently a political one: it was part of the general French policy, emerging at that time and since, of opposing any reinforcement of the existing 'supra-national' Communities and favouring instead inter-governmental co-operation—'l'Europe des patries'. It was this same policy which caused the French to oppose, or at least delay, such measures as the fusion of the European Executives, direct elections to the European Parliamentary Assembly, diplomatic representation for the Communities in third countries, and even the idea of having an official E.E.C. flag. For the moment the European University project—and cultural co-operation in general—was to become one element in the whole complex dispute about the forms of political co-operation or integration among the Six.

A second Council meeting in July failed to produce any concessions from the French side: the whole University plan was in suspense. In the meantime the Assembly held a full-scale debate, on the basis of the Geiger Report, quoted above. A number of precise criticisms of the Interim Committee's plans were put forward, and some definite recommendations were made, generally with a view to widening the scope of the University and ensuring that it would be a 'full University' not merely specializing in the study of the immediate problems of integration but dealing also with all branches of learning with a European rather than a national approach. But the Assembly at least approved the essential outlines of the project and unanimously expressed the hope that it would be carried out in the framework of the Communities.

Despite the lack of a definite decision and the consequent delay, which meant that the opening date must in any case be put off for a year, the Interim Committee continued its work on the practical problems arising over the establishment of the University. It was by now certain that it would be set up, if at all, in Florence, which was the sole official candidate for the honour and had the full backing of the Italian Government. The latter, indeed, offered to bear much of the cost of the material installations, and began negotiating for the purchase of a site. A contract for a site in the grounds of the Villa Tolomei was in fact signed in May 1961.

The Assembly too refused to be put off, and in October again passed a unanimous resolution calling for action. In May 1961 it sent a delegation to the then Chairman of the Council of Ministers

to present its views, and in June yet again called for the University to be created by the Communities.

Meanwhile the talks on political co-operation, on which everything depended, progressed slowly: the decision expected from the Heads of Government in Paris in February was not forthcoming. It was not until after their historic meeting at Bad Godesburg on 18 July 1961 that the Heads of State or Government issued not only a statement on political co-operation (since known as the Bonn Declaration) but also a statement that they had decided on—

the creation of a Council consisting of the Ministers of National Education, or responsible for cultural affairs, assisted by a committee of experts, and the negotiation of one or more conventions dealing with the following matters:
co-operation and exchanges between members of the Universities of the member countries of the European Communities;
the possibility of attributing to certain national university institutes or research institutes a 'European vocation';
the creation by Italy of a European University in Florence, to the intellectual life and the financing of which the six Governments will contribute;
the eventual creation of other European institutes devoted to university teaching or to scientific research.[1]

It was thus confirmed that the University would be created, though within a considerably different framework from that originally envisaged: its establishment was to be left to the Italian Government, with the assistance of the other E.E.C. countries, and no formal role at all was to be accorded to the Communities.

In September the Italian Government invited the other five Governments and the institutions of the Community to send representatives to a 'Committee for the organization of the European University'. At a first meeting, held in Florence on 11 and 12 October, this committee discussed the practical details involved in setting up the new institution: the construction of buildings and lodgings, a programme of investment, the budget for the first year, and the appointment of the professors. At the close of the meeting it was announced that sufficient progress had been made to ensure that the University could welcome its first students in October or November 1962.

Since then it seems that the committee has run into difficulties over the drafting of the actual Convention by which the University will be created: the Italian Government is believed to have thought

[1] *La Documentation Française* (Paris), 1 August 1961.

that the draft in preparation was 'insufficiently European'. However, such divergencies are now unlikely to prevent the opening in the coming autumn.

THE STRUCTURE AND CHARACTER OF THE UNIVERSITY IN FLORENCE

As far as the actual organization of the University is concerned, the plans drawn up by the Interim Committee may well be retained largely unchanged. To judge from those plans, the University will have the following characteristics, though nothing is yet definite.

It will be, in effect, a post-graduate institution, open to students who have completed three or four years of study at a national university. The course of studies will cover a two-year cycle, and students will be required to attend for at least one full year. The University will award its own doctorate, recognized in all the participating countries, upon successful presentation of an original thesis. It was originally planned that there should be 250 students in the first year, rising to 500 per year at the end of five years; but it now seems probable that there may be less than a hundred places available for the first year. The Interim Committee recommended that the member States should provide a certain number of scholarships. Not more than one-third of the students may be of any one nationality: a certain number of students from countries other than the founding countries will be admitted. The committee recommended that the University should be organized around a 'campus' and that professors and students should as far as possible live under the same roof.

As far as its academic programme is concerned, the University will be organized in 'departments', grouping subjects by their nature and methods, rather than in the traditional faculties. The departments to be set up during the first five years will be as follows (the committee includes certain suggestions, not intended to be binding upon the University authorities, about the subjects which might be covered):

(*a*) *Department of legal studies.* This will cover international law, European law, comparative law, the law of the overseas countries and territories.

(*b*) *Department of economic science.* This will cover mainly the following branches: the economic aspects of fuel and power, transport, and agriculture, agricultural policy, and the economies of countries in the process of development.

(*c*) *Department of social and political science.* This will provide teaching in

the following branches: labour sociology, collective psychology, human geography. As examples of subjects of study the committee mentions the demographic problems of Europe, migratory movements between member countries, social class and mobility in the member countries, etc.

(*d*) *Department of history and the development of civilizations.* Here the fields of study indicated are: history of Europe, history of art in Europe, history of science and technical progress, etc.

(*e*) *Department of pure and applied mathematics.*

(*f*) *Department of theoretical physics.*

This tentative programme clearly reflects the intention of the committee, set out in its report, that the European University should 'provide teaching which will gain from being presented in a European context'.

As to the professorial staff of the University, the report gives the following indications. The teaching personnel will consist of permanent professors, holding a chair and appointed for five years; other professors temporarily holding a chair; lecturers; and 'assistants'. A ratio of one professor or assistant to every ten students in each year is envisaged. Not more than a third of any one group are to be of one nationality, and a certain number of members of the professorial staff are to be from countries outside the Community.

Lastly, from the administrative and organizational point of view, there is to be a Rector, appointed for a three-year period by the Council of Ministers; an Administrative Board, consisting of the Rector, an administrator, and nine other members, three of them professors; and a College of Professors.

This brief outline of the main features of the future University calls for two comments. First, it is not excluded that certain points in it may be amended in the course of the work now in progress on the elaboration of the Convention on the creation of the University. Secondly, some at least of the more fundamental criticisms made by the Assembly are worth recording, because they reflect a different overall view of the University's role. In particular, the Assembly maintained that the University must not limit itself purely to the study of 'European questions'; that students who have not completed their studies at their national universities should be admitted; that in order to guarantee to the University the maximum degree of autonomy and complete liberty in teaching and research, a large proportion of the professorial staff should be appointed life-members of the teaching body; and that the Rector should be freely elected by the professorial staff, the Council of Ministers being

empowered to refuse to endorse this choice only in exceptional circumstances and after giving its reasons. The Geiger Report moreover puts far more emphasis than does the Interim Committee on the admission of both students and professors from countries other than those of the Community.

The most fundamental question about the University is clearly how far it will resemble a post-graduate school for the specialized study of the host of new subjects and problems arising out of the process of European integration, and how far, on the other hand, it will be a true university, universal in the subjects of teaching and research and in its attitude to students from all parts of the world. It is a question which will be resolved in part by those who plan its detailed programme and structure, but to an even greater extent by the attitude and aspirations of the first Rector and his colleagues, and by the first students. The experience of the next five years will provide the answer.

One other possible development should perhaps be mentioned. The new formula, according to which the University is to be created by the Government of one of the member States, leaves open the possibility, theoretically at least, that another member State might follow the Italian example. Should the University in Florence in fact prove successful, it may well attract in relatively large numbers students anxious to complete their studies at national universities by spending one or two years in this new and stimulating atmosphere; if successful, too, it will inevitably attract considerable numbers of students from all over the world who would see in it a unique Mecca for their intellectual pilgrimage to Europe. However rapidly it might grow—and its rate of expansion must inevitably be limited in the early years—the University would then prove too small. In those circumstances another Government, that of Belgium, for example, might undertake to found a second European University: it might perhaps choose to create it around the already existing nucleus of the College of Europe, in Bruges, which would form a suitably placed centre for a northern counterpart to Florence, particularly should the Scandinavian countries as well as Britain and Ireland join in its creation.

In the report of the Interim Committee the University was specifically defined as forming merely one part of a whole complex plan for increased cultural and scientific co-operation, under a European Council for Higher Learning and Research. The other aspects of the plan covered the granting to research institutes of the

title of 'European Institute' (on condition that at least one-third of their intake consisted of foreign research workers), the harmonization of university curricula, equivalence of national degrees and diplomas, and steps to encourage the exchange of students, in particular by the creation of a 'European university card' and the publication of a European students' guide giving full details of the possibilities of studying abroad. All these measures are also likely to be covered by the conventions now being worked out in accordance with the Bad Godesburg declaration, and may be approved at the next meeting of the Heads of State and Government. In view of the growing interest amongst students in the possibilities of spending at least a year of their studies abroad, these proposals, though limited for the moment to the Six, may have far-reaching effects.

THE UNIVERSITY AND EUROPEAN CULTURAL CO-OPERATION IN THE WIDER FRAMEWORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

We have seen how, during the work on the University scheme, the Dutch expressed their concern about keeping the University open to other countries beyond the Communities. Similar concern was being expressed, at about the same time, by representatives of the other countries in the Council of Europe. The latter, with the fullest membership of any of the Western European organizations, seems the natural framework for cultural co-operation, and it has indeed been extremely active in that field since its inception in 1949, with a large number of unspectacular but valuable achievements to its credit in the way of conventions on cultural co-operation and the promotion of exchanges of all kinds.

It was not surprising therefore that in April 1960, after a debate in which considerable apprehension was expressed about the danger that the economic split between the Six and the Seven might spread to the cultural field, the Consultative Assembly should adopt a resolution recommending to the Committee of Ministers, first, that representations should be made to the Governments of the Six to ensure that the projects under consideration in the Interim Committee should not lead to a cultural split, and secondly, that representations should be made urging the Governments of the other Council of Europe countries themselves to ensure that they should be associated from the start with the implementation of the plans for a European University.

During the last year, whilst the University project was hanging fire, the activity of the Council of Europe in the cultural field has

received a new impetus. This was partly due to the decision to transfer to the Council the cultural activities of Western European Union, a decision which led indirectly to a meeting of the Ministers of Education of the Council of Europe countries in April 1961 in Hamburg. There it was decided to streamline the multiple committees and other bodies in the cultural sphere under a Council for Cultural Co-operation. This new body, which has the active backing, it seems, of the member Governments, was to be called into being at a meeting of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in Paris on 16 December, and to hold its first session on 10–13 January 1962. It will be a permanent body of highly placed national civil servants with responsibilities in the educational sphere. Under it will be three committees dealing with different aspects of co-operation; and it will have at its disposal the considerably enlarged cultural budget voted by the Committee of Ministers in December 1960 (N.F.1 million as against N.F.400,000 previously), which it will probably use with greatest effect in 'pump-priming' grants towards projects and activities of all kinds.

In view of this new departure the Consultative Assembly at its session in September 1961 took an even more definite stand than before about the University project. It called on the Committee of Ministers to take steps to ensure that the Council for Cultural Co-operation should be the sole body responsible for cultural co-operation amongst member countries, and in particular to make representations to the Governments of the Six to create the European University and carry out the other schemes foreshadowed in the Bad Godesberg declaration under the auspices of the Council for Cultural Co-operation.

Although the Ministers of Education of the Six countries have of course supported the new activities of the Council of Europe, it seems practically certain that the Six will go ahead with their own plans, for these, as we have seen, fall within the framework of their aspirations towards political unity. In this as in other fields the Six, having taken the initiative, prefer to forge ahead rather than to attempt the arduous process—which has proved so fruitless in the past—of carrying the others with them. The other member countries of the Council of Europe (as distinct from the tiny group of distinctly European-minded M.P.s who 'represent' them in the Consultative Assembly) have indeed shown remarkably little interest in joining the Six in setting up the European University (the sole exception being Denmark, who was reported in August 1960 to be

thinking of applying formally to take part in its creation). However, it may be assumed that once satisfactory arrangements have been reached by which the member countries of the Council of Europe can become either full members or associates of the Common Market, the problem of cultural co-operation in general will rapidly find its solution, whilst it is inconceivable that the Six should then object to enlarging the basis of the University.

In all this Britain, and the British universities, hitherto aloof and apparently uninterested, should have an important role to play and an important contribution to make.

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Notes of the Month

'Opening to the Left' in Italy

On 10 February the outgoing Italian Prime Minister, Signor Amintore Fanfani, was invited by the President of the Republic to form a new Government, and, though this was not explicitly stated, there could be no doubt, after the build-up of the preceding weeks, that this meant a centre-left coalition consisting of Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans, with the external parliamentary support of Signor Nenni's Socialist Party. Whether or not he succeeds, the fact remains that the long-debated idea of the 'apertura a sinistra'—of effecting a *rapprochement* between the Christian-Democrat-based Government and the Socialists—has this time come nearer to fruition than ever before.

The immediate background to this development lies in the recent Christian Democrat Party Congress, held in Naples from 27 to 31 January. At that congress the party Secretary, Signor Moro, in a marathon six-hour speech, weighed in minute detail the pros and cons of such a step in relation to wellnigh every aspect of Italian political life, but in the end came out unequivocally for putting the experiment to the test. For four days the delegates to the congress debated the proposal, sometimes concentrating on particular aspects, but always with the main question in mind: was Socialist support to be sought and, if obtainable on satisfactory conditions, accepted? At the end the motion in favour of it was approved; by how large a majority was clear from the voting for the party's National Council, where, out of 120 elective seats, supporters of the 'apertura' obtained ninety-eight.

All this might seem to be making very heavy weather of a change which, after all, still involves only parliamentary support from the Socialists—for there is as yet no question of their entering the Government. But it has to be remembered that the position of the Socialists has represented one of the main problems of political life in post-war Italy. Unlike other Western European parties of that name, the Socialists in Italy were for many years after the war so closely linked

to the Communists as virtually to form a Popular Front with them. To reach their present position of autonomy has meant a long, slow process of detachment, going back to the abortive attempts at reunification with the Social Democrats in 1956, and even before. It has meant cautious, far-sighted planning on the part of the main protagonist for autonomy, Signor Nenni, in the face of constant opposition from his party's left wing. which suspected any move towards the Christian Democrats and feared any split in the workers' front. Even now, Socialist autonomy does not prevent Socialist collaboration with the Communists at local administrative and trade-union levels.

It has meant a long process of adjustment for the Christian Democrats too. This is not Signor Fanfani's first attempt at producing a Government whose eventual goal was to attract the Socialists: he tried to do so in 1958, and failed. It took three more years, including the resounding collapse of Signor Tambroni's right-wing Government in 1960, before a sufficient number of Christian Democrats were prepared to realize that the party had virtually no alternative but to turn leftwards. In the meantime, external changes had made their choice less difficult: a slackening of the cold war abroad, the weakening of the Right at home, Italy's new economic prosperity, and less rigidity on the part of the Church hierarchy all contributed.

Nevertheless, the change, if it comes about, will mean the end of a long-established pattern of post-war government in Italy. The *quadripartito* formula of collaboration between the Christian Democrats and the three secular centre parties—Liberals, Social Democrats, and Republicans—has died hard. First established in Signor De Gasperi's day, it has time and again been declared extinct, only to revive in some form of combination. Now the Liberals will be shed—and they, naturally, are sharply critical of their Socialist rivals. Their main criticism concerns foreign policy, where they maintain that Socialist insistence on neutralism is bound to mean at best a watering-down of Italian foreign policy in relation to N.A.T.O. They also object to the proposal to introduce regional administration, a point on which Signor Nenni insists and which Signor Fanfani appears to have conceded (it is in fact one of the still unfulfilled provisions of the Constitution). And, finally, they are deeply suspicious of Socialist support without prior guarantees that the Socialists will break completely with the Communists. In these criticisms they are joined, in varying degrees, by a number of

right-wing Christian Democrats such as Signor Scelba and Signor Andreotti.

Signor Fanfani's new Government (whose composition was not known at the time of writing) was expected to include, besides Christian Democrats, five Ministers from the smaller allied parties, the Social Democrats and Republicans. Its fate, when it comes before Parliament, will depend largely on two factors: its composition and its programme. As to the first, although Signor Fanfani was known to wish to include representatives of different trends within the Christian Democrat Party, there would no doubt be difficulties about the acceptability, in a centre-left Government, of certain prominent right-wingers who have in the past been associated with policies of a different kind. As to the second point, the programme, this is generally regarded as crucial both by Signor Fanfani and by Signor Nenni, who has in fact said as much. Given the short time available for its implementation (for the Presidential election, due in May, will shortly occupy the political scene, and a General Election is due in 1963), it is likely that the programme will concentrate on a few main points, all related to Signor Fanfani's aims of social improvement and modernization of the State: education, the regional question, administrative reforms, taxation, and the nationalization of electricity. This last he will probably wish to approach gradually. But the Socialists have made it a key point in their own programme, produced early in January and published in *Avanti!* (7 January), which they have been insisting must be accepted 'globally'. Half of Italy's electricity is at present in the hands of private companies, and another quarter belongs to semi-State, semi-private concerns; given the vested interests involved and the immense cost for the State of indemnification and maintenance, any suggestion of outright nationalization is bound to arouse opposition.

Another still unknown quantity is what the attitude of the Communists will be when confronted at last with the possibility of a real breakaway by the Socialists. Signor Togliatti has already frightened some Christian Democrats by suggesting that any move to the left will eventually favour the Communists, and if, in the voting on the new Government, his party were to abstain rather than oppose, he could cause it serious embarrassment.

New Deal for European Agriculture

THE shape of the new deal for European agriculture, which was agreed in Brussels after a series of marathon negotiating sessions on

14 January, has gradually emerged from the documents issued since then. So have the gaps in the structure; these may turn out to be important later on. But for the moment anxiety about the future has been submerged in the sense of triumph over the achievement, against considerable odds, of a compromise that has allowed the European Common Market to go on to the Second Stage of the Treaty of Rome. The incident has demonstrated once again what can be done by patient and unremitting argument among technicians who are determined to find some means of agreeing in the end.

The first point about the new deal is that it is in essence the antithesis of the traditional free-market conception of agriculture. This tradition is particularly strong in Britain, where agricultural policy, even where it has been trying to protect farmers' interests, has been dominated by the notion that the consumer should pay the lowest possible price for his food that the market will bear. The European Community's conception as now revealed is, on the contrary, that everything, including especially the consumer, shall be subordinated to the welfare of the agricultural producer. The decision is not altogether surprising when it is remembered that something like 22 per cent of the active population of the Common Market countries is still engaged in agriculture. Even if the agricultural population continues to decline as it has been doing recently at the rate of 2½ per cent a year, it will for some time to come continue to be a primary element in the electoral calculations of any continental politician or party.

The essential instrument for the control of agricultural supplies and prices in such a way as to give the maximum benefit to the European farmer is the 'variable levy'. This device is chiefly designed to make it impossible for outsiders to rob the European producer of his home market by offering the European consumer cheap prices. The levy is variable precisely in order to make the protective-wall insurmountable—in a way that an ordinary fixed tariff is not. Imports of food from outside the Community will have to pay an impost on arrival which is equal to the difference between the world market price and the higher domestic European price fixed by the Common Market. If the world market price goes down the levy is increased to compensate for the drop; similarly if the internal European price goes down the levy is reduced. Meanwhile, during the transition period, which will last until 1970, the individual member States of the Community will be allowed to impose import levies on each other's products to the extent that they deviate from the

centrally determined prices, laid down by the Council of Ministers and the Commission of the European Common Market. This arrangement will give high-cost German farmers a measure of protection against price-cutting from their competitors in France who are desperately looking for a market for their surpluses of grain.

How much protection will plainly depend on the level at which the Community 'target price' for cereals is fixed. This has been a matter of sharp dispute between the French and the Germans—the French wanting a low target price and the Germans a high one—and it remains unresolved. The compromise reached on 14 January only laid down that the price to be eventually agreed should be somewhere between the French and the German levels, a very wide area of choice, and also committed the contestants to a time-table for reaching an agreed decision between now and September 1963. The practical result is that the French and the Germans are at liberty to keep the present level of guaranteed prices to their farmers and the present measures for protecting them against the competition from other countries, including fellow members of the Common Market, for another two harvests. They have promised not to alter their prices for the 1962–3 harvest and to try to reach agreement by 1 May 1963 on the first steps towards a common price system to be brought into effect with the 1963–4 harvest. But if either party wishes it, it can demand a further period of grace lasting through one more harvest. However, a final decision cannot be delayed beyond September 1963, when prices must be fixed for the 1964–5 harvest.

Thus the real battle on the level of agricultural prices in the Community has still to be decided. The indications are that it will be a bitter one. By the time that the final decision on grain prices is being made Britain may well be a member of the European Common Market. In that case the likelihood is that there would be a vote from the British side in favour of the French solution and against the German one: this country's interest, as the world's biggest importer of wheat, is plainly to have the lowest possible level of 'target prices' in the Community. These prices will also determine the level at which wheat and other cereals can be bought from outside the Community.

Although grain prices are much the most explosive issue which the Common Market will have to face on the agricultural front in the next eighteen months, there are a number of other problems which the compromise of 14 January only partially solved. Chief of

these is the financing of the Community's common agricultural fund, which will provide money, among other things, to subsidize exports, particularly from France, to third countries outside the Community. Naturally, the Germans wish to limit the size of their contribution to this objective. They are particularly exposed because part of the money for the central fund will come out of the levies which are imposed on agricultural imports to bring them up to the level of prices fixed inside the Community, and Germany is the biggest importer of food among the Six. Her interests on this issue are, of course, identical with those of Britain.

Indeed, the provision which the Germans succeeded in having written into the 14 January compromise, that their contribution to the fund derived from import levies shall be limited to a maximum of 31 per cent of the total, sets an important precedent for this country. Again this is a provisional arrangement lasting for three years, and there is a time-table laid down for reaching a final decision by 1 July 1965. If Britain takes part in this as a member of the Common Market, she will, after having allied herself with France to bring prices down, find herself shifting into a close alliance with Germany to limit the amounts which food-importing countries have to pay to support France's agricultural export drive.

President Kennedy's Programme for Expanding Trade

WHEN the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act was passed in 1934 by a Democratic Congress of the United States at the request of President Roosevelt, it meant a direct reversal of the policy of the previous Republican Administration which had put through the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, raising duties on American imports to record heights. This was an attempt to protect the United States from depression by protecting her producers from competition. By 1934 the depression had hit the United States with full force and the new policy was to promote recovery by increasing exports. This was to be made possible by bargaining with importing countries to reduce their tariffs in return for reciprocal concessions made by the United States. Under the new Act the President had independent authority to lower the 1930 tariffs by up to 50 per cent and Congress no longer had to be consulted about each separate reduction, a process which had produced some of the most notorious log-rolling in legislative history and had made any effective reduction of duties impossible.

The 1934 Act has been renewed eleven times, by Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, and the original 50 per cent has been added to several times. After the last renewal in 1958—for four years which end on 30 June 1962—the total reduction possible in theory on the 1930 rates of duty was 83 per cent. For various reasons the actual cuts have been much less, although the President has now used up almost all his authority under the Act as it stands. But in 1931–5, 37 per cent of American imports were subject to tariffs which averaged 50 per cent of value; by 1959 total imports, worth $15,000 million in that year, had increased nearly tenfold in value, with 61 per cent subject to duty but with the average tariff only 11·5 per cent of value. Exports had shown an even greater increase. Trade agreements had been negotiated with fifty-six countries by the end of 1960 and their benefits had been extended to all other countries with which the United States had most-favoured-nation treaties—in practice, all the non-Communist countries.

It can certainly not be said today that the United States is a protectionist country, even though the pure liberalism of the original Act has been somewhat sullied by concessions made through the years to the protectionist forces in order to induce Congress to re-

new the President's power to negotiate agreements. In the Act as it stands at present these concessions appear in the peril point provision, under which the Tariff Commission recommends the minimum rate of duty necessary to protect domestic producers of each individual category of goods on which reductions are to be negotiated; in the escape clause, under which the commission investigates complaints from any domestic industry that it has been seriously injured by competition from imports as a result of a reduction in duty and recommends changes to the President which he can accept or reject, subject to congressional veto; and in the national security clause, under which the President may limit any import which is coming in in such quantities that it 'threatens the national security'.

This clause has been used only once, to restrict imports of oil, and it is widely held that the domestic oil producers benefited more than did the national security from this action. There have been 130 applications for relief under the escape clause, frequently from very small industries such as clothes-peg manufacturers; the Tariff Commission found injury in only forty of these cases and in only thirteen has an increase in the duty been allowed by the President, who bases his decisions on wider considerations than does the commission. Other protective devices outside the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act are found in Buy American policies, under which domestic producers have a substantial advantage over foreign ones when bidding for federal and state contracts; in Ship American clauses in foreign aid and other legislation; and in the Sugar Act and other agricultural measures.

In his new trade legislation President Kennedy proposes to keep the three main safeguards—indeed, he knows that Congress would not allow him to give them up entirely—but for the future he wants them put on a broader basis with even more discretion for himself. Relief from tariffs and the escape clause—with more up-to-date definitions—would still be available if essential, and the power to impose duties or to suspend concessions to safeguard the national security would be retained. The Tariff Commission would hold hearings and make reports to the President on the effect of suggested changes in duties, but its assessment would go farther than the present simple setting of a peril point below which a duty should not fall. The hope is also apparently that the commission will deal with general categories of goods, instead of individual items as in the past. This has meant that bargaining with other countries has had to be conducted in very detailed terms—separate discussions for each

type of screw, for example, instead of for screws as a whole. This has made the process frustratingly slow, especially when negotiations were with groups of countries, as they have been recently under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. What is now wanted is 'across-the-board' or 'linear' bargaining. This is already practised within the European Economic Community and is the only basis on which that Community can negotiate with other countries.

The rapid growth of the E.E.C. and the future inclusion in it of Britain—it is taken for granted in American official circles that Britain will join—is the main element in 'the challenge and opportunities of a rapidly changing world economy' which President Kennedy thinks can only be met by 'a new American trade initiative', 'a wholly new instrument'. The E.E.C. offers a market, nearly as large as the United States' own (now the richest in the world) and maybe larger before long, protected by a single tariff which in certain cases will be higher than were the separate tariffs of many of the countries belonging to the Community. The demand in that market, particularly for the consumer goods which Americans produce best, is growing rapidly. But, with European competitors no longer hampered by internal tariffs, American industrialists and farmers will not increase or even maintain their share in the trade of the Common Market, which now takes 30 per cent of American exports, unless the E.E.C. can be induced to lower its external tariffs.

This, at least, is the President's case, and for this reason he wants power, for five years, in reciprocal negotiations with the E.E.C., to reduce or eliminate altogether all tariffs on products in which the enlarged E.E.C. and the United States together carry on 80 per cent or more of world trade. These are mainly industrial and manufactured products—motor-cars, for example—which accounted in 1960 for $2,000 million worth of U.S. exports to the E.E.C. countries and for $1,400 million of U.S. imports from them. The plan is to bargain down tariff walls layer by layer, not brick by brick as in the past. The President also wants general authority to reduce existing tariffs by 50 per cent in negotiations with all individual countries in return for similar reductions made by them.

Concessions obtained in these ways would be non-discriminatory, extended to the other trading partners of the United States, to Latin America, Canada, Japan, and other non-European countries so as to broaden their opportunities for trade with the E.E.C. Mr Kennedy also wants power to reduce or eliminate restrictions on imports

of tropical agricultural products—most of which are on the American free list anyway—provided the E.E.C. does the same and thus lessens the preference given to the former African colonies in its arrangements. The purpose here is to enable under-developed countries to increase trade in what are normally their staple exports and thus to earn more foreign exchange and to finance more of their development projects themselves. It is not only to permit these countries to earn more abroad that new markets are needed for their products; it is also to counter the efforts of the Communist bloc to dominate their economies and to take over their trade.

But anything that will hold down American spending abroad is desirable from the point of view of the American taxpayer and also from that of the American balance of international payments. This is suffering from renewed pressure in recent months on top of a prolonged debility which results from the U.S.A.'s commitments for overseas defence and foreign aid. There is a real danger that these outlays may have to be cut if the great dollar earner in the international accounts, the surplus of exports over imports, cannot be increased. Last year's deficit in the total payments account was $2,500 million, compared with $3,900 million in 1960, but the last quarter of 1961 was much worse than the earlier ones had been. However, for the year as a whole the favourable balance in the trading account—exports and imports—was $5,700 million, compared with $4,700 million in 1960, even though at the end of the year imports were going up with the return of prosperity in the United States. Every effort is being made to maintain and expand this export trend, by stepping up credit facilities, by trade promotion abroad, and so on, but the greatest encouragement would come if other countries could be induced to lower their tariff barriers against imports from the United States.

This recent deterioration in the U.S. balance of payments, underlining the fact that the United States is no longer the undisputed economic leader of the world, is another of the factors which have made the cumbersome Trade Agreements Act obsolete. And one main reason why the President wants to reduce tariffs faster than would be possible under the old Act is the current weakness in the domestic economy, as shown by the increasing prevalence of unemployment even in times of prosperity. The recovery from the recession of 1960 began early last year, but it took nearly twelve months for unemployment to fall below 6 per cent of the labour force, and during most of 1961 it was nearly 7 per cent. The remedy

for this, according to the Administration, is a speedier rate of economic growth, an industrial expansion which will mean a greater demand for goods and services and therefore for labour. The most efficient and enterprising businesses in the country are found in the export trades, and the prospect of increased sales abroad would cause such firms to expand and provide far more new jobs than any increase in imports, resulting from simultaneous reductions in American tariffs, would take away. Moreover, competition from abroad and the need to compete in foreign markets would check inflation, Mr Kennedy believes, by forcing Americans to keep down their prices and their costs.

According to the President, if European tariffs are not lowered American firms will set up more plants in Europe to get behind those barriers and thus will export jobs and capital which the United States needs. This argument is condemned by many business men as a new form of protectionism, and undoubtedly the very marked movement of American industry into Europe in recent years has been the consequence not so much of European tariffs as of the desire to be near the final market and to save on labour and other costs. But Mr Kennedy's is an argument which will appeal to the trade unionists, whose support is vital to the new programme. The Administration is backing up with floods of statistics its contention that exports benefit every section of the American economy—farmers, workers, consumers—and every part of the country.

Only 40 per cent of imports compete directly with domestically produced goods; the rest are bananas, coffee, manganese, chrome, and so on, which the United States does not produce and could hardly do without, while competitive imports are equal to only 1½ per cent of the national output each year. Tariff reductions will only take place gradually, over five years. But in spite of all this Mr Kennedy recognizes that increased imports can cause hardship and suffering. For this reason he is prepared to continue the escape and national security provisions in the present Act. He also promises to reserve certain articles as unsuitable for tariff negotiations if necessary. It has been suggested that in the course of the coming debate in Congress opponents may be bought off with promises of help under these various provisions. The national security clause, for example, may keep the oil and coal lobbies quiet, since it is used against foreign oil, and the textile interests have already been promised that their industry, which is responsible for one of the strongest and most widespread pressure groups, will be in the reserved

category. Meanwhile other types of special help for this sick industry are under consideration.

But in this connection the President is counting on checking the opposition with his new Trade Adjustment Assistance scheme for workers, business men, and farmers who suffer from increased imports. For workers there would be special unemployment benefits, relocation allowances, and retraining programmes; for business men and farmers there would be technical advice, tax benefits to encourage diversification, and special loans. This help would not be a subsidy but a form of temporary, and relatively inexpensive, aid to enable people to adapt themselves to new conditions and to move out of uneconomic production into efficient and competitive positions. Similar schemes are already being applied in the depressed areas of the United States but have been under way for too short a time for it to be possible to judge their efficacy.

The main appeal of the new proposal will be to labour leaders, who have long been demanding something of the sort. Business men likely to want this help think that it would come too late to be of any use, that they would be bankrupt and their labour force dispersed before the process of deciding that they deserve adjustment assistance had been gone through. They feel that straight protection is the only type of aid for them, and in this they are probably often right. For the firms that are adversely affected by imports are frequently those which are out of date and unadaptable and no amount of assistance will enable them to adjust to the modern world. The American bicycle manufacturers, for instance, had to fall back on the escape clause for protection because they failed to produce the type of machine which came from abroad and attracted today's young people; the automobile manufacturers, on the other hand, had no thought of asking for higher tariffs against the competition of small foreign cars but set about producing their own compact models at lower prices.

Much more will be heard of all these arguments, and many others, during the lengthy debates on the Trade Expansion Act which will be going on in Congress for the next five or six months. They will cut across all party lines; the differences are no longer political, but regional and industrial, although some of the Republicans who voted rather unenthusiastically for lower tariffs when President Eisenhower asked for them may not be prepared to do so when the request comes from a Democratic President. The South, no longer dependent on exports of cotton and tobacco, wants protection for its

adolescent, if not still infant, textile and chemical industries; oil producers in Texas and Louisiana, lead and zinc miners in the Rocky Mountains, coal firms in Pennsylvania, jewellery makers in Rhode Island, fishermen in Massachusetts, all are afraid of imports. Nearly all of these areas are represented in Congress by Democrats who will be up for re-election next November and are therefore even more sensitive than usual to their constituents' feelings. The farmers' groups and most of the trade unions are on Mr Kennedy's side; so are the bigger and better business men, especially the internationally minded ones on the east and west coasts, most of whom are Republicans. They are backing the Administration's programme whole-heartedly, but in Congress their influence is not as great as it is outside.

Some of the President's advisers felt that he should have waited until next year, when the congressional election will be over, for a show-down on this vital issue, and have contented himself with an educational campaign to rally public opinion this year. These advisers argued that it would be at least 1963 before the effects of the E.E.C. began to be felt in the United States and not until they were would there be any real need for the President's programme. Mr Kennedy, however, fears that the E.E.C. may settle into a protectionist pattern and he is anxious to have power to influence it while it is still fluid. So he is courageously subordinating all his other plans to his tariff proposals this year, determined to push them through.

That some disappointing compromises will be necessary no one doubts; perhaps the greatest danger at the moment is that Congress may insist on some form of veto. But the President's liberal supporters hope that he will not settle for a version so weakened that it will be practically useless except as an excuse for those who want to keep Congress from passing a better measure next year. It is difficult not to sympathize with the view that if a really good Bill cannot be forced through, it would be better to let the Trade Agreements Act lapse without a substitute for a year at least. The shock of being without any tariff bargaining power might be salutary for American public opinion, and the tariff reductions agreed during the life of the old Act would continue, so that the practical effect of being without it for a year would be almost nil.

The effect on opinion abroad, always ready to announce that the United States is returning to economic isolationism, might be unfortunate. Certainly the free world's faith in the United States would be shaken and that country's leadership would be weakened. It is to

maintain this leadership that the new tariff bargaining authority is necessary, according to Mr Kennedy. But his comparison of the Bill with that which set up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and his emphasis on the anti-Communist aspect of his proposals and on their importance for the United States' political influence abroad must be due in part to his knowledge that such political considerations will incline Congress favourably towards the legislation. The success of the U.S.A.'s foreign policy today depends to a large extent upon the success of her foreign trade, says President Kennedy, and the maintenance of Western political unity upon the degree of economic unity. 'An integrated Western Europe, joined in trading partnership with the United States, will further shift the world balance of power to the side of freedom', but Mr Kennedy does not suggest that the United States is actually going to integrate herself economically or politically with Western Europe. Basically, what he wants to achieve by driving his imaginative and far-reaching proposals through Congress is to enable the United States to compete freely in an expanding world which she no longer dominates.

NANCY BALFOUR

New-Found Political Stability in Greece

IN the recent elections held in Greece on 29 October 1961 the outgoing Government Party, the National Radical Union (ERE), led by Mr Constantine Karamanlis, obtained 176 of the 300 Parliamentary seats. This was the most striking electoral success since November 1952 when the Greek Rally formed by the late Field-Marshal Papagos won 239 of the 300 seats. The majority system was employed in this instance.

The Greek Rally, formed in 1952, was stated by its founder to be a movement and not a political party. Many Greek politicians, tired of the series of political deadlocks, hastened to support the Marshal and none more eagerly than the majority of the Populist Party disillusioned by the lack of leadership in its ranks. One of the most striking recruits to the Rally, however, was the controversial yet gifted Spyros Markezinis who up to that date had headed a small party of his own. It was Markezinis who, as Minister of Economic

Co-ordination, balanced the Greek Budget for the first time in many years and paved the way for the present economic revival. But Markezinis did not last long. After a difference of opinion with Papagos over the question of contracts with German firms which the Prime Minister justly claimed had been negotiated and settled without the knowledge of the Government, Markezinis resigned in April 1954 and has once more reverted to his role of 'lone wolf' in Greek politics.

Marshal Papagos will unfortunately be remembered as the Prime Minister under whom Greece embarked on the ill-fated Cyprus struggle. Previous Greek Governments had all paid lip-service to the cause of *Enosis*—union of Greece with Cyprus—but it was the Marshal who was persuaded to take the fateful step and lend active support to the rebel cause. The result was a rift in the Balkan Pact, the rapid deterioration of relations between Greece and Turkey, and the complete stagnation of political life within Greece. The Marshal himself was ailing and his death came as no surprise in October 1955, a few days after he had appointed his Foreign Minister, Mr Stephanopoulos, to be acting Prime Minister.

Greece is a constitutional monarchy in which the monarch normally plays no decisive role in the country's policy. At the same time the king can exercise his right to summon any politician he may see fit and request him to try to form a Government when the occasion arises. King Paul now took advantage of this opportunity and summoned Mr Karamanlis, the Minister of Public Works, charging him with the formation of a new Government.

Mr Karamanlis, who was in his late forties, is a native of Macedonia and the first Macedonian ever to be a Prime Minister in Greece. Like so many of his fellow deputies, he started his political career as a Populist. A lawyer by profession, he was appointed Minister of Labour in 1946 and subsequently held the Ministries of Transport, Social Welfare, and National Defence for varying periods. But it was in the Rally Government that he first achieved prominence when, in his capacity of Minister of Public Works, he came to be known as the 'Haussmann of Athens' for his radical plans for the modernization of the Greek capital. It was this rising young politician (young by Greek standards, at any rate) whom the king selected to lead the country at this critical juncture. In the previous ten years Greece had had no fewer than twenty-six Governments, only those led by the late Marshal Papagos and Mr Sophoulis lasting for any length of time.

THE 1956 ELECTIONS

Mr Karamanlis had no difficulty in forming a Government and obtaining a large vote of confidence in the Chamber, since he was able to command the support of most of the Rally. After a brief period he formed his own political party, declaring that the Rally 'could not survive its founder'. He then resigned so that the country might have the opportunity of giving him its vote of confidence. The subsequent elections, held in April 1956, centred around the main issues of foreign policy and the Cyprus question. They were the first elections in which women exercised their newly won right to vote, but although there were about 1,900,000 women in a total electorate of 4 million, this apparently had little effect on the result.

Elections were held under a mixed system; constituencies were grouped into regional entities and seats allotted according to the size of the population. Thus the Athens area formed one constituency of sixteen seats and a small island such as Lefkas another constituency with a single seat. In constituencies carrying up to three seats the winning party took them all; when the number of seats was four, five, or six, the winning party took them all but one which went to the second party. In constituencies with seven to nine seats the second party took two seats, and in ten-seat constituencies the proportion was seven to three. Finally, constituencies with over ten seats used the simple proportional method. This complicated system tended to favour the retiring Government, which could expect a majority in most rural areas (traditionally royalist), and which, though defeated in industrial areas, could still justifiably hope for a large proportion of the votes cast. In view of this, seven political parties ranging from the right-wing Populist 'rump' to the extreme left-wing United Democratic Left (EDA)—the nearest approach to the Greek Communist Party, which had been outlawed during the Civil War period—combined to form the Democratic Union,-with a tacit understanding that this alliance would be dissolved after the elections. The elections resulted in a small overall majority for the ERE (155 to 145) although the party actually polled 100,000 votes less than the Democratic Union. Ten seats went to EDA members.

For the next two years the Greek political scene was entirely overshadowed by the Cyprus issue, which had deteriorated into a series of acts of terrorism on the island with active support from certain militant circles inside Greece. There is little doubt that the Karamanlis Government would have liked to reach a settlement, but

pressure of Greek public opinion at the time was so strong that the Government had to pay lip-service to the cause of *Enosis*, or self-determination, as it came to be known, and its small overall majority in the Chamber made matters even more difficult. The Opposition parties united in constant criticism of Government policy and this criticism was always destructive, no practical solutions to the problem ever being mooted. As early as May 1956 the new Foreign Minister, Mr Theotokis, felt obliged to resign after continual allegations by the Opposition that he had been weak in handling the issue. He was succeeded by Mr Averof, who has retained this post to the present day.

The Government went forward with its plans for economic reconstruction and laid the foundations on which the present economic stability rests. But progress was slow and doubtful, the one encouraging fact being that the drachma, revalued in the summer of 1954 at 84 to the pound sterling, maintained its newly found stability; between 1945 and 1954 it had fallen from an initial 600 to the pound to the astronomical figure of 84,000.

THE 1958 ELECTIONS

Paradoxically, it was neither the deterioration of the situation in Cyprus nor the economic situation that led to the fall of the Government in the spring of 1958. The Government had decided to revise the electoral law and to adopt a reinforced proportional system; this provoked the resignation of two Ministers and the defection of thirteen other deputies. Having thus lost his slender overall majority in the Chamber, Mr Karamànlis tendered his resignation and advised the king to proclaim a new General Election. The 'caretaker' Government formed to conduct the elections (a normal procedure in Greece) submitted the new electoral Bill to the Chamber before its dissolution and obtained the necessary majority. Elections were therefore held under this new system. The electorate had in the meantime increased to about 4,900,000—2,600,000 men and 2,300,000 women. The country was divided into fifty-five constituencies of varying sizes and on the basis of population a set figure of the number of votes required to 'earn' a seat was allotted. Any surplus votes would thus be carried on to the second distribution of seats. For example, in a two-seat constituency with 10,000 as the operative figure, if party A polled 12,000 and party B 8,000, one seat was immediately given to A and 2,000 A votes and all the B votes were held over till the second distribution. In this distribu-

tion, votes from several constituencies were taken into consideration and the remaining seats allotted accordingly. Furthermore, in order to earn the right to participate in this second distribution at all, any political party would have to poll 25 per cent of the total votes cast. This percentage was even higher for coalitions. The main parties participating in the elections were the ERE, the Liberals, the EDA, the Populists, and a centre coalition called the Progressive Agrarian Democratic Union (PADE). The main electoral issues were Greece's participation in N.A.T.O., the question of foreign bases on Greek territory, and the inevitable Cyprus issue, on which there was no disagreement. On the first two issues the ERE and the Liberals were also basically in agreement, although the Liberals thought that no foreign bases should be granted until Cyprus had achieved self-determination. The EDA professed allegiance to an 'independent foreign policy'.

The result of the elections came as a shock to all. ERE, it is true, again polled over 1,500,000 votes and this time increased its seats to 173, a clear overall majority. As the election results came through the Liberals and EDA were running neck and neck for a long time but later results gave EDA a clear lead of over 130,000 votes (about 925,000 to 787,000). The second distribution of seats left EDA with 78 as against the meagre Liberal 36. Many reasons have been advanced to explain this sharp swing to the left. The peculiar electoral system certainly recoiled on the Liberals whereas it had been expected to affect EDA more. The real reason for the swing will probably never be known and was no doubt a combination of various factors. There had been a big increase in the electorate. The general international situation at the time was favourable to a policy of peaceful co-existence, and many Greeks felt that the country should if possible steer clear of foreign alliances and become an Austria of the Balkans. This, coupled with disillusion over the Cyprus issue and dissatisfaction with a Government which after over two years in office could produce few tangible results, probably heavily influenced the 'floating vote', particularly in the towns, to support the 'independent foreign policy'.

The important result of these elections, however, was that the Government had obtained a comfortable overall majority and, despite a vociferous left-wing Opposition in the Chamber, was free to continue its policy for a further four years. It was essential to come to some sort of solution for the Cyprus problem. The differences between Greece and Turkey over this question had become so acute

that, quite apart from the situation on the island itself, the Balkan Pact between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia had become a dead letter and N.A.T.O.'s eastern flank was endangered. M. Spaak, the Secretary-General of N.A.T.O., had attempted mediation in vain, but preliminary contacts were made at a N.A.T.O. meeting in Paris in October 1958. After a fruitless debate on Cyprus at the United Nations Assembly all parties at last saw the necessity for an agreement, and the first meeting of the British, Greek, and Turkish Foreign Ministers took place in Paris in December 1958. Agreement came at a meeting of the Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers in Zurich early in 1959 followed by a conference in London.[1] Although the resulting independent State of Cyprus has had its 'teething troubles', particularly in the economic sphere, so far there has been no recurrence of the troubles between Greece and Turkey over this issue.

AFTERMATH OF THE CYPRUS ISSUE

As has been seen, the entire political scene in Greece had been affected by the Cyprus issue, and it was regarded as a great achievement for the Government to have brought it to a conclusion. This did not mean, however, that problems over Cyprus were automatically solved. The Greek Government had had to pay lip-service to *Enosis*, and under the terms of the new agreement *Enosis* was as far off as ever, a fact that the Opposition did its utmost to exploit. An even greater embarrassment to the Government was the presence in Greece of General Grivas, who under the name of Dighenis had been the leader of the Greek underground movement in Cyprus. Grivas, a native of Cyprus, had served as a regular in the Greek army and spent most of his life in Greece. During the last few months of the German occupation he had organized and led an ultra-right-wing pro-royalist organization in Athens and the south of Greece, known as 'X'. This organization, which received arms from German sources under circumstances which have never been fully explained, would probably have died a natural death in 1944 if the Communist revolt had not taken place in the capital. As it was, Grivas acquired a certain amount of prestige in the capital and the Peloponnese, a royalist stronghold, as a 'Communist-eater' and a royalist. (It will be remembered that the king did not return to

[1] See 'Cyprus: Conflict and Reconciliation', in *The World Today*, April 1959, and 'The Republic of Cyprus: From the Zurich Agreement to Independence', in *The World Today*, December 1960.

Greece until after the 1946 elections and referendum.) Grivas and his 'X' party participated in the 1946 elections but polled very few votes and gained no seats. He then retired into private life and would probably never have been heard of again had it not been for the emergence of the Cyprus issue, when he was recruited by Archbishop Makarios and sent into the island to head the resistance.

His conduct of the resistance campaign in Cyprus earned him as many enemies as friends among the Greek population. At the same time the name of Dighenis had been built up as a legendary figure and he was acclaimed in Greece as a national hero. Grivas was no doubt displeased by the Zurich and London agreements, which did not suit his personal ambitions, yet he had no alternative but to leave the island. The Greek Government, too, had no alternative but to give him the reception befitting the national hero he had been made out to be. Thus his return to Athens in March 1959 had many of the attributes of the triumph of a Roman Emperor.

Although Grivas had stated that he intended to retire from public life, he immediately began to intervene in politics and with a considerable impact. One of his first public statements was that 'Greece could not live with her present leadership'. In an obvious attempt to make capital out of the failure of the Government to achieve *Enosis* with Cyprus he made a further statement that Greece needed 'a new and healthy leadership which should spring from the people' and he formed his own political party which he christened the Movement of National Regeneration (KEA). As time went on he became more and more extreme in his utterances, calling for a powerful Greece which would include within its borders all the 'enslaved territories', such as Northern Epirus (part of Southern Albania) and Cyprus. Such statements, coupled with open attacks on a Government that was having success in solving Greece's economic problems, did much to damage his prestige, and it became obvious that he was not going to be an effective political force. Most of the right-wing support was already absorbed by the Government, Grivas's reputation and past history as an extremist alienated him from the Centre, and his record as a 'Communist-eater' was most unlikely to endear him to any left-of-centre voter.

Despite the strong left-wing faction in Parliament and the partial nature of the success over Cyprus, the Government was free to continue its policy of reconstruction at home and alliance with the West abroad. There were a number of stormy scenes in the Chamber and pro-Communist plots in the countryside, but all these

difficulties were firmly and decisively handled. Typical of the Government's good sense in the handling of the latter was the trial of a number of defendants accused of having met and collaborated with the outlawed Communist party, the KKE. Full prominence was given to this trial; the accused received every facility to defend themselves and nine of them were acquitted. The most notorious of the defendants, Manolis Glezos, a former EDA deputy and editor of the pro-Communist newspaper *Avgi*, was found guilty and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, four years' exile, and eight years' loss of civil rights. Perhaps the most noteworthy feature of the entire trial was that the maximum sentence possible was the death penalty and this was not invoked in any instance. It is difficult to imagine that this could have happened less than a decade earlier.

THE 1961 ELECTIONS

By the middle of 1961 the Government had once more to look to the future, for elections were due to be held at latest by April 1962. The 1961 census had revealed that the present population of Greece was about 8,350,000, an increase of over 700,000 in ten years, with an electorate of nearly 5½ million. The international situation was once more critical. At home, much had been achieved but a great deal still remained to be done. In view of these facts, it was asked, would it not be better to postpone elections till the last possible moment? The decision must have been a difficult one, but once again the Government showed its resolution and was amply rewarded. The elections were held on 29 October 1961 and contested under the reinforced proportional system, a method not unfavourable to the Opposition. Over 4½ million people voted and just about half of these gave their support to ERE which emerged with 176 seats, a very comfortable overall majority. Furthermore, the EDA, contesting the elections under the name of the All-Agrarian Greek Front (PAME), was reduced to 24 seats, the Liberals having turned the tables on them and obtained 78. The Government majority was such that Opposition allegations that pressure had been brought to bear on the electorate—and these have been made by people as responsible as the veteran Opposition leader Papandreou—cannot be taken seriously, and the Government is therefore free to continue its policy for a further four years. Some of the tangible results of this policy are mentioned below, and they provide the answer to any question as to why the electorate once more gave its vote of confidence to Mr Karamanlis.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Greece is a poor country and there is still much unemployment and underemployment. Yet heavy industry is making tangible progress, thanks to the important part being played by private enterprise. The Greek State Airlines have been taken over and extended by Mr Onassis under the name of Olympic Airways. The rich Greek shipowner Mr Niarchos has enlarged and modernized the shipyards at Skaramanga near Athens, where ships are now being constructed. The Government has built an oil refinery at Elefsis, fifteen miles from Athens, and plans for an aluminium plant are under way. The Government's five-year plan for industry includes the building of an iron and steel works with a total annual capacity of about 250,000 tons of crude steel. In light industry, much of the work has been transferred to new small factories, and the Greek tradition of handicrafts, despite a slight decrease in personal craftsmanship, has been maintained throughout the country; these handicrafts include Greek traditional designs in embroidery, hand weaving, pottery, and metalwork. A big scheme for the supply of electric power is well under way, four hydro-electric stations having been already constructed using rivers as a source of power, as well as two thermo-electric stations in areas of the country where lignite is mined. Another big hydro-electric station is due for completion this year. Mineral wealth is still poorly developed but the four main products, bauxite, chrome, magnesite, and lignite, have all been extracted in increasing quantities, and prospecting for uranium, gold, and oil is taking place. More and more Greek shipowners are transferring their ships to the Greek flag and the Greek mercantile marine now totals over 5 million tons.

About half the working population is engaged in some form of agriculture, 70 per cent of Greek total exports being agricultural produce. The chief crops are wheat, vegetables, melons, citrus fruit, grapes, currants, olives, and tobacco, the last being the largest single export. Most of these items are of course luxury products and, although output has been steadily increasing, markets are difficult to find. Dairy farming, wiped out during the war, has once more been raised to a reasonable level and reafforestation projects are well advanced. Greece claims to lead the Mediterranean countries in the amount of fish caught *per capita*, and a traditional branch of fishing, sponge-fishing, is worthy of note. Tourism, an important source of foreign currency, is being rapidly expanded; a new scheme for the building of roads and hotels has led to a large increase in the

number of tourists, who spent over $40 million in Greece in 1959 alone.

Soon after the formation of the European Economic Community, Greece realized that it would be in her interest to join, and a series of discussions took place with particular regard to her economic position. A draft agreement of association between her and the Community was signed late in March 1961[1] and shortly afterwards she became an associate member. Under this form of agreement she is to have a customs union with the 'Six' which will gradually be transformed into an economic union after a transitional period of twelve to twenty-two years. The agreement also provides for economic aid to the value of $125 million within a five-year period.

FOREIGN POLICY

In foreign policy, the Government has always been staunchly on the side of the West. It is true that as a result of the Cyprus dispute the Balkan Alliance between Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia was shattered and the N.A.T.O. alliance endangered. However, the situation has now been restored and Greece is a most important link in the N.A.T.O. chain. The Government has firmly resisted Soviet threats aimed at the dissolution of N.A.T.O. bases on Greek territory, and relations with Yugoslavia, which never deteriorated during the conflict with Turkey over Cyprus, appear to be set fair despite the recent Yugoslav revival of the Macedonian minority problem. Greece is also on good terms with the ex-enemy countries of Italy and Germany. She has strong links with the Middle East, but relations with the U.A.R. have now been impaired by President Nasser's policy towards the Greeks there, most of whom have been seriously affected by the nationalization policy and many of whom are now leaving for Greece. Relations with Bulgaria are in a state of deadlock over the question of war reparations, and there appears to be little hope of any agreement on this; the two countries have, however, exchanged diplomatic representatives. Paradoxically, Greece is still in a state of war with Albania, against whom she has territorial claims. Recent events within the Communist bloc lend support to the view that some sort of agreement may now be concluded between the two countries, but this agreement may well have to abide by the *status quo* concerning the question of Northern Epirus. It is difficult to envisage any final agreement on this without

[1] See 'Greece and the European Economic Community', in *The World Today*, April 1961.

an adjustment of frontiers or the repatriation of all Greeks living in the present Albanian territory, and neither country is likely to make any concessions. Similarly, although relations with Turkey have now improved, they have never regained the cordiality existing prior to the *Enosis* dispute, and any further trouble in Cyprus might well lead to more trouble between Greece and Turkey.

The Karamanlis Government, then, has a number of problems on its hands—troubled relations with Albania, Turkey, Bulgaria, and the U.A.R., Soviet pressure over N.A.T.O. bases, and, most important of all, an internal economic situation in which it has made a good start but still has much to achieve. Should the international situation remain stable, there is every ground for believing that the present internal stability in Greece will be maintained and the country will advance economically as never before. If this is the case, she will owe much to the devoted work of her present Prime Minister and his ERE colleagues.

A. G. ANGHELATOS

The Future of the Organization of American States

Significance of the Punta del Este Conference

THE Eighth Meeting of Consultation of the Foreign Ministers of the members of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.),[1] held at Punta del Este, Uruguay, from 22 to 31 January 1962, was judged —before it took place—by some as likely to prove a conference of historic importance and by others as a 'mistake' which would result in nothing but a setback for the United States and the weakening, perhaps break-up, of the inter-American system. These two prognostications are not, of course, mutually incompatible, but it is too early to say how far either was accurate. What can be asserted with confidence is that the Punta del Este meeting has underlined certain fundamental aspects of United States relations with Latin America,

[1] For a brief description of the O.A.S. see 'The Organization of American States', in *The World Today*, October 1960.

and of the inter-American system, which have not been sufficiently appreciated in the Western hemisphere, let alone outside it.

The most important single feature of the inter-American system is that it embraces one great Power and twenty small ones; the world's wealthiest country and twenty countries of differing but far lower levels of economic development. The wide margin of political and economic power enjoyed by the United States over any or all of her southern neighbours has been the key factor in inter-American relations. An effective inter-American system has been possible only to the extent that the United States has been prepared to exercise restraint in the use of this wide margin of power. Such restraint has not been easy since, given the vast disparity of power, not only action but, in certain circumstances, inaction on the part of the United States has had a profound effect on the fortunes of the other members of the system.

Nevertheless, an important measure of inter-American co-operation has been made possible by United States acceptance of the doctrine of 'non-intervention', now regarded as the cornerstone of the inter-American system. From the formulation of the Monroe Doctrine—and even earlier—non-intervention has been an American principle. But, whereas President Monroe and his successors have been concerned primarily with the threat to the United States from extra-continental intervention in the hemisphere, the Latin Americans, generally speaking—at least from the end of the nineteenth century onwards—have been much more concerned about United States intervention in their affairs, strongly associated in their experience with the unilateral Monroe Doctrine itself.

It is important to see how the O.A.S. Charter endeavours to reconcile these two viewpoints. The main 'non-intervention clauses' so dear to the Latin American countries are Articles 15 and 17. Article 15 declares:

> No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements.

Article 17 reads as follows:

> The territory of a State is inviolable; it may not be the object, even temporarily, of military occupation or of other measures of force taken by another State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No terri-

torial acquisitions or special advantages obtained either by force or by other means of coercion shall be recognized.

But there is also Article 19 which says:

Measures adopted for the maintenance of peace and security in accordance with existing treaties do not constitute a violation of the principles set forth in Articles 15 and 17.

The relevance of these articles to the Cuban situation is clear. The United States, faced by Latin American fears of possible intervention on her part, has striven to show that measures may and must be taken against the Castro regime 'for the maintenance of peace and security' under the 'existing' Inter-American (Rio) Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. The Punta del Este conference was a meeting of the 'Organ of Consultation' under the latter treaty.

Mere non-intervention on the part of the United States, however, has not been enough during the post-war period to make the inter-American system meaningful to the Latin Americans. A major concern of the twenty Republics in supporting the O.A.S. has been to obtain large-scale aid from the United States. They have been loud in their complaints of neglect by their wealthy neighbour and of the small amount of aid they have received compared with what has gone from the United States to other regions. The United States, preoccupied with her struggle against international Communism in more exposed areas of the world, has tended to take Latin America for granted. Only when convinced that Communism was becoming a threat to the Western hemisphere did she start seriously to cope with the basic economic and social problems of Latin America. In the meantime the Latin Americans were tending to view the cold war as essentially a struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union; in other words, the threat of international Communism as being directed more at United States hegemony than at hemispheric security. These factors have strengthened the idea of reciprocity: economic aid from the United States in return for political support of her policies. The link between United States concern with the Cuban situation and the Alliance for Progress is only the outstanding example of this idea. But it was undisguised at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation, held, incidentally, in the very town where the Alliance for Progress was formally established in August 1961.

The task of gaining Latin American support for United States policies has been aggravated by post-war political and social changes

south of the Rio Grande. The passing of old-style dictatorships and the emergence of the middle groups should in theory be a positive gain for the leader of the 'Free World' and an organization which proclaims that 'The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy' (O.A.S. Charter, Article 5 (d)). In fact, the United States—and not unnaturally—has always wanted co-operative Governments in Latin America, and these only too often have been dictatorships, in some cases of her own making. United States commitment to many of these dictatorships has been a growing embarrassment as one after another has fallen in recent years. The new political and social forces appearing in Latin America have not hitherto been notably friendly to the United States. On the contrary, there has been a marked growth of neutralism and in the demand for an independent foreign policy. This trend is likely to grow among the larger Latin American countries and is already powerful in Brazil, the most important of them. Brazil's recent stand on Cuba (described briefly below) is the more significant because of her long tradition of friendship and co-operation with the United States.

Certain factors have made it difficult for the United States to take a sympathetic view of radical change in Latin America, in addition to the fact that, in the short term anyway, it has been hurtful to United States interests. Dedication to the principle of private enterprise—and the considerable amount of United States capital invested in Latin America—has made United States administrations reluctant to accept the view that large-scale government lending is necessary in Latin America. The Eisenhower Administration, in particular, insisted that economic development in Latin America could be accomplished substantially by private capital if conditions were made sufficiently attractive. Apart from this general attitude, particular groups in the United States Government have had reasons for opposing a change of policy towards Latin America: for example, the military branch, concerned primarily with strategic considerations and sympathetic towards its counterparts in Latin America, and United States diplomatists, sometimes closely identified with United States business interests in Latin America and only too often friendly with the groups opposed to reforms of all kinds.

Among the general public in the United States, with little knowledge of the great changes taking place in Latin America, there is a tendency to demand drastic action to deal with the problem of inter-

national Communism in 'our' hemisphere. It has not been easy for any United States Administration to exercise restraint and to work as far as possible through the Organization of American States in dealing with this problem. As for economic aid for Latin America, Congress reflects the view that such aid should be linked with support for United States policies, especially now, with regard to Castro. Moreover, there is the feeling that the Latin Americans should do more to help themselves, as indeed they must if economic aid is to be effective. In this context, however, the term 'Latin Americans' means just those groups who have been the most co-operative with the United States in the past. Whether the Kennedy Administration can persuade them that it is in their own interests to accept a considerable curtailment of their privileges as part of the Alliance for Progress remains to be seen. These people are aware that if it came to a choice the United States infinitely prefers a Trujillo to a Castro; they will raise the cry of 'intervention' if the United States presses them too hard; and they will not be without friends in the United States. All this underlines a basic weakness in the United States position: the elements in Latin America supporting most strongly her stand against Castro are those, generally speaking, least likely to support the aims of the Alliance for Progress which is the Kennedy Administration's major long-term weapon for combating Castro and Communism in the Western hemisphere.

Once convinced that Cuba was becoming a Soviet satellite, the U.S. Government felt—and important sections of public opinion demanded—that 'something must be done about Castro'. The United States agreed to impose economic and diplomatic sanctions upon the Dominican Republic at the Sixth Meeting of Consultation, held at San José, Costa Rica, in August 1960, in the obvious hope that the Latin Americans would reciprocate by joining her in taking strong action against Cuba at the Seventh Meeting which followed. This hope was disappointed in the vaguely worded 'Declaration of San José' finally adopted by that conference.

In the United States view the situation was grave. Mr Khrushchev's challenge to the Monroe Doctrine was by far the most serious in its whole history. The Eisenhower Administration reaffirmed United States adherence to the Doctrine (i.e. the right to 'go it alone' if need be) and went ahead with plans to support an invasion of Cuba. President Kennedy, whose references to Cuba during the electoral campaign had been equivocal, later warned the Latin American countries that, failing joint action to meet the Communist

threat to the hemisphere, the United States would not hesitate to safeguard her own security. In April 1961 there occurred the ill-fated attempt in the Bay of Pigs; an attempt which, significantly, seems to have increased the President's popularity in the U.S.A. He had 'done something' about Castro even if it had proved a fiasco.

With the President pressing on with the Alliance for Progress, domestic demand for action against Castro received a strong fillip from events in the Dominican Republic in the autumn of 1961. The assassination of the old dictator and the overthrow of his heirs some months earlier did more than remove an embarrassment to the United States. A threat of further upheaval provided the occasion for a show of force by the United States, avowedly to discourage an attempt by the Trujillo family to seize power again. The United States Government clearly was encouraged by the general absence of Latin American criticism of this 'gunboat diplomacy' (due, doubtless, to the unpopularity of the Trujillo regime). It was applauded at home for at last taking a firm line in the Caribbean region; the loudest applause came from those who hoped it was a preliminary to strong measures against Castro.

The United States backed a resolution approved by the Council of the O.A.S. on 22 November 1961 that the Inter-American Peace Committee should investigate charges by Peru that Cuba was conducting Communist subversion in Latin America. She also strongly supported a Colombian resolution of 4 December calling for a Meeting of Consultation to 'consider the threats to the peace and the political independence of the American States that may emerge from the intervention of extra-continental Powers designed to break American solidarity'; that is, to consider measures against the Castro regime in Cuba though this was not actually stated in the resolution. The discussion in this Council meeting revealed an important division of opinion among the members of the O.A.S. The Mexican delegate, in particular, was concerned with the juridical basis of the Colombian resolution, which was finally adopted by fourteen votes to two (Mexico and Cuba) with Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador abstaining. The countries not supporting the resolution included the most important nations of Latin America and much more than half its population.

In the circumstances, the decision to hold the meeting on 10 January 1962 (it was later postponed to 22 January) was perhaps surprising. Some observers believed that the United States should have waited until more time could be devoted to trying to win over

at least one of the biggest States. A number of meetings between President Frondizi of Argentina and leading members of the Kennedy Administration, including the President himself, suggest that a special effort actually was made to win over that country. Whatever transpired at these meetings, the United States seemed to entertain the hope of Argentina's support at Punta del Este—perhaps because of President Frondizi's precarious internal position and the strong anti-Castro sentiments of the Argentine military leaders. United States prestige was at stake, for the conference was seen as a contest between the United States and Cuba; the Alliance for Progress versus Castroism. The Kennedy Administration was known to be pressing for economic and diplomatic sanctions.

The publication of the report of the Inter-American Peace Committee just over a week before the conference opened did not substantially strengthen the United States position. It contained much more evidence of ties between Cuba and the Communist bloc and violation of human rights by the Castro regime than of subversive actions which could be termed aggression under the Rio Treaty and thus justify sanctions. In view of the comparison made at this time between O.A.S. action against the Trujillo regime ('hard') and that adopted against Castro ('soft'), it should be recalled that sanctions against the Dominican Republic were based on evidence of actual acts of aggression, not on the character of the regime as such, even though, of course, the unpopularity of Trujillo in Latin America ensured their adoption.

It was soon evident at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation that the United States had not won over the six (who had not voted for holding the conference in the first place) to supporting sanctions against Cuba. So the United States delegation had to lower its sights and work instead for the expulsion of Cuba from the O.A.S. This itself ran into difficulties, since no machinery exists for the suspension or expulsion of members; nor was there in any case full support for such a move. During the meeting Brazil suggested that a basis be found for co-existence with Cuba. This proposal proved not only unacceptable to the United States, but even 'offensive' to some (Congressional) members of her delegation who were said to have boycotted a Brazilian reception in protest. The United States was finally able to obtain the agreement of all members of the O.A.S. except Cuba to a declaration that the principles of Communism are incompatible with those of the inter-American system. She also obtained the same or substantial majorities for other measures against

Cuba. But only fourteen delegations supported the exclusion of 'the present Government of Cuba' from participation in the system. The 'six' abstained.

The concept of 'incompatibility' which emerged from the Punta del Este conference represented a compromise between sanctions and non-intervention; between the United States view that the very existence of a Communist Government within the hemisphere constitutes aggression and the predominant Latin American view that the internal and external affairs of a State are not to be the subject of intervention. In a sense the ground had been prepared for this new concept by the increasing concern with democracy as an inter-American principle in recent years, as well as by the various resolutions passed at inter-American conferences against international Communism. But acceptance of incompatibility by the conference was a preliminary to Cuba's expulsion from the inter-American system. This was where the six parted company with the United States. For they opposed such expulsion as juridically unsound and politically unacceptable. Nevertheless, the Council of the O.A.S. and other inter-American organs were called upon to take the necessary steps to exclude Cuba. In view of the attitude of the six and the clear lack of a juridical basis for formal expulsion, there may well open up a further debate prejudicing what the United States achieved at the Punta del Este conference.

President Kennedy declared himself well pleased with the results at Punta del Este and warmly congratulated Secretary of State Rusk on his return. As the President pointed out, for the first time all the American States (except Cuba of course) had denounced the concept of Marxism–Leninism as being incompatible with the inter-American system. Cuba had been condemned by name and in far stronger terms than at previous conferences. These were important advances. But how far have they really satisfied the United States? Have they brought nearer the downfall of the Castro regime, still quite obviously the goal for which the United States is working? If not, how strong will domestic pressure be for something more drastic and also for action to punish the 'recalcitrant' six? Some United States columnists have encouraged the belief that 'outlawing' Castro removes from him the protection of the inter-American system and specifically of its non-intervention doctrine. It is possible that the Kennedy Administration will yet support another military action against Cuba. Most serious political observers discount this possibility, but it could happen. 'Watchful waiting', en-

couraged by reports of economic shortages and other internal difficulties in Cuba, seems to be the policy at the moment. In the meantime there is the Alliance for Progress, the implementation of whicl —as has been mentioned above—will encounter problems enough

For Latin Americans, the most significant feature of the conference must be the emergence of a group, including the biggest countries, which held out for an independent line in the face of grea pressure. Even if military leaders in Argentina and Brazil succeedec in forcing a reversal of the positions taken by their foreign minister at Punta del Este, it is doubtful whether that would halt the clea trend towards an independent foreign policy in the larger Latir American countries. Nor if the military leaders were successfu would this be healthy for inter-American relations; that the mos vigorous supporters of the United States position number in thei ranks the least democratic elements in Latin America does not bod well for the future.

Finally, what are the prospects for the Organization of Americar States following the Eighth Meeting of Consultation? Althougl there is an urgent need of increased responsibility on the part of the leaders of Latin America, the future of the O.A.S. still depends primarily upon the Latin American policy of the United States—upor how far the most powerful country in the Western hemisphere wil continue to exercise restraint in the face of considerable frustratior and—at least in her view—enormous provocation; how far she is able and willing to make a great and sustained effort to assist the countries of Latin America to achieve the economic and social goals of the Alliance for Progress; and how far she is prepared to accept the restrictions placed upon her by membership of a system of treaties within which it will be increasingly difficult to obtain ful support for her policies. The Good Neighbour policy was formulated to secure United States objectives through goodwill engendered mainly by the exercise of restraint. Today the United States is called upon to do far more for her neighbours in return for substantially less than the full attainment of her major policy objectives. This new situation, so apparent at Punta del Este, must raise doubts in the United States about the value of the O.A.S. It calls for a reappraisal of United States policy on Latin America and the place of the inter-American system in it. Upon the outcome of such a reappraisal will largely depend the future of the Organization of American States.

GORDON CONNELL-SMITH

Reflections on Africa and the Commonwealth

The following article is based upon discussions which took place at an unofficial Commonwealth conference which met in Lagos from 8 to 16 January 1962. The conference had been initiated by the Prime Minister of the Federation of Nigeria; the host was the newly formed Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, and the forty-five participants were drawn from all the independent countries and most of the self-governing territories of the Commonwealth, especially those in Africa.

THE current drive towards regional unity both in Africa and in Europe has faced the Commonwealth with a familiar question in a new and sharpened form. Can the Commonwealth, which prides itself on making no inroads on national sovereignty and rarely even attempts to reach collective decisions, maintain its importance alongside newer groupings, which explicitly aim to reduce national sovereignty by promoting joint regional action over a growing range of practical matters?

Debate on this question provided the climax of the recent Lagos conference, but before this point was reached a good deal of light had been thrown on the attitude of independent Africa to the many issues which confront it as it steps on to the centre of the international stage.

At the root of the African approach to all current problems is the importance attached to the Pan-African idea. It is very easy for outsiders to raise a supercilious smile at the thought that the vast and heterogeneous continent of Africa is about to burst upon the world scene as a united force. Europeans and Asians alike recall the strife-torn history of their own continents and reflect on the immense difficulties which still surround all efforts at unification. They note the lack of communications between different parts of Africa, above all the lack of any common African language, and the difficulties caused both by inter-tribal rivalries and by the artificial divisions created in Africa by European colonization.

There are indeed formidable obstacles to the unification of the continent, or even of any particular region of it. Moreover, some of the obstacles may well become more serious and more divisive before they can be finally overcome, for many new States have to

begin by ensuring the coherence of the limited political units which they have inherited from the colonial past, before they can embark upon an equally determined effort to build wider loyalties.

It would be a great mistake to think that these considerations have escaped the notice of African leaders or that, when all are added together, they justify the conclusion that Pan-Africanism is either an idle dream or perhaps a mere cover for the political ambitions of a few individuals or groups. Many leading Africans, including notably Dr Azikiwe, the Governor-General of Nigeria, have gone on record with highly realistic appreciations of the length and difficulty of the road to be travelled and have made practical proposals about the first steps to be taken. Others have concentrated on the popularization of the concept of unity and of the final goal.

As in the building of all great political movements, there are the practical technicians, concerned to assure the foundations before they put on the roof, and there are the 'dreamers of dreams', rousing men to activity by visions of the finished temple. Both are essential to ultimate success. In the African context the 'dreamers of dreams' are the preachers of 'négritude', of the 'African personality', of the peculiarly African contribution which they believe their continent is about to make to the culture and government of the world.

How real this distinctively African contribution will prove to be only time will show, but in the present phase the mere idea of it is a potent and on the whole a constructive force in the evolution of peoples who are all emerging from foreign domination. They are greatly helped in facing their new responsibilities by the confidence which the concept of Pan-Africanism can give. Those who, like Sir Roy Welensky, profess to see in Pan-Africanism only a new racialism of a malignant kind are surely mistaking the legitimate assertion of racial equality for the assertion of racial superiority, which was so hideously dramatized by Nazism. It is not among the Pan-Africans that the imitators of Nazism in the continent are to be found, though it would be foolish to deny that a movement of this kind could take dangerous turnings, if its legitimate aims were to suffer frustration for too long.

Once the all-pervading determination to assert the equality of Africans is grasped, it becomes easier to appreciate the African attitude to the remains of colonialism in Africa, to the task of securing economic independence, and to the cold war.

The remaining colonial territories in Africa, and the territories where racial superiority is maintained as a basis for minority rule,

will inevitably be excluded from the Pan-African dream until their regimes change. Britain or any other Power which is thought to be lending them support will endanger its own good standing in Africa as a whole. This is a simple principle to grasp, if not always easy to apply.

It is harder to see clearly how the legitimate ambition of economic independence can best be given its due outlet. In the long run development of the local economy is the indispensable element, for an undeveloped country can never feel truly independent. But there will be a long period in which foreign skills and foreign capital will be a condition of progress. Africans will want this foreign aid but will feel resentful that essential elements in their economies should remain at the mercy of foreign Governments or shareholders. The fear of exploitation, of 'neo-colonialism', probably cannot be wholly eradicated until development is far advanced, until African economies have been diversified and the accumulation of indigenous African capital has begun. In the meantime what can be done by more developed countries is to adjust their own aid and investment policies so as to take account of this African need; to avoid the temptation to retain an exclusive economic position in formerly dependent countries; to enlist as much indigenous skill as possible, especially at the higher levels, in every undertaking; and to channel foreign capital increasingly into those areas of manufacture which local enterprise cannot yet attempt.

Another aspect of the search for true independence is the well-nigh universal desire in Africa to remain 'non-aligned' in the quarrels of the great Powers. To Africans 'non-alignment' means both avoidance of military blocs or alliances and a diplomatic posture which will enable them to decide their attitude on any given issue without being bound by prior commitments. In this their desire closely parallels the nineteenth-century determination of the developing United States to remain aloof from the quarrels of 'wicked old Europe'. In the twentieth century, isolation from world tensions is unlikely to be attainable by developing Africa and Africans know it, but they will rightly try to minimize their involvement. Since the 'non-alignment' of African States corresponds very well with what Western countries would in any case wish to see, there is here a ready-made basis for co-operation. The same is probably less true for the countries of the Communist bloc, for their aid is inevitably in part, at least, politically motivated. Their long-term aims exclude the concept of non-alignment and, as at present formulated,

involve the winning of Africa, as of other areas, to their own system and objectives.

Most of the African States are determined to trade with Communist countries and to use their own judgment about receiving Communist aid, but relatively few of them go so far as to view all the various Powers, from whose machinations they seek to protect themselves, with equal suspicion. The appeal of Marxism–Leninism, at least in tropical Africa, is not yet great. Though it may seem to outsiders that the drawbacks of the Communist system tend to be underestimated, this is simply because Communist countries are far away and their influence, outside a few areas, is only marginally felt.

There is, however, one strong appeal which the Soviet Union and, *a fortiori*, China can increasingly make. Both countries are achieving rapid development, and one of the instruments of this achievement can be seen to be the monolithic and authoritarian quality of their political systems. At a time when many African States are struggling to adapt the pluralistic concepts of Western society to their own urgent needs and are not finding it easy, it cannot be wondered at if questions are asked about the universal appropriateness of the Westminster parliamentary model.

This tendency is reinforced by the consciousness that tribal tradition, in Africa as elsewhere, embodies a belief both in leadership and in the notion that democratic discussion should be followed by the rallying of the whole community behind the decisions taken. The idea of a permanent 'loyal Opposition' is something quite different. It is proving hard for many ruling parties or tribal groups to grasp and also, be it said, equally hard for those who are in opposition. Moreover, Africans whose first objective is the modernization of their countries find it difficult to accept as perfect a system under which half of the country's scarce political cadres have to wait in the wings, carping and criticizing, when the need is for a combined national effort.

The idea is thus growing up that, while the main democratic principles developed in the Western world should be maintained, especially the independence of the judiciary and other guarantees of human rights, there is a case for regarding the early years of independence as a national emergency and for devising transitional institutions capable of generating a truly national effort without opening the way to tyranny.

If the proposed remedy sounds vague and dangerous, the reality of the need which it is designed to meet is easily grasped. What is

now done about it will depend on African decisions. The role of outsiders is to try to understand the process and to avoid the hasty inference that every deviation from Western models is necessarily a step down the slope to Communism.

It would not have required a prophet to foresee that these problems, economic and political, were bound in some form or other to become acute in Africa in the post-independence years, but one immediate issue, of particular concern to the Commonwealth, was not widely predicted. That is the British application to join the European Economic Community. It is no matter for surprise that the British application should have few if any friends among Asians or Africans. They may concede that the Common Market has brought benefits to its six founder members in Europe, but its effect upon the rest of the world is not welcomed and its future development and intentions are regarded with suspicion.

It does not seem to be sufficiently appreciated in Africa that the existence of the Common Market, with its associated African States,[1] already poses a problem for the Commonwealth countries of Africa, irrespective of any consequences which may flow from Britain's joining the Community. Indeed, many British people have feared that, with Britain remaining outside, Commonwealth African countries would suffer increasing discrimination against their exports to European markets, especially Western Germany. This is already happening owing to the extension to the whole Common Market area of certain advantages which the French-speaking African States previously enjoyed only in the market of one metropolitan Power. This discrimination between Africans, arising purely from the division of the Six and the Seven in Europe, has been used as an argument for Britain's joining the Six and carrying the African Commonwealth countries with her into association with Europe, thus ending the discrimination not only in Europe but in Africa too.

The extent to which the problem looks different to African Commonwealth countries is striking. Britain's entry into the Common Market would, of course, benefit them only if they were offered and if they accepted association with the enlarged Common Market on the same terms as those enjoyed by their French-speaking African neighbours. As they contemplate the determination of these neighbours to retain all their existing advantages, they naturally wonder whether association on the basis of full equality is going to be offered

[1] These include the former French African dependencies other than Guinea; the ex-Belgian Congo and Ruanda Urundi; and Somalia.

to them at all. But even supposing that it is, they see political objections to their acceptance of the offer, which outweigh in their minds the purely economic advantages. Indeed, one has the impression that their political distaste for the whole idea has so far inhibited a cool calculation of the possibilities which might be open to them if they could agree among themselves upon a common point of view and could combine to press it upon Britain and Europe.

The distaste arises from the feeling that their trade has been too closely tied to Britain and Europe in the past, and that anything which seems to institutionalize this trend for a further period may restrict their freedom to develop trade with such areas as the Communist bloc, the United States, and Japan. They fear that it may retard the growth of inter-African trade too. On top of this is their distrust of Paris and their conviction that France still retains a tight hold upon the policies of her former dependencies. Association with the Common Market is seen as a device for achieving this result.

It is of course true that the original agreement of Association was negotiated before French Africa attained independence, and undoubtedly reflected the predominance of Paris. This agreement will be superseded at the end of 1962 by a new one. The new formula is not yet decided, but it is known that it is intended to provide for political institutions, ministerial, parliamentary, and official, which will give to the Associated Territories equality of status with the full members of the Community in the management of their joint affairs. Economically, it will put greater emphasis upon development aid and less upon preferences.

Whatever the reality underlying these provisions, whose final form is in any case unlikely to be known for some time, Commonwealth Africans are going to require some persuading that Association is the right solution for them. This explains why many Africans feel that the British application, so far from offering them a remedy for the present discrimination between different parts of Africa, simply threatens them with the prospect of their main overseas customer, Britain, crossing to the other side of the discriminatory line. In that event they would look to Britain to negotiate terms which would offer them at least a breathing-space in which to find new markets. They would try to achieve a common front among themselves to strengthen their bargaining position. They would no doubt also seek the support of the United States, whose proposals, made to the European Economic Community, for the virtual elimi-

nation of import duties, quotas, and other taxes upon tropical products would help to ease their problems.

At the present time, the greatest need is for this whole matter to be more fully examined in Africa, if possible by joint bodies representing both Commonwealth countries and the present Associated States. In the meantime there is no mistaking the fact that much of Commonwealth Africa has taken Britain's new approach to Europe as serving notice that in future her regional interests are to take priority over her older Commonwealth connections. This impression has, rightly or wrongly, been reinforced both by the introduction of the Immigration Bill into the British House of Commons and by indications of Britain's solidarity with her European neighbours accentuated by recent voting in the United Nations.

These attitudes reveal the extent to which the 'mother-country' still holds a special position in Commonwealth thinking. It is true that people from all over the Commonwealth will say, if asked, that the Commonwealth must in future cease to be 'U.K.-centred', that meetings of Commonwealth Prime Ministers should rotate from one capital to another, and that in the modern Commonwealth it is no longer acceptable that all roads should lead to London. Yet the fact remains that the mother-country's conduct is still judged by a special standard. Countries which themselves impose strict controls upon Commonwealth immigration are dismayed when Britain proposes to control it too. Africans who would not tolerate any Commonwealth criticism of regional integration in Africa talk of 'betrayal of the Commonwealth' when Britain proposes to unite with her European neighbours. This is no matter for surprise or complaint. It is a natural product of past history. But one must surely ask how this sentimental expectation that Britain will remain the lynch-pin of Commonwealth unity is going to correspond in future with her ability to play this part, or indeed with the sort of status which the rest of the Commonwealth is in practice now willing to accord to her.

If one accepts the view, widely expressed at Lagos, that what is needed is a Commonwealth in which emphasis upon various forms of multilateral co-operation around the perimeter increasingly replaces the concept of bilateral arrangements between each member and the mother-country at the centre, one has to ask what forms this new co-operation can be expected to take and how it is to be promoted. No one denies that there is still a solid basis of material interest, in the shape of trade links, investment, and the facilities offered by the sterling area, which, if not precisely co-terminous

with the Commonwealth, nevertheless has a predominantly Commonwealth character. Much of this is likely to persist for a time, but its relative importance seems bound to decline with the ending of United Kingdom dominance, the erosion of Commonwealth preferences, and the diversification of the growing foreign trade of other member States.

It is rather in the field of consultation that the Commonwealth's main claim to effectiveness is nowadays advanced. There are undoubtedly a range of contacts and an intimacy of exchanges among Commonwealth countries which exceed anything normally achieved in relations between foreign States. Even here, however, it may be observed that it is above all the United Kingdom who is expected to provide the driving force. Particularly intimate exchanges between most other members of the Commonwealth are the exception rather than the rule. Moreover, while criticism is quickly levelled at the United Kingdom if she mistakes the mere exchange of information for genuine consultation (an accusation made at the time of the Suez crisis and again over the application to join the Common Market), it is not so clear that all other members apply the same criteria to themselves when their own sectional interests are in volved.

There are indeed some sceptics who assert that consultation within the Commonwealth has tended to become an end in itself, a process valued rather because it represents an agreeable style of conversation than because it achieves any particular results. Commonwealth countries, it is said, tend to keep out of their fraternal discussions anything liable to disturb one another's equanimity, and consequently to talk less frankly to one another than they do to others.

While there may be some exaggeration in this picture, and while it is legitimate to claim that exchanges of view may often be mutually useful even if no joint action can be clearly seen to result from them, the effectiveness of Commonwealth consultation must in the long run depend upon the priority which members give in framing their policies to the views which their colleagues have advanced. If the priority sinks too low, consultation becomes a waste of time.

While most Commonwealth members continue to believe that they can proceed some way along the road of regional integration without damaging their Commonwealth ties, the question surely remains whether groupings which exist to do things in common are not bound, eventually, to acquire priority over an association which

has no such purpose. Africans are openly asking this question and are saying that consultation by itself has only limited appeal to them. They need help and want to know if they can reasonably look to the Commonwealth to provide it, for instance by organizing a Development Fund or at least by co-ordinating technical assistance.

The one field in which at present there seems to be some chance of these wishes being met is in education. Commonwealth co-operation in education is already established and derives strength from the use of the English language and from many well-tried Commonwealth links at university and other levels. It is not so easy to see how the Commonwealth could provide an equally satisfactory framework for handling economic aid. Any effective multilateral scheme for organizing aid to Africa would inevitably have to include non-Commonwealth countries both at the giving and at the receiving ends. Commonwealth co-operation can oil the wheels of such an enterprise, but cannot and should not claim to keep the machinery itself as a Commonwealth preserve.

The most encouraging feature of today's Commonwealth is the evident desire of its members, including its African members, that it should flourish and should offer them a sense of free participation in a world-wide community. This is an asset that no one would wish to throw away, but words alone will not maintain it for ever. If the Commonwealth is to keep its vitality, as its members turn increasingly to other groupings for their practical needs, a bigger effort of imagination and performance will be needed than either Britain or the other countries of the Commonwealth have so far shown themselves willing to make.

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Note of the Month

New Soviet Farm Policy

A PLENARY session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was held from 5 to 9 March, attended by more than 400 delegates and by many agricultural experts. Agriculture was the only published item on the agenda and on the closing day the meeting adopted unanimously a Decision, the key sentence of which ran as follows:

> Sharply criticizing shortcomings in the development of agriculture in the Republics, the plenum of the Central Committee most gravely underlines the necessity for raising the responsibility of Party and administrative organizations and of every Communist for the state of affairs in agriculture, for a speedy increase in the production of grain, cotton, meat, milk, and other products.

The urgency given to this 'powerful upsurge of agriculture' is explicable under three main heads. First, the disappointing figures for agriculture in 1961; according to Mr Khrushchev's reckoning in his opening speech, the targets set under the present Seven-Year Plan were fulfilled in 1961 only to the extent of 90 per cent for grain, 80 per cent for milk, and 75 per cent for meat, a failure due in part to the ambitiously high levels set in the Plan. Secondly, the gap between the long-term targets and results is widening. Concessions have been made to the farming community, ranging from reductions in taxes and delivery quotas to increases in farm prices and agricultural wages, and administrative changes have been introduced, from the abolition of machine tractor stations and Republic Ministries of Agriculture as controlling agencies to the amalgamation of collectives and the strengthening of State farms. Yet results continue to fall short. The target of the present Seven-Year Plan requires an increase of 70 per cent, equivalent to almost 8 per cent per annum. Achievement so far has been between one-quarter and one-third of this annual goal, and there seems no prospect of catching up in the remaining years of the Plan.

Thirdly, there is an ever-widening discrepancy between the rates of growth of industry and agriculture. Since 1953 the urban popu-

lation has increased by one-third, the industrial working class by almost 50 per cent, and the payments and benefits received by the population by more than one-half. Even if the claim of an annual increase in industrial real wages by 5 per cent is exaggerated, there is no doubt that money is chasing goods, and although an increasing amount of wage income is spent on industrial durables, there is a real shortage of dairy products, fruit, and vegetables; and meat and dairy produce are still counted as luxuries rather than necessities.

When Mr Khrushchev initiated the virgin lands campaign in 1954, he apparently calculated on the basis of two good harvests, one medium result, and two crop failures every five years. The first five years ran in fact roughly true to form. The year 1961 brought yet another disappointing crop in Kazakhstan, but owing to a substantial increase of acreage under grain, and to favourable weather in the Ukraine, the total crop was said to be 3 million tons higher than in 1960. As a result of increased pressure on collectives and State farms grain deliveries to the State surpassed those of the previous year by about 5·5 million tons. But fodder requirements were still not met and supplies of meat, milk, and dairy produce were unsatisfactory. In his opening speech at the plenary session, Mr Khrushchev admitted that 'there simply is not enough meat'. Collectives and State farms increased their livestock in 1961 by 6 million head of cattle and 6 million pigs instead of delivering these animals to the slaughterhouses.

At current rates of performance there is no prospect of reaching the ambitious targets of food production in 1965, let alone of reaching and surpassing U.S. *per capita* consumption levels. Two practical steps, one technical and one administrative, were therefore put before the Central Committee: the ploughing-up of over 40 million hectares (100 million acres) of grassland, fallow, and acreage under oats, together with increased allocations of mineral fertilizers and farm machines for the purpose of gathering fodder crops of higher yield and fodder content; and the setting-up of a farm production directorate, under high-level Party supervision, at Union, Republic, regional, and district level, which is to check, through inspectorates, on performance and management of both collectives and State farms.

It is noteworthy that there is no suggestion of reconsideration of agricultural prices nor of incentives to members of collectives (only the inspectors of the new directorate may expect payment by results). Such questions as the private plot, the creation of agro-

towns, the provision of fixed minimum wages for members of collectives, or the adjustment of net incomes of collectives by way of a land tax were not raised.

There would seem to be four main reasons for the failure to check the continued stagnation in the principal sectors of Soviet agriculture. Mr Khrushchev appears to have made a quite unrealistic assessment of the possibilities of grassland, fallow, and areas under oats as alternative sources of supply. They could only yield the high returns shown by the research stations, which have formed the basis of his calculations, if they were to receive substantial additions of fertilizers and farm machinery, the supplies of which have either increased little or declined in recent years. Moreover, even if such supplies were increased, they would not be likely to yield the required returns unless there were added incentives and monetary inducements for managers of State farms and chairmen and members of collectives. Current prices do not reflect cost relations, and genuinely economic transactions are thus limited to the proceeds of private plots. But there is likely to be resistance on the part of members of the collectives to any ploughing-up of public grasslands or badly used areas which are now largely grazed by the 20 million or so head of privately owned cattle.

Climax in Algeria

The O.A.S. and the Pieds Noirs

WHEN President de Gaulle began to negotiate with the F.L.N.,[1] the European community in Algeria, which had hitherto played a secondary and relatively passive part in the war, emerged as a protagonist in its own right. The O.A.S. (*Organisation de l'Armée Secrète*, or Secret Army Organization), in a sense the European equivalent of the F.L.N., has set out to prove that Algeria cannot be governed without its consent, and at the time of writing has gone a long way to substantiate this claim.

This naturally raises the question why the overwhelming majority of Algerian Europeans have given their support, active or passive, to a body which openly flouts the authority of the French Government and does not hesitate to use unbridled violence against its agents. Epithets such as 'fascist', 'right-wing *colon* organization', 'settler intransigence', or 'ultras' do not take us very far, since we are in fact dealing with more or less total rebellion against their mother country by a community of some million people. To understand why a whole community should act in this way we must go behind the stereotypes and see the *pieds noirs* both as they are and as they see themselves.[2]

In the first place, application of the term 'settler' to the *pieds noirs* has several misleading connotations. They see themselves not as foreigners in an alien continent but as Frenchmen living in France on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, in a country they wrested from devastation and restored to its Roman heritage. Over five-sixths of the European community—though a smaller proportion, of course, of adults—were in fact born in Algeria. Most of them can trace ancestors back for two or three generations, on one side at least, to the half-million settlers who had arrived before 1860, or to the wave of immigration which followed the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. Though only a minority of *pieds noirs* actually come from the pioneer stock who drained the marshes, settled the land, and built new

[1] The Algerian Insurgent leadership in exile has actually described itself as the G.P.R.A. (*Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne*), a title not accepted by the French. Its military arm was described as the A.L.N.—*Armée de la Libération Nationale*—while the term F.L.N.—*Front de la Libération Nationale*—was, properly speaking, reserved for the political arm. For the sake of convenience, however, the usual custom is followed here of referring to all three as F.L.N.

[2] The term *pieds noirs* was originally applied to the local Europeans pejoratively by Metropolitan Frenchmen but has since been adopted with pride.

towns, the majority share the belief that they have the inherited characteristics of pioneers, including courage and self-reliance, and this has always been a factor shaping their political orientation. On the whole, they do not live as Europeans do in Black Africa, as a small *élite* surrounded by and dependent on the native population. They live in large concentrations, over two-thirds in the five major towns, nearly nine-tenths in towns with a sizeable European community. Until recently Europeans constituted a majority in the towns where most of them were settled (they are still a majority in Oran), and in addition most of the Muslims with whom they came into contact were also drawn from the million or so who had become most Europeanized.[1]

Though the average living standards and social status of the *pieds noirs* were higher than those of the Muslims, they were no higher than those of Metropolitan France, and differed relatively little from those of the Europeanized Muslims with whom the urban *pieds noirs* had most to do. There were relatively fewer manual workers among the *pieds noirs* than among Metropolitan Frenchmen, and almost no unskilled or casual labourers, but this difference was largely compensated for by the large number of self-employed 'small men', white-collar workers, petty officials, and the like. From the economic point of view the Algerian population could be divided into two groups: those living under the modern economy, and those still adhering to the traditional subsistence economy. The modern economy encompasses about a third of the population, some 2½ million, i.e. the 1 million *pieds noirs* and 1½ million Muslims. Besides providing the unskilled and agricultural labour the Muslims also accounted for a substantial proportion of the skilled labour force, and were strongly represented in the professions, service occupations, commerce, industry, large-scale agriculture, the police, and the army.

Though France, French culture, and the European community dominated Algerian life, there was no institutionalized 'white superiority' of the kind which characterized (or still characterizes parts of) Black Africa. In most fields, it is true, the European had a better chance than the Muslim, but these advantages were by no means

[1] Not all statistics on Algeria differentiate between *pieds noirs* and Muslims. The best available source on the relative conditions of the two communities is the General Report on the Constantine Plan, a 500-page closely documented study published by the authorities on 30 October 1960, the second anniversary of the launching of the Plan by President de Gaulle. Demographic changes occasioned by the more recent troubles are almost impossible to calculate.

absolute; the Muslim could make his way in life, and his personal social status differed comparatively little from that of a Frenchman in the same economic, educational, and social category. Europeans and Muslims were not segregated socially and residentially: they lived in the same quarters, mixed, ate, and drank together. There was a certain amount of inter-marriage between Muslim men and European women; obstacles to inter-marriage in the other direction came primarily from the Muslim community.

The attitude of the *pieds noirs* towards the Muslims has always been ambivalent. On the one hand they have feared the Muslims as what the Russian intellectuals used to call the 'dark people'—ignorant priest-ridden masses liable to swing from apathy to mob violence, a danger to French civilization and Republican institutions. Some of the '*petits blancs*' feared them as competitors. On the other hand they genuinely believed that French presence was desired by the mass of the Muslim population in their own interests, and made much of an Algerian *mystique*, which saw them and Muslims as 'fellow Algerians' bound by a common loyalty to their North African home. The war in Algeria made no difference to this belief; on the contrary, one major tenet of the O.A.S. has been that the majority of Muslims still favour the French presence, or at least prefer it to F.L.N. dictatorship—otherwise, they claim, the French would have been pushed into the sea long ago. (A considerable part of the American and British press seems to have taken for granted that the F.L.N. does, in fact, enjoy the support of an overwhelming majority of Muslims, and did so from early on in the war. There are many reasons for contesting this belief. Detailed argument would lie outside the scope of this article, but suffice it to say that the French authorities and *pieds noirs* have always been able to make out a strong *prima facie* case to support their contention, certainly strong enough to maintain their own belief in the rightness of their cause, which is what counts in this context. Indeed, they have tended to under-estimate the support for the F.L.N. among substantial sections of the Muslim population.)

The picture of an Algerian lobby in Paris consistently thwarting reforms and finally driving the Arabs to desperation is a half-truth, since there never was one single *pied-noir* approach to this question, apart from the almost universal desire that Algeria should remain part of France. The agricultural interests, *colons* in the real sense of the word, often retained an unenlightened attitude almost to the end, opposing anything which might interfere with their supply of

docile, cheap labour. But in this they did not differ markedly from Arab farmers, in fact they generally treated their workers better than their Arab equivalent. In some cases, where *colons* left Algeria after 1954 to take up farming in the more peaceful atmosphere of Metropolitan France, their workers insisted on being taken with them.

The European workers were strongly trade unionist in sentiment, and usually voted for one or other of the left-wing parties. Their attitude towards the 'Algerian problem', i.e. the Muslims, reflected their political philosophy and the line of their parties at any given time. By and large they believed the problem to be economic and social rather than national, and saw the solution in solidarity of Muslim and European workers inside the labour movement to struggle for social and economic rights. They met with a fair measure of success with the regularly employed Muslims, particularly the skilled or semi-skilled workers, who remained in the non-denominational or multiracial unions till many were persuaded to leave when the F.L.N. formed its own all-Muslim unions. Many, indeed, were forced to leave the unions at the point of the gun or knife by the F.L.N., who referred to them pejoratively as 'the aristocracy of labour', a term originally coined by Lenin to describe the non-revolutionary trade unionists in Britain; this naturally antagonized the European workers.

None of the left-wing parties had ever gone so far as to advocate Algeria's secession from France, and indeed they could hardly do so without isolating themselves completely from all *pied-noir* and French support. The Communists took an extremely tortuous and ambiguous line on this question, often co-operating with Algerian nationalists on issues where they conflicted with the Government or establishment, without taking a stand on the main point at issue. Soon after the outbreak of the war, the F.L.N. itself turned on the Algerian Communist Party. They not only declared that for all practical purposes 'the Communist Party had ceased to exist as a serious organization largely due to the overwhelming number of Europeans within its ranks . . .' but in many ways speeded up this process by one means or another.[1]

Only an insignificant number of Europeans in Algeria supported the F.L.N. in its armed struggle, and they were soon arrested, killed, or escaped to Tunisia. It was noticeable that the Left and Left-of-Centre in Metropolitan France adopted an entirely different ap-

[1] *El-Mujahid.* Special Issue on the Soummam Conference of August 1956. No date or place of issue given, but the place of publication was in fact Tunis.

proach from their opposite numbers in Algeria, people of similar social status, background, and general approach. Though every *pied noir* was convinced that he 'understood the Muslims', this very familiarity helped to prevent him from understanding modern Arab nationalism, which inevitably struck belated roots in Algeria too.

Reforms in Algeria, whether in the mid-1930s, late 1940s, or early 1950s, did not fail only because of *pied-noir* opposition and Metropolitan indifference. Nationalist opposition also played its part. Algerian nationalism could be divided roughly into two categories; the terms 'moderate' and 'extremist' usually applied to the nationalist groups are not particularly apt, since their basic aims were different. One group was largely concerned with obtaining social, political, and economic gains for the Algerian Muslims as individuals within the existing political framework or something similar; the other group wanted a sovereign Arab Algeria distinct from France. (Within this group there were moderates and extremists, the first favouring legal methods and close ties with France, while the second believed that only revolutionary action could succeed. The first group, which remained loyal to their former leader Messali Haj, became the M.N.A. [*Mouvement National Algérien*], while the second group became the F.L.N., which did its best to destroy the M.N.A. by the use of terror as well as propaganda.) Those nationalists who were usually described as moderates favoured the reforms, supported by European liberals and the labour movement. The second, extremist, group opposed, boycotted, and worked against reform because they regarded it as designed to perpetuate Algeria's annexation to France, whereas they wished to organize the Algerians to struggle for secession. So, as so often happens, the reforms were opposed from both extremes, Arab nationalist and *colon*, and European moderates resented this.

The outbreak of the rebellion in 1954[1] came as a shock to the *pieds noirs*, who had compulsively failed to see that the changes taking place in the world around them could not leave Algeria unchanged. The sudden terror—bombs exploding in cinemas, shops, and schools, random shootings in the street, destruction of farms and warehouses, and killing and mutilation of civilians—often led to outbreaks of hysteria and mob violence, and to a demand for sterner measures of repression. An objective history of the Algerian war, when it is eventually written, may show that indiscriminate

[1] For a general survey see 'The Seven-Year Struggle in Algeria: Retrospect and Prospect', in *The World Today*, November 1961.

reprisals did more than anything else to win the F.L.N. its support among the Muslims. Indeed, the Sétif massacres in 1945—when the *pieds noirs* and French Army lost their heads completely and ran amok, killing thousands of Muslims and virtually destroying whole villages in revenge for a Muslim outbreak in which a hundred French civilians were murdered—are considered by many informed observers to have played a substantial part in setting the scene for the 1954 uprising.

Their spirits began to rise in the years that followed, as the army and administration began to regain the initiative, and when it seemed that the Algerian tail had not lost its power to wag the French dog. The conversion of Jacques Soustelle—who was originally sent by M. Mendès-France to pave the way for Algerian independence —to active leadership of the struggle to keep Algeria French, M. Guy Mollet's *volte-face*, and the overthrow of the Pflimlin Government in 1958 convinced them that no Government which did not fight actively to defend the *status quo* in Algeria could retain power in Paris. The year 1958 and most of 1959 were golden years for the *pieds noirs*: terrorism in the Algiers area was largely suppressed; large areas of the countryside were pacified, and many villages rallied to the French cause; the F.L.N.'s forces were driven back behind the barrage. President de Gaulle had promised to crush the rebellion and it seemed that he would succeed in doing so.

The President's radical change of policy in his statement of 16 September 1959 came to the *pieds noirs* as a traumatic shock, all the more so because it followed a period of euphoria. The attempt of the *pieds noirs* in January 1960 to repeat their success of 1958 failed, though not by so wide a margin as to dissuade them from future attempts. The *putsch* of April 1961 also came close enough to success to convince the majority of *pieds noirs* that the next time might be luckier.

To the Europeans, the talks begun in May 1961 at Evian and continued at Lugrin in July represented a betrayal of themselves and of everything that France stood for. It seemed to them that recognition of the F.L.N. not only betrayed the hardships and sacrifices undergone in several years of war, but also deprived them of the fruit of 120 years of hard work. Modern Algeria, the fertile coastal plains, the roads, harbours, railways and buildings, factories and mines, shops and warehouses were all the work of the *pieds noirs* (and French money). To most Europeans it seemed quite impossible that they could go on living in a sovereign Algeria. For one thing,

the F.L.N. favoured a one-party dictatorship, and it seemed to them certain that once the F.L.N. was installed in provisional authority it would make its power absolute. For another thing, it seemed unlikely that any independent Government would tolerate the existence of what it would see as a foreign community enjoying an average standard of living immeasurably higher than that of the native nine-tenths. The question at stake for most *pieds noirs* was not one of losing their 'privileges'—as the American and British press often assumes—but their homes, livelihood, and property.

The situation, as it appeared from Algiers, was fundamentally different from the way it appeared in Paris. For the *pieds noirs* Algeria is the centre of the world, and they were unable to understand that Paris had to take the international situation into account; the pressure from Afro-Asian countries, even pro-Western ones, and from France's own allies to come to terms with the F.L.N. had grown throughout the period. President de Gaulle and his advisers, having rejected the solution of partition and found proposals for setting up Algerian authority without the F.L.N. no longer practicable, saw no alternative to the peace-talks, and concentrated their efforts on obtaining the best terms that they could. They hoped, and still hope, that by cutting their losses, accepting most of the F.L.N.'s basic demands, and offering the massive aid without which no Algerian Government can hold the country together, let alone develop it into a modern nation, they could win concessions in the fields which they considered most important. These include the naval base at Mers El-Kebir—whose loss could have placed a severe strain on the Navy's loyalties—and guarantees for the Europeans. Paris hoped, and still hopes, that most of the legitimate preoccupations of the *pieds noirs* can be safeguarded.

Under other circumstances Paris might have convinced the *pieds noirs*, but the combined resentment and mistrust felt by the latter for a man and a Government that they believed had betrayed them, their belief that they could still turn the tables, and the secrecy in which the Evian talks were shrouded combined to bring about a complete breakdown in communications between the French Government and the *pieds noirs*. The latter no longer believe wholeheartedly in the possibility of maintaining *Algérie française*, though they will not admit this publicly, but they refuse to accept any settlement reached and implemented without their participation as a contracting party, or *interlocuteur valable*, to use their own words. The O.A.S. believe themselves capable of preventing the implementa-

tion of any settlement reached against their will. They have already shown themselves to be enterprising, bold, and quite ruthless. They have the moral and material support of the overwhelming majority of the *pieds noirs*—of French, Mediterranean, and Jewish origin alike—and believe that the French armed forces would not stomach the measures which would be necessary to repress them.

In some ways the situation created by the cease-fire of 19 March 1962 is similar to that associated with the Curragh incident in Ireland nearly fifty years ago. The Metropolitan Government, after belatedly accepting nationalist demands, is met with an upsurge of resistance by the loyalist minority, prepared to show that anything the F.L.N. could do they can do better, and convinced that the armed forces will not intervene against them and in favour of the rebels.

The O.A.S. have many advantages in their struggle. They have already shown that they can paralyse life in the large towns and prevent the docks, electricity, transport, and other vital services from working if they wish. The French Government cannot effectively administer the country without their co-operation, let alone implement its plans for rehabilitation and development. In some ways a parallel can be drawn between the O.A.S. and the F.L.N., whose methods they have been reproducing in so many of their aspects. For several years the French authorities tried to suppress the F.L.N. by force, or appeal above its head to the Muslim population; only after several costly years did they come to the conclusion that negotiation of a political solution had to be found. The O.A.S. at present enjoys a far greater measure of support from the *pieds noirs* than the F.L.N. ever did among the Muslims, and they believe that a substantial section of Muslims will back them too, from fear of F.L.N. reprisals, while the French Government's will or ability to deploy force against them in anything like the degree and manner employed against the F.L.N. remains to be seen. This lends some credibility to the view that sooner or later the French authorities will have to come to terms with the *pieds noirs* and the O.A.S. too.

But at the time of writing many obstacles to such an agreement are evident. In the first place, the O.A.S. has insisted on challenging not only the French Government's policies and authority in Algeria but also its right to rule in France. In the second place, its defiance, and the counter-measures by the authorities, have inevitably exacerbated relations between the two sides, making reconciliation and mutual understanding more difficult to come by. In the third

place, the O.A.S. has drawn on itself the hostility both of the French Left and also of substantial sections of the middle-of-the-road French public, not only by its intransigence in Algeria, but also by its actions in France and the disreputable sources from which it draws support there. Furthermore, whereas the F.L.N. from the very beginning had a clear idea of what its political aims were, the O.A.S. and its supporters have not yet worked out any viable political perspectives. They know what they bitterly oppose, but what political solution they hope to arrive at now that *Algérie française* is patently irresurrectable has yet to be worked out. The danger is that, whereas the F.L.N. gained in realism from experience, the leadership of the O.A.S. and the European community will pass into even more extreme hands as the struggle becomes increasingly bitter, and that the second Algerian war—between the Metropolis and the *pieds noirs*—following the ending of the first will wreak even greater havoc, not least on the *pieds noirs* themselves.

ALFRED SHERMAN

Conflicting Forces in Argentina

JUAN DOMINGO PERÓN once said: '*Peronismo* will survive me.' It may turn out to be the only true statement of real significance that he ever made, but it is a truth that is still of decisive importance in Argentina today. By championing the under-privileged *descamisado* and teaching the new industrial labour force how to organize trade unions, Perón brought about in Argentina a social revolution in the fullest sense; it may now be seen as a part of the continuing process of social emergence in Latin America that began with the Mexican revolution fifty years ago and has found its latest expression in Cuba. *Peronismo*, after several years' proscription, has now been brought into the open through the elections of 18 March, in which the *peronistas* showed themselves to be as strong as they were five years ago.

The essential difficulty that President Arturo Frondizi faces is to preserve what may be counted the valid achievement of *peronismo*, without becoming contaminated by the reputation for corruption acquired by the Perón regime in its last years, and without allowing

labour to disrupt the economic reforms that are needed for Argentina's emergence as a prosperous industrial nation.

Frondizi is by inclination a socialist of a kind, and his sympathies lie with the legitimate aspirations of labour; but both economic considerations and the feelings of the armed forces make it impossible for him to be too sympathetic towards the *peronistas* and their exacting demands.

The numerous—careful observers say thirty-four—minor crises that Frondizi's Government has survived have all been connected with the difficulties of reconciling the political and economic interests of the two main pressure groups: labour and the armed forces. His tenure of office has been a feat of balancing, and it is to his credit that, although he has been much criticized for his unreliability and lack of principles, he has preserved a measure of political and economic stability that might otherwise have been impossible. It has long been evident, and after the latest major crisis following the elections it is now abundantly obvious, that the only alternative to Frondizi's Government would be another military dictatorship.

Frondizi was elected in 1958 with the support of the *peronista* vote, representing perhaps a third of the electorate. The armed forces, which had been rigorously purged of *peronismo* by the provisional Government of General Pedro Aramburu, were restrained only by their innate respect for the Constitution from preventing Frondizi's taking office. Since then they have been monitoring his every move and have frequently demanded changes of policy that have forced him somewhat to the right of where his personal convictions probably lie.

The armed forces in Argentina believe that they have a political duty to the nation. They see their mission as that of preserving an orderly, orthodox right-wing democracy and of rigorously suppressing *peronismo*, Communism, *fidelismo* (after Castro), and any excessively leftish movements. Another of the functions assumed by the chiefs of staff is to act on occasions as spokesmen for the business world, giving the President instructions on economic and monetary policy. Recently they also intervened, in the interests of their conception of the nation's prestige, in the matter of Argentina's position at the Punta del Este conference of the Organization of American States on relations with Cuba. These crises of confidence between the Government and the armed forces have been damaging not only to the Government's authority in the country, but also to Argentina's reputation abroad as a leader in Latin American affairs. This

was particularly noticeable in the affair of Cuba, when the military chiefs obliged Frondizi to break off relations with Cuba, thus reversing the liberal and enlightened position taken by Argentina at the Punta del Este conference.

Although Frondizi lost the support of the *peronistas* soon after he was elected, and subsequently lost popularity in other sectors as well, the fortunes of his party—*Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente* —had lately improved considerably, and he was apparently confident that the congressional elections held on 18 March would give him a good working majority in the Deputies. This confidence had enabled him to take a rather less conciliatory line with the armed forces, especially over Cuba, after he had ceded to their demands. The outcome of the elections suggests that Frondizi was right in his assessment that the other wing of the old Radical Party—*Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo*—formerly his chief rival, had lost ground considerably; but he either underestimated the strength of the *peronistas*, or else wished to force them out into the open, knowing that the armed forces would react.

When Frondizi was elected the country had been drifting for two and a half years under the provisional military Government set up after the revolution of September 1955. The revolutionary Government was more concerned with purging the armed forces of all vestiges of *peronismo* than with reorganizing and cleaning up the trade unions: *peronistas* in the unions had time to reassemble their forces after the fall of their leader, and to consolidate their positions.

Frondizi inherited a situation in which the whole of organized labour was about equally divided in two groups of unions: those that remained loyal to Perón, and those that were disposed to support Frondizi. The distinction became blurred in the larger struggle between labour and business interests, but has re-emerged in the current keen rivalry for control of the Confederación General del Trabajo, at present undergoing reorganization, and in the violent repercussions from the elections.

The revolutionary Government was also expeditious in dismantling the corrupt machinery of economic controls built up by Perón, but it failed to understand the nature of Argentina's basic economic difficulties, and an over-large dose of liberalism had the effect of accentuating the structural weaknesses in the economy.

The first year of Frondizi's presidency was also ineffectual in this context: a programme of economic reforms was drawn up, but not applied, while the situation deteriorated: the cost of living rose

faster than ever, industrial production declined, the gold and foreign exchange reserves fell, and progress was virtually halted.

It was not until June 1959, when Frondizi appointed Ingeniero Álvaro Alsogaray as Minister of Economy, that the Government came to grips with the situation. Alsogaray's programme was basically an orthodox plan to restrain the growth in the money supply, eliminate government expenditure in excess of revenue, stabilize prices and wages, encourage investment and production, including foreign investment, stabilize the exchange value of the peso, and bring the overseas payments position into balance. The initial impact of his reforms was extremely unwelcome to labour; one of his first moves was to eliminate extremely costly food subsidies, which had the effect of raising many consumer prices very considerably. Although wage increases were allowed to compensate some of the rise in living costs, the purchasing power of the working classes was reduced. Strikes and acts of sabotage were numerous and at first the success of the plan, and even the stability of the Government, seemed in doubt.

Alsogaray proved to be not only tenacious but persuasive, and he achieved a large measure of success. The cost of living, after rising by 102 per cent in 1959, levelled out in 1960 and increased by only 12 per cent. The gross national product, which had risen slowly up to 1958, declined in 1959 but resumed its growth in 1960; investment also increased, and industrial productivity, which fell sharply in 1959, began to recover in 1960.

Another of Alsogaray's successes was his pruning of the grossly over-staffed federal administration: in the first year of the programme 80,000 employees were dismissed or pensioned, and the total is now in the region of 200,000. This situation was a legacy from Perón.

As a result of his reforms in the pattern of government expenditure, Alsogaray was able to achieve a balanced budget for the central administration in the 1960–1 fiscal year, and this has been repeated for 1961–2. The restriction of bank credit was a powerful factor in checking price rises and speculation, including speculation against the peso; in conjunction with a system of special taxes and other restrictions, it also held down the demand for imports. It was thus possible for the Banco Central to support the exchange rate and at the same time to add substantially to its reserves.

All this was achieved without any perceptible unemployment, though at the expense of some industrial and commercial expansion.

By the early months of 1961 stability appeared to have been achieve in most sectors. Two major problems, however, have so far defie solution, and are at present threatening to undo much of what Also garay achieved.

One is the enormous cost to the Treasury—amounting to nearl 20 per cent of revenue—of the operating deficit of the railways When Alsogaray became Minister of Economy he had to deal witl a country in which almost every branch of economic activity ha become decapitalized during a decade of inflation and inadequat investment: in most branches of activity in the private sector th confidence of both domestic and foreign investors was restored an the situation improved significantly. The decline of the railways— collectively one of the largest investments in Latin America—ma be traced back to the world depression of 1929–30, when investment in maintenance and modernization ceased to be adequate and the problem is one of very long standing and enormous magnitude.

The technical and administrative efficiency of the railways declined rapidly during the second World War, and by 1948 whe they were nationalized there was some justification for Perón' Finance Minister to describe them as so much scrap iron. Perón having acquired the railways for the nation, made no attempt to fin fresh capital for their improvement. In addition, for purely politica reasons, freights and fares were kept absurdly low, and employmen in the railways was used as a reward for supporters of the Firs Worker.

Today the railways, though miraculously still running after fashion, are some thirty years behind in maintenance and modernization. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development has estimated that a minimum first-stage rehabilitation programme would need an investment equivalent to £100 million ove five years. It is evident that the operating losses must persist s long as charges bear so little relation to the cost of the services but the Government recognizes that, while the services are so extremely inefficient, higher charges would not be equitable. Meanwhile, although there has been a significant growth in road transport, and road-building is proceeding rapidly, the inadequacy of th railways is an impediment to economic expansion.

Moreover, so long as the Treasury has to meet the railways' operating deficits, balanced budgets will be virtually impossible. Thi suggests that, although a great measure of stability was achieved i

most sectors of the economy, an inflationary influence has persisted, and is in fact manifesting itself again.

The Government drew up a programme of emergency reforms designed at least to reduce the railway deficit: these included the closing of many branch lines and redundant repair shop , the contracting out of ancillary services, such as catering, and the dismissal or pensioning of numerous employees. Attempts to apply the programme have caused strong reaction from the railway unions, including a six-week strike towards the end of last year, and a subsequent attempt by the railway unions to organize a three-day general strike, which was not wholly successful because of popular feeling that the railway problem urgently needs a solution. The whole matter remains at present unresolved.

Alsogaray, despite his achievements in reaching a significant degree of stabilization, was too much aware of latent inflationary forces to give way to the many demands from the business world for a relaxation of the restrictions. By April 1961 this had become a political question and the armed forces, in their role of spokesmen for industry and commerce, forced Frondizi to dismiss Alsogaray. He was succeeded in the Ministry of Economy by one of his own 'economic team', Dr Roberto T. Alemann, an able young economist who was expected to be more 'flexible' in his policy.

In the event, Alemann turned out to be almost as stern as Alsogaray, though less successful in getting his policy accepted, and he remained in office only until January of this year. He was succeeded by Dr Carlos A. Coll Benegas, a Conservative, former President of the Banco Central, and presumably acceptable to right-wing interests, who has since resigned with the rest of the Cabinet.

The basic problem of allowing an expansion of industrial and commercial activity and at the same time preserving stability remains, however, and it is doubtful whether it can be solved in less than several years, whoever may be Minister of Economy. It is significant that industrial expansion during 1961, which was at nearly three times the rather low rate of 1960, has been accompanied by a rise in the cost of living of some 19 per cent. By the standards of the years before 1960 this rise may not be considered very serious and may be acceptable as the price to be paid for expansion and rising incomes, but it should undoubtedly be seen as a warning.

The importance of stability goes beyond domestic considerations and the mere desirability of avoiding constantly rising living costs. It is a key factor in any country's relations with the International

Monetary Fund; and the Fund's opinion of a country's creditworthiness is decisive in determining the attitude of other international and national lending agencies. Alsogaray's programme was entirely in keeping with I.M.F. doctrine, and its success has led to stand-by credits from the Fund without which the stability of the peso might have been more difficult to maintain. Other credits, such as I.B.R.D. loans for roads and railways, Export-Import Bank loans and the like, would not have been readily available without the I.M.F. placet.

It is much debated in Latin America and elsewhere whether the rigid attitude of the I.M.F. on the question of credit restriction and monetary stability is harmful to rapidly developing economies in that it imposes restrictions and distortions that, in terms of social progress, are a high price to pay for short-term balance of payments loans. This is precisely Argentina's dilemma; quite apart from the views of industrialists—for whom turnover is more important than price stability—or the military chiefs, who are seldom economists there is in Argentina a sector of opinion that holds expansion to be more important than rigid stability.

Moreover, Argentina has by now progressed some way along the road of industrialization and has reached a point at which a large volume of imports of machinery and raw materials is necessary for the process to continue. The difficulty of paying for these imports is the second of Argentina's intractable economic problems. Although the process of import substitution is virtually complete as regards consumption goods and consumer durables, requirements of capital equipment and industrial raw materials have grown considerably and have become not only more voluminous but also more sophisticated.

In spite of a rigorously selective import control mechanism and in spite of the virtual elimination of crude petroleum—formerly accounting for 20 per cent or more of imports—the minimum volume of imports required to keep the industrial structure operating and expanding at a pace that will avoid unemployment is beyond the exchange-earning capacity of Argentina's exports.

The terms of trade have deteriorated sharply for Argentina; rising wages and production costs in the industrial countries of the Northern hemisphere have increased the prices of Argentina's imports; at the same time the market value, and even the saleability, of the country's main exports has persistently weakened. Argentina is in the particularly difficult position of being a producer and exporter

of temperate-zone agricultural commodities, and her export trade is based on the supply of food and allied products to the industrial countries. Agricultural subsidies and protectionism in the Northern hemisphere has led to the creation of large surpluses and progressively closing markets. This situation presents even greater difficulties than those attending the marketing of tropical produce, since it involves a complex series of domestic political considerations in the industrial countries.

The extent to which agricultural protectionism prevails in Western Europe has become apparent during the recent discussions by the six countries of the European Economic Community on a common agricultural policy. The problem has been recognized by the U.S. Administration, and the negotiations currently in progress between the U.S.A. and the E.E.C. at the G.A.T.T. meetings, though reasonably successful where industrial products were concerned, have shown that the question of temperate-zone agriculture is one of profound and almost world-wide complexity. Argentina therefore can hardly be expected to find a solution to her own problem without reference to the world situation, which can only mean that no solution will be found quickly.

A significant improvement in Argentina's foreign trade structure has been achieved by the development of domestic petroleum resources. Although much of this has been carried out with the assistance of foreign capital, and although the petroleum produced by foreign contractors has to be paid for in dollars, energy supplies are now very much cheaper than when petroleum had to be imported, and much more abundant. The parallel development of natural gas and the construction of pipelines has entirely eliminated the 'energy deficit' and industry is now assured of regular supplies of gas and petroleum.

The elimination of petroleum imports to the value of some U.S. $250 million annually has materially assisted the trade balance and has permitted larger imports of machinery. Even so, industrial expansion is taking place so rapidly that a substantial trade deficit appeared once more in 1961 after the improvement in 1959 and 1960. Prospects for 1962 are more promising, but the problem cannot by any means be regarded as solved.

Argentina must therefore continue to rely on credits of various kinds; further help from the I.M.F. may perhaps be obtained if internal stability does not weaken too significantly; foreign Governments or banking groups may give some assistance; and suppliers'

credits will doubtless continue to be available. All these possibilities will depend to some extent on confidence in Argentina's immediate future. It is therefore all the more desirable that political calm should be restored as quickly as possible.

The problem of achieving economic expansion without inflation has not been solved in Argentina, and is unlikely to be solved until the economy can generate sufficient domestic capital for the purpose and until exports can be made to match import needs. Aid and credits may help to accelerate the process during the present intermediate stage of industrialization, but they are no substitute for domestic investment and favourable terms of trade. It is in any case doubtful whether the Northern hemisphere countries are able to meet the capital requirements of the under-developed world, especially while their military expenditure continues to be almost equal to the under-developed countries' collective national incomes.

There is promise in the current tariff negotiations at the G.A.T.T. meetings and in the growing awareness among the industrial nations that from the under-developed countries' point of view—and ultimately from their own—the traditional Western system of free commodity markets, combined with trade protectionism, can hardly be said to be working satisfactorily. World reforms, however, tend to take place slowly, and Argentina's problems are immediate.

The events of the last few weeks and months show that Argentina's position is unquestionably difficult. Industrial expansion in 1961 was accompanied by increases in the money supply, despite a rigorous control of bank credit, which has led to price rises, wage demands, and all the familiar signs of inflation. The large trade deficit of some U.S. $450 million—nearly half the export total—brought a sharp reduction in the gold and foreign exchange reserves of the Banco Central, which in turn has caused speculation against the peso and has cost the Banco Central a further loss of reserves in supporting the exchange rate.

Devaluation of the peso, which would have been desirable some months ago, has recently become unavoidable. Production costs have risen considerably and exports, even after the removal of taxes and other levies, were beginning to be unremunerative at an exchange rate that decidedly over-valued the peso. Similarly imports, even with levies, were becoming comparatively cheaper; although there is a minimum volume of imports required to keep industry operating and expanding, and this minimum tends to rise, there can be little

doubt that the exchange rate was causing a speculative acceleration of import operations.

The political situation emerging from the results of the elections appears to be one of extreme fragmentation. Within the *Unión Cívica Radical Intransigente* is the strictly intransigent group which tolerates no alliances, and the group known as 'integrationists', headed by Frondizi's personal adviser, Sr Rogelio Frigerio, a former member of Perón's entourage, which would seek a reconciliation with the *Justicialista* Party—the *peronistas*—presumably by offering them a few posts in the Cabinet and incorporating some of their national socialist ideas into government policy.

To the armed forces the integrationists are as odious as the outright *peronistas*. Within the armed forces are the ultra-reactionary chiefs who want Frondizi's removal and the more moderate officers who fear that a military *coup d'état* would provoke violence in the labour sector, with serious social and economic consequences, and who wish to come to an agreement with Frondizi.

The *peronistas* themselves are in a curious position: it was reported in a Buenos Aires newspaper that their leader in Argentina, Sr Framini (who was elected to the governorship of the Province of Buenos Aires), had requested Frondizi to proscribe the *Justicialista* Party before the elections; this would have left the strength of the *peronistas* concealed, which they are believed to have desired, with an eye on the presidential elections in 1964. Frondizi refused the request, however, and the success of the party may now lead to its being permanently proscribed under military pressure.

Of the fourteen provincial governorships up for election, ten went to the *peronistas* and five of these have subsequently been 'intervened'. Intervention is a normal way for the Federal Government to deal with recalcitrant provinces; it was carried out reluctantly by Frondizi, under military pressure, and led to the resignation of the Minister of the Interior, Dr Vítolo, who strongly disapproved. The position of the forty-three *peronista* Deputies seems uncertain.

The *Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo* did comparatively poorly in the elections. Its importance lies at the moment in its refusal to rejoin forces with Frondizi's party in the Chamber of Deputies. The U.C.R.I. no longer has an absolute majority in the Chamber, and the support of the U.C.R.P. could be important in furthering legislation against *peronista* opposition. The Senate, where Frondizi has a solid majority, was not involved in the elections, but the decisions of the lower Chamber may be vital in the implementation of policy.

The electoral success of the *Justicialista* Party is not to be interpreted as a sudden and surprising resurgence of *peronismo*; these elections were the first in which the *peronistas* were allowed to put up candidates, to campaign, and to vote as such. The proportion of their vote was much the same as in the 1957 elections for a Constituent Assembly, when the size of the *peronista* vote was assessed by the number of blank ballot papers. It is significant, however, that the strength of *peronismo*, without Perón, has not dwindled over the last five years.

It seems probable that the armed forces will reach some sort of agreement with Frondizi; he may be forced to accept their nominees into his new Cabinet; he may be obliged to take a stronger line than he would like in banning *peronismo* as a political doctrine and in eliminating 'integrationists' from among his advisers and perhaps from positions of influence in his party.

These events and the resignation of the Cabinet—a routine courtesy in times of crisis—are delaying the solution of Argentina's pressing economic problems as well as undermining the confidence of traders and investors abroad. A devaluation of the peso seems inevitable, and the adoption of a different policy on the exchange rate may be considered opportune; the identity of the Minister of Economy will be important, but more important would be a working coalition of the democratic political parties—especially the two branches of the Radical Party—to keep *peronismo* out of power and do away with the need felt by the armed forces for constant intervention in the affairs of government.

DAVID HUELIN

Australia, Britain, and the Common Market

Some Australian Views

AUSTRALIANS in 1962 are concerned about Britain's possible entry into the Common Market chiefly because of the crisis in international trade which it would cause them. For the public, the recent de-

velopment of this issue has served to mask the possibility that the political consequences of Britain's joining Europe might in the long run prove more serious than the economic. But as the probable commercial alternatives are hardly in dispute, it may be useful before turning to differences of Australian opinion to draw a profile of the country's trading position and prospects.

Most of the workers in Australia's population of 10½ million are employed in secondary and tertiary industry; but, at least until the beginning of this decade, most of her overseas income has been earned by primary exports. Whether the economy could ever become a major exporter of manufactures is a question that has long been in dispute among economists, who, however, agree that to provide an adequate home market for them a much larger population would be required. Population, on the other hand, has been sought—and, since the war, found—by immigration, not only or mainly nowadays from traditional British and Irish sources, but from many parts of Europe. Full employment and an apparent comparative advantage in real wages are and will be the necessary conditions of continuing high immigration.

These facts alone go far to determine Australia's commercial policy. Certain raw materials such as oil must be imported to maintain the industries which sustain full employment and high wages. Those imports are paid for by an export trade which is widely distributed but in proportions that since the war have changed considerably. A striking feature of the picture given in Table I is the large post-war increase in exports to Japan, which ran last year at four times their pre-war percentage share of total exports. During the same time, the United Kingdom's share (though not the total value) of Australian exports has declined from nearly 55 per cent in 1937–8 to a little more than 26 per cent in 1959–60. Britain's share of Australia's imports, by contrast, has declined only from about 40 per cent to about 35 per cent.

Whether or not both exports to and imports from Britain are reduced, temporarily at least, by the United Kingdom's joining the Six, Canberra's policy will be relying heavily upon being able to benefit from Japan's 'New Long-Range Economic Plan, 1961–70'. A consequence of the plan would be an increase in Japanese imports by a factor of more than three. If Australia could maintain her present share of imports into Japan, that country's share of Australia's exports would rise from about 14 per cent as at present to more than 20 per cent in 1970, thus making up for a constant or more probably

TABLE I

Value of imports by area of origin (£A million) with percentage composition of imports in parentheses

AREA OF ORIGIN	1937–8	Av. 1950–5	1955–6	1956–7	1957–8	1958–9	1959–60
U.K.	46·2 (*40·6*)	349·5 (*45·6*)	355·9 (*43·3*)	296·3 (*41·2*)	325·0 (*41·0*)	307·4 (*38·6*)	329·9 (*35·6*)
W. Europe	11·0 (*9·6*)	109·7 (*14·3*)	123·4 (*15·0*)	98·1 (*13·6*)	113·6 (*14·3*)	116·3 (*14·6*)	146·2 (*15·8*)
Canada–USA	25·8 (*22·6*)	106·6 (*13·9*)	122·1 (*14·9*)	117·7 (*16·4*)	127·5 (*16·1*)	131·7 (*16·5*)	179·3 (*19·4*)
New Zealand	2·0 (*1·7*)	5·9 (*0·8*)	8·5 (*1·0*)	12·0 (*1·7*)	12·8 (*1·6*)	12·5 (*1·6*)	15·9 (*1·7*)
Pacific	3·3 (*2·9*)	9·2 (*1·2*)	12·5 (*1·5*)	12·5 (*1·7*)	12·8 (*1·6*)	14·1 (*1·8*)	14·9 (*1·6*)
Japan	5·3 (*4·7*)	17·8 (*2·3*)	22·6 (*2·8*)	12·9 (*1·8*)	23·8 (*3·0*)	29·9 (*3·8*)	41·5 (*4·5*)
China	0·6 (*0·6*)	4·0 (*0·5*)	5·1 (*0·6*)	5·0 (*0·7*)	6·6 (*0·8*)	7·6 (*1·0*)	9·7 (*1·0*)
India–Pakistan	4·0 (*3·5*)	45·0 (*5·9*)	34·1 (*4·2*)	35·6 (*4·9*)	33·0 (*4·2*)	33·6 (*4·2*)	32·8 (*3·5*)
S.E. Asia	8·8 (*7·8*)	52·0 (*6·8*)	50·3 (*6·1*)	53·8 (*7·5*)	53·3 (*6·7*)	57·7 (*7·2*)	65·4 (*7·1*)
Other	6·9 (*6·0*)	67·6 (*8·7*)	86·6 (*10·6*)	75·3 (*10·5*)	83·6 (*10·7*)	85·8 (*10·7*)	90·8 (*9·8*)
Total imports	114·0	767·4	821·1	719·0	791·9	796·6	926·4

TABLE I (CONT.)

Value of exports by destination (£A million)
with percentage composition of exports in parentheses

DESTINATION	1937–8	Av. 1950–5	1955–6	1956–7	1957–8	1958–9	1959–60
U.K.	86·4 (*54·8*)	294·9 (*35·7*)	257·4 (*32·9*)	277·5 (*27·9*)	221·4 (*27·1*)	256·9 (*31·7*)	247·3 (*26·4*)
W. Europe	26·3 (*16·7*)	201·3 (*24·4*)	184·4 (*23·6*)	246·8 (*24·9*)	199·8 (*24·4*)	153·0 (*18·9*)	187·3 (*20·0*)
Canada–USA	13·1 (*8·3*)	89·7 (*10·9*)	66·3 (*8·5*)	77·2 (*7·8*)	60·5 (*7·4*)	78·3 (*9·6*)	89·8 (*9·6*)
New Zealand	7·1 (*4·5*)	31·5 (*3·8*)	40·9 (*5·2*)	51·0 (*5·1*)	55·5 (*6·8*)	49·6 (*6·1*)	54·3 (*5·8*)
Pacific	2·7 (*1·7*)	19·3 (*2·3*)	25·8 (*3·3*)	29·0 (*2·9*)	29·2 (*3·6*)	28·4 (*3·5*)	31·9 (*3·4*)
Japan	5·9 (*3·7*)	61·7 (*7·5*)	86·5 (*11·1*)	138·9 (*14·0*)	102·7 (*12·6*)	102·3 (*12·6*)	134·7 (*14·4*)
China	1·9 (*1·2*)	10·4 (*1·3*)	17·6 (*2·2*)	30·4 (*3·1*)	22·8 (*2·8*)	26·5 (*3·3*)	26·8 (*2·9*)
India–Pakistan	2·0 (*1·3*)	31·4 (*3·8*)	22·7 (*2·9*)	45·9 (*4·6*)	22·8 (*2·8*)	17·5 (*2·2*)	29·0 (*3·1*)
S.E. Asia	4·5 (*2·8*)	29·4 (*3·6*)	35·3 (*4·5*)	39·3 (*4·0*)	37·6 (*4·6*)	34·1 (*4·2*)	38·1 (*4·1*)
Other	7·8 (*5·0*)	56·6 (*6·7*)	44·9 (*5·8*)	56·9 (*5·7*)	65·7 (*7·9*)	64·7 (*7·9*)	98·5 (*10·3*)
Total exports	157·6	826·1	781·9	992·9	817·9	811·5	937·7

Source: Tables prepared by R. K. Hefford for J. G. Crawford: 'The Significance of Recent Developments in Asia for the Economic Future of Australia', *Australian Journal of Science*, 21 October 1961; from *Oversea Trade*, Bulletins 50–7, Canberra.

declining export trade with the United Kingdom and Western Europe.

For this reason, as Sir John Crawford, former Secretary of the Australian Department of Trade, has pointed out,[1] Australia has a stake in the success of the Japanese plan. Even so, unfortunately, Japan may not provide all the leeway hoped for: while about 8 per cent of her imports are Australian, they are matched by less than 5 per cent of her exports. She may be neither willing nor able to have such a balance maintained. Japan has not yet regained her trading position in South East Asia, and may soon face devastating Chinese competition there. Her recent successes in Western Europe and in the United States could be reversed by the consummation of European Economic Union.

The case of Japan has been dealt with at some length because from Australia's point of view it provides the most hopeful and easily the best prospect in the whole of Asia (see Table I). Only in very recent years has Western Europe, excluding the United Kingdom (i.e. the Six, since exports to E.F.T.A. have been negligible), taken less of Australia's exports than the whole of Asia combined. The notion that Australia might join an Asian Common Market—beloved by Australian 'progressives' and canvassed a little apologetically by some British advocates of a merger with the Six—hardly begins to look like a substitute for Australia's former commerce with Britain or for her favourable post-war balance with Europe. Since, indeed, Australia will not be invited to join the one Common Market that could resolve most of her exporting problems, the sub-division of the world into exclusive economic blocs and regions is a trend that, given her present multilateral pattern of commerce, she cannot be expected to welcome.

The components of Australia's multilateral export have broadened and multiplied since the war (see Table II) so that even a great decline in the British market for her 'temperate foodstuffs' is not likely to prove as ruinous to Australia as it would to New Zealand. But, by the same token, she cannot make out New Zealand's persuasive case for special consideration in Common Market negotiations. The adverse consequences, therefore, of a decline in exports of wheat, dried fruit, canned fruit, and meat could be felt particularly by the areas in Australia that produce them, and generally as a loss of national funds for buying imports and for investment in

[1] 'The Significance of Recent Developments in Asia for the Economic Future of Australia', *Australian Journal of Science*, 21 October 1961.

TABLE II

Main items—Australian visible trade (£A million)

	With United Kingdom		*With the E.E.C.*	
EXPORTS	*1956–7*	*1958–9*	*1956–7*	*1958–9*
Food and Drink	123·3	152·4	16·7	17·8
Wool, Hides, etc.	120·4	73·3	205·3	110·3
Metals etc.	19·9	16·2	1·2	4·4
Total: Three main items	263·6	241·9	223·2	132·5
IMPORTS				
Metals etc.	170·2	168·1	24·7	39·7
Yarns, textiles, etc.	41·6	36·9	14·4	13·9
Pulp, Paper, etc.	20·2	21·7		
Chemicals			7·5	7·9
Total: Three main items	232·0	226·7	46·6	61·5

Source: I. Bowen, 'The European Common Market', *Australian Outlook*, April 1961, adapted from *Oversea Trade 1958–9*, Bulletin 56, Canberra.

growth. North America, the apparent alternative consumer of temperate foodstuffs, practises quantitative restriction of the kind that Australian officials find disadvantageous in E.E.C. arrangements.

As response to an unavoidable prospect of a decade's adverse balance of payments, Canberra could reimpose direct import controls (though the present Liberal–Country coalition opposes this in principle) *or* cut immigration and other long-term investments in growth so as to prevent unemployment, *or* borrow, *or* devalue, *or* attempt some combination of these. Whichever expedients were adopted, a halt might have to be called to the country's remarkable economic advance, which has proceeded from the intensive measures of the second World War.

If, on the other hand, Britain for any reason stays out of the E.E.C. she might reasonably ask Australia to try at least to restore the excellent market of the mid-fifties for U.K. products and, more importantly, not to seek higher U.K. prices for her large-scale food exports. Perhaps for tactical reasons, Australian authorities have lately been making much of the latter: on 19 February of this year, Mr McEwen, the Australian Minister for Trade and Leader of the Country Party which maintains the Government's precarious majority in the House of Representatives, complained:

> A large proportion of world food supplies is produced in highly industrialized countries. These countries, including Britain, provide for their own producers profitable returns by way of heavy subsidies and

other devices. But Britain apparently believes that producers in Australia, New Zealand, and other food exporting countries are entitled only to quite artificial and unprofitable returns, determined by the dumping on the so-called world market of a small proportion of the world's production of wheat, butter, and other commodities which enter world trade.[1]

Cheap food is indeed an Australasian talking-point with the United Kingdom, as are Australia's and New Zealand's shares of British exports. In 1960 more of these were taken by Australia than by France and Germany together. Australia, for her part, stands to make no positive gains in the short run by Britain's staying out of Europe: her long-run benefit—and for a primary exporter it is no small one—would lie in the retention of predictable markets and of the mutual economic understanding which the E.E.C. in its Memorandum of October 1958 had so evidently mistrusted.

Until the middle of 1961 there was a remarkable difference between the ignorance of Australia's press and public about Britain's involvement with Europe and the deep and detailed concern of her Government and civil service. The public may have been influenced by such expressions of British doubts about Europe as Mr Macmillan's speech of 1958 in Christchurch, New Zealand. The interest of certain Government departments, however, is said to have been aroused by early manifestations of Europe's desire to integrate such as the European Coal and Steel Community Treaty of 1951. Australia's exports to Western Europe as a whole were running at a record height, but after the Treaty of Rome it became evident that the Six were the chief recipients. It was not surprising therefore that Australasian officials should have given the impression that they considered E.F.T.A. a time-wasting stratagem, despite its agreement and E.E.C.'s evident disagreement with the provisions of G.A.T.T., by which they set so much store. Some appeared to believe that the United Kingdom would have to join Europe sooner or later, and hoped that if she could manage to make an early approach to the Six favourable arrangements might be made for Commonwealth countries. In particular, it seemed possible that Europe might be persuaded to abandon her practice of protecting agriculture by quotas.

The Common Agricultural Policy created a problem for Australasia which, as Sir John Crawford pointed out on 17 August 1961, was not

> ... simply one of our surmounting a fixed tariff barrier. We can't finally object if countries protect their agriculture by tariffs—we protect our

[1] *The Times*, 20 February 1962.

industry this way. What is objectionable is the paraphernalia of variable duties designed themselves to prevent any price cutting competition by overseas suppliers, backed in turn by quantitative restrictions to be applied if, despite the variable duties, overseas supplies do threaten domestic production.[1]

As a possible alternative, he suggested (on 9 October) agreements between Europe and all of her major suppliers of temperate foodstuffs on minimum *country* (not 'global') quotas for imports into Britain and Europe.

The public, usually more willing than most to venture political opinions, was cagey. Six out of ten in Hobart, polled during late August on attitudes to E.E.C., were undecided; three out of ten believed Britain should go in, and most of those thought that she had no alternative. In Brisbane two months later a comparable proportion ventured no opinion, while 15 per cent (approximating the vote and voicing the opinion of the breakaway Catholic party, Queensland Labor—elsewhere the Democratic Labor Party) believed that if Britain joined Europe, Australia should form a Common Market with Asia. E.E.C. was making the headlines rather slowly.

Mr Menzies had raised the issue in a paper, tabled in the House on 11 April 1961, which had been notable for another Commonwealth issue—South Africa's withdrawal of her application to retain membership. The Australian Prime Minister, though opposed to *apartheid*, had stood by the 'old concept' of the Commonwealth, according to which even multiracialism should not be made a test of fitness for membership. He seemed in this to part company with Mr Macmillan, and was rumoured to disagree with other aspects of United Kingdom policy. In his paper, he reported having made clear to Messrs Heath, Soames, and Selwyn Lloyd that Australia expected the 'fullest consultation' before any 'agreement in principle' was made with Europe. Yet he saw 'great political as well as economic value' in Western European unity, especially if it should include Britain; and he has remained faithful to that assessment throughout the subsequent negotiations.

Mr McEwen, standing for a Country Party of which many supporters seemed selectively threatened by Britain's approach to Europe, has formally qualified his criticisms in the same way, but has campaigned vigorously for the interests of the Australian primary producer. On 22 June 1961 he told a conference of his party

[1] Paper given at Economic Society, Canberra, 17 August 1961.

that preferential treatment of European farm produce at the expense of Australia would be 'totally unacceptable'. Three weeks later, much of the press saw Mr McEwen's hand in the extremely reserved communiqué issued at the conclusion of Mr Sandys's conference with Australian Ministers. From this time onwards, the editorial columns of the *Sydney Morning Herald* and one or two other of the leading newspapers were disapproving of the Federal Government's 'dusty answer' to the news of the U.K.'s approach to Europe.

The communiqué had made it clear that the 'absence of objection' by Australia 'should in the circumstances not be interpreted as implying approval', and that she should be 'in a position to negotiate directly' on her own behalf when issues affecting her trade were being discussed. The present Australian Government has not since publicly upbraided the United Kingdom as some Canadians have, but it has kept a jealous eye on the negotiations. For example, in mid-August 1961 Mr Menzies announced the formation of a special Cabinet committee to keep Australia's officials and representatives at the negotiations fully briefed; and on 7 February 1962 the E.E.C. was asked to allow Australian representatives to take part in such Brussels negotiations as those concerning wheat or dried fruits.

The Australian Labor Party, soon to launch a pre-electoral attack on the Government for having failed to anticipate Britain's decision to approach the Six, was not yet prepared to answer definitely the question of substance. In mid-July the Leader of the Opposition, Mr Calwell, affirming that Australia should have sought alternative markets immediately the Common Market was proposed, nevertheless allowed that Britain's not joining could mean '... the destruction of English influence in European politics'.[1]

The theme of Europe was apt to create reflective and elegiac moods in Australian politicians. On the same day, Mr Menzies told the press that Australia disagreed with Britain, holding that the latter's joining an E.E.C. which was about to become the third world Power would loosen Commonwealth relations: this, he thought, '... may be a price worth paying for a European association. I am not endeavouring to sit in judgment on that. Only time will provide the answer.'[2]

In Australia, as in Britain, some eminent figures took the contrary view. While Englishmen look out at a broad and variegated

[1] *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 July 1961. [2] *ibid.*

Commonwealth with which the U.K. has all kinds of relationships, Australians are more likely to see in near perspective their own peculiar relation with Britain, which is formally commercial and constitutional, but which has also less formal aspects concerned with military security and foreign policy. They are latter-day mercantilists, who envisage populousness and prosperity as contributing to national defence and world politics as a competition for economic as well as for military alliances. Though their first thought, upon learning that Commonwealth preferences may have to go, is for alternative trading relationships, their second is likely to concern the future of Commonwealth defence—in Singapore, Malaya, a possible new British base on the Western Australian coast of the Indian Ocean, at S.E.A.T.O. headquarters in Bangkok. Will the transatlantic section of N.A.T.O. become the common defence of a Western Europe incorporating Great Britain? Would the abandonment of Commonwealth preferences make certain the United Kingdom's final military withdrawal from South East Asia?

The latter question was, of course, too delicate to be raised by the Government parties; but their members did consider major changes possibly consequent upon greater Western European integration. Senator Spooner feared that British and American investment in Australia would decline, draining away instead to Western Europe. Several months before 'Atlantic Union' became an American talking-point, Mr McEwen responded to the U.K. Prime Minister's announcement of the decision to negotiate by a hint at the notion that surpluses of agricultural products, increased by E.E.C.'s restrictive and exclusive measures, should be pooled and made available on concessional terms to under-developed countries, thus helping, as the Melbourne *Age* (7 August 1961) added, 'to save them from Communist domination'. A fortnight later Mr McEwen laid out this plan more explicitly.

He had also called the attention of the United States and the nations of Western Europe to the possible economic plight of other free countries, pointing out that an economically strong Common Market would not necessarily mean better markets for Australia, who, after all, sold virtually no foodstuffs to the strong United States. This is a very natural Australian complaint: apart from Britain, the countries most able to buy Australia's food production are the ones least willing to do so.

In July there had been a flurry of Government interest in Hong Kong's proposal for a South East Asian Common Market; but in

the campaign for the Federal elections of December 1961 only the Democratic Labor Party grouping made much of the idea. In August it had proposed a Pacific Confederation of Japan, the Philippines, Thailand, South Vietnam, Taiwan, New Zealand, and Australia, directed explicitly against the economic, military, and political designs of Communist China. A not dissimilar policy was advocated a month later by the economist Colin Clark.

The Government's election policy was foreshadowed by Mr Holt, the Treasurer, on his return from the Accra Commonwealth Finance Ministers' conference in September, where he had received firm assurances that Britain would not enter E.E.C. unless vital Commonwealth trade interests could be safeguarded. He proposed that Australia should assist Britain by a 'constructive attitude'. Partly because of this commitment, the Federal Government made little trouble about the leaking of the Heath Plan to American circles. Australian Labor Party leaders cited this as an example of the Menzies Government's failure of liaison with its U.K. opposites. In its almost-successful struggle, the A.L.P. paid relatively little attention to the Common Market issue—less, proportionately, than any of the other parties. Chiefly, it attacked the Government for having failed to promote external trade, which had been delivered over to 'foreign commercial, shipping, financial, and insurance companies'. A Labor Government faced with Britain's absorption into Europe would establish export commodity boards to promote sales, and would subsidize primary producers otherwise likely to be driven out of business by the merger.

Country Party spokesmen, and Mr Menzies when campaigning in rural areas, made Government handling of the Common Market negotiations the first item of their case. The Country Party was more militantly Australian, the Liberals more concerned to ask the electors not to hand over supervision of such complex negotiations to a team as untried as that of the A.L.P. Though anti-Governmental columnists derided this claim to a monopoly of wisdom (the *Sydney Morning Herald* and several other papers tended to favour the A.L.P. at this election), Labor itself did not bother to take up the gage. The poll, which almost brought the A.L.P. back to power, suggests that to do so would not have been electorally significant. The D.L.P.–Q.L.P. group's proposal was the most radical of the methods suggested to meet the crisis, but it seems not to have picked up many votes as a result. In future, however—especially if another Federal election follows quickly upon the U.K.'s announcement of

the terms for her admission to E.E.C.—the issue could become decisive. Bold adoption of a 'pro-British' policy by Labor could win votes. Attempts to seek associate membership in E.E.C. could also prove popular.

Despite occasional hard words about the restrictive practices of Europeans, the Government parties and the administration maintain Australia's connection with Europe quite vigorously: she belongs, for instance, to the European Launcher Development Organization, as the Woomera Rocket Range could be useful for testing rockets and space vehicles. At present, however, the administration seems to favour as a strategy the enlistment of U.S. assistance.

This policy was first clearly formulated by Mr McEwen at the end of August 1961 in *Overseas Trading*, the organ of Australia's Department of Trade. Reflecting that the U.K.'s record of protecting her primary products was not encouraging to Australia, he hoped that the U.S.A. could induce fundamental changes in Western European and U.K. policies affecting trade in primary products and raw materials. In the first two months of 1962, pronouncements of the press and of Government Departments made much of the E.E.C.'s difficulties in agreeing about agriculture, and the coincidence of that with the sweeping American proposals for tariff reduction. A climax came in early March 1962 when Mr McEwen said he was confident that Britain would not join the Common Market if it had to be on Treaty of Rome conditions, and that she had not 'the slightest chance on earth of joining the Common Market and having cheap food while she has access to a Europe which has dear food'. Further, he was going to ask the U.S. not to press Britain to end Commonwealth trade preferences.

This of course was a considerable change on the part of Australia's conservative Government. It is not now assuming that Britain will have to fall into the Common Market, and it is suggesting doubts and courses of action remarkably like those proposed by the anti-E.E.C. section of the British Labour Party.

A. L. Burns

Economic Problems during the Transfer of Power in Kenya

It is by now well known that Kenya has run into serious economic troubles in the past two years—with natural disasters compounding them—and that they show little sign of easing up as independence approaches. These troubles were largely unexpected by the nationalist leaders, and were certainly underrated by them and many others. Why? In the writer's view, the answer is to be found in a widespread failure to appreciate the importance of either the relative sophistication of the Kenya economy, or its vulnerability arising out of the economic dominance of the racial minorities, or the economic significance of the large and complex government machine. Some of these difficulties have been experienced during the transfer of power in other colonies, but not so intensely as in Kenya now. They may provide a foretaste of the problems which are coming to the boil in Central Africa.

PROBLEMS OF CONFIDENCE

The concept of a dependent economy is familiar in economic analysis for describing countries in the early stages of economic development which are dependent upon the advanced nations of the world for markets for their raw materials, for capital to develop them, for goods to purchase with the proceeds, for the very permission—it often seems—to participate in the modern exchange economy. To this typical picture Kenya adds a further degree of dependence, not in itself unique, but which has not until now been of major importance in the emancipation of African colonies: an internal economic structure which is overwhelmingly dependent upon resident racial minorities for its operation. It might be said that all the African colonies up to now have been able to conduct their freedom struggle without serious regard to adverse economic repercussions; indeed it is often asserted that the process of independence is associated with quickening economic progress as development plans get under way, industrialization speeds up, and so on.

Before 1960 there were few people who realized that a radically different situation existed in Kenya. But the events of that year brought home in a rather startling way that although the Africans had won the political battle for Kenya at the February constitutional conference, they had also lost the confidence of the racial minorities

who effectively determined economic activity and were therefore in danger of acquiring control of a declining economy.

Financial institutions were the first to be affected by a flight of capital abroad. The Post Office Savings Bank, the commercial banks, and the building societies all lost deposits. In the latter case a special rescue operation had to be mounted by the Government, with the assistance of the Colonial Development Corporation, to keep their doors open. The commercial banks had a particularly tough time and for the first time the banking system went into heavy net overdraft on London. They were compelled to introduce a credit squeeze in July 1960, reinforced by higher overdraft and deposit rates in October, in order to restore their liquidity position.

By this time the economic repercussions were spreading. Instead of the boom conditions anticipated by traders at the beginning of the year, and financed by the banks, the abrupt reversal of expectations left them heavily overstocked and bankruptcies increased. Residential building was quickly reduced to a trickle by the cessation of building society mortgages and commercial building projects also fell off rapidly. Only a sustained programme of public and military construction saved the building industry from sudden collapse. On plantations and mixed farms development work slowed down or was halted. Unemployment increased.

Fortunately there were no immediate effects on the level of agricultural production. Indeed the heavy investment of the 'fifties resulted in record levels of both production and exports in 1960. But the period of maximum danger still lies ahead. It can be put quite simply: in 1960 gross revenue to farmers amounted to £47½ million, of which only 20 per cent was produced by African farmers. Eighty per cent was produced by European mixed farmers and plantation companies in roughly equal proportions. Neither settlement schemes nor the acceleration of the Swynnerton Plan[1] will change in the short run this awkward fact of life. It presents the most exposed facet of the larger problem facing the nationalist leaders at every turn: if they are to keep the economy moving in the short run —and maintain, let alone expand, the level of Government services —they must win back the confidence of farmers, traders, and industrialists who also comprise the minority racial communities. An attempt to 'go it alone' is inseparable from a period of economic decline for the country.

[1] *A plan to intensify the development of African agriculture in Kenya.* Nairobi, Government Printer, 1954.

The Development Programme was the first part of the Budget to be affected by the crisis of confidence. Plans had been partly based on the expectation of continuing to raise £2 million a year in long-term loans from the local capital market, and also considerable sums in mortgage finance from abroad for a number of large building projects. But the effect of the political situation was to dry up the local market as well as to destroy hopes of raising the building finance.

The effect on the recurrent Budget was to enforce a complete revision of expectations as to the revenue prospects for the Government and hence also a revision of the level of services the Government could hope to finance as it approached independence. The first priority was to slash expenditure in face of a yawning deficit—no easy matter half-way through a financial year. Even so, instead of the modest surplus budgeted for, the Government ended the year with nearly 15 per cent of expenditure uncovered by revenue. By using all available reserves it was able to meet two-fifths of the deficit and the balance was met by a direct grant, after a searching on-the-spot scrutiny, from the British Treasury.

Once opened so wide, this imbalance in the Government's finances will be extremely difficult to close again. The result of herculean labours on the 1961–2 estimates still left the Government with a prospective deficit of £4 million, or 12 per cent of net expenditure. The British Government insisted on tax increases amounting to £2 million and agreed to underwrite the difference, thus mitigating once again the full effects of the crisis. Looking ahead to the Budget of 1962–3 there is the prospect of an even larger deficit.

The second group of financial difficulties may be summed up as the problem of the exploding Budget. The quickening pace of economic development, major departments coming under the control or influence of national political leaders, the very fact of approaching independence—all these factors exert enormous pressures for rapidly increasing expenditure. In Kenya the problem has been intensified by the effects of the Mau Mau movement in the 'fifties, with its legacy of a large and dynamic administrative machine closely spread over the country and huge forces of law and order. To this must be added the impact of a vigorous, development-minded Finance Minister, Sir Ernest Vasey. Thus by 1960 there already existed a considerable head of steam for expanding services, together with the administrative means to implement them.

In the five years 1956-7 to 1961-2 gross Government expenditure rose by as much as 43 per cent to £43·6 million. But certain key services expanded at an even faster rate: educational expenditure increased by 79 per cent (to £8·2 million), expenditure on agricultural and veterinary services rose by 69 per cent (to £3·8 million), public debt payments rose by 102 per cent (to £4·3 million).[1] On the basis of any criteria of need this expansion should continue; but how is it to be afforded? Moreover, as the economy exercises of the last two years have brought home, once started it is extremely difficult to arrest the momentum of expansion in many public services.

Over and above all these forces working for a continuing rapid expansion of Government services, there are a number of special commitments associated with the independence period. First there is the matter of compensation for departing expatriates. The more wealthy West African colonies were able to pay off this bill from their reserves. In East Africa it forms another burden on the Budget, although fortunately the British Government will share it. In addition, the principle has been established of phasing the payments over a number of years. The corollary of compensation is Africanization. Kenya has been fortunate in obtaining substantial financial assistance from the United States for the capital costs of the programme and from the British Government for the initial recurrent costs, so the local burden is small as yet. Two problems which are less amenable to outside aid are foreign affairs and defence, since both are intimately bound up with the *amour propre* of newly emerging States; unhappily they can both be extremely expensive.

It is hard to resist the conclusion that, altogether apart from the setbacks to revenue growth which are inevitably associated with periods of political change, and after allowing all possible credit for further administrative economies, very substantial increases in taxation and a widening of the tax net are called for in Kenya during the next few years—increases that will be all the more severe because of the momentum of expansion of public services that had already been established before the transfer of power was under way.

Consideration of substantial increases in taxation before the trans-

[1] Public finance statistics can seldom be presented without qualification. In this instance it should be explained that Mau Mau expenditure has been excluded for the early years; that gross expenditure means before allowing for departmental earnings; that for the 1961-2 estimates the expenses of Africanization have been excluded as well as the Raisman Commission's recommendations and that the change in public debt accounting has been allowed for; that development expenditure has not been included.

fer of power leads naturally into the question of how far political independence can be matched by financial independence.

Kenya at the moment is a grant-aided territory, that is, the recurrent Budget has to be balanced by subventions from the British Government. Very strict control is therefore exercised from London over the details of expenditure. It is unlikely, however, to be feasible to apply the full rigour of the grant-in-aid rules to an independent Government. A more workable arrangement lies in the direction either of relieving the Government of the cost of whole services or easily defined magnitudes, such as the pay of expatriates or the pensions of colonial officials, or of a lump sum subsidy over some years. Both courses lead to political pitfalls. More seriously, they evade the basic issue: it is just as important to establish a viable system of public finance in a territory before independence as it is to establish a viable Constitution, for the absence of the former is a sure path to the rapid subversion of the latter. In the same way also, it is important for the imperial Power to be a party to the often unpleasant decisions required to set matters on a sound footing. It would seem therefore that the next Budget[1] in Kenya, for 1962–3, should deal with as many as possible of the unpleasant tax measures that are required, so that the new independent Government does not bear the entire odium for them; moreover, this would best be done while experienced officers are still available to plan and introduce them.

The essential minimum of financial independence is the ability to pay for recurrent Government expenditure out of the taxes and other imposts levied on the economy, taking one year with another. This offers at least the possibility of independence with dignity, if not of independence with much development. A poor country, which aspires to higher standards of living, has also to come to terms with the foreign aid problem. The programme of economic development which the Government feels obliged to adopt, when taken together with other capital commitments, is likely to be considerably beyond any feasible Budget surpluses or the capacity of rudimentary capital markets, and the Government is therefore obliged to turn, more or less willingly, to the channels of international public finance.

The outstanding feature of development finance in Kenya is the extreme dependence at the present time on external sources. There

[1] The financial year runs from July to 30 June and the Budget is usually presented in May.

is no regular provision for contributions from taxation via Budget surpluses—on the contrary, substantial sums are provided each year from development funds for recurring development services in the ordinary Budget. It was planned to raise about £6 million (or one-sixth of the total) from the local capital market, but the confidence crisis washed out this possibility. The Government has no reserves as a result of the Mau Mau emergency. In short, it looks as if nearly £34 million, or 94 per cent of the cost of the current three-year development programme, will have to be raised abroad.

Great efforts have been made to lessen Kenya's dependence on the U.K. for development aid, and in fact important breakthroughs have been achieved with commitments from the World Bank, West Germany, and—to a lesser extent so far—the United States and the U.N. Even so the probability is that Britain will have to provide 60 per cent of the total.

A main difficulty in lessening this dependence on Britain is that most international donors have a strong predilection for tying their aid to specific, preferably new, projects; whereas Kenya's need is for funds to maintain existing top priority development schemes. There is a real danger that the Government will be unable to maintain some of these services, on the one hand because of the falling away of untied development finance, and, on the other, because of its inability to absorb them into the recurrent Budget.

This is but one aspect of a very tricky problem for sensitive, newly independent Governments: namely, the imposition from abroad of priorities and conditions for their development plans. Furthermore, an international panel of bondholders imposes—or is thought to impose—restraints of a more general nature on the permissible range of economic policy which the Government can pursue. The agricultural settlement schemes could well prove a case in point.

PROBLEMS OF ADMINISTRATION

The experience of newly independent nations in other parts of Africa has already familiarized observers with many of the problems of creating a civil service to meet the needs of the new State; in particular, such problems as how to retain the expatriates that are still wanted after independence, the difficulties of extending the effective range of activity of the independent Government, the pitfalls of indiscriminate Africanization, and the proper role of foreign advisers. In Kenya it is difficult to resist the foreboding that the new

Government will be confronted with more than the usual civil service difficulties.

The civil service machine in Kenya is large by colonial standards, its operations are complex, even sophisticated, and at the beginning of 1960 it was largely manned by non-Africans in its executive and especially administrative grades. One special feature of the administrative machine in Kenya is the large-scale projection of the Government outside the capital and into the districts. Two main reasons for this were probably the Mau Mau emergency, which led to a system of administration that carried executive leadership down to very small administrative units—with other departments of Government following closely behind; and, secondly, the emphasis laid in the Development Programmes on bringing extension services down to grass-roots level, as opposed to large-scale capital projects.[1]

Apart from the bureaucracy needed to sustain large field forces deployed across the country, two organizational factors have served to increase the size of the civil service in Nairobi. First there is the development of ministerial government and the progressive fragmentation since the war of the traditional colonial secretariat, which has meant a multiplication of all civil service jobs. Secondly, and reinforcing this duplication of facilities, there has been the consequences of financial devolution following the introduction of the exchequer system of accounting in 1954.

Unlike many colonies at the time of independence, Kenya has been elaborating her development mechanism for over fifteen years —and particularly her capacity to spend large sums of money annually over a wide range of activities—and this development programme provides one of the main sources of complexity in government today. In addition to the development services already mentioned there is the planning and execution of capital works programmes, and the increasingly complex procedural and accounting requirements of the international agencies.

In a number of respects Kenya has become a highly controlled and administered society, partly as a result of the Mau Mau emergency, partly because of the energy of her colonial administration, partly for reasons of economic policy, partly because of the particular emphasis of her development programmes. Quite apart from

[1] For example, between 1950 and 1960-1 the number of posts graded as administrative assistant and above in the Provincial Administration increased by 189 per cent to 434 and the field force of agricultural and veterinary officers (excluding research workers and specialists) grew by 166 per cent to 372 at the qualified levels and by 126 per cent to 1,436 at the technical assistant level.

any reappraisal of the merits of the individual policies leading to such a controlled society, there is an urgent need to consider their manpower implications in relation to the best use of very scarce African administrative talent.

However vigorous may be the prosecution of civil service training schemes to make the most effective use of Africans coming forward from the universities or already in the service or from any other source, their numbers are so small and the time factor is such that the Government will run serious risks of breakdown in certain branches if it carries over into independence without modification an administrative machine of the present size and complexity. It would seem unrealistic to trust that this problem can be avoided through the retention of expatriates and foreign advisers. In the first place, expatriates have the right to retire of their own volition with compensation in advance of their being dispensed with. Secondly, the racial element in African nationalism, which produces a strong compulsion to replace expatriates by Africans whatever the objective need, should not be overlooked. Nevertheless—and having regard to the real danger of a collapse of sectors of the civil service machine due to the departure of expatriates at a faster rate than they can be replaced by Africans—there is possibly a case for introducing discriminatory incentives, of a kind which could not be offered generally, for certain groups of officers whom the Government recognizes a special interest in retaining. Such groups might include doctors, engineers, research specialists, etc., groups which the programme of Africanization cannot hope to cover for a considerable time, and also jobs with a low political priority for Africanization, which, if filled by expatriates, will enable the Government to maintain a greater range of effective services than would otherwise be possible. Schoolteachers are a good example.

PROBLEMS OF RISING EXPECTATION?

Finally, there are problems likely to face the newly independent Government arising from the economic expectations held by the African electorate. The African political leaders will themselves have played a large part in arousing these expectations, in particular the idea that they will be realized with the coming of independence.

One of the most important of these expectations is that of a higher standard of living after independence. The essential task for the Government is to transform the belief that the millenium will dawn on the morrow of independence into a belief that everything possible

is being done through the development programme to press ahead with rapid economic expansion. Success depends in large measure on a massive adult education campaign by the national leaders to relate the facts and mechanisms of economic life to ordinary expectations.

Unhappily, a number of pitfalls lie in the way of the new Government. First there is the probability that there will be serious political divisions in the country, inhibiting the growth of a sense of national unity which is important if expectations are to be kept under control. Secondly, the presence of relatively wealthy Asian and European communities will suggest to some a tempting short-cut through racial envy, in the hope that dispossession and redistribution of wealth will produce attractive short-term gains. Thirdly, there is the difficulty that the development effort of recent years leaves little scope for exciting novelty; the main need now is to maintain a steady application of effort to existing programmes and to prevent damage to the productive forces already there. As in many Middle Eastern countries, the uncomfortable truth is that the economic structures already in existence (and created by foreigners to boot) are much more important for raising living standards than any fresh initiatives undertaken by the new Government can hope to be for many years to come.

Land presents other big problems. First there are those created by the unsolved disputes of the past, mainly concerning the former white highlands area—the so-called Sore Thumbs problem. These should be largely solved by the time of independence, since the present Government is currently acquiring the disputed territories in the highlands for settlement by the irredentist tribes. There are other problems arising from inter-tribal fears, which lie behind much KADU support; these can only be settled by conciliatory political leadership and the gradual weakening of tribal exclusiveness, and are likely to block a national land policy for many years.

There are also the land problems created by population pressure. The agricultural settlement schemes in the Highlands are a large-scale attempt to relieve land pressure in the African land units by settling Africans on land acquired from European settlers. The Government hopes in this way to achieve a controlled infiltration of the Highlands on a sufficient scale to be able to prevent an uncontrolled invasion after independence, and thus to sustain the level of production while carrying out a fundamental land reform. The concept

is undoubtedly right (as is evidenced by the financial support already agreed by the World Bank, the Colonial Development Corporation, the West German Government, and the British Government). The pity is that the operation has been started so late in the day, when a clear lead for such schemes was given back in 1955 by the East Africa Royal Commission.[1] The task of making sufficient impact before independence, in terms of the number of families settled on the land, is thus made very much harder. Already expectations of free land after independence are prejudicing the operation.

Although the Kenya Government has accumulated considerable experience of settlement schemes in the last fifteen years, the peculiar problems of introducing intensive African settlement into the agricultural pattern of the Highlands really calls for pilot experiments. But the time factor precludes this. Moreover, there is an even more serious danger that the political urgency of these schemes will prejudice the establishment of a properly effective administrative structure to run them. In view of the large sums of money involved, the international consortium taking an interest in the schemes (whose help will be needed in due course for other projects), the burden on the Kenya public debt, and the economic and political factors already mentioned, it is of great importance that the successor Government in Kenya should be fully alive to the 'test case' nature of the settlement schemes and become fully committed to their success.

Judged by the standards of many under-developed areas, particularly in Asia, Kenya's unemployment problem might appear marginal. Nevertheless, in relation to Kenya's own history and recent experience, the country is undoubtedly suffering at the present time from serious unemployment, and there are keen expectations that an independent Government should go a long way towards solving it. Unfortunately the facts of the situation strongly suggest that there is no easy answer to the problem and, indeed, that it could very easily get worse. The implications for law and order are by no means academic.

The fundamental reasons for this problem in Kenya are the same as in many similar countries: a fast rate of population growth with, on the one hand, limited opportunities for employment in traditional agriculture, and, on the other, a growing demand for wage employment and participation in the urban money economy. The cure lies in achieving sustained economic growth with more agricultural ex-

[1] Cmd. 9475.

ports, and the attendant growth of the industrial and service sectors, rather than in any short-term measures.

Of the immediate factors aggravating the situation, the two-year famine, which drove subsistence farmers into the employment market, will now be subsiding. Many unemployed Kikuyu will be demanding land rather than jobs in the next few years and it is to be hoped that the settlement schemes will alleviate this pressure. The effects of the confidence crisis are more serious. Not only did it check the growth of opportunities for total employment, but also part of the established work force has been dispensed with. A potential aggravating factor that will require careful watching is the effect of settlement schemes on agricultural employment in the Highlands. What of solutions? For a bankrupt Government there is little scope in public works, even if this made economic sense. The possibly unpalatable truth is that the most effective short-term solution of the problem of unemployment would be by the restoration among business men and farming interests of confidence in their future in the country.

A number of newly independent States have been able to satisfy to a considerable extent the enormous urge for increased educational opportunities by drawing on reserves accumulated before independence and by exploiting a very modestly developed taxable capacity. Kenya has no such reserves and is likely to experience great difficulty in the next few years even in financing the pre-independence level of Government services, in spite of substantial tax increases. Yet the demand for education in Kenya is as vociferous as anywhere in the world. To make the dilemma even more acute, the political demand at present is for universal primary education, yet the national need is for all available extra resources to be put into secondary and higher education, into what Arthur Lewis calls Investment education as opposed to Consumption education.[1] Within the next few years the money, the teachers, and the buildings will all be lacking by far too large a margin, and it will require leadership of a high order if the new Government is to ride out the pressures.

To sum up, it would seem that the newly independent Government in Kenya will inherit control of an economy of unexpected sophistication and of a government administrative machine of unusual complexity. Europeans and Asians as business men and ad-

[1] 'Education and Economic Development', by Arthur Lewis, in *Social and Economic Studies*, June 1961, published by the Institute of Social and Economic Research, University College of the West Indies, Jamaica.

ministrators have been the agents of this vigorous development and their attitudes towards the new African Government and the treatment they received from it will in large part determine whether this precarious achievement is maintained and developed in the next few years or whether the economy suffers a grave relapse. The new Ministers will be confronted with some stark alternatives and with very little room for manœuvre.

The purely African agricultural and business sector is still so small that economic activity in the country (and the employment of over half a million Africans) is geared to non-African enterprise. No conceivable scale of external economic assistance could alter this situation quickly. Moreover, any harsh steps in this direction, such as expropriation, would be likely to condemn the country to years of stagnation, even of decline.

It will require very firm measures for the new Government to balance its recurrent Budget out of local resources, and even then it is likely to be heavily dependent on external aid for its development programme. Any serious setback would destroy even this precarious achievement and put the country in pawn.

The size and complexity of the administrative machine in Kenya enforces further restrictions on the freedom of action of the independence leaders. Crash programmes of Africanization will not save the Government from having to take special steps to reduce and simplify their administrative commitments, and to continue the employment of expatriates, if they are to preserve effective government, let alone extend their activities in selected fields.

Expectations on the part of the majority of the Africans of greater material well-being, of land acquisition through the expropriation of European farms, and of dramatic improvements in employment and education will surround their leaders with dangerous and conflicting temptations.

Finding themselves so hedged about with economic pressures and so dependent on Western confidence, money, and men—scarcely master of their own political independence—it will not be surprising if advocates are found within the country for two extreme courses, on the one hand a return to a more indigenous economy free of all these complications, and, on the other, for the panacea of a Chinese or Soviet connection.

M. D. McWilliam

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Notes of the Month

Britain and European Political Integration

On 10 April at the meeting of Western European Union in London Mr Heath, the Lord Privy Seal, made an important statement on the British Government's attitude towards the efforts currently being made to establish a form of political union among the six members of the European Economic Community. The statement was made in private session but was leaked to the press, and subsequently the text of Mr Heath's remarks was released by the Government. It revealed that the Lord Privy Seal had asked the Ministers of the Six represented at the London meeting to include Britain forthwith in 'your discussions about the future political framework of Europe'.

The request is notable because it appears to mark a change of tactics, at least, on the British side in the negotiations with the E.E.C. Hitherto the British negotiators have been careful to make no claims for representation in any of the Community's debates on its own policies, even when the decisions being taken were vital and of immediate concern to Britain's own interests. This has been especially noticeable in the discussions on agriculture, where Britain, as much the largest potential importer of food in the group, might well have been consulted, and on the question of the Associated Overseas Territories, where the inclusion of part or all of the Commonwealth must plainly alter the whole structure of the relationship that has been built up to accommodate the interests of a relatively small group of countries, chiefly ex-French colonies, in Africa.

There had been sharp disagreements inside the Commission set up by the Six to work out plans for a new form of political machinery (the so-called Fouchet Commission, named after its original Chairman, M. Fouchet, who was appointed French High Commissioner in Algeria in March). An attempt was made by President de Gaulle to resolve the points at issue in direct conversations with Dr Adenauer and with Signor Fanfani, the Italian Prime Minister. However, at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Six in Paris on 17 April it became apparent that there was a complete deadlock. Matters were brought to a head when a minority among the Foreign

Ministers' group, believed to comprise the Netherlands and Belgium, insisted that no decisions should be taken until Britain had become a member of the European Community and had been given a chance to state her views on the political issue. The French, who had taken the initiative in these political discussions, did not conceal their disappointment. As it was originally presented in the early meetings of the Fouchet Commission the French aim was to establish a body of European Ministers which would be quite separate from the existing European Communities in Brussels and Luxemburg, would concern itself with foreign policy and defence, and would operate like any other friendly alliance on the basis of the unanimity rule. Most of this was obnoxious to the European integrationists, and a series of attempts have been made during the early months of this year to find a formula which will be somewhere between de Gaulle's *l'Europe des patries* and the ideal of an integrated Europe favoured by the supporters of the E.E.C.

On the face of it, Mr Heath's statement leans more towards the Brussels than the Paris position. At any rate it accepts unequivocally the view that the European Economic Community, and not some separate new institution, is the basis on which the political unity of Europe should be built up. Mr Heath also accepts another view of the European integrationists—that the 'political and economic community' will grow and 'will have opinions on many subjects—perhaps on most subjects'. He pointed particularly to the subject of defence, where he said he expected a common European point of view to emerge. This would no doubt change the balance inside the Atlantic alliance. This was welcomed so long as it was absolutely clear that the European Community was a loyal member of N.A.T.O.

It is impossible to say how far any of this conflicts with the modified French view as it has emerged in the discussions of the Fouchet Commission. Mr Heath's statement gave British support to the French view that there was a need for a new piece of European Ministerial machinery to deal with political questions, and that this should organize meetings between Heads of Governments. But perhaps the most interesting aspect of his remarks—as an indication of the thinking of the British Government on the long-term future of Europe—was his insistence on the British desire to reinforce the democratic control over the European Communities by strengthening the European Parliament. This body has so far had very little power, although its views on certain issues have been given con-

siderable weight by the European Commission in preparing its laws for submission to the Council of Ministers. Indeed the Commission and the Parliament tend to regard themselves as allies in the process of furthering European integration against the sometimes laggard Council of Ministers. So once again on this issue it appears that the British Government's position is close to that of the European Commission in Brussels.

Technical Co-operation among African States

THE renaissance of Pan-African co-operation, following on the emergence of separate sovereign States, led inevitably to the reformation of the Commission for Technical Co-operation in Africa (C.C.T.A.).[1] The seventeenth session of the Commission at Abidjan in February brought to its logical conclusion the process of ousting the founder members in favour of independent Africa. That process began in 1957 with the admission of Ghana; reached a crescendo in the last eighteen months when ten new States were admitted; and ended this year with the transformation of the structure of control. Of the six founder members, two (South Africa and Portugal) were expelled; and the other four are relegated to the status of non-voting associates.

The change has technical as well as political implications. Already the work of the Commission has begun to reflect its larger and technically less-endowed membership; and this process will be accelerated. It is one thing for six technically advanced nations to agree to exchange and co-ordinate information and research on African problems. It is quite another for some thirty needy nations, inexperienced in co-operation, to attempt the same. The emphasis, at least, is bound to be different—for several reasons.

First, the members themselves will have to find most of their technical resources from outside the continent: their problem will be not so much co-ordinating existing resources and technical knowledge as attracting it from outside and rationalizing its use. The reformed Commission has voluntarily denied itself the technical wealth and experience of South Africa, which is especially advanced in the fields of animal health and soil chemistry.

Second, the Commission's activities have been extended, for political reasons, north of the Sahara—previously excluded on the

[1] The Commission was set up in 1950 by the four colonial Powers, France, Belgium, Portugal, and Britain, together with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, in order to co-ordinate technical work, particularly scientific research, in Africa.

ground that its problems were too different to be usefully tackled with those of the south. Third, M. Claude Cheysson, the energetic and enlightened French Secretary-General, is to be replaced, again for political reasons, by an African. The sensitivities of nationalist Africa will make the post of Secretary-General one of the most delicate in Africa; and its African incumbent must prove himself doubly invulnerable to sectional national pressures. Co-ordination of the technical output of six established European Governments is a different matter from integrating and allocating scarce resources between nearly thirty competing emergent nations in revolutionary transition.

For these reasons, the emphasis of the work of the Commission is already shifting from the pure exchange of information to instituting practical projects on the ground at a regional level. This means getting African Governments to co-operate on schemes, with outside technical help, which none of them could undertake on its own. Three such projects, planned or under way, have already attracted more attention in Africa than any of the previous scientific study conferences. A very far-reaching scheme for the eradication of rinderpest in the sub-Saharan States of Cameroun, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria is expected to wipe out the disease altogether in ten years. Another will be the thorough exploration of the fisheries resources in the Gulf of Guinea; all the member Governments on that coastline will co-operate in the project 'Guinean Year'.

The third project was introduced at Abidjan this year. It is an imaginative long-term scheme for the training of middle-grade personnel *in Africa itself*, based on the thesis that present shortages are likely to increase rather than diminish in the immediate future, and that training in Africa is both cheaper and more productive than training overseas. A double appeal went out from Abidjan: to African Governments to throw open their educational institutions to students from neighbouring countries, and to donor nations in Europe to concentrate their offers of help on building up training institutions within Africa.

These projects are administered by the Foundation for Mutual Assistance in Africa (F.A.M.A.), to which donations are invited from outside, and which is run under the aegis of the C.C.T.A. France has already agreed to double her contribution to F.A.M.A., and Britain to increase hers by 50 per cent. The U.S.A. and the E.E.C. are important contributors to many of F.A.M.A.'s schemes.

As the relative importance of F.A.M.A. increases, that of the

Commission's other associated body, the Scientific Council for Africa (C.S.A.), is likely to diminish. The Council consists of individual scientists who work independently of Governments to advise the C.C.T.A. on technical matters. Much of its expertise has been drawn from South Africa. Though in theory its composition is not affected by the South African Government's exclusion from the Commission, it would be wrong to be too sanguine about South African participation in the future, if only because of the difficulty of travelling in Africa on a South African passport. With or without South Africans, the C.S.A. will continue to do a vital job; but its role is likely to decline by comparison with the practical projects undertaken by F.A.M.A.

Looking farther ahead, the big question mark is whether the C.C.T.A. will eventually come to be absorbed by or integrated with the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa. Already the two co-operate and overlap in certain functions. The E.C.A. is, of course, a larger body with considerably more resources at its command and longer-term projects in mind. It also has less specifically African experience. But as the C.C.T.A. gradually gives more prominence to the work of F.A.M.A., and the E.C.A. gains experience in the regional needs of Africa, it will become more and more difficult to draw a line between their separate functions. Very much will depend upon the direction which the new executive secretary, Mr Robert Gardiner, will give to the E.C.A.

That is a problem for the future. Meanwhile, the C.C.T.A. has yet to prove itself equal to the challenge of functional Pan-Africanism presented by its new structure. Two years ago, Ghana withdrew because of the continued membership of the colonial Powers. The first test of the reformed Commission will be whether Ghana restores her active membership, and whether the North African States will join by the time the new Constitution is accepted. The next will come with the appointment of an African Secretary-General. Mauritania's present Ambassador to Paris, M. Mamadou Touré, was suggested at Abidjan; but the appointment will not be confirmed until every member has expressed agreement. M. Touré formerly served as an economist in the Secretariat of the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community. If appointed, he will inherit an organization which has shown itself flexible enough to ride the stormy period of transition from European to African control. His task will be to prove its technical effectiveness in the new political context.

Turkey: The Thorny Road to Democracy

In a previous article in *The World Today*,[1] which gave an account of events between the revolution of 27 May 1960 and the beginning of August, I ventured a cautious prediction: 'If, as seems likely, the franchise is restricted to the literate ... the next Government is likely to be a dictatorship of the intellectuals.' In so saying, I was underestimating General Gürsel's determination to see a real democracy established in Turkey. To the deep disgust of most of the intellectuals, the general election of 15 October 1961 was held on a basis of universal adult suffrage, and the resulting Assembly, thanks to proportional representation, so accurately reflected all the conflicting views of 28 million Turks that for four months it was not able to make up its mind about anything.

It became apparent soon after the revolution that the National Unity Committee was not wholeheartedly behind General Gürsel in his plan to give democracy another chance. It became apparent too, however, that General Gürsel had been unrealistic in hoping for a new civilian Government composed of men above party.[2] This hope had guided his choice of the civilian members of the Cabinet formed the day after the revolution, but the military junta soon lost patience with the business men, professors, and civil servants who were now their colleagues in the Government. There were complaints of bad liaison between the National Unity Committee and the civilian Ministers; the officers who were discussing plans for a national health service never bothered to consult the Minister of Health, while the Minister of Agriculture's views were ignored by the officers who were planning a drastic land reform. The civilian Ministers naturally felt that they had hardly even the semblance of authority. On 25 August 1960 the General, as Prime Minister, announced the dismissal of ten of the fifteen civilians, and it was a fortnight before their places were filled, the Committee allowing itself more time for the choice than in the case of the original Cabinet. One of the dismissed Ministers, asked whether he was disappointed at the decision, philosophically replied that he had accepted office as a civil servant accepts a new appointment, and was giving it up in the same spirit. Everyone realized that power was in the hands of the soldiers; nor could it be otherwise, since the Committee had assumed the functions of the Grand National Assembly.

[1] 'Turkey: The End of the First Republic', *The World Today*, September 1960.

[2] This accounts for the failure of another of my cautious predictions, that there was little likelihood of Ismet Inönü's being permitted to stand for office again.

As had happened inside the Committee of Union and Progress in 1908, so, in the National Unity Committee fifty-two years later, sectional interests began to emerge once the first enthusiasm of the revolution was over. A powerful group of officers was hoping to delay indefinitely the return to constitutional government. In their view, the mistakes and the corruption of the Menderes regime were a proof that Ismet Inönü had acted prematurely in 1950 in permitting the free election which had brought Menderes to power. Civilians were not to be trusted. The officers' attitude, though none of them expressed it in so many words, may be summed up as that the Turkish nation consists of the Turkish army plus camp-followers. Civilians were incapable of leading the people. Intellectual civilians were regarded as the worst of all, because they have ideas, and ideas are infectious.

Hence the bombshell of 27 October 1960. On that day, the Committee decreed the dismissal of 147 university teachers, on the general grounds of incompetence, laziness, homosexuality, and neglecting their duties for extra-mural activities. An analysis of the list of names, which included several scholars with international reputations, suggested that at least part of the purpose was to remove any teacher capable of influencing his students. But clearly not all the 147 were in this category. There were a few supporters of the old regime; a number who were moderately left-wing; one whose marriage to a Communist had recently ended in divorce. There were also, it is true, a few who had not been as assiduous in their attendance at the university as they should have been, but a great many such had escaped the notice of the purgers. The one factor common to all the 147 was that they had clearly been denounced. Spotting the informers at once became the current craze in academic circles, and the names of nine of them were soon coming over the grape-vine. They included one journalist, but most were themselves university teachers. It also became known that twenty teachers in Istanbul University had telegraphed their congratulations and thanks to the Committee for the dismissals. Since the days of the struggle against the absolutism of Abdul-Hamid, informers have been detested by most Turks,[1] and the realization of the treason of the intellectuals to the cause of academic freedom has had a profoundly demoralizing

[1] H. A. Göktürk, in his *Medenî Hukuk* (*Civil Law*—Ankara, 1943), says, *à propos* grounds for divorce: 'Our law has had the courage to place the leading of an indecent mode of life on the same level as committing a shameful crime. As examples of an indecent mode of life, we may cite the occupations of brothel-keeper, *agent provocateur*, or informer.'

effect. In spite of repeated promises by the Government to quash the dismissals, nothing concrete has been done up to the time of writing. One of the 147 said to me recently, 'This shows you the lengths some people will go to in order to save university teaching in Turkey from becoming a learned profession.'

In the lower ranks of academic life, too, there was discontent. One of the most promising acts of the military Government was to decree, in October 1960, that *lycée* graduates should not be automatically entitled to commissions but should perform their national service as schoolteachers in villages in the remote country districts. The young men affected by this measure were furious. To be an officer has always been every Turkish boy's ambition, and since the revolution the prestige of officer's status has been enhanced. The attitude of many parents was ostensibly different; every citizen could see the vital need for bringing education to the villages, and no one disputed that the army had been top-heavy. But never was a law so much approved in principle and so much deplored in practice.

The decree was repealed just before martial law ended in November 1961; no one knows exactly why. *Lycée* graduates, who were therefore told that they would not be required to do their national service for the moment, then besieged the universities. Like the prestige of the army, the prestige of university students has been enhanced since May 1960; after all, it was an undergraduate demonstration that triggered off the revolution.[1] The voice of Turkish Youth, with a capital 'Y', has been heard at every public meeting; there was even a representative of Turkish Youth alongside the representatives of the other estates in the Constituent Assembly (see below). Students have therefore been giving themselves airs. Those in one academic institution boycotted their lectures because their demands for certain administrative changes had been rejected by the authorities. In another, the students' union protested against the practice of failing students who did not reach the pass-mark in their examinations. To the teachers, who mildly expostulated that this practice was universal and had a certain logical basis, they replied, 'You do not understand our difficulties. If a student fails, his career is finished. Is this democratic?' Small wonder that young people are

[1] Awareness of this fact brought about a curious incident in Munich last autumn, when some of the many Turkish workers who had recently migrated to Germany and found that the streets were not paved with gold, unfairly attacked a group of Turkish students, on the ground that if the students hadn't upset the apple-cart by starting the revolution everything in Turkey would have been wonderful and the workers need not have left home.

falling over themselves to join this junior *élite*. More *lycée* graduates than ever before have been trying to secure entrance to the universities; this winter, 40,000 have had to be turned away, and this means 40,000 more malcontents. A demonstration by some of them in Istanbul on 1 November 1961 carried banners bearing such slogans as 'Education is out; military service is out; what's left?'

To be able to follow Turkish politics, one must understand the interpretation not only of a lot of confusing initials but also of a series of mystic numbers. There are the 5,000, the majors and colonels compulsorily retired after a 'reorganization of the forces' announced on 6 August 1960. Then came the 147, the dismissed professors and lecturers. On 13 November 1960 they were joined by the 14. On that day, General Gürsel broadcast to the nation that he had dissolved the National Unity Committee, 'as its functioning was endangering the country's interests', and that he had created a new Committee, made up of twenty-three members of the old one. The reason for this procedure, when it might have seemed simpler to drop the undesirable fourteen men from the Committee without dissolving it, was that the provisional Constitution of 12 June 1960 safeguarded members of the Committee against dismissal unless a court established that they had broken the oath by which they pledged themselves to hand over power as soon as possible to a new elected Assembly. But no member could be brought before a court on this or any other charge without the approval of four-fifths of those present at a meeting attended by six-sevenths of the membership of the Committee.

And this approval would never have been forthcoming. The Committee had just rejected by 19 votes to 18 (Gürsel having voted twice, as Chairman, to resolve the tie) a draft law which would have kept the Committee in power for four years. Another draft law, which was on the agenda for 14 November, would have abolished the Ministry of Education and set up a National Union of Ideals and Culture, independent of the Government, with a regional organization throughout the country, a special section for controlling the minorities, and an immovable head. This law would have been passed.

The leading member of the 14, Colonel Alpaslan Türkesh, and some of the others were known to be devotees of Pan-Turanianism, a creed which sees the Turks as a master race. But even those of the 14 who did not hold this quaint doctrine were convinced that Turkey needed a stronger hand than a civilian Government could provide.

General Gürsel's prompt action had saved the day, and the honour of the Committee, but, as we shall see, there were other officers who thought it expedient to forget Atatürk's prime directive, that the army should take no part in politics.

On 6 January 1961 the new Constituent Assembly met for the first time. The Committee formed an upper house, with a lower house containing representatives of provinces, political parties (except the Democrat Party, liquidated by court order in September 1960), and professional bodies. Almost 80 per cent were members or sympathizers of the Republican People's Party (R.P.P.). The duties of the Assembly were to produce a new Constitution and electoral law, both designed to make impossible any repetition of the abuses of the previous decade. Feelings ran particularly high over Article 2 of the draft Constitution, which ran: 'The Turkish Republic is democratic and secular, and is based on the principles of work and social justice', regarded by the right wing as paving the way for Communism. Social justice was eventually relegated to the preamble. The final form of Article 2 is worth quoting, as its slight woolliness is typical of much of the whole document: 'The Turkish Republic is a nationalist, democratic, secular and social State governed by the rule of law, based on human rights and the fundamental tenets set forth in the preamble.'

A referendum held on 16 July 1961 approved the new Constitution, but gave scant comfort to those who had drafted it. Out of an electorate of 12·7 million, 6·3 million voted for the Constitution, 2·4 million abstained, and 3·9 million voted against it. In the fourteen months that had passed since the revolution, the millenial hopes of those who had ardently supported it had waned. No significant improvement in the economic situation, so far as it affected ordinary people, had been noted. Few supporters of Menderes had found in the trials, which had been dragging on since October 1960, any reason to abandon their loyalty to the magnetic leader, whose understanding of the Turkish peasant was as great as his understanding of the Turkish officer was small. The ban on political activity, imposed immediately after the revolution, had been lifted on 13 January 1961. Of the eleven new parties which applied for official recognition, only three appeared to have much hope of electoral success against the R.P.P. There was, first, the Justice Party (J.P.), founded by one of the generals compulsorily retired on 1 August 1960, which appealed for the support of the 5,000 other officers who had been retired shortly afterwards. But obviously, even if all these dis-

gruntled officers voted for the J.P., they would not constitute the mass support it wanted. The vice-chairman of the party gave the game away when he announced that it was a continuation of the Democrat Party. Then there was the New Turkey Party (N.T.P.), whose leadership included some former Democrats who had parted company with Menderes before the 1957 elections; this hoped for the votes of the liberal wing of the outlawed party. The Republican Peasants' National Party (R.P.N.P.), generally characterized as moderate conservative, was also counting on a share of the 4 million votes which had been the basis of Menderes's power and which had been cast against the new Constitution in the referendum.

The results of the general election held on 15 October 1961 were described by the foreign press as a shock to the military junta, but this seems hard to believe. The R.P.P. won 37 per cent of the votes. In 1950 it had won 40 per cent; in 1954, 35; in 1957, 42. Why should anyone have supposed that its poll would substantially increase after the revolution, which, as all concerned were careful to point out, was carried out by a group of patriotic officers with no political affiliations? For the convinced supporters of Menderes, their duty was plainly to vote for the party which had proclaimed itself his spiritual heir. The uncommitted voters, whose choice at each election is based on an objective assessment of the merits of the rival candidates, even if they believed every word of the evidence of Democrat corruption adduced at the trials, were not likely to forget on that account the corruption of the R.P.P.'s quarter-century in office. Useless to remind them of Ismet Inönü's selfless abdication of his power in 1950, after he had staged the first entirely fair election in Turkish history; even if they accepted that Ismet Pasha had his good points, what about the rest of his party? And above all other influences on the uncommitted voter was the hideous aftermath of the trials.

The judges on Yassiada, the bleak 'Flat Island' in the Sea of Marmara, passed sentence on 15 September 1961. Fifteen of the accused were sentenced to death, 31 to life imprisonment, 418 to shorter terms, while 123 were acquitted. The judges had performed their task scrupulously; they had passed the sentences laid down by the law for the offences they had found proved—but there is good reason to believe that they had never imagined the death-sentences would be confirmed by the National Unity Committee, and that the Committee had never imagined so either. The trials had gone on too long; countless photographs, newsreels, and the daily broadcasts of ex-

cerpts from the court proceedings had familiarized everyone with the gallant bearing of Adnan Menderes, physically shrunken but still well groomed, evasive in his answers but witty and courteous. As the months went by, his relationship with Salim Bashol, the slightly built but immensely impressive presiding judge, had become a strange and, in retrospect, terrifying affability, almost an intimacy. The Committee well knew the growing sympathy for Menderes in Turkey and abroad. They did not want to stain the 'Bloodless Revolution'; they may even perhaps have remembered the first day of it, when they seized the radio stations and broadcast an invitation to all members of the Menderes Government to 'place themselves under the protection of the armed forces'. But the decision was taken out of the Committee's hands; a group of officers outside the Committee gave them the choice of confirming the death-sentences on Adnan Menderes and two of his Ministers, or seeing the island bombed with all the prisoners on it. Knowing that those who made the threat had the means and the ruthlessness to implement it, the Committee accepted the awful bargain. Zorlu and Polatkan were hanged on 16 September, Menderes the next day. Menderes's execution could perhaps be justified on grounds of political expediency; the other two were executed because they were unpopular. Such was the chilling background to the general election of 15 October 1961.

The millions who had idolized the fallen Prime Minister, together with many who had disapproved of him but were nevertheless horrified at the manner of his death, struck back in the only safe way open to them: they voted against the man and the party who had opposed Menderes in his lifetime and whom many blamed for his death. Ismet Inönü had in fact done his best to save Menderes, but few peasants would believe it, in view of his reputation for extreme craftiness: 'Ismet Pasha has nine foxes wandering round inside his head, and their tails don't even touch.' Of 150 seats in the new Senate, his R.P.P. obtained 36, the J.P. 70, the N.T.P. 28, the R.P.N.P. 16. In the Lower House, proportional representation gave the R.P.P. 173 seats, the J.P. 158, the N.T.P. 65, the R.P.N.P. 54.

On 26 October, both Houses, in joint session, elected General Gürsel to the Presidency of the Republic, by 434 votes to 173. The only other candidate, Professor Ali Fuad Bashgil, who had tried to defend Menderes against the charge of violating the Constitution, was intimidated into leaving Ankara before the joint session. From

the safety of Istanbul he telegraphed his resignation from the Senate. The puppet-show was being operated with unusual clumsiness; the faces of the operators may not have been visible to the audience, but their hands and their uniforms were in full view. They were not aiming at military government, they were prepared to let the civilians have another try, but they would not let the self-declared heirs of the Democrats win control again.

After days of fruitless talk about the possibility of a coalition, General Gürsel cut the Gordian knot and appointed Ismet Inönü Prime Minister. He tried to form a coalition Cabinet, but the Justice Party were in no mood for compromise. They would enter a coalition only on their terms: the Prime Minister, as well as the President, would have to be above party, and Inönü must therefore resign from the R.P.P., and the new Government would have to include in its programme an amnesty for the imprisoned Democrats. The army lost patience; in what the newspapers called 'a triumph for Messrs Thompson and Sten', the J.P. were forced to agree to join a coalition, on terms to be settled later. A twenty-two-man Cabinet was formed, the R.P.P. and the J.P. each providing half the Ministers, and on 20 November the new Government began work. Weeks passed and nothing was achieved. For day after day the Assembly wrangled about the amnesty. A stream of J.P. Ministers and deputies went back and forth between Ankara and Kayseri jail, where the former Democrat leaders held court and advised their spiritual heirs about political strategy. The farcical climax came when Celâl Bayar, the ex-President, whose death-sentence had been commuted in view of his advanced age (he is seventy-eight), told his disciples that he thought it premature to press for an amnesty.

The Turks had found little amusement in the events of the past eighteen months, and this incident was a welcome change, as was the next: a J.P. deputy complained in the Assembly that deputies' salaries were inadequate and must be increased, as many of his colleagues could not afford to celebrate the New Year. Spontaneously, up and down the country, people who for years of perennial economic crisis had been struggling to make ends meet began organizing collections for the poor starving deputies (the highest-salaried class in Turkey). At Istanbul Technical University, students were collecting coppers to be remitted to the deputy who had started it all, when a beggar came along; the situation was explained to him and he contributed three piastres.

The nightmare of the professional politicians was coming true; people were beginning to think. Something unprecedented happened just before the New Year: printed notices appeared, signed by 'The Meetings Committee of the Istanbul Union of Workers' Syndicates' and reading: 'Worker Brother! For the human living conditions you want, come to Saraçhane at 11 a.m. on Sunday, 31 December.' A hundred thousand people turned up, some of whom, it was plausibly argued, had been paid to come; such a practice, however, was a regular feature of political life under the old regime and does not detract from the importance of the occasion. Among the slogans on the banners were these: 'You gave us your word, you got our votes, and now you've fallen asleep'; 'Cabbage for the worker, caviare for the boss'; 'A syndicate without the right to strike is like an unarmed soldier'; 'We don't want favours, we want our rights.' This is the sort of thing to which many a May Day has accustomed the people of Western Europe, but in Turkey it was totally novel. And, whether or not there was the right to strike, two days later there were strikes of taxi-drivers in Ankara and stevedores in Istanbul. Nor were the workers alone; the newspaper *Milliyet*, probably the most responsible of the big Istanbul dailies, had announced that it would follow a socialist policy, and on 20 December a new weekly appeared, entitled *Yön* ('Direction'), with a manifesto signed by scores of writers and teachers, demanding economic planning, State ownership of industry, and social justice. It seems that the Turks are at last trying to find a political philosophy other than the two hitherto known: on the one hand, an étatism which glorifies the nation but bullies the individual citizen; on the other, a greedy and hypocritical exploitation masquerading as economic liberalism.

Meanwhile, however, other organs of the press were criticizing those responsible for the revolution. In February of this year, the criticism was becoming more and more outspoken. The wiser among the leaders of the Justice Party realized that, whereas the army was an irresistible force, they themselves were a movable obstacle; the only way to prevent another military intervention was to forget about the past and to work sensibly with the Republican People's Party. But while they were thinking about expelling some of the extremists from their own party, the extremist press was continuing to vilify the revolution and all that had happened since. The good sense of some of the J.P. leaders was not effective enough to placate a group of colonels in Ankara, who decided that the time had come to stage another 27 May. Several units of the army, with cadets of

the Ankara War College, attempted a *coup d'état* on 22 February. The bulk of the forces remained loyal and the attempt was put down without bloodshed. Prime Minister Inönü, in a statement on 8 March, reminded the country how the army had honoured its promise to hand back power to the civilians, and how infuriating it was for the army to be subjected to insults and threats of vengeance. He went on to describe the authors of the abortive rebellion as 'thoughtless and irresponsible', but made it plain that he felt they had acted under extreme provocation. Three days before this statement, the Senate had approved a law punishing with up to five years' hard labour anyone who claimed that his party was a continuation of the Democrat Party, or who impugned the legality or rightness of the revolution and the Yassiada trials, even indirectly, by praising or defending the fallen Democrat leaders. Sentences of up to two years await any who attack the multi-party democratic order, or who suggest that such an order cannot be made to work in Turkey, or who try to arouse feelings of vengeance.

The press has been unanimous in condemning the new law as unconstitutional and undemocratic.[1] Even so, it may be for the best. The situation up to now has been ridiculous. In the Justice Party, an equal partner in the ruling coalition, there were on the one hand the extremists who considered that they had a mandate from the electors to exact vengeance from the other party in the coalition and from the army; on the other hand there were the moderates, whose only apparent policy was to restrain the extremists. Now that vengeance as a political programme has been outlawed, and the J.P. has expelled the extremists from its ranks, there is some hope that the coalition will start to deal with the country's real problems, high in the list of which comes the commercial stagnation caused by fears for the future. And after all, if, in consequence of the new law, the political and religious reactionaries can no longer attack the multiparty democracy, no more can the impatient colonels in the army.

GEOFFREY LEWIS

[1] A sample from *Yön* (7 March 1962): 'We were under the impression that democracy and the revolution were to protect our rights. Now they themselves need protecting! And is a new law being contemplated, to protect *this* new law? You know the popular saying, "If the meat smells, they throw salt on it. But what if the salt smells?"'

Proposals for Malaysia

SERIOUS discussion of the possibility of an early merger between the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, and the three territories of British Borneo (North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak) to form Malaysia started with a speech made by Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Federation of Malaya's Prime Minister, at a Foreign Correspondents' luncheon in May 1961. In June Mr Harold Macmillan stated that the plan merited the widest discussion, and its advantages and disadvantages have been canvassed in Malaya and Borneo at every level in the ensuing months. A Commission, with Lord Cobbold as Chairman and two members nominated by the British Government and two by the Malayan Government, has been appointed with the following terms of reference:

> Having regard to the expressed agreement of the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya that the inclusion of North Borneo and Sarawak (together with other territories) in the proposed Federation of Malaysia is a desirable aim in the interests of the peoples of the territories concerned—
>
> (*a*) to ascertain the views of the peoples of North Borneo and Sarawak on this question; and
>
> (*b*) in the light of their assessment of these views, to make recommendations.

The British members of the Commission left London in the middle of February.

If Malaysia is born, the new State will contain about 10 million people as compared with the Federation of Malaya's population of 7 million. The increase in land area will be proportionately greater, for the large population and small area of Singapore is more than balanced by the small population and large area of the three Borneo territories. Indeed the land area of Sarawak alone is not much smaller than that of the Federation of Malaya, but the population density of the former is only one-tenth of that of the latter country. Preliminary figures of total population for the recent censuses held in Borneo in 1960 were about 454,000 in North Borneo, 84,000 in Brunei, and 745,000 in Sarawak, making a total of some 1,283,000. The very smallness of the population of British Borneo adds to the difficulty of 'decolonization' and makes a merger bid by another neighbouring Commonwealth country an attractive method of providing a possible constitutional solution to the problem.

The ethnic composition of the Borneo territories is as diverse as that of Malaya herself. Sarawak's largest group is the Sea Dayak

community, which forms just under one-third of the population. The Chinese were, at the time of the 1960 census, nearly as numerous as the Sea Dayaks[1] and the remaining 37 per cent consist of Malays, Land Dayaks, Melanaus, Europeans, and others. In the State of Brunei 56 per cent of the population are Malays and 20 per cent are Chinese, most of the remainder consisting of other indigenous ethnic groups. In North Borneo, nearly one-quarter of the population are Chinese, but the largest community is the mostly pagan Dusun people. Indigenous ethnic groups, including the Dusun, Murut, and Bajau, make up 67·5 per cent of North Borneo's population. In both the Federation of Malaya and Singapore the proportion of Chinese in the total population is higher than in Borneo—37·2 per cent in the Federation and 75·4 per cent in Singapore. The proposed Federation of Malaysia will have a Chinese component proportionately a little greater than the existing Federation of Malaya but not so great as would a pan-Malayan unit restricted to the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. Communal arithmetic of this kind has undoubtedly played an important part in linking the Borneo territories with any proposal for union between the Federation and Singapore. Such arithmetical exercises, however naïve, reflect popular political thought in both Malaya and Borneo.

The five territories already have much in common. North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak share a common currency with the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. For Sarawak and part of North Borneo as well as Malaya, Singapore is the main commercial hub and, in general, Malaya and Borneo have similar economic interests. Malay is a lingua franca throughout the area. Above all, there is a common pattern in administration. On economic and cultural grounds, therefore, Malaysia makes good sense. It can also be argued that, from the British point of view, the sooner Malaysia becomes effective the better. There is no threat to British economic interests in the creation of the proposed union. Suitable arrangements acceptable to both Britain and Malaya have apparently been agreed in respect of the Singapore bases. Britain is to be allowed to use the Singapore bases 'to assist in the defence of Malaysia, for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia'.[2] (The various interpretations which have been or could be put on this last phrase are not at present worrying the Governments concerned.)

[1] Sometimes called the Ibans. Most of these Sea Dayaks, despite the name, live in the interior of Sarawak.

[2] *Joint Statement by the Governments of the United Kingdom and the Federation of Malaya*, Cmnd. 1563.

Finally, the creation of Malaysia would remove the last remnants of British imperialism in South East Asia. The one remaining British requirement is to ensure that the proposals do not run counter to the wishes of a really large section of the population of the Borneo territories.

No valid case has been argued so far against the ultimate merger of the five territories in a single Malaysia, but there are some grounds for wondering whether, from the Borneo point of view, the move is not premature. These Borneo territories are backward in their educational programmes and in their ability to provide senior officers for governmental administration and finance for economic development, as well as being the laggards in political and constitutional development. Perhaps by Asian standards (though not by African standards) the time for self-government has not yet been reached, and some fear that the creation of Malaysia would mean merely the exchange of Malayan colonialism for British colonialism. Moreover, in many matters, such as methods and levels of taxation, systems of electoral representation, and policy in regard to education, there are important differences in current practice between Malaya and the Borneo territories.

Although Malayan official interest in the future of Borneo is new, it is believed that some years ago, when the Federation was well advanced along the path to self-government, Tunku Abdul Rahman gave some thought to the idea of a united Malaysia that would include the Borneo territories. The idea was put on one side when it became clear that there were strong arguments against the early admission of Singapore to the Federation. Obviously the Singapore of the late 1950s with her largely Chinese population, her radically minded Government, her student problems, and her powerful and raucous trade unions must have seemed from a short-term point of view an undesirable partner for a newly independent country with a Malay-dominated conservative Government. Yet it is the course of events in Singapore that has forced the hands of the Federation's Prime Minister. Since the ruling People's Action Party in Singapore broke with the Communists and Communist sympathizers in 1957, an all-out political struggle has developed in the island between the moderate anti-Communist group, headed by the Prime Minister Mr Lee Kuan Yew and relying to a considerable extent for support on the English-school-educated section of the community, and the pro-Communist groups, including a breakaway section of the People's Action Party, who have the backing of

many of the Chinese-school-educated members of Singapore's population. By-elections in the last year or two have not gone well for Mr Lee Kuan Yew, and Tunku Abdul Rahman has apparently been persuaded that an early merger is the only sure way of stopping the spread of Communist control to Singapore. Once Communist sympathizers got themselves elected to power in Singapore, the Borneo territories would be vulnerable (Sarawak already has her Communist 'problem') and the Federation of Malaya itself would have the greatest difficulty in holding Communism at bay.

Within Borneo the possibility of some form of closer association between North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak has been canvassed for some time, though never with any sense of urgency. In 1958 the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo suggested simultaneously in broadcasts the possibility of some form of federation, and discussion has been stimulated by a series of inter-territorial conferences. In Brunei, however, there has never been much enthusiasm for federation or confederation with Sarawak and North Borneo, partly perhaps because of fear of designs on Brunei's wealth gained from her oil revenues, and partly no doubt because of fear that Brunei's Sultan and his advisers would lose in stature and influence. The pace of constitutional and political advance in the Borneo territories has been slow in comparison with most other Commonwealth dependencies, and not one of the three has as yet held popular direct elections to its legislative council or can boast a quasi-ministerial system of government. However, Sarawak held indirect elections to her legislature in 1959 and Brunei plans to do so in 1962. North Borneo had no political parties until July 1961.

The existing Constitution of the Federation of Malaya allows for the adherence of additional states. Article 2 of the Constitution provides that:

> Parliament may by law—
> (*a*) admit other States to the Federation;
> (*b*) alter the boundaries of any State; . . .

Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak vary greatly in area and population, but there are big differences between the area and population of the existing states of the Federation; size is evidently not a limiting factor in the admission of new territories to the Federation. It seems clear, however, that important changes will have to be made to the Constitution. Singapore wishes to have executive and legislative power over certain matters (such as education and labour) on which the Federal Parliament legislates for the Federa-

tion of Malaya, and the desirability of providing constitutional safeguards for giving autonomy in certain directions to one or more states but not to all has apparently been accepted in principle. Again, the principle has been accepted that there should be control by the Borneo territories over immigration from other parts of the Federation of Malaysia, despite the fact that there are no controls on internal migration from one state to another within the present Federation of Malaya. It is fundamental to the Malaysia idea that the Federal Government would have both legislative and executive responsibility for internal security, for only in this way do its proponents consider that Communism could be successfully contained throughout the country.

In the Federation of Malaya, Parliament passed a motion in October 1961 agreeing in principle to the concept of Malaysia. Of the opposition parties in Parliament, the Socialist Front accepted the principle of merger in the debate but later, as plans developed, opposed the merger. The Pan-Malayan Islamic Party (a Malay communal party) opposed the idea as contrary to the interests of the Malays and suggested the inclusion of the Philippines and Indonesia in any larger unit. Opposition also came from the People's Progressive Party (an extreme left-wing party) on the ground that full merger should not take place until after a general election in Singapore. During the course of the debate the Minister for the Interior stated that he would put all Communists in detention camps if they tried to 'subvert' Greater Malaysia, and finished his speech by saying: 'We must do something to prevent the Communists from dominating this country. That is why, today, we are discussing this question of merger.'

In the Singapore Assembly, whilst the main opposition parties support the principle of merger with the Federation, they take issue with the Government over the question of an early election and over the proposed control of internal security by the Central Government. The Singapore Government argues that its own People's Action Party members elected to the Assembly in 1959 were committed to merger in the party's election manifesto and that the party therefore already has a mandate to try to reach agreement with the Federation Government on the subject. The only difference between Singapore and other states in the enlarged Federation would be that more powers would lie with the Singapore State Government. The Barisan Socialis (Socialist Front), who are the Government's most dangerous pro-Communist rivals, describe the inten-

tion to go ahead with plans for a merger without first fighting an election on the issue as reckless and reprehensible, and they argue that the Central Government could in fact interfere with the Singapore State Government's handling of educational and labour problems in the name of internal security. The present Singapore Government can remain in office until June 1963, and it is clear that it intends to complete the negotiations over merger before it goes to the country.

Considerably greater autonomy for Singapore than for other states of the Federation of Malaysia will be balanced by a relatively small number of seats in the Federal Parliament and this has, of course, been a point on which the parties opposing the Singapore Government have attempted to score. Answering questions from members of the public in January, the Singapore Minister of Home Affairs explained the fact that Singapore is to have only fifteen seats (rather than the twenty-five or thirty she might expect on a population basis) in the new Parliament as follows:

> Even if all Singapore citizens can qualify as Federation citizens under the citizenship laws of the Federation and Singapore has the full 624,000 voters, this would entitle Singapore to only 25 seats because Perak (the largest State in the existing Federation) with 450,000 voters has only 19...
>
> It has been agreed that in a fair balance of interests Singapore would get 15 seats because under complete merger there would only be 284,000 citizens who would automatically become Federal citizens because they were born in Singapore, plus 110,000 citizens who would qualify by registration, giving a total of 394,000 citizens. This would make Singapore entitled to 17 seats.
>
> We have agreed on 15 seats because we are retaining powers over education, labour, welfare, health and a wide field of other subjects. To discharge these state responsibilities in Singapore we will retain our revenue which in other States go to the Central Government. This revenue will amount to more than three-quarters of our present revenue, and the way in which this three-quarters will be spent will be decided by the Singapore Government.
>
> The principle is, there is no taxation without representation and conversely no representation without taxation...[1]

In Borneo, understandably enough, there has been a good deal of confusion and misunderstanding over the merger proposals. Some of the non-Malay indigenous groups (such as the Iban of Sarawak), remembering stories of Malay oppression in the distant past when the State of Brunei held suzerainty over a wide area, fear that they will be second-class citizens of Malaysia, despite the fact that assur-

[1] *Straits Times*, 14 January 1962.

ances have been given that the indigenous peoples of the Borneo territories will automatically become founder citizens of Malaysia by operation of law. Sections of the Chinese community in Borneo were among the first to support the Malaysia proposal, but second thoughts have led to fears and misgivings about the change; indeed the objective of one or two of the new political parties in North Borneo is to defer the creation of Malaysia and to move towards a smaller confederation of the British Borneo territories as a first step. Certainly the idea of Malaysia has given rise to the open expression of racial feelings which is in sharp contrast to the normally good relations between the different peoples of the Borneo territories.

In the state of Brunei, the Sultan has publicly stated that he considers the Malaysia plan to be attractive and he has powers under the Brunei Constitution to make a decision on the question. His informal ties with Kuala Lumpur are already close. He intends, however, to set up a commission of inquiry which is to study the views of the Brunei people, and this commission will certainly find a good deal of opposition to the plan. A leading member of the Brunei Party Ra'ayat (People's Party) has said that the British Government should return the Borneo territories to the Sultan of Brunei, to whom they once belonged, and establish a democratic Government in an independent Borneo federation with the Sultan of Brunei as Paramount Ruler.

Fanning such fears and uncertainties in the Borneo territories and in Malaya is the uncompromising and bitter opposition of the Communists to the idea of Malaysia. In the Communist view, Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Federation of Malaya's Prime Minister, is an imperialist puppet and his Government is a disguised form of British colonial rule. Malaysia cannot be tolerated so long as the Government of Malaya is rigidly anti-Communist. Moreover, if the Borneo territories achieve independence in the near future through merger, the Communists would be denied the opportunity of leading the nationalist movements there.

In order to clarify the shape which Malaysia should take and ensure that an agreed concrete plan should emerge as soon as possible, a 'Malaysia Solidarity Consultation Committee' was mooted at the regional meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association held in Singapore in July 1961 and was subsequently set up with the approval and participation of the Governments concerned. Four meetings of the Committee have been held, in Jesselton in August, Kuching in December, Kuala Lumpur in January, and

Singapore in February, and the communiqué issued at the end of the fourth meeting in Singapore on 3 February 1962 shows that the Committee has covered much ground and intends to present to the Cobbold Commission a memorandum reflecting the consensus of opinion of delegates from the five territories.

The stage has thus been set for the Cobbold Commission to get to work. Its members are faced with a formidable task of investigation and it seems likely at the time of writing that their itinerary will have to include visits to all residencies and divisions in the territories concerned. Opinion in Borneo is clearly divided and confused and the Commission will have to decide whether claims by a few individuals to speak for large blocks of the population are in fact justified. No machinery exists at present in Borneo for holding a plebiscite and it would take some months to make preparations for such an operation. The most important single recommendation which the Commission may feel obliged to make is whether merger of all five territories should take place simultaneously in 1963 or whether the three Borneo territories should first move closer to one another and join a united Malaya at a later stage.

If and when the Federation of Malaysia becomes a reality, the states of the existing Federation will together return a total of one hundred Members to the Federal Parliament and Singapore will return fifteen Members, according to an agreement reached between the Federation and Singapore Prime Ministers. The number of Members to represent the Borneo territories has still to be decided, but, on a population basis, they could be expected to have a total of about twenty, and the number might in fact be greater in view of the low density of population in Borneo. The Federation's Constitution recognizes that some allowance should be made for differences in density of population and the means of communication in the delimitation of constituencies. Present indications are that the Alliance will do at least as well at the next general election in the Federation of Malaya as it did in 1959, when it captured a total of 74 seats out of 104. Although the Alliance may have given a little ground to the left-wing parties in the West Coast states of Malaya since 1959, it has balanced any such loss with gains at the expense of the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party on the East Coast. Since the last election, there has been a redistribution of constituencies reducing the total number in the Federation from 104 to 100. Assuming that the Alliance wins 65 or 70 of the Malayan seats in the next general election, it will have a virtual majority in the

Federation of Malaysia Parliament without requiring support from the newly admitted territories of Singapore, North Borneo, Brunei, and Sarawak. In fact, it is likely that some of the infant Borneo political parties will wish to merge with the Alliance in due course, and there seems to be little doubt that the new Federation, if created, will start life with a strong Central Government led by experienced politicians.

T. E. SMITH

Spain's Economic Situation

POLITICALLY, things in Spain have changed but little over a long period; but in the economic field everything is in movement and the future is full of possibilities, inspiring and forbidding, with a likelihood of social, and eventually political, repercussions.

The outstanding fact is that Spain applied in March to open negotiations for association with the Common Market. It remains to be seen what form association might take. Spain will move cautiously, with a view to ensuring not only a continued market for her agricultural exports but also the survival of her industry, which is not strong enough to meet full competition in the home market from West European products. It is possible that she will be refused admission, either because trade terms cannot be agreed or on account of the character of her regime, and that, after three years of trying to modernize her economy, she will be thrown back on autarky; but the mere prospect of entering the Common Market in some way has been enough to keep private enterprise in suspense for the past few months. Business opinion generally seems to favour the move, but the apprehensions, particularly of the smaller firms, are understandable. Apart from the effects of twenty years of isolation under exchange and import controls, Spain has always been, and remains, an economically backward country. Average daily income per inhabitant is estimated to be only a quarter of that in France and West Germany and a fifth of that in Britain. The supply of industrial equipment in relation to the labour force is low, as also is the standard of efficiency and education among the workers. Employers and executives have much to learn in business methods, and they are

aware of the fact, as can be seen from the proliferation of lectures and courses on management.

The other item of immediate interest is that in May the World Bank mission is expected to present its long-awaited report on a five-year plan for Spanish economic development. The mission spent three months in Spain in the spring of last year studying the situation on the spot in collaboration with Spanish experts. Its visit was comparable to that of the International Monetary Fund's mission in 1959, which resulted in the foreign credits that enabled the peseta to be stabilized. The object now is to establish a programme under which, with foreign assistance, the Spanish economy can be modernized and put on a viable basis. The mission is understood to have concentrated particularly on transport, roads, and electricity with a view to an increase in the economic activity of the country as a whole and aiming at an annual increment of the gross national product of between 4 and 5 per cent.

It will be some time, however, before the effects either of the application to the Common Market or of the report of the World Bank are felt. Spain's letter of application has been acknowledged; but it has been made clear that the next step will depend on how the talks with Britain go. If and when negotiations are opened with Spain, they will be prolonged. As for the World Bank's report, it will be presented to the Spanish Government, who will then work out and approve the official plan; but the latter is not expected to be promulgated until a year later. The expansion of the Spanish economy is not a matter that can wait, particularly with the prospect ahead of entering the Common Market, and the Spanish Government has had to take action meanwhile. In January it established a central planning agency and appointed Señor Lopez Rodó as Commissioner for Economic Development. Various measures to reform the economic structure on the lines recommended by the O.E.E.C. report of last year are either awaiting enactment or have been put into force. A bank reform Bill—designed to ensure stricter control of monetary policy and to correct the tendency of Spanish banks to combine commercial banking with excessive commitments in industry—is before the Cortes, as also are several Bills dealing with the critical problem of land reform. The cotton industry reorganization plan, to promote re-equipment and concentration of firms, has come into force, and similar reorganization of other industries is in an advanced stage. An order was published in March which is expected to have considerable effect on foreign investment

in Spain, as it removes the previous limits on the transfer abroad of dividends and profits from stock exchange dealings. The Government has announced an ambitious long-term plan for improving the roads. A great deal has also been done during the past two and a half years in lifting restrictions on trade as regards price controls and, more particularly, restrictions on import trade. Three-quarters of Spanish imports now come in freely and most of the remainder under global quotas, which allow imports from any country within the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development up to a total limit fixed for each commodity; only a fraction of imports are still subject to bilateral agreements. The dispatch of import licences has also been greatly speeded up.

But, while carrying out and projecting reforms, the Government has been faced with the immediate problem of keeping the Spanish economy on an even keel. When the peseta was stabilized in 1959, it was a question of cutting short a headlong inflation and a catastrophic drain of foreign exchange; in the past two years it has been a question of reviving Spanish industry, internal trade, and employment after the shock of the deflationary policy that accompanied stabilization. Real recovery started only last year, and is not complete, but it has already brought with it the dangers of a new inflation.

The stabilization of July 1959 was strikingly successful in its immediate objectives. The peseta held firm at the devalued rate. The country's balance of payments on current account, which had shown a deficit of $50 million for 1958, showed a favourable balance of $80 million for 1959, accumulated almost entirely in the last five months. Internally, the inflation was brought to a sharp halt. Prices, which had been rocketing, were almost stabilized after the new measures, and the scarcity of goods was relieved as the large stocks hoarded during the inflation came on the market. These improvements have been largely maintained. The peseta is now one of the strongest currencies. Spain's gold and foreign exchange reserves, which had sunk to some £5 million by July 1959, were £320 million at the end of 1961. Prices have risen only moderately (though certainly more than the official indices suggest) and goods have become plentiful through the greatly increased imports due to liberalization.

But the shock of the deflation to the country's internal trade, after a period of high prices, a sellers' market, and rising opportunities for employment, was profound, and more so than it would have been

in a country more industrially advanced. Many small firms, apart from the speculative firms that had lived on the inflation and traffic in Government permits, were ruined or in difficulties. The official unemployment figures rose sharply, and these told only a small part of the story, both because many workers were not registered and because workers' actual earnings had depended largely on overtime and incentive payments, which now ceased. Retail trade was paralysed, partly by lack of purchasing power and partly by a depression mentality and uncertainty about the future. Within six months of stabilization the Government was faced with the task of getting the economic machinery moving again. The keyword became 're-activization'.

'Re-activization', however, proved a slow process. The Government took some measures to put more money in circulation—by public spending, by easing credit, and by taxation reliefs to encourage investment, particularly in building; but it moved cautiously for fear of undoing the stabilization achieved at such cost. Up to August 1960, things remained practically stationary. Unemployment was falling; but this was partly due to increased emigration. In the autumn of 1960, however, there were more hopeful signs. The liquidation of hoarded stocks had dried up and traders, faced with the Christmas season, were obliged to resume purchases. Meanwhile a movement started among manufacturers, which spread to offices and small firms, to extend and improve their equipment and premises to face the necessity of competing in the home market and for exports. Investment in industry, either in establishing new concerns or in improving existing ones, totalled over 5,400 million pesetas in 1960, an increase of over 2,000 million on 1959 and the highest figure ever reached.

This movement continued into 1961, and at the same time the effects of increased Government spending and extended credit made themselves felt. To this was added the effects of rises in wages. The figures now available for the year provide undeniable proof of a revival of activity. Industrial production rose by 11 per cent, principally in the iron and steel, machinery, and metallurgical industries, followed by building and the building materials industries (production of steel rose by 20 per cent and that of cement by 16 per cent). Consumption of electricity rose by 12 per cent, a percentage increase double that of the two preceding years. The total of the note circulation and bank deposits also increased by 12 per cent, against an increase of less than 1 per cent in 1960. Credit accounts and

credits and discounts recorded the biggest increase in history, and savings bank deposits reached 90,600 million pesetas at the end of 1961, an increase of 10,000 million compared with the previous year.

Unemployment is still a problem, but its main severity is felt in the agricultural areas of the south and west—Andalusia, La Mancha, and Extremadura. The wheat harvest was a failure last year and agricultural production generally increased by only 2·1 per cent. The position of industrial workers has greatly improved and there is a widespread shortage of skilled workers. It is true that in terms of the basic wage, which has never been altered from the rate fixed in 1956, workers' purchasing power has continued to fall, though much less than in the inflation years; but wages for a very large range of workers have in fact been legally raised piecemeal through the collective agreements negotiated industry by industry by the official trade unions. Over 700 of these *convenios colectivos* had been signed at the beginning of this year and over 500 more were being negotiated. A total of some 324,000 firms are affected and the wage increases in some cases are as much as 25 or 30 per cent.

Many of the big companies, however, had already granted most of the increase voluntarily in order to retain their workmen. The whole labour situation in industry has been radically changed by the recent scale of emigration. Although emigration to South America is traditional and Spaniards have for years found employment in France, the ties of family and the home town are strong. The depression years after 1959, however, drove Spanish workers to emigrate in increasing numbers and there are now well over 20,000 in Switzerland and over 60,000 in Germany. Government policy has been to facilitate this movement to relieve the shortage of employment at home. At the same time one hears of police obstruction in issuing exit permits, and more so recently; but the Government policy has been reiterated, and in any case a large proportion of the emigrants do not find employment through official channels but leave the country on the pretext of temporary visits. Now that the Spanish worker has overcome his diffidence and is beginning to regard Europe as a single labour market, employers are beginning to raise wages nearer to the level of other countries, and this trend may well continue since Spanish wages are low. According to estimates of the central council of the Spanish Chambers of Commerce, referring to the year 1958, the purchasing power of a skilled worker's earnings without overtime was less than a third of that of a British or German

worker and little more than half that of an Italian; and an inquiry by the National Insurance Institute among 4,000 firms in 1960 showed that the average monthly wages of over 278,000 workers out of 350,000 was 2,500 pesetas (£15) or less.

Meanwhile, in spite of the revival of industrial activity, wholesale and retail trade have not picked up. But there are good prospects that they will do so. This year is likely to see a continued rise in business activity (which, according to the index of the Bank of Bilbao, was still below the pre-stabilization level last December) stimulated by Government spending, the flow of credit, and higher wages, as well as by restocking by manufacturers and traders and the carrying out of projects previously held up by the depression.

The danger of a renewed inflation, however, is clear. The wage increases are bound to be largely inflationary. Although the *convenios* have always included a pious statement that a corresponding increase in productivity is expected, no one believes that this will be the general result, particularly in the smaller firms. The increased note circulation is inflationary: at the end of 1961 it had reached 88,600 million pesetas, a rise of 12·6 per cent in twelve months, which had not been attained since 1957, the year of maximum inflation. Between November and December it rose by 7,100 million, which is not matched by figures for the corresponding period in any of the inflationary years and shows that the movement is gathering momentum. Probably not more than half of the increase corresponded to greater business activity.

One of the inflationary factors is due, not to a too daring expansionism on the part of the Government, but to its caution and desire to keep control of the situation. Just as, rather than follow the advice of the O.E.E.C. and reduce taxation, it prefers to raise exchequer receipts and increase public spending, so it has hoarded the foreign exchange acquired by the favourable balance of payments of the last two and a half years to build up reserves. In 1961 the account of the Foreign Exchange Institute with the Bank of Spain rose by 19,000 million pesetas. These holdings in pesetas, to finance the foreign exchange reserves, explain the rise in the note circulation.

The favourable balance of payments of the last years is itself no longer secure. The striking rise in exports that followed stabilization has been halted and the great increase in imports, due to the liberalization, has continued. Fortunately, receipts from tourist

traffic are still booming and show every sign of reaching new heights (last year the number of visitors rose by another 22 per cent to nearly 7½ million).

The perspectives, if Spain can assimilate her economy to that of other West European countries, are inspiring and may well mark the end of a social and political stagnation of centuries. But Spaniards, and foreigners who know Spain, are bound to regard the future with a certain reserve. The obstacles are enormous. In removing Government restrictions on industry and trade alone, the Ministers are faced by the resistance and conservatism of the large civil service which, even after a new order has been issued, is apt to continue in the old ways (there is a Spanish story about a park seat bearing a notice: 'Wet paint, not to be sat on', which was not sat on for two years because no one removed the notice). Many controls still remain. Competition is restricted by the fact that authority is still required to start any new business except on a very small scale. Prices of a number of important products are still controlled—rolled steel, coal for certain uses, power, cement, industrial alcohol, sugar. There is a strongly entrenched monopolism exerted through the parastatal agency I.N.I., which controls over 800 firms, predominantly in basic industries, and the banks, which in 1960 controlled over 54 per cent of the issued capital of Spanish limited liability companies.[1] Above all, there is the seemingly insoluble problem of poverty and unemployment on the large estates of the south of Spain—not only are the big landlords a formidable force, closely involved with the regime, but a land reform is made difficult by the backwardness of the peasants, who might not survive as smallholders.

Any friend of Spain must hope that the line followed since the 1959 stabilization succeeds and that the Spanish economy can be built up to the point when it can play its part in European trade. The Ministers mainly responsible for carrying it out, Señor Ullastres, the Minister of Trade, and Señor Navarro Rubio, the Minister of Finance, have achieved much and have shown some

[1] This is largely due to the reluctance of the Spanish public to invest. They prefer to keep their savings on deposit at the bank, with the result that resources are concentrated in the hands of the banks and firms have to go to them for funds. In 1960 only 45 per cent of savings was invested and new stock and bond issues, both Government and private, absorbed no more than 6·59 per cent of the national income. The total dealings on the three national stock exchanges of Spain—Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao—in August 1961 were the equivalent of £12,150,000; in Switzerland, on the Zurich bourse alone in that month, they were £138,516,000.

courage in steadfastly applying a policy which could not be popular, but which most observers recognized to be the only possible policy.

RICHARD COMYNS CARR

The General Election in India

THE recent general election in India, the third to be held since the country became independent, began, technically speaking, on 13 January and ended on 31 March 1962. But the actual polling in the overwhelming majority of constituencies took place between 16 and 25 February, by which date it was virtually completed except in Tripura, Manipur, Kashmir, and Himachal Pradesh. Polling in Tripura, Kashmir, and Manipur was completed in March. Only in Himachal Pradesh, in one parliamentary constituency in Punjab, and in one constituency in Jammu and Kashmir was polling still to take place, towards the end of April. Afterwards the six Lok Sabha seats from Kashmir were to be filled up by indirect election by members of the Jammu and Kashmir Legislature.

The electorate numbered 216 million, as compared with 193 million in 1957 and 173 million in 1952. According to results available by mid-April, slightly over 50 per cent of the voters exercised their franchise to elect 485 members to Parliament. In absolute numbers, over 115 million voters had by then cast their ballots. Over 90 million voters did not exercise their franchise.

VOTING METHODS AND PARTIES

In every constituency a voters' list is prepared well ahead of the polling date. A draft list is usually kept in a public place for suggestions from members of the public and is then revised and brought up to date. Despite the care taken to include all the names of voters, some eligible names were unfortunately not included in the voters' list.[1] A glaring omission was that of the mother of the Union Home Minister, Mr Lal Bahadur Shastri. When this octogenarian lady came to a polling station in Allahabad to vote for her son on 3 Febru-

[1] For a complaint regarding non-inclusion of certain names in Jamalpur, in the Monghyr district of Bihar, see letter to *The Statesman*, Calcutta, 10 March 1962, by 'Deprived of Right'.

ary she had to go back disappointed, since her name was not in the list. Another notable omission was that of the name of Mr Radhanath Rath, former Minister of Orissa.[1] In Andhra about Rs.20,000 were realized in fees for late registration as voters.[2]

Voters coming to the polling booths to cast their votes were allowed to bring unofficial identity slips issued to them by the candidates bearing the name of the candidate and/or the name of his party and/or the facsimile of the symbol allotted to him. But no slogans were allowed to be printed on the identity slips. Since the majority of the voters were illiterate the identity slips facilitated the identification of voters at polling booths.

The marking system of voting (i.e., indicating the voter's choice on the ballot paper itself) was first tried during the mid-term elections in Kerala. In the present general election the new system was adopted all over the country except in a few remote places in Andhra Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, the Punjab, and Gujarat, where the old ballot system was followed.

Contests were held for 500 elective seats of the Lok Sabha (Lower House of Parliament), of which 494 are elected by direct vote and six by indirect vote by the Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. In addition, seven persons are to be nominated (two from among Anglo-Indians, and one each from the Andaman and Nicobar Islands; Laccadive, Minicoy, and Amindive islands; Dadra and Nagar Haveli; North East Frontier Tract; and Naga Hills Tuensang area).

Elections were also held for 3,196 elective seats in the legislative assemblies of various States. Kerala (126 seats) and Orissa (140 seats) had held mid-term elections earlier; thus contests for 2,930 Assembly seats remained to be held.[3]

The Election Commission accorded recognition to sixteen political parties and allotted them symbols for the use of their candidates for parliamentary and assembly elections in the different States and Union Territories. The Indian National Congress was the only party to be officially recognized as an all-India party; it was allotted the same symbol (a pair of bullocks under a yoke) throughout the country. The Communist Party was similarly recognized in all States and Union Territories except Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, and Himachal Pradesh, and so too was the Praja-Socialist Party (P.S.P.) except in Punjab, Rajasthan, and Tripura. The Jan Sangh

[1] *The Hindu*, Madras, 24 February 1962. [2] *ibid.*, 9 February 1962.
[3] *Indian Express*, Bombay, 15 February 1962.

was recognized in Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, and Delhi; the Socialist Party in Andhra, Bihar, Gujarat, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, and Manipur; the Swatantra Party in Andhra, Bihar, Gujarat, Madras, Uttar Pradesh, and Himachal Pradesh; Hindu Mahasabha in Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and Delhi; Ram Rajya Parishad in Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan; the Republican Party in Maharashtra and Punjab; the Jharkhand Party in Bihar; the Muslim League in Kerala; the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (D.M.K.) in Madras; the Peasants and Workers' Party in Maharashtra; Ganatantra Parishad in Orissa; Akali Dal in Punjab; and the Forward Bloc in West Bengal.[1]

There were 1,979 candidates for the 489 contested seats of the Lok Sabha, as compared with 1,593 in the second general election. The Congress Party, with 485 candidates, accounted for the largest number, followed by Jan Sangh (198), Swatantra (172), Praja Socialist Party (166), Communists (137), Socialists (107), Republicans (80), Hindu Mahasabha (42), Ram Rajya Parishad (41), Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (18), Jharkhand Party (11), Ganatantra Parishad of Orissa and the Peasants' and Workers' Party of Maharashtra (10 each), Forward Bloc and the Akali Dal (7 each), the Muslim League (3), and other parties and Independent candidates (85). There was a straight contest in 64 constituencies.[2]

In the State legislatures (except in Kerala and Orissa), 12,764 candidates contested 2,930 elective seats, Uttar Pradesh accounting for the largest number (2,627) of candidates, followed by Bihar (1,529), and Madhya Pradesh (1,333).[3]

Three persons, all of them Congress nominees, were declared elected unopposed to the Lok Sabha. They are the former Union Finance Minister, Mr T. T. Krishnamachari (from Madras), Mr Hare Krushna Mahtab, former Union Commerce Minister (from Orissa), and Mr Manabandra Shah (Uttar Pradesh).[4] Forty-six persons—thirteen Congress nominees and the rest belonging to the National Conference in Jammu and Kashmir—were returned unopposed to the various State legislatures—33 in Jammu and Kashmir, 6 in Andhra Pradesh, 3 in Madhya Pradesh, 2 in Mysore, and 1 each in Rajasthan and West Bengal.[5]

[1] *Indian Affairs Record*, New Delhi, Vol. VII, No. 9, October 1961, p. 176.
[2] *Times of India*, Bombay, 12 February 1962.
[3] *Indian Express*, Bombay, 16 February 1962.
[4] *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, Calcutta, 25 February 1962.
[5] P.T.I. Report from New Delhi, *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, 16 February 1962. See also *ibid.*, 25 February 1962.

The unopposed return to Parliament of the former Union Finance Minister, Mr T. T. Krishnamachari, was made possible by the sudden (and apparently unauthorized) withdrawal from the contest of the Swatantra Party candidate, Mr Thangaswami Nadar, on 23 January. This caused much excitement in the Swatantra circles and the party leader, Mr C. Rajagopalachari, came out with a denunciation of both Mr Krishnamachari and Mr Thangaswami. The result, he said, would not 'redound to the credit of the contesting parties'.[1] In Orissa the Swatantra Party claimed credit for the uncontested return of the Congress nominee, Mr H. K. Mahtab.

Except for occasional minor incidents, polling was peaceful throughout the country. It took place usually between 8 a.m. and 5 p.m., being extended only in exceptional cases beyond that time. For example, at a booth in Muthampatti village in Oddanchathiram constituency (one of the Assembly components of Dindigul Parliamentary constituency in Madras), polling on 17 February had to be prolonged till eleven o'clock at night, as much time was lost because of objections raised by polling agents about the alleged prompting of voters by the Presiding Officer.[2]

In a polling booth in the Ekbalpur constituency in Calcutta no voters at all turned up, nor were any votes cast in the three polling booths in Koyali village of Baroda north constituency.[3] Only 17 out of about 650 voters turned up on 19 February at the polling station in the Kathghora tribal reserved constituency, in Bilaspur district in Madhya Pradesh.

Reports were received from several places concerning the voters' superstition about some aspect of polling arrangements. For example, a young woman left a polling booth at Ramghat, in Varanasi in Uttar Pradesh, without voting because she feared that the indelible ink mark on her hand might hamper her marital prospects. At a booth in the rural area of the Chail Assembly constituency in Allahabad district of Uttar Pradesh the polling staff were faced with a ticklish problem when a group of married women voters refused to give the names of their husbands. (A married Hindu woman is, according to custom, not supposed to utter the name of her husband or the husband's elders.) The Presiding Officer solved the problem by reading out the names of the husbands and the ladies were asked to say 'yes' or 'no'. A number of centenarians voted, among them a

[1] *Times of India*, 25 January 1962. [2] *The Hindu*, 23 February 1962.
[3] *Free Press Journal*, Bombay, 27 February 1962.

woman, Mrs Guru Sambi, aged 120, who was born before the Indian War of Independence (1857).

Efforts were made this time to complete the elections in a shorter period than on previous occasions. But it was decided, in agreement with all the major parties, not to publish any results until polling was completed all over the country in order to avoid possible psychological effects on the voters.[1] Consequently counting did not begin until 25 February, although polling had begun on the 16th. Between 25 February and 1 March the Government-owned All-India Radio broadcast special news bulletins from New Delhi and other regional stations announcing the results. From New Delhi eight additional news bulletins—four each in Hindi and English—were broadcast every day from the night of 25 February, as well as bulletins in Urdu, which also came from Srinagar. The bulletins broadcast from State capitals (except in Punjab, where the broadcasting station was in Jullundur) gave a summary of State results in the regional language of the State concerned.[2]

In the large cities the telephone authorities in the Government-owned sector made arrangements to furnish the results through their special information services. Although this service was intended mainly to communicate results of contests held within the respective States, results of important contests outside the State were also given.[3] The *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, an enterprising Bengali daily of Calcutta, went a step farther and set up two centres in the northern and southern parts of Calcutta to announce the results.[4]

About 3·9 million votes, or some 3·8 per cent of the total votes cast, were declared invalid.[5] The reasons for this large number of invalid votes have not been satisfactorily established, but one cause may have been the introduction of the marking system of ballot papers. As the correspondent of *Amrita Bazar Patrika* reported from Coimbatore, in Southern India (21 February), 'Thousands of votes are likely to be invalidated in several constituencies during counting due to illiterate voters, mostly *harijans* and peasants, marking ballot papers on two symbols, because they thought they

[1] Statement of Mr K. V. K. Sundaram, Chief Election Commissioner, at New Delhi on 17 January (*Hindu*, 18 January 1962).

[2] For arrangements see Press Trust of India Report in the *Times of India*, 20 February 1962.

[3] For arrangements in the city of Calcutta, see the *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 15 February 1962.

[4] *Ananda Bazar Patrika*, 26 February 1962.

[5] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 9 March 1962.

would favour two candidates who had wooed them for their votes.' *The Statesman* wrote (3 March), 'The very high proportion of invalid votes suggests defects, or avoidable intricacies, in voting procedure.' Describing the invalid votes as 'a melancholy feature', Mr C. Rajagopalachari, the Swatantra Party leader, said that it was 'indeed a pity that the voter, who goes to the polling station presumably instructed by persons interested in his vote, should fail in his task'. He blamed the election machinery and added, 'We must say, therefore, that the machinery has not done its duty and the arrangements taken for recording the votes were not satisfactory'.[1]

THE MENON–KRIPALANI CONTEST

A number of contests attracted particular attention. On the national front, the contest between the Congress nominee Mr V. K. Krishna Menon, Union Defence Minister, and Mr J. B. Kripalani, a former president of the Indian National Congress who stood as an Independent candidate with the backing of all Opposition parties except the Communist Party and the Hindu Mahasabha, was easily the most notable one, judging by the prominence accorded to it in the press in and outside Bombay City, where the two leaders opposed each other. Two other important contests on a national scale were that in Calcutta between the Union Law Minister, Mr A. K. Sen, and the Communist nominee, Mr S. K. Acharya, and that in New Delhi between the Union Rehabilitation Minister, Mr Mehr Chand Khanna, and the Jan Sangh candidate, Professor Balraj Madhok. The Communist Party opposed the Union Law Minister in Calcutta, but actively campaigned in favour of the Union Rehabilitation Minister in New Delhi and the Union Defence Minister in Bombay. All three contests went in favour of the Congress.

The most widely discussed contest in the country was undoubtedly that between Mr J. B. Kripalani and Mr V. K. Krishna Menon, in North Bombay. The Chief Minister of Maharashtra, describing it as of international importance, said the result would affect the country's future for the next decade.[2] Mr Kripalani's supporters claimed it to be a fight between Communism and democracy. He himself stated that he had entered the North Bombay contest not to oppose the Congress or the Prime Minister but 'to oppose the Communist and anti-national forces working in the

[1] *Hindustan Times*, 14 March 1962. [2] *ibid.*, 24 February 1962.

country openly and secretly. I consider Mr Menon as the spearh of the creeping march of Communism in the country and in Congress.'[1] He was backed by such venerable leaders as Jayaprakash Narayan and Mr Vaikunth L. Mehta, who occupie position of special honour in Bombay City. The Prime Minis Mr Nehru, and other senior leaders of the Congress Party, includ two former Congress Presidents, Mr U. N. Dhebar and M Indira Gandhi, forcefully refuted Mr Kripalani's allegation a described Mr Menon as a true socialist. Mr Nehru stron denounced the campaign against him, branding it as an Ind variant of McCarthyism, and even condemning foreign interfere in the North Bombay election.

Since Mr Menon was the country's Defence Minister and had many occasions acted as its chief spokesman at the United Natio foreign policy was naturally prominent in the debate between hi self and Mr Kripalani. The latter held Mr Menon responsible the Chinese occupation of Indian territory. Mr Nehru interver decisively and absolved Mr Menon of any responsibility for pol towards China. 'If anyone is to be blamed for it,' he declared, 'tl it is I who should be blamed as I am in charge of the Exter Affairs Ministry. Mr Krishna Menon or the Defence Ministry h nothing to do with this aggression on Indian territory by t Chinese.'[2] Although Mr Kripalani several times proclaimed that had nothing personally against the Union Defence Minister, p sonal references against Mr Menon figured prominently in the ar Menon campaign, the tone of which was indeed more anti-Men than pro-Kripalani.

A special feature of this contest was that Mr Menon, thougl Congress nominee, was openly opposed by a section of Congre men but was firmly supported by the Communist Party. On t other hand Mr Kripalani, who stood as an Independent candida had the open support of all the other parties including the P.S. Swatantra Party, Jan Sangh, D.M.K., and the Muslim League. T only notable exception was the Hindu Mahasabha, which had own candidate in the field. Another interesting feature was the op support given to the anti-Menon campaign by two leading nev papers in Bombay. On polling day (25 February) one of them, t *Indian Express*, came out with a box appeal on the front page telli the voters that while it was their duty to vote Congress they shou make an exception in Bombay and vote against the official Cc

[1] *ibid.*, 22 February 1962. [2] *ibid.*, 12 February 1962.

gress nominee, Mr Menon, and support the anti-Menon forces.

Mr Menon obtained 298,427 votes and thus won by a thumping majority three times the size of that (48,000) of the 1957 election. Mr Kripalani, with 153,069 votes, was defeated in all the six assembly constituencies included in the North Bombay parliamentary constituency. The other seven candidates together polled some 21,400 votes; 10,250 votes were declared invalid.[1]

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

According to the Election Commissioner, there was little excitement in the country about this election.[2] The Prime Minister undertook an extensive tour to lead the Congress campaign. All the leading political figures moved about up and down the country in the month before polling began. The Congress leaders stressed the need for national integration, economic planning, State ownership of industry, and non-alignment in international relations. The Opposition, being divided ideologically, politically, and in organization, naturally had different and not always mutually compatible things to say. On the economic front the stand of the Communist, Praja Socialist, and Hindu Mahasabha parties was hardly distinguishable from that of the Congress, apart from occasional variations of emphasis. The Swatantra and the Jan Sangh, opposing planning and socialism, were nearer to each other in their opposition to Congress. On foreign policy, the Communist Party generally agreed, with minor reservations, with the Congress Government's policies, but most of the other parties—notably the Praja Socialist Party, the Swatantra Party, the Jan Sangh, and the Hindu Mahasabha—were very much opposed to the policy of non-alignment.

To sum up, socialism, nationalization of industries, agrarian reforms, national integration, corruption, China, Goa, and national defence were among the subjects prominent both in the parties' election manifestoes and in the campaign speeches. Only in West Bengal did the Communist Party raise the slogan of an alternative Government to the Congress. Elsewhere, the Opposition parties, including the Communists, confined themselves to demanding a more powerful and effective opposition. The absence of a real challenge to the Congress, even at the beginning, robbed the campaign of much of its importance, although in sharply contested areas it took on a very interesting shape. Mr Nehru again and again

[1] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 4 March 1962.

[2] *Indian Express*, 15 February 1962, report from Amritsar.

warned the nation against the danger of communalism and separatism.[1] The main burden of his speeches was a denunciation of the policies of the Jan Sangh and the Swatantra Party which were directly opposed to the home and foreign policies of the Congress and were backed by landed interests in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Generally he was more vocal in criticizing the rightist elements, although he was equally critical of the extreme Left as represented by the Communist Party of India, whose extra-national allegiance he denounced.

Undoubtedly to many people national issues such as economic and defence policies were of significance. But over a wide area it was the small local issues that dominated the rival campaigns. In Rajkot, where the former Congress President, Mr U. N. Dhebar, was seeking election to the Lok Sabha, his opponents raised the most far-fetched issues to discredit him and his party; these issues nevertheless had some influence on the voters. It was alleged by the opponents of the Congress that under the Congress Government the people's religious sentiments had been wounded because of large-scale fishing industry on the Gujarat and Saurashtra coast, the export of cows and monkeys to foreign countries, or the killing of flies and dogs to eradicate their menace.[2] But eventually Mr Dhebar won.

The usual election campaign technique in India has been for the parties and candidates to hold public or group meetings, processions shouting slogans asking support for the different parties, cultural shows organized by party supporters, and to display posters. In keenly contested areas, there would be door-to-door canvassing, sometimes even by the candidates themselves. All these traditional methods were employed at this election.

There were, however, several innovations. For the first time in India several parties, notably the Congress and the newly founded Swatantra Party, used the media of newspaper advertisements to appeal to the voters. The Government-run postal department in certain places allowed posters in favour of particular candidates to be displayed in the post offices on a payment of Rs.50.[3]

The Congress Party made an election film for use in the Hindi-speaking areas. It also ordered 6,000 gramophone records of two songs in praise of the party, which were distributed to the different

[1] Speeches at Poona and Baroda on 11 February (*Hindustan Times*, 12 February 1962); at Muzaffarpur (*Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 17 February 1962).
[2] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 21 February 1962.
[3] For arrangements in Madras see *Hindu*, 4 February 1962.

ɔnstituencies. In the North Bombay constituency recorded music 'as played. The special correspondent of the *Hindustan Times* :2 February) reported from Bombay: 'The latest propaganda ıedia are recorded songs of film playbacks and printed news- ıeets of the size of evening newspapers. A jeep was moving round ıe suburbs the other day playing a recorded song extolling the rtues of Mr Menon and describing Mr Kripalani in not so com- imentary terms, and telling the voters whom to vote for. Not to : outdone, the Kripalani Committee has since composed a song ı reply.'

An independent candidate from Ernakulam contesting a seat ;ainst the Union Deputy Minister for Food used an aircraft to ·op leaflets in the constituency. The Congress Party also employed rcraft in Lucknow to drop tricolours, Congress election symbols, ıd messages from Mr Nehru.[1] In Gujarat candidates distributed tes of all sizes bearing their own names and their party's symbols. All parties sought the help of film stars, dancers, and musicians. lthough on earlier occasions the services of such artistes had been quisitioned in support of party campaigns, they would not norm- ly talk about politics. But this time the artistes themselves were rect campaigners.

Mr Nehru, along with other leaders of his party, undertook ıgthy and strenuous tours on behalf of the Congress Party. It was lculated that the seventy-two-year-old Prime Minister had set up ·ecord in election campaigning, having travelled 17,792 miles— ,362 miles by air, 1,300 miles by road, and 130 miles by train—in irty-one days. He visited eighty-eight cities and towns in fourteen ates and spoke before ninety-one public meetings attended by out 10 million people. Besides this, he had on several occasions to eak his journey by road in order to address roadside gatherings at ıich he met another 10 million people. This marathon tour far lipsed the election tours of 1952 or 1957.

There were several openly communal parties in the field— tably the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha. But neither : Muslim nor the Hindu religious leaders called upon their herents to vote for or against any particular party or candidate. ıis was not so with the Christian Church, however. The Christian ıurch in South India took a direct part in the elections which was ıt viewed with approbation by many. Sixteen Catholic bishops and ɔhbishops of Kerala issued a joint pastoral letter on 4 February

[1] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, 17 February 1962.

calling upon Catholic voters not to exercise their franchise in favour of the Communists or the Communist-supported independents.[1] This was resented not only by the Communists[2] but also by Mr Nehru as well as by the Election Commissioner.[3] The issue of the pastoral letter was defended by the Working Committee of the All-Kerala Catholic Congress in a statement issued on 19 February.[4] Two days earlier, the Central Council of the Catholic Association of Bombay adopted a resolution advising councillors and other members of the association 'to desist from working for election purposes for anyone known or generally regarded as a Communist'.[5] A Catholic priest, Father Vadakkan, in signed articles published in his Malayalam newspaper in Kerala exhorted the 'enlightened' electorate of Kerala to 'teach' the ruling Congress–P.S.P. alliance a 'lesson' by refusing to support their candidates in the election. He was, however, sufficiently anti-Communist to ask his supporters to vote for the Congress–P.S.P. alliance against Communists.[6]

THE RESULTS

The election witnessed the return to power of the Congress Party in the Centre and all the States. The Congress secured 356 Lok Sabha seats (15 less than in 1957) and 1,768 State Assembly seats (145 less than in 1957). It won an absolute majority of seats in the Lok Sabha and in all but two of the State Assemblies for which elections were held. Forty-nine Congress Ministers and Deputy Ministers in the Union and State Governments, including the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh, were unseated. The ministries have taken office in all the States. In the Centre, Mr Nehru, who was re-elected leader of the Congress Party in Parliament on 3 April, submitted his list of seventeen Cabinet Ministers and six Ministers of State to the President of India on 9 April.

The dominant impression after the election was the failure of an effective opposition to emerge. In one or other State of the Union some party may have gained in strength, but except in Madhya Pradesh, where the Congress has been reduced to a minority party in the legislature, and perhaps in Rajasthan where the Congress has a majority of only one seat, no party was able to secure enough seats in Parliament to offer any effective opposition to the Congress

[1] *Hindu*, 5 February 1962.
[2] For a Communist criticism see report of Mr Bhupesh Gupta's telegrams to the President and Prime Minister in the *Free Press Journal*, 8 February 1962.
[3] *Indian Express*, 15 February 1962.
[4] *Hindustan Times*, 20 February 1962. [5] *ibid.* [6] *ibid.*

Party. No other party in the Lok Sabha is strong enough to warrant its being officially recognized as an opposition party, for which a minimum membership of fifty is required.

In the Lok Sabha the Congress Party, with over 51 million votes (45 per cent of the total), has retained its position as the leading party in Parliament. It not only secured an absolute majority of seats there (356) but also the crucial two-thirds majority which is required for any amendment of the Constitution of India. It polled an absolute majority of votes cast in Gujarat, Maharashtra, Mysore, Orissa, and Delhi, but less than 40 per cent in Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh. But it obtained fewer votes and seats than in the previous general election. The Communist Party, with two more seats and 623,690 more votes, retained its position as the second largest party in the Lok Sabha. By securing an absolute majority (51·27 per cent) of votes cast in Tripura, it achieved a distinction not shared by any other opposition party. It secured 39·46 per cent of the Lok Sabha votes in Kerala, 29·38 per cent in West Bengal, and 21·05 in Andhra. The Praja–Socialist Party, which occupied third place in the second Lok Sabha, now declined to fifth, yielding place to both the Swatantra Party and the Jan Sangh. It lost on all counts—in popularity (it got 4·7 million fewer votes), percentage share of votes polled (which declined from 10·41 to 6·84), and seats (seven less than in 1957). The Swatantra Party, founded in 1959, polled fewer votes than the P.S.P. but with twenty-two representatives in the new House it occupied the third place. It was very powerful in Gujarat, where it polled 26·54 per cent of the Lok Sabha votes. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh retained the fourth place in the House. Although its representation rose more than threefold it got only 113,690 more votes, its percentage share registering a slight rise from 5·93 in 1957 to 6·44 in 1962. In Delhi, though it failed to retain the seat won in the by-election of 1960, it mustered sizeable support (32·16 per cent) among the electorate.

An overall state-wise analysis of results of Lok Sabha contests disclosed that the Congress Party lost 40 seats and gained 28; the Communist Party lost eight seats and gained eleven; the Praja Socialist Party lost eleven seats and gained four; the Jan Sangh lost two seats (in Maharashtra) and gained twelve (three each in Madhya Pradesh and Punjab, five in Uttar Pradesh, and one in Rajasthan). The Swatantra Party secured 18 seats. With the merger of that party with the Ganatantra Parishad of Orissa, the four parliamentary delegates of the latter joined the Swatantra ranks to swell its

strength in the new Lok Sabha to 22. Out of 489 Members of the House, 283 are new, including 182 belonging to the Congress Party.

Fewer people voted in the elections for the Assembly than in those for the Lok Sabha. The Congress Party secured 1,770 of the 2,930 seats—143 less than in 1957. It secured an absolute majority of seats in all the Assemblies except Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh. The Swatantra Party, with 166 seats, emerged as the second largest party, displacing the Praja-Socialist Party, which suffered a sharp decline, securing 149 seats as compared with its previous 188. The Communist Party, with 153 seats, retained its position as the third largest party, securing 46 more seats than in 1957. The Praja-Socialist Party, with 149 seats, came fourth. The Jan Sangh increased its strength by about 50 per cent to secure 115 seats but nevertheless only came fifth.

This general picture does not adequately reflect the fortunes of the various parties in the different States. Except in Gujarat, West Bengal, Assam, and Maharashtra, the Congress Party lost seats. Its poll declined in West Bengal, Assam, Gujarat, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Punjab, and Mysore. It secured more votes in Maharashtra, Madras, and Andhra but lost in seats in the two latter States. There was no clear relation between loss of popularity and loss of seats. In Uttar Pradesh the party lost over 3 million votes but only 37 seats, whereas in Rajasthan it lost as many as 31 seats though only 100,000 votes. The most severe loss in seats was in Madhya Pradesh, where there were ninety fewer Congressmen in the State Legislature but where the party lost 1,172,703 votes. The only Chief Minister not returned by the electors was in Madhya Pradesh. The severity of Congress losses in seats in particular States was partly belied by the party's resounding success in Maharashtra (gain of 79 seats) and Gujarat (gain of 16 seats).

Similarly, the Communist Party increased its strength in the Legislative Assembly (where it secured 51 seats) by more than 33 per cent although it lost over a million votes. In Punjab the Communist strength in the Assembly rose from 6 seats to 9, although it lost 552,583 votes. On the other hand in Assam it failed to retain any of its four seats although it polled over 153,500 votes. In Maharashtra it polled 84,544 fewer votes but lost 12 seats. The party gained in popularity in West Bengal, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, Rajasthan, Madras, and Mysore. It has become the principal opposition party in the legislatures of West Bengal and

Andhra but will be without any representative in Assam and Gujarat.

The Praja Socialist Party will be the principal opposition only in Mysore, where it has 20 members in an Assembly of 208. It lost its position in Uttar Pradesh to the Jan Sangh, and was eliminated from Andhra, Madras, and Punjab. The Jan Sangh became the principal opposition party in Uttar Pradesh (where it secured 49 seats in a House of 430) and Madhya Pradesh (41 seats out of a total of 288) but will be without a representative in Assam, West Bengal, Andhra, Madras, Mysore, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. The Swatantra Party became the principal opposition party in Gujarat (with 26 members in a House of 154), Bihar (50 in 318), and Rajasthan (36 in 176).

In the legislatures of Madras, Maharashtra, Punjab, and Assam the regional parties became the principal opposition. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Madras, which is in favour of a separate independent State (Dravidasthan) in Southern India, got 3,406,806 votes (27 per cent) and 50 seats out of a total of 206; the Peasants' and Workers' Party in Maharashtra got 814,963 votes and 15 seats out of a total of 264; the Akali Dal in Punjab, which wants to form a separate State (Punjabi Suba) for the Sikhs within the Indian Union, got 798,925 votes and 19 seats out of 152; and the Hill Leaders' Conference in Assam, which wants to form a separate State for the Hill people within the Indian Union, got 1,272,666 votes and 11 seats (out of a total of 105) to become the principal legislature opposition party in the respective States.

Among the other regional groups the Jharkhand Party in Bihar, which wants to form a separate State for the Adivasis (aboriginal tribes), did fairly well by polling 435,660, or 4·48 per cent of the votes, and securing 20 seats.

The election yielded the remarkable spectacle of the defeat of some of the most outstanding opposition leaders, irrespective of their party affiliations. Among the defeated candidates were such well-known politicians as Mr S. A. Dange (Communist), Mr Asoka Mehta (Praja Socialist), Mr A. B. Bajpayee (Jan Sangh), and Professor N. G. Ranga (Swatantra)—all leaders in their respective parties in the last Parliament.

At the States level also the election proved to be disastrous for a number of well-known political leaders—again affecting the opposition parties more than the Congress. On the Congress side, apart from that of Dr Katju, other notable defeats were those of Mr S.

Nijalingappa, President of the Mysore Pradesh Congress Committee and member of the Congress Working Committee, Mr Thakorebhai Desai, President of Gujarat Pradesh Congress Committee, Shri A. G. Kher, Speaker of the Uttar Pradesh Legislature Assembly, Mr Hargovind Singh, Finance Minister of Uttar Pradesh, Mr K. V. Ranga Reddy, Deputy Chief Minister, and Mr P. Ranga Reddy, Minister for Planning and Information, both of Andhra, and Mr Balwantrai Mehta, Congress leader from Gujarat. The defeats of Mr Nijalingappa and Mr Balwantrai Mehta were particularly upsetting in their impact since both of them were tipped as prospective Chief Ministers of their States. Among the defeated Ministers were Mr Bhupati Majumdar, Mr Abdus Sattar, and Dr A. B. Roy, all Cabinet Ministers of West Bengal. On the opposition side, the leaders of the opposition in Assam, Maharashtra, and Uttar Pradesh lost their seats.

In the second general election of 1957, 4,359 Assembly candidates and 496 candidates for the Lok Sabha forfeited their deposits, bringing the Treasury a sum of Rs.1,337,750. In the present election the deposits forfeited amounted to Rs.7,500,000, or nearly one-hundredth of the total election expenses, which are estimated to amount to Rs.70 million. The Jan Sangh was the worst sufferer, over 50 per cent of its contestants for Assembly seats and half its contestants for Lok Sabha seats forfeiting their deposits.

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Note of the Month

The CENTO and N.A.T.O. Meetings

On 30 April and 1 May a meeting took place in London of Ministers representing the member States of the Central Treaty Organization (Britain, Turkey, Persia, and Pakistan); the United States, which belongs to the military and economic committees, was represented by the Secretary of State, Mr Dean Rusk, as an observer. The most notable feature of the meeting was the failure to agree on the chief item of business, the appointment to the new post of Commander, military staff. Britain and the United States were known to favour the appointment of a British officer; the regional members of the alliance, especially Pakistan, favoured an American.

This disagreement reflects a deeper division within the alliance. CENTO, unlike N.A.T.O., does not possess forces of its own. Although there exists a military deputies group which meets permanently in Ankara, and although the member States have certain forces 'earmarked' for use in connection with their treaty obligations, CENTO is no more than the sum of its parts. Pakistan, concerned as always to strengthen U.S. commitment to her defence and to increase the flow of military and economic aid towards her, has sought to engage the United States more heavily in the Organization. She does not regard Britain as a satisfactory substitute; and her representative at the London meeting, General Shaik, publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the quantity of British economic aid to CENTO countries. The U.S. Administration, however, mindful of the political effects in neutral countries of her full adhesion to the alliance, and somewhat embarrassed by her existing relations with it, is reluctant to be drawn in. Recently the CENTO Powers have not experienced any Communist pressures upon their area comparable to those exerted upon the N.A.T.O. and S.E.A.T.O. areas by the crises over Berlin and Laos, such as might induce them to resolve their differences. But quite apart from this, it is difficult to resist the impression of waning vitality.

From 2 to 5 May, the N.A.T.O. Council of Ministers met in Athens. The preoccupation of the alliance with the problem of the

control of nuclear weapons was reflected in the attendance of fourteen Ministers of Defence as well as the fifteen Foreign Ministers (Iceland has no Defence Minister).

At present strategic nuclear forces within the alliance are possessed only by the United States and Britain (France, though she is accumulating nuclear explosives, does not yet have a bomber force able to deliver them upon Russian targets). Tactical nuclear weapons, although available to N.A.T.O. whose European forces are trained in their use, are physically in the possession of United States forces (apart from the nuclear bombs of the British tactical air forces) and can be used only with American consent. This position is regarded as unsatisfactory by most European N.A.T.O. countries, especially France and West Germany, chiefly because the growth of Soviet power to strike at the United States has raised doubts in their minds about the willingness of that country to engage in nuclear war in order to repel a Soviet attack directed at Europe alone. The view that the American deterrent is of diminishing value to Europe has led to the demand that it be supplemented by nuclear forces over the use of which the Europeans themselves exert control. Thus, on the one hand, France is determined to make herself an independent nuclear Power, while, on the other hand, West Germany has pressed for a joint N.A.T.O. strategic nuclear force, in the control of which she would have some share.

Although the United States has sometimes appeared to favour the idea of 'N.A.T.O. as a fourth nuclear power', as an alternative preferable to the proliferation of independent national nuclear forces within the alliance, she has shown no sign of willingness to accept a supra-national force in which her own nuclear forces would be merged. She also regards it as desirable to prevent the increase of the number of nuclear Powers and wishes to keep open the possibility of negotiating agreements with the Soviet Union to that end. The Athens decisions reflect however the U.S. desire to make certain concessions towards the European point of view.

First, five United States *Polaris*-carrying submarines are to be committed to N.A.T.O.'s European command, this number to increase as further submarines become available. This is not a revolutionary change, and it does not involve any increase in the number of submarines already operating in European waters from their base in Scotland. Nor does it involve any sharing by the United States of control over their use: General Norstad, as well as being Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, is an American officer, and can order

the use of these weapons only on the authority of President Kennedy. However, this assignment of medium-range ballistic missiles to an international command specifically concerned with the defence of Europe does go some way towards allaying the fears of West Germany and others. It also partly meets the demand which General Norstad has been putting forward for a missile force which will play the role in European defence at present assigned to the tactical bomber forces stationed in his area, when these become obsolete.

Secondly, the United States has agreed to make available to her allies information concerning the location, capabilities, and targets of her nuclear weapons in Europe. A fifteen-nation committee, the permanent council under another name, is to be constituted in order to receive this information. According to some reports it is also to lay down 'guide-lines' determining the circumstances in which commanders in the field will be empowered to employ nuclear weapons. There is some doubt as to whether France will take part in this committee: General de Gaulle believes that the nuclear policy of the alliance should be entrusted to a three-power directorate. Moreover, this committee is the merest shadow of the body disposing of a 'N.A.T.O. deterrent' that has sometimes been proposed; the fifteen representatives will not have their 'fingers on the trigger'. But it does appear to strengthen the American commitment to Europe. Thirdly, the United States and Britain have reaffirmed that their strategic nuclear forces are available for the defence of Europe.

Mr Dean Rusk used the opportunity of the meeting to impress upon member countries, and especially Britain and West Germany, the need to increase conventional forces. It is a basic element in the military policy of the new U.S. Administration that N.A.T.O. should be able to stem limited attacks in Europe without resort to nuclear weapons.

The decisions of the Athens conference represent a partial recognition by the United States of the shift that has occurred in the balance of power within the alliance, away from North America and towards Europe. The shifting political combinations and divisions among the N.A.T.O. countries on such questions as negotiations with Russia, the E.E.C. and Britain's entry into it, and the degree of military and political integration that is desirable within the alliance all reflect this new situation. The diplomatic opportunities for N.A.T.O. countries are more open, and the relations between them more capable of surprises, than in the early days of unquestioned U.S. pre-eminence.

Britain and the Common Market: The Test Case of New Zealand

BRITAIN'S application to join the European Economic Community has thrown into the melting-pot the conditions on which imports from the Commonwealth enter the United Kingdom. In this context it is often mentioned that New Zealand sends more than half of her exports to Britain—in the three years 1958 to 1960 the proportion was 55 per cent. But this information in itself does not convey the full measure of New Zealand's dependence on this single lifeline. One has to add that over the same three-year period the value of total exports equalled more than 24 per cent of the gross national product, which means that over 13 per cent of all the goods and services produced in New Zealand were ultimately sold on the British market. And even this figure has to be viewed in the light of some others. Sixty-five per cent of all exports to Britain were made up of four products for which the share of this one outlet in total sales is particularly high: for butter and cheese it was 92 to 93 per cent, for mutton about 80 per cent, for lamb 97 per cent. The conditions on which these four foodstuffs can be sold also have a strong effect on other major exports which in themselves have wider markets, because the two categories of goods are produced jointly. Mutton and lamb come from the same flocks as wool, butter and cheese from the same herds as hides, veal, and much of the beef, and within the dairy industry there is a similar technical relationship between butter on the one hand and skimmed milk powder and casein on the other.

Nor is the importance of all exports together fully described by pointing out that they represent almost one-quarter of the gross national product. Export earnings are used to pay for imports, well over four-fifths of which now consist of machinery and fuel, and of raw materials and semi-manufactures processed further in New Zealand. Most of these imports are non-competitive, i.e. it would be quite impossible to produce similar goods in New Zealand at a tolerable cost, or in many cases at all. If the flow of such supplies were seriously reduced, the resulting fall in total output and employment could be a multiple of the value of the missing imports. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that New Zealand's whole economic existence hangs on the thread of the British connection.

During the last decade this thread has been subject to fluctuating

but on the whole increasing tension. While the price level of the goods which New Zealand imports has been rising, the trend in food prices has been downward, particularly since 1955. The decline had its causes both on the side of supply and on that of demand. New Zealand herself has been sending increasing quantities of mutton and lamb to Britain, but the volume of her shipments of dairy produce has been more or less stable, and even with respect to meat the activities of other suppliers had a much greater influence on the market. In meat, New Zealand's main competitor is British agriculture which, stimulated by State subsidies, is rapidly increasing its output of mutton and lamb, as well as of the alternative products, beef and poultry. In cheese, too, domestic production is the other main supplier and has been growing fast. British butter output, although expanding on a similar scale, still holds only a minor share of the market and the particularly sharp fall in butter prices can be attributed to the greatly increased quantities reaching Britain from the continent of Europe. The additional supplies could have been absorbed at a better sustained level of prices had demand been growing at a comparable rate; but the British people were already well fed ten years ago, and, as both their numbers and their incomes have been increasing at a fairly slow rate since then, housewives in recent years could be persuaded to clear the shelves of all the meat and dairy produce pumped into the shops only at considerably reduced prices. The consequences can be seen in the position of New Zealand's dairy industry: total receipts in 1961 were not sufficient to cover the milk price guaranteed to farmers and the industry ran up an overdraft of several million pounds.

Even more disturbing are the figures for New Zealand's overseas exchange transactions in 1961: over the year the current balance of payments and private capital movements taken together showed a deficit of £56·2 million, amounting to more than 4 per cent of the gross national product. This happened in spite of the fact that imports were curtailed in the second half of 1961, with the result that stocks of imported goods, including raw materials and components for industry, were lower at the end of the year than at its beginning. The deficit was covered by long-term government borrowing, sales of official investments held overseas, and a fall in the reserves; the scope for further financing on these lines, though still appreciable, is naturally limited. It should be added that in November 1961 the British Government imposed a quota system on butter imports, mainly with the intention of helping New Zea-

land. This measure has recently been extended till 1 April 196; New Zealand's quota is generous, and the London butter price i now considerably higher than it was during most of 1961. But th present price is still about 10 per cent less than what would b needed to keep the industry from running into further debt. Ne Zealand was also compelled to renounce her right of quantitativel unlimited access to the British market, although it is doubtfi whether in the existing circumstances this was an economic loss, a distinct from the surrender of a principle. It has since been reporte that, with respect to cheese, for which no official quotas exist, th New Zealand Dairy Production and Marketing Board and it Australian counterpart are considering the adoption of voluntar export ceilings to prevent a collapse of prices in the United King dom.

Why then is New Zealand afraid of a project that aims at th abolition of trade barriers between the limited British market an the markets of continental Western Europe, which are not onl much larger but have also been growing faster during the las decade? It is certainly not price competition, in the sense in whic it promotes productive efficiency, that is feared. Although Ne Zealand's difficulties on the British market have so far taken th form of a decline in prices to a level at which even her producers- as well as the country as a whole—cannot make ends meet, Ne Zealand still has far lower costs of production for the commoditie involved than either Britain or the Six as a whole. British and cor tinental producers are able to undercut New Zealand not becaus they are more efficient, but because they can sell at prices whic need not cover costs. In Britain government subsidies make goo the difference between market receipts and the farm-gate price, th latter being fixed through a more or less formalized process of bai gaining between the farmers and the Government, more often as matter of social policy (or of party politics) than in accordance wit a clear-cut concept of the national economic interest. The Britis method nevertheless has the virtue that, although on the side c supply it promotes high-cost production just as much as the cor tinental one, on the demand side at least it permits the market t find its own price level and thus ensures the absorption of a deliveries, overseas as well as domestic. In the present membe countries of the E.E.C., on the other hand, food imports are subjec to severe quantitative regulation and high prices are maintained o the internal market. This, and similar policies in other parts of th

world, are the main reason why New Zealand's food sales are so heavily concentrated on the United Kingdom. The E.E.C. countries, as well as a number of others, use subsidies to dispose of excess output not at home but in Britain, increasing the pressure of supplies there even more; it was this dumping policy of continental countries which made the fall in butter prices in the United Kingdom over the last few years particularly steep.

What New Zealand and other outside suppliers of temperate zone foodstuffs fear is the extension, albeit gradually, of the continental high-price policy to the United Kingdom. Such a change seems to be foreseen in the statements and proposals made and the decisions so far taken about the Community's common agricultural policy, and it can be expected to reduce British imports from non-member countries on two counts: firstly, because the increase in consumer prices to the continental level would considerably cut down consumption; and secondly, because if these same prices were retained on the Continent, the Six and the other prospective members (the Irish Republic, Denmark, and Norway) would have a large and growing excess output over domestic requirements, particularly in dairy produce, and this exportable surplus would presumably have to be absorbed by the British market before imports from outside were admitted. In addition to these worries about quantities, outsiders also have some cause to be concerned about their future export prices. Though wholesale food prices in Britain would rise, ultimately to the unified target level decided by the authorities of the Community in the framework of the common agricultural policy, it is not clear how far non-member suppliers would be allowed to share in this rise. Whereas New Zealand's exports now enter the United Kingdom free of duty, they would become subject to the common external tariff of the Community and/or to import certificates (licences) in combination with threshold prices and import levies, the size of which could be varied by administrative action at short notice. These dispositions are obviously aimed at regulating the quantity of imports, but as they stand they also appear to contain the danger that the overwhelming bargaining power of the enlarged E.E.C. might possibly be used by relatively subordinate administrators, even against the intentions of the E.E.C. Commission, to depress the prices paid for imported food to very low levels.

In spite of these apprehensions the New Zealand Government has adopted a more co-operative and less critical posture towards the British intention to join the E.E.C. than other members of the

Commonwealth. Official spokesmen explain this attitude with reference to the assurance, given by the British Secretary for Commonwealth Relations, Mr Sandys, in Wellington in July 1961, that Britain will not join the Community unless New Zealand's vital interests are protected. Trust in the friendship and in the given word of the United Kingdom is undoubtedly one of the main determinants of New Zealand's policy in this matter. But another impulse working in the same direction can also be mentioned as a private opinion: the fact that for New Zealand, unlike some other Commonwealth countries, the simple maintenance of the *status quo* could be disastrous. The present institutional framework of the British food market, and the financial straits to which New Zealand has been reduced under it, have been described above. Most New Zealanders would prefer to seek a solution through bilateral contracts with the United Kingdom, and for butter an improvement has in fact been achieved in this way. Nevertheless, the need for a re-examination on the highest political level of the outlets for New Zealand's food exports and for their far-reaching readjustment is still so pressing that even an approach which makes any new permanent arrangements conditional on the consent and co-operation of Britain's prospective fellow-members in the E.E.C. might appear preferable to a continuation of the trend experienced over the last few years. Nor is such an approach, perhaps, altogether hopeless: the bare outlines of a possible solution acceptable to all the parties concerned—though nothing more than this—seem to be visible.

Such a solution would have both a short-term and a long-term aspect. For the time being, the decisive element would be the level of food prices determined under the common agricultural policy. If these prices were, say, 20 to 30 per cent lower than the present average price level in the E.E.C. area—though above the prices now ruling in Britain—the domestic output of the member countries in meat and dairy produce could probably be fully absorbed and still leave room for sizeable purchases from outside; and if these imports were paid for at, or not very much below, the Community's internal wholesale prices, New Zealand and other Commonwealth suppliers might be assured of a satisfactory income from their exports to the enlarged E.E.C. in the next few years. In the longer run, however, domestic output in the enlarged E.E.C. could be expected to catch up even with the new level of consumption, unless factors of production, in the first place labour, were transferred from European agriculture into other activities on a fairly large scale; a permanent

ıtlet for food imports could therefore be secured only under an ricultural policy which deliberately set out to promote such a -allocation of resources.

Admittedly, it does not seem possible to find a solution to the oblem merely through the manipulation of customs duties and ıport quotas: a settlement on the lines set forth in the previous ragraph would deeply affect the whole economic structure and ture of the enlarged Community, and require some politically ficult readjustments. Granted that arrangements acceptable to ɜw Zealand are imaginable, can one realistically expect the Euro-ans to be interested in the described approach? What would there in it for them?

The United Kingdom would obviously be interested in keeping ɔd prices as low as possible, partly to mitigate the impact of the ange on the British consumer who has become used to cheap food ıd on wage rates through the consumers' reaction), and partly in der to avoid too sharp a rise in the country's food import bill. It ould be noted that the major cause of this rise, and one that could rdly be avoided if the principles of the Rome Treaty are to be plied, would be Britain's obligation to buy the exportable food rplus of her continental fellow-members at the internal adminis-ed wholesale price of the Community. Moreover, if—as is now eseen—the eventual unified common market in foodstuffs were be protected by import levies paid into agricultural support funds ıtralized in Brussels, as distinct from customs duties accruing to Exchequers of the member States, there would be little differ-ce between the effective cost to the British economy of food ports from inside and outside the Community. But, even if this stem were not adopted, it would seem most ungracious on the rt of Britain to try to depress the prices she paid for food from the ımmonwealth far below the price conceded to continental sup-ers, and the effect of any such policy on the aggregate cost of itish food imports could at best be only marginal. On the other nd, low common wholesale prices in the Community could bring ıssive relief. Concerning the long-term aspect of the problem, e of the advantages the British Government appears to expect ım joining the E.E.C. is an opportunity to shed the mounting ancial burden of direct subsidies to agriculture. This aim would ıke it desirable to restrict home output to the quantities which ıld be produced economically at the unified European wholesale ce level.

In the countries of the Six, reduced food prices would contribı to the rise in living standards and, more specifically, help to kε wage inflation in check. Nor would lower prices to the consum necessarily mean smaller returns to farmers. There seems to be soı room for consumer subsidies: a few exist already, and the sums nı spent on export subsidies, for example on butter sold to Britain : below cost, could be allocated to this purpose. Even more importa is the fact that, according to strong evidence, the present agricultu price maintenance arrangements are being used as a shelter by i efficient food manufacturers and distributors; for example an intı national report published in 1960[1] states: 'It is mainly in the man facturing stage that the costs of French dairy produce increase . the collection of milk and the distribution of dairy produce are ı properly organized...' It would seem reasonable, and would harı be opposed by the farmers, if agricultural price guarantees wı limited to milk as a raw material and to animals on the hoof, a food processors and distributors were treated according to the saı principles as other industrial and commercial firms. The openi up of their cosy preserves to international competition, backed freely moving know-how and capital, would soon cut down excı sive manufacturing and distributive margins and thereby redu both wholesale and retail prices. With regard to the long-teı policy mentioned above, it can be pointed out that in the maj member countries of the E.E.C. output per head in agricultu. even if valued at the present high protected prices, is less than tw thirds of the total production per head for the whole economy, aı that a shortage of workers is now regarded as the main obstacle continued fast industrial expansion. In these circumstances, a rap outflow of labour from agriculture would undoubtedly benefit bo the workers concerned and the rate of overall economic growth.

Thus it appears that the interests of New Zealand as an efficie low-cost food supplier coincide to a large extent with the forwar looking aims and enlightened self-interest of the proposed larg E.E.C.; but they are in conflict with strongly entrenched sectioı interests and ingrained habits of agricultural autarky on the Co tinent. In a different context, and with a small *c*, Professor Stone Cambridge wrote recently[2]: '... it is up to the community itself decide whether it prefers to sacrifice its habits to its aims or its aiı

[1] O.E.E.C. *4th Report on Agricultural Policies in Europe and North Ameri* Vol. II, *Problems in Dairy Policy*, Paris 1960, p. 192.

[2] Stone, R., 'An Econometric Model of Growth—The British Economy in T Years Time', *Discovery*, Vol. XXII, 1961, No. 5.

to its habits.' Although this is a choice with which all societies are constantly faced on many points, occasionally economic issues arise which present the alternatives, and the foreseeable consequences of either possible option, in a particularly clear-cut way. The future of New Zealand's food sales to Western Europe seems to be one of these, and it is in this sense that it can be called a test case. Not for New Zealand; she, like other countries, is certainly not free from the retarding influence of vested sectional interests and mental inertia, but in the present problem the power of decision rests with the prospective members of the enlarged E.E.C., to some extent with Britain, and very largely with the Six. The question of outlets for New Zealand's food exports is closely bound up with the common agricultural policy. When this policy finally emerges in a coherent form, it will show more than any other single feature whether the Community is to be characterized by exclusivity, structural rigidity, and restrictive economic practices as its critics suggest, or whether it can live up to the outward-looking, rational, dynamic image projected and believed in by its supporters.

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The Failure of the West Indies Federation

THREE hundred years of history will become a memory this August when Jamaica, the largest of the British West Indian islands, attains her independence. Jamaica was captured from the Spaniards in 1655 as a consolation prize after the failure of the expedition sent out by Cromwell to establish his dominion in the Caribbean. Her attainment of independence will therefore attract wide interest; yet, as the shouting and the tumult die, a discerning ear should catch an altogether different note, for the Jamaicans, even in the midst of their celebrations, will also be sounding a Last Post over the short-lived Federation of the West Indies, which was one of the prime objectives of British post-war colonial policy.

In a referendum last September the Jamaican electorate voted in favour of withdrawal from the Federation which had been inaugu-

rated in 1958. Mr Norman Manley, the Jamaican Premier, promptly flew to London to seek implementation of this expression of his people's will, although his Government had campaigned on behalf of federation and he himself had been a leading advocate of closer association between the territories of the West Indies. Mr Iain Macleod, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, accepted the Jamaican decision, undertaking to arrange for the territory's secession from the Federation and to co-operate in its early achievement of individual independence. The formal documents of independence were signed at a London conference last February and a Bill was introduced in the U.K. Parliament in March making provision for the secession of a territory from the Federation—there was no such provision in the Federal Constitution—or for its dissolution.

Jamaica was not only geographically the largest territory in the Federation; her people formed slightly more than half the total population of about 3 million and they contributed more than 40 per cent of the federal revenue. Thus, the back of this experiment in nation-building was broken by the Jamaican withdrawal; and post-war hopes of a tidy transfer of power from Whitehall to the Caribbean were further disrupted by the refusal of Trinidad, the second largest and the wealthiest territory in the Federation, to continue in a smaller federation with the remaining islands. Trinidad's refusal is primarily to be explained by the economic weakness of the Windward and Leeward groups, which, with Barbados, were the other participants.[1] The Trinidad Government offered any or all of them the opportunity of accession to a unitary state of Trinidad and Tobago in which there could be central direction of development and a rationalization of administrative machinery in the interests of economy and greater efficiency.

The offer has been rejected by the smaller islands. The loss of their individual identities has seemed to them too big a price to pay in return for a comparatively assured future. Trinidad is therefore 'going it alone' whilst the other islands are attempting to form a federation on their own. In place of a community of 3 million people stretching from Jamaica among the Greater Antilles in the north to Trinidad lying a few miles off the South American coast, the prospect now is one of three independent States—Jamaica with a population of 1,600,000, Trinidad and Tobago with about 800,000, and a grouping of the smaller islands totalling some 700,000 people. When it is recalled that the original plan was for British Guiana in

[1] See 'Nine Islands Seek a Happy Union', *The Times*, 18 January 1962.

South America and British Honduras in Central America to join with the Caribbean islands and that the two mainland territories are still in search of separate destinies, the extent of the failure to avoid fragmentation will be appreciated.

Ironically, the immediate cause of the Federation's collapse, the referendum result in Jamaica, can be explained in terms which have little to do with the very real difficulties attending the concept of association and afflicting the brief span of the Federation's existence. Just under 61 per cent of the Jamaican electorate voted in the referendum and the Noes had it by a comfortable, but not overwhelming, majority of approximately 35,000. The vote ran regionally along the customary party lines, the adverse majority being built up in the rural districts where sophisticated political and economic arguments are out of place and where, in fact, demagoguery found its readiest response. Nor is there any doubt that the referendum had as much to do with the internal struggle for power between Mr Manley and his great political rival, Sir Alexander Bustamante, as it had to do with anything else. A more fruitful subject for discussion might centre on the reasons why Mr Manley called the referendum, thus putting in jeopardy a project which he had cherished, and the explanation may well come more readily from the social historian than from the economist or from the political analyst.

The case for closer association between the West Indian territories was put to West Indian leaders at the first major conference held in Jamaica in September 1947 by Mr Arthur Creech Jones, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies. He said: 'It is clearly impossible in the modern world for the present separate communities, small and isolated as most of them are, to achieve and maintain full self-government on their own. On the other hand, a community of well over two million people in the Caribbean area with much that is homogeneous in their culture could reasonably hope to achieve self-government and to formulate and carry through a policy and way of life of their own.'[1] More than ten years later, Mr Manley summarized the idea in a single sentence, saying that the British West Indian problem, *inter alia*, was 'how to overcome the disadvantage of being too small to be heard in a world where silence means stagnation'.[2] And later still, in 1961, during a conference intended to clear the way for independence but at which territorial

[1] Cmd. 7291.

[2] Quoted by Mr Creech Jones in an article 'Salute to Federation' in *The West India Committee Circular*, April 1958.

dissension was brought to boiling point, Dr Eric Williams, the Premier of Trinidad, gave a concrete, up-to-the-minute illustration of this principal theme. 'Castro,' he said, 'will hold the West Indies together.'[1]

There were other arguments in favour of closer association, not as dramatic perhaps as the political need for a united front, which certainly became predominant in Jamaican thinking as time went on, but none the less of importance in their own right—the opportunity to establish joint institutions such as the University College of the West Indies, the possibility of co-ordinating public services, and the new opportunities for integrating economic development. Moreover, no ground can have been gone over more thoroughly by expert investigators. In the years between the first proposal in 1945, contained in the Colonial Office Circular to the West Indian Governments officially inviting their consideration of the idea of federation, and the establishment of the Federation in 1958, Commission after Commission had reported on every relevant subject—trade and tariffs, the judiciary, education, civil service matters, the financial aspects. By 1951, one Commission[2] was recommending the establishment at the earliest opportunity of a Customs Union of all the British Caribbean territories, except the Virgin Islands and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Customs Union was to prove one of the most awkward issues, but the experts had no doubts regarding its practicability and desirability. Seven years later, another Commission's report[3] was quoting with approval the dictum of Professor Arthur Lewis, a West Indian economist of international standing who is now the Principal of the University College, that 'the first essential to any vigorous industrialization is a Customs Union and it is idle to talk about making a serious effort at industrialization until the whole area is brought within a single Customs Union.'

This was forcefully put, but in practice West Indians were accustomed to living apart and might well ask why, if co-ordination was so beneficial, it had not been introduced on an approximate scale by the colonial regime, and had made no striking difference when applied, even if in a circumscribed form, among the Windwards and Leewards. Indeed, the habit of separateness was so in-

[1] In an interview reported in *The Times*, 7 June 1961.

[2] Report of the Commission on the Establishment of a Customs Union in the British Caribbean Area 1948–50. Col. No. 268, 1951.

[3] Report of the Trade and Tariffs Commission, Parts I and II, published by the Government of the West Indies, 1958. W.I. 1/58.

grained in West Indian life that Mr Creech Jones, even as he extolled the advantages of association at the 1947 conference, had to remember to promise that individual progress towards self-government would not be allowed to suffer from the combined operation. The British Government kept its word here. By 1958 the three leading territories, Jamaica, Trinidad, and Barbados, were enjoying, in effect, internal self-government, only a step or two away from full independence.

The argument for federation met its greatest opposition in the economic field. The case for integration of development planning found little support in the initial phase, because the larger islands were concentrating on their own domestic post-war programmes of development. Jamaica for one did not intend to permit interference with her independent economy. As events turned out the year of federation, 1958, saw the Jamaican economy emerge from the searching test of a year of adverse world conditions with satisfactory evidence for the domestic planners of the appropriateness of their policies. In the words of the official Annual Report, the economy 'operated during 1958 in adverse world conditions and the experience was of importance as testing the value of the changes made during the previous decade. . . Such a combination of adverse circumstances would before World War II have been considered calamitous. . . The diversified economy of 1958 was apparently better able to support a population of 1,600,000 under difficult conditions than the economy of a quarter of a century ago could support two-thirds of that number. The diversification of the economy has been effected through the development of mining, manufacturing industry, and tourism.'[1] Thirteen new factories were established in Jamaica during 1958 and manufacturing accounted for 12·5 per cent of the gross domestic product compared with 13·2 per cent for agriculture, forestry, and fishing. Jamaica set much store by the encouragement of secondary industry behind high tariff walls, and post-war progress in this connection encouraged Government opposition to a regional Customs Union. Well might the 1958 Report of the Commission on Trade and Tariffs comment that 'the problem would have been easier to solve five or ten years ago when the difference of interests, if it existed at all, was less marked; and it will become increasingly difficult if Units continue upon different and divergent courses for another period of years.'

At the other end of the Caribbean, Trinidad faced the problem of

[1] See *Jamaica; Report for the year 1958*, chap. 2. (London, H.M.S.O., 1961.)

freedom of movement. As the wealthiest territory because of her income from the exploitation and refining of mineral oil, Trinidad has always been under pressure from her smaller and poorer neighbours in the Windwards and Leewards, and particularly from the over-populated island of Barbados. The case put forward by Trinidad was that the immediate granting of freedom of movement would in the existing economic circumstances lead to a flood of immigrants swamping the island's prosperity. Yet it would have been farcical to talk of federating into one nation while maintaining immigration barriers between the different territories. The Trinidad Government accepted the logic of the federal argument, but insisted on a time-lag before inter-island migration should be wholly surrendered to federal jurisdiction. It argued that full freedom of migration should wait on closer economic integration; and this argument inevitably clashed with Jamaican reluctance over the establishment of a Customs Union.

The form of federation eventually decided on after a decade of discussion followed the original suggestion for a Constitution on the Australian pattern, the Federal Government exercising only those powers specifically allotted to it, and the territorial Governments continuing to exercise much of their previous powers. A Federal Exclusive List covered defence, exchange control, immigration and emigration, the public services of the Federation, and the maintenance of federal agencies and institutions, these including the University College. A Concurrent List, of matters on which the Federal Parliament had power to legislate, embraced civil aviation and shipping, banks and banking, industrial arbitration, currency, customs and excise duties, industrial development, postal services, higher education apart from the University College, communications, trade and commerce, and trade unions. Federal law was to prevail over matters on this List in the event of inconsistency with territorial law. In practice, the territorial Governments interpreted 'Concurrent' as meaning with their concurrence, and they were in a position to call the tune. There was to be a review of the Constitution after five years, but during this interim period the revenue of the Federal Government was to be derived from a mandatory levy on the territorial Governments to the limit of $BWI9,120,000, the fixed value of the British West Indian dollar being 4s. 2d. sterling. The Federal Government was entitled to profits from the issue of currency but had no other means of direct income-raising. It was thus weak in constitutional fibre and in financial substance, depend-

ent on the goodwill of the territorial Governments, in particular those of Jamaica and Trinidad, which contributed 43 per cent and 39 per cent respectively of the mandatory levy.[1]

In the beginning, the political situation promised co-operation between the two main territorial Governments and the federal authority. The year 1958 opened with Mr Manley, who had been the leading spokesman for West Indian unity, in the middle of a successful first term at the head of the Jamaican Government. His party, the People's National Party, was forward-looking at home and eager for independence. In Trinidad, Dr Eric Williams, a dynamic newcomer, had won the 1956 General Election with his People's National Movement, founded only a few months earlier. P.N.M. was modelled on P.N.P. and Dr Williams's admiration for Mr Manley was, at this stage, unconcealed. P.N.M. had attached itself to the Federal Labour Party, which was formed to contest the federal elections and of which P.N.P. and the Barbados Labour Party of Sir Grantley Adams were founder members. The F.L.P., led by Mr Manley with Sir Grantley as his deputy, had firm backing in the Windwards and Leewards. It was opposed by a federal Democratic Labour Party led by Sir Alexander Bustamante.

The F.L.P. was expected to win the first federal General Election and did so, but with a difference. P.N.P. and P.N.M. were both defeated at home, and their defeats were particularly harmful to the federal cause. Although neither Mr Manley nor Dr Williams stood for election, their prestige was involved and the messianic aura surrounding them was disturbed by the setback. Their supporters resented this intrusion of the Federation in their domestic politics. Assessment of the election results could only lead them to the conclusion that, for party purposes, federal sentiments should be played down.

The F.L.P. scraped to a very narrow victory by virtue of successes in the smaller islands, and this result helped to determine the composition of the Federal Cabinet in favour of these territories. Mr Manley, the natural choice for Federal Prime Minister, had decided against going to the centre because of the possible effect of his departure from Jamaica on the delicate political balance there, with Sir Alexander Bustamante remaining constant in his hostility to the form, if not to the principle, of federation. Thus, Sir Grantley

[1] See *The West Indies, a Nation in the Making* (London, Central Office of Information, 1957) for useful background information on the eve of the inauguration of the Federation.

Adams from Barbados, F.L.P.'s deputy leader, became the first Federal Prime Minister. Sir Grantley possessed more administrative experience than the other political leaders, but his was not the most important territory; his loyalties were with the smaller islands and the election results disposed him further towards them. Of the five Ministries with portfolios, Jamaica was allotted one, Trinidad one, the Leewards one, and the Windwards two. These last three included the Ministry for Trade and Industry and the Ministry of Finance. The Leader of the Opposition was a Trinidadian, although the Jamaicans formed the largest group in the Opposition. There had been a careful allocation of seats in the elected Federal House of Representatives to avoid undue domination by one territory; Jamaica's share was seventeen out of a total of forty-five. The distribution of Government appointments therefore accentuated the disparity between the size of the Jamaican population and their contribution to the federal revenue on the one hand and their representation at the centre on the other.

An open quarrel broke out between the Federal and Jamaican Governments before the end of 1958. Embarrassed by the paucity of his finances, Sir Grantley Adams introduced the subject of direct federal taxes. The Jamaican reaction to this was violent, Sir Alexander Bustamante's comments so disturbing local opinion that Mr Manley decided that he, too, must express his disapproval, and a breach therefore developed between him and Sir Grantley. The dispute provided a focus for Jamaican reservations on federation, indeed it turned them into active complaints.[1] By the time of the Jamaican General Election in July 1959, Mr Manley was expressing his Government's attitude to federation in the following terms: 'Proper representation on a population basis, protection against every form of taxation, revision of the constitution to give us freedom to pursue our own economic development policy, protection of Jamaica's interest and, in particular, of our industrial programme in everything that relates to a Customs Union.' Sir Alexander, for his part, adopted the slogan, 'Jamaica must lead the Federation, or secede.'[2]

Mr Manley won the 1959 election decisively, and the measure of federal reliance on him and fear of Sir Alexander can be gauged from Sir Grantley's remark on hearing the result, 'The West Indies

[1] See 'Focus on the West Indies', in *New Commonwealth*, December 1958 and December 1959.

[2] See 'Brighter Prospects in the West Indies', in *Venture* (journal of the Fabian Commonwealth Bureau), October 1959.

have to say "Thank God." The future is assured.' As matters turned out, the contrary was the case. The very decisiveness of Mr Manley's domestic victory increased the strategic importance of the federal issue for the Opposition and Sir Alexander did not hesitate to employ it as the biggest stick left to him with which to beat the Government.

Early in its history, in October 1958, the Federal House of Representatives passed a motion seeking to move the Federation quickly to independence and Dominion status within the Commonwealth. Resulting from this motion, an inter-governmental conference was held in Trinidad, where the Federal capital was sited, in September–October 1959, to revise the Constitution and prepare for a meeting with the British Government. Jamaica brought controversial new demands to the Trinidad conference, asking that the House of Representatives should be enlarged to sixty-five seats, of which Jamaica should be allotted thirty-two, and that Federal powers to 'interfere' with any unit territory's development policies should be curtailed. Additional material for contention was provided by Trinidad's stand for much stronger central authority and more financial powers. The conference reached no conclusions, although Mr Manley claimed that the principle of relating population and representation had been established. Nevertheless, there was little or no improvement in the relations between the various Governments, and at the beginning of 1960 Mr Manley found himself obliged to visit London to discuss the situation with the Colonial Secretary, warning him that Jamaica would not compromise on her demands and mentioning the possibility of secession. The announcement that a referendum would be held came in May 1960. Sir Alexander Bustamante had issued his ultimate threat that if his party were returned to power he would take Jamaica out of the Federation. Mr Manley made his decision to hold a referendum on his own responsibility without consulting the British Government or his federal party associates. He argued that Sir Alexander's threat was tantamount to a withdrawal of Opposition support for the general principle of federation and that this necessitated a reference back to the popular will. The referendum was held seventeen months later in September 1961.

Before that fateful event, however, the pre-independence conference with the British Government had taken place in London in May–June 1961,[1] following preparatory discussions in the West

[1] Cmnd. 1417.

Indies. Tempers remained as high as ever but the date for independence for the Federation was fixed—31 May 1962; Jamaica gained her point regarding increased representation in a larger House of Representatives; compromise agreements were achieved respecting a Customs Union and freedom of movement; and the Federal Government was granted independent powers of taxation to give it a substantially increased revenue. A final conference with the British Government was arranged for January 1962.

When the referendum came, it seemed the final step before the achievement of independence in unity. Short as its life had been, the Federation had gained support in West Indian thought as a useful framework for future self-government. If federation could be worked, it would be tolerated. That probably sums up West Indian opinion as the people awaited the independence which might well have made more apparent the advantages to be derived from unity. But a foot slipped on the threshold.

CHARLES H. ARCHIBALD

At the time of writing, the decision had been taken to dissolve the Federation, the target date being 31 *May* 1962. *During May, a conference on the future of Barbados, the Windwards, and the Leewards was held, and a Trinidad delegation was expected in London at the end of May to discuss that territory's independence.*

Backs to the Wall: East Germany's Economy in 1962

IF Tacitus were to write of the East–West conflict concerning Germany, he might start his historical survey: 'Germania est omnis divisa in partes tres'; and he might well continue: 'ultra muros terra incognita est'. Once or twice a year foreigners are given special facilities to visit the Leipzig Fair. It provides a glimpse of Communism's fairyland. This spring extra stocks of potatoes and meat were laid in at hotels and restaurants catering for visitors to the Fair; yet the feeling of gaiety and expectation usual on such occasions seemed to have deserted newcomers and natives alike. The volume of trade

concluded and the number of foreign visitors were less than last year. The shadow of the Wall lay heavily across the land. It had been erected to do away with such problems as the ever-growing stream of refugees to the West; yet, when it had been completed, its architects had created as many problems as they had tried to solve. The pull of the Germany that lies West of the Wall has grown and not vanished, despite the Socialist Unity (Communist) Party's attempts to counteract it by such devices as the legend spread by its functionaries that the Hilton Hotel in West Berlin is empty and lit up every night simply to deceive the million inhabitants of the walled-in Eastern sector of the town. The pull of the West clearly remains, although it has been out of reach for nine months.

When the Wall was erected on 13 August 1961, a state of suspense which had lasted fifteen years was finally brought to an end. East Germans, on holiday in Czechoslovakia and Soviet Russia, could be overheard saying: 'We have ceased to be Europeans; now we are Easterners (Oestler).' In Eastern Europe the 'Iron Curtain' has never been regarded as the brain-child of Western imperialists and cold warriors but as a reality, a fact of life. Nevertheless, as long as the traveller from the East could ascend after a short ride on the underground to a world where no Communist writ could be served, the division of Germany, of Europe, of the world could be interpreted as an interlude. Now it has taken on the complexion of finality and the impact of this change cannot yet be grasped to its full extent.

One thing is certain: the East German Communist leaders did not waste any time in taking advantage of the new situation. At long last their concept of detaching the 'German Democratic Republic' from the rest of Germany and bringing it into line with the Soviet Union and its European empire had come within reach. It may well be a matter of years rather than months before this aim can materialize, but the economic steps taken following the erection of the Wall are a clear indication of a new direction of policy. This does not mean, however, that it will be easy to sever the country's ties with the West, to adopt Soviet patterns of industrial production, and to integrate the national economy with economies as far apart as, say, Czechoslovakia in the west and Bulgaria in the east. The statements made in March this year at the Fifteenth session of the Central Committee of the Party left no doubt about the mistakes made in the past and the difficulties expected in the future. Herr Ulbricht, the First Secretary of the Party and Head of State, Herr Mewis, the

Chief Planner, and Herr Rumpf, the Minister of Finance, showed no signs of exuberance over a victory gained but presented a programme that aimed at retrenchment and austerity.

In fact, East Germany's economy is in a precarious state, and has been so for some time. It thus came as no surprise when in the spring of 1961 the quarterly reporting of Plan results was discontinued. When the economic Plan for 1961 was presented at the Twelfth session of the Central Committee in the spring of that year, it had been known for some time that the economy had progressed at a much slower rate than in 1958 and 1959. 1960 had, in fact, been the turning point. Since then industrial output has increased at a steadily declining rate of growth, namely in 1959 by 13 per cent, in 1960 by 8 per cent, and in 1961 by 6 per cent.

These are the official claims for gross industrial production. Even the reduced rates might seem high by Western standards, but it must be borne in mind that they are inflated by statistical padding and multiple counting at fictitious prices.[1] Although the concept of gross industrial production is known to be faulty, it continues to remain in use in East Germany as elsewhere in the Soviet orbit. The gross national product figure, which eliminates some of the statistical errors, has not been published for 1961, but an increase of 3·5 per cent is thought to have been achieved, compared with rates of growth of 8·5 and 6 per cent in 1959 and 1960 respectively, again a steadily declining rate of progress in the last three years.

The output of the metal industry, a key sector of the economy, was particularly disappointing last year; it lagged significantly behind both the 1961 target and performance in 1960. The supply of fuel and power was equally unsatisfactory. Among the major sectors of the economy, the chemical industry alone did better than planned. Against this, building stagnated and transport continued to be a serious problem. The reasons for the reduced rate of expansion are manifold, but the general uncertainty about the future was undoubtedly one of the most important. It was not surprising, therefore, that during the seven and a half months before the frontiers were sealed more East Germans fled to the West than during the whole of 1960.[2] After the erection of the Wall the drain of manpower

[1] Whereas the value of gross industrial production is supposed to have risen by about 6 per cent in 1961, some twenty-five out of forty-two items show an increase of no more than 3 per cent, and another ten items have remained unchanged or have declined in the last twelve months. Similar discrepancies can be observed in the index of retail trade.

[2] In 1960 some 199,000 East Germans fled to the West. In 1961 they numbered 205,000 up to the time of the erection of the Wall.

ceased, and 50,000 East Berliners formerly employed in West Berlin were added to the East German labour force. This advantage was lost when conscription was introduced early in 1962.

When the Wall was erected, the East German population suffered its greatest psychological shock since the war. But the party *cadres* were given little time to enjoy their newly gained freedom of action, and when Mr Khrushchev announced at the opening of the Twenty-second Congress of the C.P.S.U. that he would no longer insist on December 1961 as the deadline for the signing of a German peace treaty it was the turn of the East German Party functionaries to suffer their shock. Since then the political confusion has been nation-wide and has left its mark on the performance of the economy.

An important aspect of the economic situation has been the substantial reduction in capital investment, the growth rate of which declined from over 16 per cent in 1959 to half as much in 1960; it was hoped to maintain this level in 1961 but in fact the increase was only approximately 3 per cent. If allowance is made for rising costs, investment appears to have become stagnant—an event almost unheard of in a Communist-planned economy. In these circumstances, it was not surprising that the appeal to produce more in the same time and for the same wages, which was launched by the Party after sealing the border, had only a limited effect. As long as there was a way open to the West, the Party had been forced to use discretion in exercising pressure on the wage incomes of the workers. In fact, incomes rose faster than supplies of consumer goods with the inevitable inflationary result. The subsequent forced savings campaign was intended to put this matter right, but by the end of the year had not yielded any tangible results.

The proclaimed target to raise living standards sufficiently to overtake West Germany in the supply of important consumer goods per head of population has been dropped without explanation, and comparisons between levels of income and consumption in East and West Germany are no longer made. When the East German Seven-Year Plan, like that of the Soviet Union, was inaugurated in 1959, one of its aims was to surpass the Federal German Republic in the same way as the Soviet Union undertook to surpass the United States. As West Germany has increased her industrial output and national product substantially faster than East Germany in recent years, this goal is more remote today than it was when it was set.

Working conditions are of supreme importance to the majority of

the citizens of the 'German Democratic Republic', since more than one million East Germans have moved from self-employment to wage-earning, and more than two-thirds of all women between fifteen and sixty years of age are employed. In this sphere much remains to be done. The five-day working week, which Herr Ulbricht had promised in March 1956 for certain industries before the end of the second Five-Year Plan in 1960, is nowhere in sight. Nominal industrial wages are still below those paid for corresponding categories of workers in West Germany, and in terms of purchasing power wages are at least one-quarter lower. The same is true of old-age pensions. The supply of consumer goods remains unsatisfactory. The volume of retail trade increased by 10 per cent in 1959 but by only 7 per cent in 1960; the planned rise for 1961 was no more than 6 per cent. Price increases have blurred the picture, but, as the output of the food industries has fallen badly behind the Plan, the 1961 target is unlikely to have been achieved. At the end of the year substantial quantities of food, clothing, and housing had to be transferred from civilian consumption to the armed forces.

The year 1961 was moreover the worst agricultural season since 1953. Farming seems to be the child of sorrow wherever Communists are in control, and in East Germany it is in a particularly sorry state. As elsewhere in the Soviet orbit the weather is blamed for low yields, but there can be no doubt that forced collectivization is largely responsible for the magnitude of the crop failure. Most agricultural data are withheld nowadays, but at the Farmers' Congress held by the Party in Magdeburg in March 1961 some of the essential facts became known. Output of grain and sugar-beet can be estimated at 15 per cent less in 1961 than in 1960. Potato yields declined by more than one-third. As the acreage was also reduced, the total potato crop was at least four million tons lower than the year before. The shortfall of grain and potatoes amounted to 2 million tons of grain equivalent, and thus more than doubled East Germany's traditional grain deficit. Animals went short of fodder, milk and meat production therefore stagnated, and there was premature slaughter of livestock.

Even in more normal years, East Germany's farm output is unsatisfactory. Grain yields are usually about 15 per cent below those of West Germany. The difference is even greater in the case of livestock farming where milk yields are one-quarter and slaughter weights one-third lower. An equal quantity of farm output thus requires a greater number of workers and animals than in West

Germany. Stern measures are to be applied in future to remedy this situation. First of all, grassland is to be brought under the control of the collectives. In this way the private livestock sector is to be deprived of its principal source of feeding stuffs and members of collectives are to be denied their predominant interest in their private plots, which are their main source of income. At least one-tenth of the collective farm income is to be set aside for investment purposes. At the same time the dual price system is to be maintained to provide farmers with premiums for deliveries of milk and meat in excess of the compulsory delivery quotas. On the other hand, farmers will be paid for their labour in strict proportion to the fulfilment of their monthly work plan. Hard times lie ahead for the farming community.

In spite of these efforts East Germany will remain dependent on large-scale Soviet aid. In May 1961, a credit covering the years 1961 to 1965 and equivalent to more than $500 million was made available; this was the largest Soviet credit so far offered to East Germany. As East Germany's short-term debts had accumulated by the end of 1961 to at least twice this amount, another credit became necessary in 1962. This was made available in the Commodity Credit Agreement signed by Mr Mikoyan during his visit to the Spring Fair in Leipzig. It provided for Soviet supplies on credit during 1962 to the equivalent of over $300 million, the largest amount of Soviet assistance offered to East Germany in any one year. No convertible foreign exchange appears to be involved. East Germany will thus move still farther in the direction of an 'economic community' with the Soviet Union, a target dear to Ulbricht's heart.

As it is, of East Germany's total external trade, which is equivalent to $4,500 million, the Soviet share amounts to 45 per cent and that of the Soviet bloc (including Soviet Russia) to 75 per cent, another 10 per cent being inter-zonal trade between East and West Germany, and the remainder East–West trade (excluding interzonal transactions). In recent years, East Germany's foreign trade, like its domestic economy, has made slow progress: the rate of increase declined from 15 per cent in 1959 to 6 per cent in 1960; in 1961 it declined further to 3 per cent. Trade between East Germany and the Soviet Union has been little better; an increase of 13 per cent was planned for 1961 but only 5 per cent was achieved, due almost entirely to increased Soviet exports to East Germany with the volume of trade in the opposite direction remaining unchanged. This pattern will be maintained in 1962, but the East German trade

deficit is likely to grow even bigger than it was last year, when it probably amounted to $150 million. East Germany's dependence on Soviet co-operation will thus increase. In these circumstances she would be foolish to sever her precarious economic ties with West Germany and Western Europe.

At home, as abroad, East Germany is likely to mark time in 1962. This will go much against the grain for the First Secretary, who has fixed the end of 1965 as the date by which to complete the 'construction of socialism' and to enter the age of 'communism'. At the modest rate of less than 6 per cent for gross industrial production planned for 1962, it will require the full co-operation of workers and peasants if the original momentum of the Seven-Year Plan is to be regained by 1963. This is unlikely to meet with an enthusiastic response. After the events of 1961 the East German population may have been cowed, but it does not appear to have abandoned its opposition to the Communist regime. This is borne out by the firmness of the Evangelical Church, by the attitude of trade unionists, and by Ulbricht's references to the Jekyll-and-Hyde behaviour of farmers. The Plan for 1962 leaves little room for manœuvre. It has been designed as an austerity programme, allowing for a declining rate of industrial growth for the third year running, for reduced investment in industry, agriculture, and public services, for lower targets in farm production, and for smaller supplies in meat, dairy produce, and vegetables.

In these circumstances the Communist leadership is likely to cling desperately to its position with its back to the wall. In view of this state of considerable weakness, it should not be taken too seriously if it simulates a position of strength, promising to surpass the economic performance of the West or brandishing political threats. The First Secretary of the Party, sometimes called contemptuously 'the beard', has rarely been anything but his master's voice. He is likely to conclude his long years of service in this role. The future of the country that he rules with ruthlessness thus rests, as before, with Moscow rather than Pankow.

W. U. K.

The Present State of the Disarmament Debate

NEGOTIATIONS on a nuclear test ban and on disarmament have both been continuing since the former was examined in *The World Today* (June 1961). Since then the two subjects have tended to become linked together more closely than formerly. This is partly because the voluntary moratorium on nuclear testing, which had obtained since September 1958, was broken by Russia in August 1961 and led to an intensified discussion of how the general danger to world peace could be reduced by imposing a ban, and partly because of the increased interest shown by the neutral nations in disarmament and the tendency of their delegates at the eighteen-nations conference which began in March 1962 to see the two subjects as part of one overriding problem.

Thus they have become linked in three ways. They obviously form part, in a very tenuous and general way, of the whole problem of limiting the spread of weapons of mass, or even limited, destruction. Further, the unremitting tension between the United States and the U.S.S.R. has led many public figures, who are active in negotiations, together with specialists in the subject, to argue that it is too much to hope for large-scale mutual disarmament (and it is certainly dangerous to indulge in unilateral disarmament), but that agreed measures of arms control are possible; banning nuclear tests would be a form of such control. They could therefore be construed as providing the atmosphere in which limited mutual control and disarmament could be contemplated. One example would be an agreement not to produce fissionable material for war-like purposes. Literally, such an agreement would be neither arms control nor disarmament, but, in a pragmatic way, it is certainly the first so far as nuclear weapons are concerned, and it could provide a more encouraging atmosphere for negotiating the second.

For the record, one should note that President Kennedy said in February last that he would not test whilst the eighteen-nations Geneva disarmament conference was sitting. But he has done so, and those who believe that discussions *per se* impose some checks on the arms race have had a disappointment.

The third reason why the two subjects are linked is that participants at the test ban and disarmament talks in the last twelve months have all advocated a treaty concerned with disarmament when

frustrated in their efforts to achieve a test ban—and have reversed this tactic, more particularly during the rather protracted eighteen-nations conference which is ostensibly only concerned with disarmament. To illustrate the Soviet technique of reversing priorities the following quotation from *Soviet News* of 3 October 1961 is apt:

> The Soviet government's decision to resume tests of nuclear weapons was also adopted in connection with the fact that the Western powers stubbornly opposed all the Soviet Union's attempts to achieve progress in the talks on general and complete disarmament, with the fact that they refused, contrary to the decision of the United Nations General Assembly, to begin to draw up a treaty on general and complete disarmament...
>
> The conclusion of a treaty on ending nuclear tests in these circumstances, and not as a part of the programme of general and complete disarmament, might give the peoples a false sense of security, might act as a kind of sleeping-draught to lull their vigilance with regard to the question of safe-guarding peace...
>
> Consequently, if a persistent and resolute struggle is not waged for general and complete disarmament, nobody can guarantee that tomorrow other states as well will not start testing their own nuclear weapons, even if the three-power treaty on ending tests were concluded.
>
> The truth must be faced squarely: At present it is not a question of the harmful effects of atomic radiation on living organisms, but of delivering mankind from the danger of thermonuclear war, of saving the lives of hundreds of millions of people and preventing atomic weapons from being used. This can be achieved only through general and complete disarmament. This is the main goal, the main task today.

This passage has been quoted *in extenso* because it formed the official defence of the Soviet delegation, headed by Mr Tsarapkin, when it was accused by the United States and the United Kingdom of a breach of faith in resuming nuclear tests whilst the test ban talks were continuing in Geneva. The talks were suspended in September but resumed in November and, although 'collapsing' in February 1962, have in fact been revived through the inception of the eighteen-nations disarmament conference.

The passage quoted is also a good example of the semantic twists which are now common in discussing the subject, and which are used to justify various acts. Further, it may be noted that the official justification for the resumption of both the Soviet and the U.S. tests was that the other side was preparing to resume, and it was necessary to get in first—a policy of course analogous to the strategy of 'pre-empting' or what Soviet writers call the 'forestalling blow'. This is a pertinent point because the current tests possibly do increase tension and the risk of an accidental outbreak of hostilities.

As to the reverse situation, where a test ban is advocated if disarmament appears hopeless, this has been most noticeable in recent weeks at Geneva, where the proposals put forward by the unaligned nations are largely concerned with means of inspecting and verifying military preparedness on national territory. These proposals have found little acceptance with the Soviet delegations, but they have had a useful effect in keeping the test ban group debating.

It should be remembered that in the post-war disarmament talks there has been a constant shifting from one position to another. Thus when the United States had a nuclear monopoly, she was a proponent of comprehensive disarmament, with the Soviet Government in opposition, suspicious that the U.S. *capacity* to manufacture nuclear weapons would not only remain but would be utilized. When the United States lost this monopoly, the U.S.S.R. began enthusiastically to advocate comprehensive disarmament, though never in the step-by-step manner which has been a consistent element in U.S. schemes, namely that armaments be reduced to 'successive agreed levels' commensurate with the size of the signatories' forces at the time of the treaty. The current position appears to be that both States do accept the concept of comprehensive disarmament and the latest U.S. position even appears to accept the rather unrealistic idea of a totally disarmed world. This is a possibility which its representatives formerly had derided.

The real key between test bans and disarmament is of course the trinity of inspection, verification, and control. These three guardians of arms limitation are possibly not as important as some have suggested, although obviously they are the key-words for the proponents of the view that only mutual agreements to control arms at possibly a high level will provide mutual security. The academic school of strategists in the United States have been paying increasing attention recently to arms limitation, but few of them have advocated much in the way of actual disarmament, and virtually all of them have said that elaborate measures of inspection and control were inseparable from any workable arrangement. It is for this reason that new scientific developments in space (such as the 'sky-spy', a satellite which photographs the earth's surface) may be said to be conducive to arms limitation rather than to indicate an advance in the strategic capability for waging war.

These ideas mean much less to the advocates of genuine disarmament, whether limited or comprehensive, conventional or nuclear, and are openly derided by the advocates of unilateral disarmament.

Scientific opinion is also somewhat divided on the question of the need to inspect either tests or armaments, by stationing observers on the potential tester's or the actual owner's soil. The point of this on-site inspection applies more particularly to preventing nuclear tests (or proclaiming to the world that the treaty has been violated) than it does to arms limitation (measurement and publication of arms *levels*) or disarmament.

The short point is that scientists now believe that atmospheric tests can be detected without the necessity of 'on-site' inspections. By a sort of Irish logic, in fact, a situation could theoretically arise where the volume of testing by the United States and the U.S.S.R. provided scientists and Governments with enough information to reassure both sides and the general public about what was happening and what were the military and medical effects. This has led some people to argue that this greater public knowledge (or conversely the danger of increased tension, as has been said earlier) could lead to protests among the uncommitted nations, and thus to a mutual, if undeclared, cessation of tests by both major States. This may be true, and it is certainly relevant to a situation which may develop in the coming months if the Soviet Government again resumes testing while the present U.S. series is revived or extended.

It is indeed arguable that this situation could almost be construed as war by proxy. There seems no guarantee, however, that the urge to test will be inhibited by this possibility, or even by the further possibility that simultaneous testing could lead to another mutual, if equally undeclared, admission that no spectacular advances are possible or that either side will learn much about the other's capability. There are still further extensions of these theoretical arguments about nuclear tests. On the one hand, it is said that a fresh series indicates that new discoveries are being made, on the other that new advances have yet to be made. The Bethe report, on which President Kennedy is said to have relied in deciding on the new U.S. series, illustrates this point very well, for the authors admitted that few dramatic discoveries were thought to have been made by the Soviet testers, and yet they advocated resumption of tests by the U.S. Whichever view is taken, a case can always be argued by scientists who wish to test for the reason that all precise knowledge requires experiment and cannot remain merely theoretical. Some of the most ardent Western advocates of testing are scientists. One should note, however, that there is now a growing volume of scientific opinion in the United States which opposes more tests on scien-

tific, strategic, or moral grounds. Not least amongst these scientists is Professor Bethe himself.

But control, in the sense of examination of another nation's territory, remains the key issue in both test ban and disarmament talks, and is the biggest stumbling block to agreement. U.S. insistence on it (which still obtains at the time of writing) doubtless springs from irritation that Russia is a 'closed society', where outsiders know nothing of what goes on, whereas the U.S. is an 'open society', where maps of missile sites are published in the press, accompanied by full and usually reasonably accurate accounts of progress in offensive and defensive techniques. U.S. delegates also argue quite reasonably that there is no better earnest of a nation's good intentions than a willingness to let foreigners inspect its territory. If there is one precise clue to the failure of test ban and disarmament talks to date, it is the seemingly ineradicable suspicion on the part of the Soviet Government that inspection is really espionage, a fear which indicates, as much as anything, deep-seated mistrust of U.S. intentions, and also an unwillingness to let the outside world inspect what is still in some ways a backward country.

But the more the Soviet Government refuses to allow inspection, the more the U.S. Government insists on it—increasingly as a measure of good faith and decreasingly as an essential part of either a test ban or a disarmament treaty. This intransigence may have the unfortunate effect of stalling the eighteen-nations conference, in which the neutrals have been playing an increasingly active and useful part by suggesting ways in which inspection could be fairly and usefully carried out. At the present moment, even their suggestions of inspection by neutrals or by sampling (i.e. inspecting one part only of a State and calculating from that the probable total actual and potential military capacity of the whole) have met with flat Soviet objections. It is interesting to note that the sampling suggestion derives from the 'Sohn zones' originally suggested by an American scientist.

In looking to the future, it is the activities and especially the growing technical knowledge of the neutrals that may offer the best chance of a solution to the arms race. It looks increasingly doubtful whether the United States and the U.S.S.R. will come to an agreement to stop tests or curtail arms, but if lesser States can do both, there is some chance for a net reduction, or at least stabilization, of the world's collection of instruments of both massive and military destruction. In this connection Britain, France, and Ger-

many, as the States currently most interested in developing a nuclear potential, have a particularly vital rołe to play, and self-restraint by them is certainly necessary for even a modest measure of success. This is equally true of course of China, but it is hardly possible for a Western commentator to suggest this.

There are two final points. One is that the arms race is not confined to nuclear weapons, and that the de-stabilizing effects of marked superiority or inferiority in conventional armaments must not be forgotten. For example, at present the United States is in many ways inferior to the U.S.S.R. and China in techniques of waging guerrilla or limited war. The weapons and equipment may be technically superior in some cases, but their application by commanders and troops is not. The other point is that a high level of armaments has partly been maintained by vested interests in the industrial field. This is certainly true of the United States, and the more that it can be conclusively shown that economic collapse would not follow a reduction in armaments the better are the chances for a genuine measure of disarmament.

TEST BAN PROPOSALS

Shortly before the resumption of Soviet tests in August 1961 the Russian delegate at the test ban talks, which had been continuing since October 1958, proposed that the whole idea of a test ban treaty should be absorbed into one for comprehensive disarmament. When the talks were revived in November, however, all that the 'new' Russian plan did was to propose the dissolution of the whole structure of an international control and inspection system, which had been the subject of negotiations for the previous three years. Instead it proposed a permanent ban, without any international control, on all tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water, and called for the suspension of underground tests, pending agreement on a control system to detect them—an indication that Soviet scientists were as aware as their Western brethren that this kind of test was inherently less detectable than those in the atmosphere or in space. It should be noted that incorporated in these proposals was a demand that France be called to the Geneva talks and that she must be a party to any agreement. Apart from this slight innovation, however, the Soviet position reverted to that which was held three years ago before the talks began.

The Western position (and, for the record, it should be noted that this is an Anglo-American approach with no known divergence of

view) may be summarized in the following passages of a draft resolution urging a tripartite nuclear weapons test ban treaty, submitted to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1961:

(*a*) The treaty should have as its objective the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests in all environments, under inspection and control machinery adequate to ensure compliance with its terms;

(*b*) International control machinery should be organized so as to be representative of all parties to the treaty and should be staffed and operated to guarantee its objectivity and effectiveness, avoiding self-inspection, under procedures which would ensure that its facilities will be used exclusively for purposes of effective control;

(*c*) The day-to-day executive and administrative operations of the control system established under the treaty should not be susceptible to obstruction by the exercise of a veto; administrative responsibility should be concentrated in the hands of a single administrator acting impartially and functioning under the supervision of a commission composed of representatives of parties to the treaty.

The concession in (*c*) to the Soviet dislike of either an overriding controller or a widely drawn committee should be noted. In effect the Anglo-American approach is comparable to the resolution of the problem of finding a United Nations Secretary-General. It allows for a 'troika' who would advise but who would not be able to coerce the 'single administrator'.

The latest situation in the talks is that the non-aligned nations at the Geneva disarmament conference submitted on 16 April test ban proposals which in all essentials followed the Anglo-American line, although, as has been noted earlier, various ingenious modifications relating to inspection have been added. This neutral approach has had a chilly welcome from the Soviet delegation, although no outright rejection, and a cordial one from Mr Arthur Dean, the U.S. delegate. It is clear, however, in the context of the questions he put to the eight non-aligned nations, that he still insists on an elaborate system of control and is unenthusiastic about one of their suggestions. This is that the control post system 'be based upon already existing national networks of observation posts and institutions'. In other words, participants to a test ban treaty would inspect themselves and use their own apparatus to do so, with occasional visits from neutral appointees, who would presumably use the sampling method already referred to. This may be regarded as an imaginative concession to Soviet suspicions, and it is believed that in private discussions the Soviet delegation is sympathetic towards them. Publicly, however, it remains unenthusiastic, whilst the U.S. view is that the concessions dilute the effectiveness of the control system.

DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS

It is noteworthy that the United States and the U.S.S.R. succeeded last autumn in producing a joint statement on disarmament principles which they presented to the United Nations General Assembly in September 1961. These principles were drawn up after bilateral talks which began in Washington in June 1961 and were continued in Moscow and New York. They may be summarized as follows:[1]

The United States and the U.S.S.R. have agreed to recommend the following principles as the basis for future multilateral negotiations on disarmament and to call upon other states to co-operate in reaching early agreement on general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world in accordance with these principles:

1. The goal of negotiations is to achieve agreements on a programme which will ensure that (*a*) disarmament is general and complete and war is no longer an instrument for settling international problems, and (*b*) such disarmament is accompanied by the establishment of reliable procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes and effective arrangements for the maintenance of peace in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.
2. The programme for general and complete disarmament shall ensure that states will have at their disposal only those non-nuclear armaments, forces, facilities, and establishments as are agreed to be necessary to maintain internal order and protect the personal security of citizens; and that states shall support and provide agreed manpower for a U.N. peace force.
3. To this end, the programme for general and complete disarmament shall contain the necessary provisions, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for:
   (*a*) disbanding of armed forces, dismantling of military establishments, including bases, cessation of the production of armaments as well as their liquidation or conversion to peaceful uses;
   (*b*) elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, and other weapons of mass destruction and cessation of the production of such weapons;
   (*c*) elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction;
   (*d*) abolishment of the organizations and institutions designed to organize the military effort of states, cessation of military training, and closing of all military training institutions;
   (*e*) discontinuance of military expenditures.
4. This disarmament programme should be implemented in an agreed sequence, by stages until it is completed, with each measure and stage carried out within specified time limits. Transition to a subsequent stage in the process of disarmament should take place upon a review of the implementation of measures included in the preceding stage and

[1] United States Information Service, 21 September 1961.

upon a decision that all such measures have been implemented and verified and that any additional verification arrangements required for measures in the next stage are, when appropriate, ready to operate.

5. All measures of general and complete disarmament should be balanced so that at no stage of the implementation of the treaty could any state or group of states gain military advantage and that security is ensured equally for all.
6. All disarmament measures should be implemented from beginning to end under such strict and effective international control as would provide firm assurance that all parties are honouring their obligations. During and after the implementation of general and complete disarmament, the most thorough control should be exercised, the nature and extent of such control depending on the requirements for verification of the disarmament measures being carried out in each stage. To implement control over, and inspection of, disarmament, an international disarmament organization including all parties to the agreement should be created within the framework of the United Nations. This international disarmament organization and its inspectors should be assured unrestricted access without veto to all places as necessary for the purpose of effective verification.
7. Progress in disarmament should be accompanied by measures to strengthen institutions for maintaining peace and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means. During and after the implementation of the programme of general and complete disarmament, there should be taken, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the necessary measures to maintain international peace and security, including the obligation of states to place at the disposal of the United Nations agreed manpower necessary to an international peace force to be equipped with agreed types of armaments. Arrangements for the use of this force should ensure that the United Nations can effectively deter or suppress any threat or use of arms in violation of the purposes and principles of the United Nations.
8. States participating in the negotiations should seek to achieve and implement the widest possible agreement at the earliest possible date. Efforts should continue without interruption until agreement upon the total programme has been achieved, and efforts to ensure early agreement on and implementation of measures of disarmament should be undertaken without prejudicing progress on agreement on the total programme and in such a way that these measures would facilitate and form part of that programme.

It is important to note that in all essentials this joint statement forms the framework for the eighteen-nations disarmament conference which began in Geneva on 14 March, and which is still sitting. This conference is in effect a continuation of the previous disarmament talks which broke down in Geneva in June 1960. These were between five Western nations (America, Britain, France, Italy, and Canada), and five from the East (Russia, Poland, Czecho-

slovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria). The talks had been arranged directly between the Western and Soviet Governments.[1]

This time the talks are firmly within the framework of the United Nations. To the original ten countries, now minus France, there have been added eight others to represent both the main geographical areas of the world and also non-aligned opinion. The eight (India, Burma, Sweden, Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and the United Arab Republic) are a useful cross-section of the United Nations General Assembly.

The conference is also concerned with several resolutions passed by the General Assembly which call for the ending of nuclear tests, for a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, for a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons, and for a nuclear-free zone in Africa. The comprehensiveness of the conference's terms of reference, rather than of the joint statement itself, is perhaps one of the most encouraging, as it is certainly one of the novel, features of this latest attempt at disarmament. It is in fact a kind of little General Assembly, which is authorized to take note of and express opinions on issues which do actually affect the chances of disarmament today. This is a marked pragmatic advance. For example, there is no reason why the conference should not express views on the possibility of a *détente* in Europe. This is the aim of the talks between Mr Dean Rusk and the Soviet Ambassador in Washington, one of the objects being to deny nuclear arms to either East or West Germany. The conference should be interested in this kind of practical arms control.

It should nevertheless be noted that one important point of principle has not yet been settled. This is the method by which arms on both sides would be scaled down. In the interval between the U.S.–Soviet joint statement and the opening of the conference on 14 March both sides have given their own national interpretations in a number of statements. The Americans, for example, suggest in their proposals put before the conference on 18 April that, during the first stage, there should be a 30 per cent cut in nuclear delivery vehicles, the turning over of 50 metric tons of weapons' grade uranium 235 to peaceful purposes, and force reductions to 2·1 million men each. This stage would take three years, and during this period observation posts and international inspection of testing sites would be initiated. The Soviet proposals in their draft treaty

[1] See 'Attempts to Break the Disarmament Deadlock' (Note of the Month), *The World Today*, March 1960.

submitted on 15 March[1] are more comprehensive in stage one and would be achieved in fifteen months. In this period all means of nuclear delivery would be abolished, together with the destruction of all factories which produce such means, the withdrawal of all forces stationed outside national boundaries, and the reduction of force levels to 1·7 million men each.

There are many other provisions in both sets of proposals, but these are the most significant, because they illustrate that both parties are still at the old game of mixing disarmament proposals with the retention or acquisition of strategic advantages. Thus the U.S. proposal to turn over 50 metric tons of uranium could either be construed as generosity or ingenuity, since that amount is thought to be about one-seventh of the American stock-pile while it might be as much as one-third of the Soviet stock-pile. Comparably, the Soviet proposals would leave conventional Soviet forces five hundred land miles away from the dividing line in Europe and conventional American forces three or four thousand sea miles away. As has been well said by Wayland Young, 'there is no combination of West European national military strengths which can stand up to the Soviet army, and this is presumably well known to the Russians.'[2]

Enough has been said to show that both sides are still widely opposed in their endeavours to balance genuine disarmament with genuine national security. So far as discussion and debating points go, however, they are possibly less wide apart than they were in the 1958 conference, and it is certainly worth remembering that this time they have a vigilant and, from the viewpoint of international peace, highly 'committed' group of neutrals to spur them on.

ANTHONY VERRIER

Military Government in Sudan: The Past Three Years

WHEN a handful of senior officers took over the government of Sudan in November 1958, there were many who accepted military

[1] *Soviet News*, 19 March 1962. [2] *The Guardian*, 20 March 1962.

rule as a temporary necessity and took General Abboud's assurance that he and his colleagues would return to barracks as soon as possible—'in six months, a year, perhaps two years'—at its face value. The new regime had the nature, by its own declarations, of a caretaker Government protecting national interests during a tricky period and holding the ring for the return of a reformed parliamentary system. Army rule had not come as the result of any popular demand nor through any great popular revulsion against the civil politicians; rather, the military had been encouraged to take power by the then Prime Minister, Sayed Abdullah Khalil, who, tiring under the strain of keeping a coalition together and ever-suspicious of Egyptian intrigue, believed the military would provide unity, firmness, and a sense of purpose.

Now General Abboud and his colleagues have run Sudan for three and a half years and look set on staying in office for an equal time to come. After their troubled first year of rule,[1] they have since sought to transform the temporary nature of their regime, if not into a permanency, then into a definite phase of the country's evolution and at the same time retrospectively to make of their initial take-over a popular revolution. In this they are having a growing success.

Two events in November 1959, at the time of the regime's first anniversary, made this task much easier. The regime suffered in its first year from internal strife within the army and so failed to show the unity and stability expected from it, and it also came to power largely because of the unsettled state of relations with the United Arab Republic. In November 1959 both stability within the army and smooth relations with the U.A.R. were assured.

The first event was a minor attempt at a *coup d'état* by some majors of the Khartum Garrison on 10 November 1959. The attempt was poorly organized and had little chance of success in unseating the generals and, compared with the three attempted *coups* earlier that year which had been led or instigated by senior officers, it was of little importance. Its significance lay in the punishment meted out to the conspirators. Where before generals and colonels who had challenged the regime had been imprisoned, five majors and captains involved in this attempt were, after trial, sentenced to death and hanged. The regime, in shedding its first blood, showed, however unpleasantly, that it was no longer going to tolerate insubordination on political grounds inside the officer corps and since

[1] See 'A Year of Army Rule in the Sudan', *The World Today*, November 1959.

that time, apart from the dismissal of seventeen officers on suspicion of being involved in the November events, the army has been quiet and loyal to its senior officers turned politicians.

The second event was the signature, in the same week as this abortive *coup*, of the Nile Waters Agreement with the U.A.R. This agreement, reached after a month of negotiation in Cairo, assured to Sudan the use of 18½ milliard cubic metres of Nile water annually (one-quarter of the total average annual flow of 84 milliards, after deducting 10 milliards for evaporation in the proposed High Aswan Dam reservoir) and £S15 million[1] in compensation for losses through flooding when the High Aswan Dam is built. Although these figures, both for water and for compensation, were lower than those Sudan had for many years sought, the agreement was widely welcomed as being a fair compromise and as ending the major dispute in Sudan–U.A.R. relations, which had not only hampered co-operation between the two neighbour States but also caused delays in Sudan's internal economic development. Since the agreement was signed, Sudan has been able to go ahead with, and find international finance for, the Roseires Dam and Khashm-el-Girba Dam schemes, both of great importance for the extension of the area of land cultivable by irrigation. The subsidiary parts of the agreement have worked well—the U.A.R. has paid £S11 million in compensation in regular instalments and half-yearly meetings of a joint technical committee to discuss control of the Nile have been held alternately in Khartum and Cairo—and with satisfactory financial and trade relations, the bugbear of stresses and strains between the two countries, which in the past was a perpetual subject of dispute in Khartum politics, has been eliminated. The exchange of visits by President Nasser to Khartum and General Abboud to Cairo has further cemented this mutual tolerance and, to a satisfactory degree, encouraged co-operation.

With the internal problem of military insubordination and the external problem of relations with the U.A.R. solved, the regime has faced the task of building up its own image as a substitute for the sectarian and political leadership which the Sudanese were used to accepting and of creating new social institutions to fill the vacuum left by the abolition of political parties, the suspension of trade unions and clubs of many kinds, and the ban on free speech and free association.

In building up its own image, the regime has had three important

[1] £S1 = £E1 = £1. –. 6d. sterling.

factors on its side: the personality of General Abboud; the undoubted economic progress achieved in the past three years, thanks largely to satisfactory cotton production and sales and generous foreign aid; and the widespread indifference of the Sudanese countryman as to who rules in Khartum so long as some benefits are apparent. The Sudanese Army was widely respected for its military prowess but it was never considered an *élite* in intellect or ability, and the regime, by limiting to a minimum the interference of army officers in civil affairs, has reduced the possibilities of clashes between the military and civil officials and the public. Senior military officers have, under the new local government system (see below), taken over the prestige and some of the duties of civil governors in the nine provinces, and there are five other officers holding civil service posts, but, these apart, it is only the seven generals who make up the Supreme Military Council (which acts collectively as Head of State) and are also Ministers, who personify the regime. At the head of them, sixty-two-year-old General Abboud, through his warm and likeable nature coupled with a lack of pretentiousness in his presidential role, has become a popular figure throughout most of the country, and building-up of his image into that of the regime causes any faults on the part of his colleagues the more easily to be overlooked. If Sudan today is technically a dictatorship, General Abboud is far removed from the usual concept of a dictator and, by all accounts, the crowds that welcome him on public occasions today do so with genuine enthusiasm, unlike the officially organized rows of school-children who appeared in the early months of the regime. However, the regime has not yet thought it wise to test General Abboud's popularity by any election or referendum on the presidency; a proposal to do so in the first half of 1961 was quietly dropped.

In the countryside as a whole the regime can rely on some tribal enthusiasm and a wealth of apathy. In the towns, particularly among the educated people, and in the Mahdist areas of the countryside, it is regarded with bare tolerance, and some opposition, in spite of rigorous restrictions, has at times seethed to the surface. This opposition stems not from a *claque* of discredited politicians (as the regime would have the foreign public suppose) but from three elements which feel they have a genuine stake in the country's development, its independence, and its democratic principles: they are the Mahdists; the neo-nationalists, successors of the Congress movement which led up to Sudanese independence, most easily

associated with the name of Sudan's first Prime Minister, Sayed Ismail al-Azhari; and the workers and students.

To deal with opposition the regime has the two powerful weapons with which it armed itself when it came to power—the State of Emergency Regulations (Sudan has been in a state of emergency now for three and a half years) and the Defence of Sudan Act of 1958, which provides for unlimited detention without trial, the transfer of civil cases to the military courts, and increased punishment for a wide range of activities considered hostile to the Government or its reputation. Within this all-embracing framework of laws and regulations, the courts continue to administer justice and there is technically 'the rule of law'. It is against the measures taken under these laws and against the laws themselves that opposition has been directed rather than against the military rulers, whose regime is tolerated, particularly by the Mahdists, so long as it moves towards reintroduction of some form of consultative government.

The three opposition elements came together during 1960 into an open National Front, thus reinforcing the protests which both Imam Siddik al-Mahdi and Sayed Ismail al-Azhari had presented in November 1959 against continued military rule. These protests were repeated in November 1960 and came out into the open again in July 1961. The November 1960 protests, on the second anniversary of the military take-over, followed widespread demonstrations, clearly co-ordinated, in the capital and main towns against the decision to transfer the people of Wadi-Halfa (due to be flooded by the High Aswan Dam lake in 1963) to the Khashm-el-Girba area on the River Atbara. These demonstrations, due not to the transfer as such but to the regime's failure to honour an alleged promise to allow the Wadi-Halfa people to choose a resettlement area for themselves, were a gauge of the opposition's strength. Apart from keeping three Ministers virtually imprisoned in a Wadi-Halfa hotel for three days—an acute enough embarrassment—the demonstrations caused little trouble and were dispersed by the police with tear gas and whips.

The July protests of last year followed a strike by the railwaymen's trade union in the previous month over a pay claim which crippled Sudan Railways services for a week and led to the banning of the trade union, which had only a few months earlier been allowed to re-register under new labour laws. Student participation in demonstrations had also led the regime to amend the University of Khartum Act to give the Government powers of direct control

over the university. The immediate cause of the July protests, contained in a sharply worded telegram to General Abboud, was the detention of a lawyer in a rural town who had alleged in court that a witness had been tortured. The tone of the protest and the series of minor troubles leading up to it provoked the regime to action and seven prominent politicians, as well as others who signed the protest telegram, were arrested and sent for detention to Juba in the remote south. Those detained included Sayed Ismail al-Azhari, the country's first Prime Minister; Sayed Abdullah Khalil, his successor and one of the main initiators of military rule; and their respective Foreign Ministers, Sayed Mubarak Zarroug and Sayed Mohamed Ahmed Mahgoub.

No action was taken against Imam Siddik, the Mahdist leader and head of the National Front, but the public activities of the Mahdist youth movement, a socio-religious organization whose combined action on any political issue could cause uprisings over a wide area which would be difficult for the security forces to control, were banned. This ban led in the following month, August, to a clash, unhappy and unnecessary, between a Mahdist group and police at the celebrations for the Mulid (the Prophet's Birthday) in Omdurman, the residential part of the capital. Police opened fire on the Mahdist group, who had allegedly been ordered to disperse, and in the crowded square, seventeen, including four police, were killed. Although during the funeral the following day Omdurman had the appearance of being taken over by Mahdist supporters and sympathizers, the Mulid incident was not followed by further clashes and the country remained quiet. Once again the regime's authority had been tested and, at the cost of bloodshed, upheld. Six weeks later, Imam Siddik, who, as leader of the opposition groups, could speak with wide backing and yet whose words, generally phrased with tolerance and imbued with a desire for peaceful transformation from military to civilian rule, were listened to by General Abboud, died suddenly at the age of fifty. His deathbed appeal—'our demand is the demand of the whole country—public liberties, democracy, rule by consultation'—will still be echoed by many, but his death robbed the National Front of its unifying leader.

Since his death little has been heard publicly from the main opposition groups. His successor, in welcoming steps towards democratic government announced by General Abboud in November 1961, called for lifting the state of emergency and urged a speedy process towards democracy. The seven former Ministers, detained

in the south since July last year, were released in January 1962 and the possible rallying of the old National Front at a party to welcome their return as 'heroes of democracy' was forestalled by a government ban on the party, a ban which was quietly accepted.

These major incidents between the military regime and opposition groups have been isolated upsurges of resentment, but there has also been a continuous harassment of the Government by worker and student groups, sometimes instigated by Communists among them, in demonstrations and vocal and written protests. The attempted prevention of this has led to a continuous series of military and civil court trials. At the same time, that part of the press not already under direct Government control has been severely curtailed, and comment on Government plans for new democratic organs and on new labour laws has been specifically banned.

Of the southern Sudan, the mainly non-Arab part of the country, only little can be mentioned here. It has for the most part, so far as facts are available, been quiet in the past three years, although not without a sullen resentment at measures taken by the administration, under the general policy of unifying the country, against all political activity, in enforcing uniformity and in attempting to discourage acceptance of the Christian religion. The particular measures which have caused this resentment include the not unexpected decision to substitute the Muslim Friday for the Christian Sunday holiday, the banning in some districts of catechism classes and other Christian gatherings under the emergency regulations against public assembly, and the insistence that any pupil seeking Christian instruction must go, together with a parent and his chief, before the district officer and signify his request in writing. This last measure can open itself, in the conditions of southern Sudan, to obvious pressures. In general it is the regime's policy, no different from that of the civilian Governments of the past, to put into reverse the policy followed by the British administration from 1930 to 1946, when Christianity, local languages, and English were encouraged and Islam and Arabic definitely discouraged.

Heavy sentences passed in December 1960 on a former member of the Khartum Parliament and on five students at a secondary school who were said to have circulated a protest against introduction of the Friday holiday led at least five other former southern parliamentarians to flee the country the following month. A district official who also fled during 1961 has set up a 'Southern Sudan Liberation Movement', based, on the most recent information, at Dar-Es-

Salaam, Tanganyika, and is seeking to enlist the support of the leaders of the three East African States in remedying the situation in the southern Sudan. He has stated he will appeal to the United Nations but no such appeal has as yet been published by that body.

To write in detail of opposition political movements in Sudan is perhaps to exaggerate their importance in the long run of democratic development. On the positive side, the military regime has taken two steps towards building, in its own words, 'a real democracy avoiding the mistakes of the past'. The first step was the introduction in July 1961, following a long study by a committee headed by the Chief Justice, of a new form of district and provincial administration which replaced the already existing rural and urban local councils, reinforced their powers, provided the framework for their extension to other areas not already covered by local councils, and revitalized with considerable autonomous powers the provincial councils, which in most of the nine provinces had become dormant. Under the new system, which is said by observers to be working well, the offices of district commissioner and provincial governor are done away with (although in practice the same officials are in the less developed areas still carrying out much the same functions under another name) and in the provinces decision lies with a provincial assembly and the execution of its decisions with a provincial executive. While at present the assembly in each province is headed by the senior military officer and the members are all nominated either by district councils (themselves nominated) or by the Supreme Military Council, provision exists for their democratization and the new system could provide the first two layers in a pyramid of indirect democracy for the whole Sudan. The regime's second step has been the formation of a constitutional committee to make recommendations on the formation of a central assembly, the third and top layer of the pyramid. This committee, which includes only one army officer and has among its members a distinguished southern Sudanese administrator, held its first meeting in January this year. It is expected to make its recommendations by November 1962.

In the economic field, the military regime has been able, after its first year of retrenchment and preoccupation with bolstering up foreign currency reserves, to push ahead rapidly with the many development projects which, although prepared under previous Governments, had not been executed through lack of funds and, in the case of Nile projects, through absence of agreement with the

U.A.R. Execution of these projects has entailed heavy expenditure of foreign currency on imports and there has been a deficit in the balance of trade in each quarter for the past eighteen months. This has been more than offset by foreign loans. Over the three full years 1959–61, the deficit on current account—trade and invisibles—amounted to £S8·3 million, while £S31·1 million was drawn from foreign loan allocations and £S7 million received from the U.A.R. (earmarked for Wadi-Halfa compensation)[1] during the same period. Sudan's free foreign exchange reserves, almost entirely in sterling, after reaching a higher point in 1960, stood at £S35·7 million at the end of 1961, with balances in Sudan's favour on the special U.A.R. account of £S8 million and on bilateral accounts with Eastern European countries of £S0·4 million.[2]

Apart from British and Federal German credits negotiated in 1958,[3] continuing United States aid (£S14·8 million made available up to the end of 1961) and an earlier International Bank loan for railway development of £S13·6 million, Sudan has since negotiated an International Bank loan of £S5·4 million for completion of the Managil extension to the Gezira irrigated area; a joint I.B.R.D.–I.D.A.–Federal German loan of £S17·9 million for the Roseires Dam; a Yugoslav credit of £S5·4 million for commercial ship production, a tannery, and a cardboard factory; and a Soviet credit of approximately £S8 million to cover construction of four food-processing plants, two granaries, three education centres, and an agricultural research institute. Projects completed during the past two years include a textile factory at Khartum-North, partly financed from the United States Development Loan Fund, which started production in November 1961; an extension of Sudan Railways to Wau, southern Sudan, opened in February 1962; and a sugar refinery at Guneid, Blue Nile Province, built and partly financed by Federal German interests, which started production in May 1962. The Managil extension should be completed this summer, contracts for the Roseires Dam and the Khashm-el-Girba Dam (for Wadi-Halfa resettlement) have already been awarded, and the first ship constructed under the Yugoslav credit sailed on its maiden voyage from Port-Sudan to Europe in March this year.

[1] A further £S4 million has been received in 1962.

[2] Sources: Bank of Sudan, *Annual Report* 1960 and *Quarterly Bulletins* to December 1961. Three-year figures include provisional trade estimates for the last quarter of 1961. Free foreign exchange reserves equal eligible external assets less statutory cover for currency in circulation and sight liabilities.

[3] See *The World Today*, November 1959.

The regime, which has up to now planned and financed development on a year-to-year basis, is now embarking on a seven-year development Plan covering 1962–9 and providing for expenditure of about £S250 million. Details have not yet been published, but an I.B.R.D. vice-president who visited Sudan in May 1962 was reported to have shown interest in financing some parts of the Plan while expressing some reservations about the concentration of development in particular areas of the country. This seven-year Plan will include expansion of the railway network and improvements to Port-Sudan harbour, both of which have failed, so it appears from constant reports of congestion, to keep up with the needs of an expanding economy; it will also provide for initiation of a road network between Khartum, Wad-Medani, Kassala, and Port-Sudan, for which surveys are being made under the United States aid programme.

Cotton is still Sudan's main foreign currency earner and in carrying out this ambitious seven-year development Plan much will depend on satisfactory sales of cotton, in turn dependent on world market conditions. The 1961–2 season has produced a record cotton crop but, with United Kingdom and Western European spinners reportedly well stocked, disposal of the crop may not be easy. Difficulties in disposing of the crop this year and in the coming years of the Plan may entail Sudan's further reliance on foreign loans; repayment and interest payments on loans already contracted will amount to £S19·9 million during the four years 1962–5.

By November next the military regime will be entering its fifth year. Barring any trifling with its authority by younger officers or any sudden upsurge of civilian opposition, it is likely to stay in power long enough to implement its form of indirect democracy and see its economic development planning bearing fruit; by then, as it hopes, the memory of the old days of party politics may have faded and the influence of sectarian religion have decreased. The south, too, may have been unified with the rest of the country in a new spirit of nationalism. Now, with its potential seven-year course only half run, it is difficult to judge whether the achievement will prove worth the cost in free political development, in which all might share to arrive at a debated, and not imposed, system, and whether the same could not as well have been achieved by civilian rule.

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Notes of the Month

The Dilemma of Comecon

THE meeting in Moscow on 6 and 7 June of the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (often known as Comecon) was notable for one or two moves of significance on the wider world stage. Firstly, it granted full membership to the Mongolian People's Republic. According to its constitution, C.M.E.A. is an open organization, not confined to any single political and ideological grouping, but the way in which Albania was eliminated from the previous meeting (12–15 December 1961) in spite of her protests, makes a telling comment on this constitutional provision. It is because of C.M.E.A.'s nature as a grouping within the Soviet orbit that the inclusion of Mongolia is of significance, and China cannot fail to see the challenge.

Secondly, the meeting came forward in support of Mr Khrushchev's initiative in proposing an international conference with the aim of founding a new organization, devoted to the promotion of world trade and embracing all countries 'without discrimination'. The C.M.E.A. leaders are not likely to have any illusions about the value for real business of such a talking-shop. But they are no doubt worried about certain strains and stresses in their own economies, and they may see the new body as a means of mobilizing pressures in Western public opinion in support of more East–West trade, with the increased credits which the bloc badly needs. The move is also connected with Mr Khrushchev's anti-Common Market campaign, and one of its objectives is obviously to play on the misgivings of the uncommitted and under-developed countries with regard to the Common Market and the economic organizations of European Powers in general.

On the other hand some Western appraisals have probably somewhat overstated the relevance of this Comecon–Common Market rivalry to the main subject on the meeting's agenda, the economic co-ordination of the economies of the member States. This is by now a traditional item, for the very *raison d'être* of C.M.E.A. is economic integration. How far has it succeeded? About two-thirds

of the members' foreign trade moves within C.M.E.A. (compared with half that ratio among the members of the Common Market). Further, C.M.E.A. has lent its support to various inter-country projects, such as the Polish-Czech arrangements for the exploitation of the newly discovered vast sulphur resources in Poland, the 'Friendship Pipeline' for conveying Soviet oil to Central Europe, and the power-transmission grid for all the member countries now under construction.

The technical organs of C.M.E.A. now cover virtually every field of economic life. Yet C.M.E.A. leaders are avowedly concerned, and rightly so, about what might be called the qualitative side of economic integration, the 'international division of labour'. By this they mean the welding of the region into an efficient whole—one within which each component nation develops its economic resources in the direction for which it is best endowed—for some overall benefit. It is plain logic that a system of *centrally planned* economies can be effectively harmonized only by a *central plan*. Yet throughout the greater part of its existence C.M.E.A. has tried to do this mainly by means of bilateral barter. True, in more recent times it has tried its hand at some co-ordination of long-range plans; but integration through planning comes up against many difficulties.

Firstly, Soviet-type planning techniques, still very crude, are experiencing great difficulty in coping with the task of co-ordinating a single economy, and C.M.E.A. specialists are increasingly aware of their inadequacy for the integrated planning of several national economies, stretching from the Elbe to the Pacific. The June meeting again highlighted this problem of techniques, but the solution is hardly in sight. The shortcomings of the 'invisible hand' as the integrator of market economies are only too well known, but a substitute has still to be devised. Secondly, efficient integration would call for the free movement of productive factors, of capital and manpower, between the member countries. Unfortunately there is very little capital to circulate within the Soviet bloc, and there are serious political and psychological inhibitions against any massive movement of labour across national frontiers. The third difficulty also belongs to the category of imponderables. Planning from one centre would involve choices not always palatable to individual nations; for example, the development of certain capital-intensive sectors of the economy may entail, for the nation concerned, greater effort in saving up capital at the expense of its current consumption. Who is going to enforce, and how, such choices and possible sacrifices?

The C.M.E.A.'s dilemma is that while its economic logic demands centralized decision-making, the post-1956 political climate works in a precisely opposite direction.

The South African 'Sabotage' Bill

BECAUSE of its most controversial provisions, the South African General Laws Amendment Act, passed in the House of Assembly on 12 June 1962, has become generally known as the Sabotage Bill. The purpose of the Bill as a whole is to tighten up the powers already available to the Government to act against those it believes to be dangerous to its authority. Only the sections defining the crime of sabotage and prescribing penalties for it are altogether new. The Bill lists a number of actions, and then a set of intentions. Sabotage consists in performing one of the enumerated acts with one of the intentions in mind, and while the State must prove the accused to have committed one of the acts, the onus is on the accused to prove that his intention was *not* one of those listed.

Here are some of the actions listed in the Bill. The State must prove that any person over fourteen years of age has committed 'any wrongful and wilful act—or attempts, incites, aids or advises the commission of such an act—whereby he injures, damages, obstructs, endangers [etc.] any of the following: maintenance of law and order; the safety and health of the public; power, fuel, foodstuffs or water supplies or distribution; the free movement of traffic, on land, sea or air; any property of any person or of the State'. This established, the accused, for acquittal, must prove that the alleged offence was not committed with any of the listed intentions in view. Here are some of them: 'To further or encourage the achievement of any political aim, including the bringing about of any social or economic change in the Republic'—'To cause, encourage or further an insurrection or forcible resistance to the government'. (It is perhaps interesting that these two objectives are separately defined, and both constitute sabotage if pursued by the means listed above.) 'To cripple or seriously prejudice any industry or undertaking . . . or distribution of commodities or foodstuffs'—'To cause, encourage or further feelings of hostility between different sections of the population'—'To embarrass the administration of the affairs of the State'—'To cause serious bodily injury—or substantial financial loss—to any person or to the State'.

Upon conviction, the accused would be sentenced to a minimum of five years in prison, and the death penalty may be invoked at the

discretion of the Court. Acquittal on a charge of sabotage will not prevent a person being charged with any other offence arising out of the acts on which the original charge was based.

The overall effect of the Bill, leaving aside the sections on sabotage, is to give the Minister virtually unassailable powers of detention and house arrest without trial, and to allow him to forbid any gathering for as long as he considers that the absence of the ban might further the *aims* of 'any suppressed organization'—in effect the Communist Party or either of the two African Nationalist Congresses.

The Bill has aroused more widespread and united opposition within South Africa than any other passed by the present Government. Meetings and statements of protest have been jointly sponsored by people ranging from the very conservative to the far left. Seldom, if ever, have the different splinter elements of South African opposition so readily swallowed their objections to each other to make common cause. Their common fear is that the Bill will be used to silence all opposition and to enforce the Government's policies. In theory, they point out, a march of strikers which temporarily obstructs traffic may be construed as sabotage, and so could any political meeting in a public place or even, indeed, ordinary burglary.

The Government counters these protests with the reassurance that the Bill will not be used against any but genuine saboteurs and Communists. It would be fair to say that the public is not reassured. A protest march organized during the second reading by the Civil Rights Defence Committee was banned by the Cape Town City Council in consultation with the police. The march was to have been held under the leadership of former Chief Justice van der Sandt Centlivres. Questioned in Parliament about the ban, the Minister of Justice described the ex-Chief Justice as a front for, and therefore a stooge of, the Communists, who, he claimed, were among the sponsors of the protest. The description augurs ill for the use to which the Bill will be put.

Constitutional Factors in the Transfer of Power

THE suspension on 19 June of the Constitution of Grenada by Order-in-Council is a reminder of a constitutional principle prevailing in all cases of the transfer of power. When this French island capitulated in 1762, King George III's proclamation promised the inhabitants a measure of self-government. By inadvertence an

export duty was imposed upon their trade before a legislative council had been convened. The legality of this duty was challenged and on 28 November 1774 Lord Mansfield gave a decision in the King's Bench (*Campbell* v. *Hall*) which has affected British colonial policy ever since. Though the duty was 'reasonable and equitable' it was nevertheless void, he said. 'The thing can now only be done . . . by the Assembly of the island or by an Act of Parliament of Great Britain', the essential point being that a grant of self-government by the Crown is irrevocable. How, then, has the Constitution of Grenada been lawfully suspended? The answer is that while the power of the Crown is limited, the power of Parliament is theoretically unlimited, and an Act of 1877 (39 and 40 *Vict. c.* 47) revised the Constitution notwithstanding the rule in *Campbell* v. *Hall.*

Two principles are here involved: the extent of the authority of the Secretary of State to legislate, either by prerogative power or by virtue of powers conferred in an Act of Parliament, and his real power to enforce his nominal authority. In 1774, and still in 1962, the legal authority over Grenada is matched by adequate force. But in the same year, 1774, the Government of George III was faced by a situation in New England where legality did not square with actual competence. Massachusetts had enjoyed a measure of self-government under royal charter for about eighty years and the reality of power had long since been transferred. Whatever the law might say, the grant was irrevocable, and when an Act of Parliament (14 *Geo. III c.* 45) nominally reduced the powers of the provincial assembly it could not be implemented. Massachusetts defied the Government at Westminster.

The question at issue in Southern Rhodesia today is not the right of the British Government to override the legislation of a colony but its actual power to intervene. The Constitution of 1923 was issued under letters patent and therefore fell under the rule established in *Campbell* v. *Hall,* and, furthermore, an official ruling (*Cmnd* 1399) states that it has become 'an established convention' for Parliament not to legislate for Southern Rhodesia without the consent of the Southern Rhodesian Government. But when the Constitution was revised last year an enabling Act was passed (10 *Eliz. II c.* 2) with the significant clause that 'notwithstanding anything in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution Letters Patent, 1923, Her Majesty may by Order in Council amend or revoke . . . all or any of the provisions of the said Letters Patent.' *Campbell* v. *Hall* thus no longer applies. But the precedent of Massachusetts may still be relevant.

Politics and Power in the Rhodesias

THIS article aims at assessing the power situation in the Rhodesias, taking into account both domestic and external influences. On the basis of this assessment it makes an estimate of what the immediate future will hold and, in the light of this, reconsiders what white Rhodesians and their Governments should now be aiming at.

Provided that the results of the coming elections in Northern Rhodesia are not unrepresentative of the wishes of the people, the balance of raw power in Northern Rhodesia is not of great importance in assessing the internal developments there in the next year or so. The strength of the country people, when roused, was shown in the disturbances in the Northern Province in August last year. The strength of the Federal defence forces is considerable, but the Nationalist leaders want no incidents, and the Territorial Government does not wish to call for Federal assistance. The power of the white population is not great: that of the Copper Companies is. The inter-action of these powers will make little further difference to the pattern which the same powers have already shaped and which has in effect been accepted by all parties. The pattern is one of rapid progress towards African majority government.

In Southern Rhodesia the power structure is less well known and less easy to plot. At present in almost every respect the white population is comfortably on top. The country has good communications and widespread European settlement, making control of rural areas fairly easy. £4·77 million will be spent on the British South Africa Police, according to the estimates for 1961–2. (This compares, as a matter of interest, with £4·8 million on African education.) In the Police Reserve there are 5,800 Africans and 6,800 Europeans. There are 11,000 Special Constables out of a total white population—man, woman, and child—of 212,000. All European, Asian, and Coloured men are liable to be called up for military service.

In addition to this considerable strength under the control of the Southern Rhodesian Government, there are substantial Federal forces which could be called upon at any time. In 1961 expenditure on defence, including the supplementary estimates, was about £8 million. The army is entirely officered by Europeans. There is a Special Air Service, one squadron of armoured cars, one infantry battalion of European regular troops, and four of African. The Royal Rhodesian Air Force has a strength of 200 officers and 700 other ranks, all of whom are white. The Territorial Army has nine

infantry battalions and a regiment of artillery.

The armed forces and the police, with all their ramifications, plainly constitute a major power factor on the European side and they are ranged behind a Constitution whose qualifications for the vote were designed to keep Europeans in power for a long time. There is also, on the surface at least, a great degree of white solidarity in defending the Constitution and 'what it stands for'. The economy is still buoyant enough to give confidence to a great many Europeans. The Government is able to control almost any activity against it started by Africans, whose general position is very weak.

At a guess (and it must be a guess, for accurate figures are not available), there are 80,000 African unemployed as against an urban working population of 120,000. The great majority of the employed are unskilled and, should they decide to strike, could be dismissed and replaced with little difficulty. Over the whole Federation, African employment fell between 1956 and 1961 by roughly 1·2 per cent, at a time when the population was increasing by 12 to 15 per cent. A high percentage of employees are committed to some form of credit or hire-purchase payment which would further discourage them from risking losing their jobs.

Demonstrations by the unemployed can be handled by the police, and 'loafers' (Rhodes's great word, which is still in common usage) can be sent back to the Reserves. Further, any unemployed man who has not registered at a labour exchange may be committed to a corrective detention centre under the Vagrancy Act. For good measure the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act provides an excuse for putting a man into jail for any one of a wide range of fairly innocent activities.

The weakness of the power position of Africans in the towns needs little further stressing. In the European farming areas there are practically no opportunities even for protest. The Reserves show a rather different situation, however. In some Reserves there is little or no shortage of land and it would seem that these are likely to be the more contented. But in most Reserves there is profound discontent, and its core is often based on the way the Native Land Husbandry Act has been implemented in the area. This Act set out to preserve the soil by dividing communal land into individual arable holdings and communal grazing. In many cases, however, through shortage of land in the particular African-designated area, holdings have been cut down to an uneconomic size and men who traditionally had the right to plough have lost their right. The story

is a complicated one and by no means entirely to the Government's discredit. The Land Husbandry Act is not the only cause for rural discontent but it is frequently encountered and runs deep. It may seem at first hardly relevant to the power situation. Such deeply felt discontent does, however, stiffen the attitudes of people in the Reserves, and sporadic outbreaks of violence against property or persons—especially anything that can be identified with 'Government'—can be expected. But these are not likely to make a crucial difference to the overall power balance.

The weakness of the African position is made greater by certain marked political failings on the part of Africans and their leaders. First of all, African leaders have not appreciated the nature or balance of the power situation. Somewhat naïvely they complain that the Southern Rhodesian Government, or the British Government, is treating them *unfairly*. They fail to appreciate that they will not be treated fairly until they are strong enough to demand to be. Secondly there is no politician of real stature among Africans in Southern Rhodesia; and the one or two outside the country are playing safe for the present.

The third failure is a dual one, of the system and of the leader. As things stand, the President of the Zimbabwe African Peoples' Union, Mr Nkomo, virtually selects his own Executive; this is a bad system, and Mr Nkomo is bad at selecting. The fourth failing is rather more sophisticated, for it concerns a conflict of interest between party members. In the last months before it was banned, the National Democratic Party, Z.A.P.U.'s predecessor, was claiming that the only way in which Africans could put severe pressure on Europeans was by wrecking the economy. The party may well have been right. But the traditional—some would say the genuine—trade unionist is engaged in pressing for higher pay for the union's members and knows that the one way not to achieve this is to wreck the economy. This is one of a number of inherent divisions within Z.A.P.U. The existence of such a division is not to the party's discredit, but there is a real weakness in the failure to recognize it and to modify action accordingly.

It would be possible to enumerate a great many more African weaknesses. These largely concern the failure of their political leaders to get a full intellectual grasp of the problems and their consequent failure to work out or to put into operation solutions to these problems. Particularly, there seems to be little appreciation that Southern Rhodesia's is a unique political situation. Policies for

winning majority government that were worked out in Ghana, for example, simply have no relevance in Southern Rhodesia. The experience gained by Dr Nkrumah's methods will not help to shift an established European Government already freed from almost every control of the British Government.

The picture given here of the power structure in Southern Rhodesia *at the present time* certainly shows the Europeans and the Government firmly in control and the African opposition in no position to challenge them. It may be argued that European farms and even the suburbs of the large towns are vulnerable to organized African marauding parties out to break white resistance. Academically this is true: but there is little immediate prospect of such attacks being mounted. There is barely a sniff of Mau Mau in the air.

On the other hand it must be emphasized that this whole assessment is only of the structure *at the present time*. There is strong cause to believe that pressures from both inside and outside the country will radically and rapidly transform the scene. Britain, particularly when the United Nations is pushing her, will not like to see her otherwise very creditable colonial record ruined by the obstinacy of 80,000 white voters in Southern Rhodesia. In addition she will not wish to see that same obstinacy preventing any form of co-operation between the Territories of Central Africa. Assuming that the Federal Government, even as applying only to the two Rhodesias, loses a great part of its power, Southern Rhodesia, like the other Territories, will have an increased measure of autonomy. The British Government could well say that a broadening of the franchise is necessary to match it. Equally, financial aid to Southern Rhodesia could be made conditional on such a change. It is also highly likely that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland will wish to discriminate against goods made in Southern Rhodesia; this would damage the economy and thus affect the power structure.

If the Federation falls apart, what is to happen to the army? Is it to be divided between the Territories? If the power status is to be maintained, Southern Rhodesia will wish to inherit a considerable part of the Federal army. Yet in the event of a break-up of the Federation, Southern Rhodesia is likely to be economically and financially so shaky that, unless she is given financial help from outside, from South Africa for example, she is most unlikely to be able to afford a substantial army. This would constitute a significant change in the power structure.

By far the most important change, however, is one for which very

little concrete evidence can be given. It is the steady wearing down of resistance to change on the part of the Europeans. More and more straws indicate that the wind is blowing this way. Logically it might well be argued that, as the Europeans see their privileged position disintegrating, their resistance should be becoming tougher. One can only reply that this does not appear to be the case. The desire to hold on, however seldom it was clearly articulated, has perhaps been the most powerful single weapon in the white armoury. It looks as though it may soon be rusted beyond repair. Very few have yet broken ranks in the European front line, but there is a feeling of uncertainty rather than of grim determination in the air.

Assuming then that the heavy preponderance of European power in Southern Rhodesia is on the decline, what is the most likely pattern of development over the next year or eighteen months? The first thing to admit is that this assumption may well be wrong. The earlier part of this article was largely concerned with listing details of the strength of the European position. European resistance could quite possibly stiffen, and a more right-wing Government—be it of the United Federal Party, the Rhodesian Front, or a coalition—could come to power. This very fact would ensure the complete separation of Southern from Northern Rhodesia, and the power structure would then begin to change in the way already suggested. For the white position to be upheld, South African money would be needed; how much would be forthcoming is an open question.

To return to the assumption, however, that European power is on the wane, what then? It seems a fair deduction that after the Southern Rhodesian elections (or before, if Northern Rhodesia and the British Government are really firm) substantial changes will be made to the qualifications for the franchise. Each such move is likely further to reduce white resistance, although there may be, at every stage, an attempt to increase it. A number of business firms are already within an ace of closing their Rhodesian offices. As the Northern Territories start to discriminate or to cut back production substantially against Southern Rhodesian products, certain industries are bound to close down and this will affect the companies which have already come near to packing up. An increasing number of Europeans, especially working wives, are likely to lose their jobs; and it must be remembered that most Rhodesian townspeople, indeed most Rhodesians, have come to the country only since the war. Among the civilian population the chances of an O.A.S. type of resistance arising are extremely small. It is too late for 'a White

Rhodesia' to become the battle cry; indeed the whole concept of a battle cry is out of date.

What many Africans fear most is a situation where the police and the army are given a fairly free hand or where they take it for themselves. The police are often aggressive and provocative in the townships, and it seems that many African politicians are really scared of them. A situation where they had a free hand could arise, but unless law and order broke down completely and the banks were robbed, or unless a great deal of money was coming in from outside, it could not last long.

It appears then that majority government in Southern Rhodesia is likely to be achieved more as the result of the erosion of white resistance to change and of the application of pressure from outside than as a result of the irresistible growth of a Nationalist movement. That movement is likely in fact to be quite unprepared to receive power. Whether power comes to the present leaders or to their successors, very few will have had experience of exercising responsibility and, if the present pattern continues, very few will have had much administrative experience.

In the light of these probabilities the aims of white Rhodesians and their Governments must be very clearly defined. Generalities of the 'happy and prosperous future for all races' type are merely a smoke-screen, which helps those who are using it to advance their own position and gets into the eyes and lungs of everyone else. The main aim must be to help to make the black Governments of the future less inefficient and less intolerant than they are likely to be. Most white Rhodesians would consider one faint-hearted and defeatist to accept such modest aims. But Rhodesians who had grander aims of a happy and prosperous State in which the colour of a man's skin made no difference to his chances in life have failed to achieve them. They may have made a fine effort to fulfil them or they may never have tried, but in either case they have failed, and there is neither credit nor advantage in pretending otherwise.

There are four main lines along which progress towards the modest aim of a little efficiency and tolerance could be made. These are the giving of more education, more training, more responsibility, and more respect to Africans. If this were fully recognized now even by Governments, let alone by individuals, great progress could still be made in the short time that remains.

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Canada at the Polls

For the first time in post-war elections no single issue has emerged to dominate this year's Canadian General Election campaign. Instead, and symptomatically, voters have been treated to a barrage of querulous, contradictory, and occasionally whining catalogues of the nation's social, economic, and political problems with precious few positive indications of solutions to meet them. Equally, as the results noted below indicate, the voters have responded with comparable uncertainty. Neither of the two major parties has been given a wholly clear mandate and enough support has been thrown to the two extremist splinter parties to raise serious doubts as to the nature and consistency of government for some time to come. All this has been no accident of politics and polling. Instead, the confusion of the present political scene reflects a basic uncertainty throughout Canada as to the direction and scope of both its immediate and long-term development.

The major part of this uncertainty has resulted from the unexpected and relatively rapid demolition of many of the established truths that were the bedrock of Canadian economic, social, and political life until the mid-1950s. It was then that the war-time and post-war surge of virtually uninterrupted expansion and full employment was rudely ended. As a result, for the first time on any scale since the 1930s, many Canadians have found themselves unemployed (a peak of 11 per cent of the labour force was reached at one stage, with an average of 4 to 6 per cent at present), and almost all have felt in some way the pinch of a deep and far-reaching recession.

It has been discovered, suddenly and uncomfortably, that the system of triangular trade that gave stability in the past (trading deficit with the United States balanced by surpluses with Britain and Europe) has broken down. It has become painfully clear that inflationary pressures, many of them the result of bidding for U.S. wage and living standards without comparable capital and industrial underpinnings, are pricing Canadian exports out of many needed markets. And as glum faces in investment houses testify, it is also evident that the golden flow of foreign investment funds—the mortgage on the future that has helped to cover and camouflage past imbalances—is beginning to dry up.

The new economic influences offer puzzles too. The most recent statistics (for the first quarter of 1962) show that 61·3 per cent of Canadian exports and 72·1 per cent of imports are to and from the

United States—a trade pattern leaving Canada dangerously exposed to every whim and vagary of U.S. tariff policies, legislative decisions, and outright economic blackmail. In addition, the new Common Market coalition in Europe, with its presumed expansion to include Britain, raises the spectre of even greater reliance on the United States. For Canadians, still short of precise data on likely E.E.C. terms for Britain, there is a gloomy supposition that Commonwealth preferences will go by 1970 and that the protectionist elements of the Common Market group will, if anything, prevail positively to restrict Canadian opportunities to exploit the European export market. This gloom applies especially to Canadian manufactured goods which have just recently begun to penetrate into Britain and Europe and which hold great promise as a counterbalance to Canada's basic commodity exports, long prone to violent fluctuations of world prices and demand.

At the same time, in the social sphere, other elements of past orderliness have crashed before a rush of new ideas and influences. Post-war immigration has brought in more than 2 million people, mostly from Europe, to challenge the dominance of the French and British majority and create important new sectional interests within the country. The crest of unemployment, although moderated somewhat during the last year, has gone a long way towards destroying the myth of Canada as a one-class nation. This culminated in August 1961 in the formal political alliance between the nation's socialists and labour unions to form the New Democratic Party.

From Europe, meanwhile, have come the threats to long-established Commonwealth ties posed by the political implications of British membership in the Common Market. From Washington, first rumbles are being heard of schemes for a North American customs union with their bogies of political assimilation. And from the parry and thrust of international politics, Canadians have found themselves absorbing more and more new responsibilities and experiences abroad on truce commissions (Indo-China), police forces (Middle East and Congo), technical assistance projects (India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Ghana, Nigeria), and the ever-increasing post-war range of international organizations and institutions.

In response to these outside pressures and, in part, as an expression of an internal development towards maturity, a wave of nationalism has swept the country. As suddenly and uncomfortably as they have discovered their economic ills, Canadians have during the last five years discovered their nationalistic plight and promise.

On the negative side, major concern has begun to be expressed about the extent and nature of foreign holdings in the country. Although still conceded to be vitally necessary for the development of rich untapped primary resources, newly self-aware Canadians question the price to be paid. With up to 85 per cent of some basic industries foreign-owned, there are charges that the pattern of development does not suit local needs, that the load of debt being piled up is too high, and that foreign managers are seeking to impose alien policies on both the Canadian Government and people. This was underlined last year, for instance, when a U.S. subsidiary company was prohibited from supplying pumps for ships delivering Canadian wheat to China. And yet, while they question such a price, Canadians remain puzzled about what can or should be done to improve the terms. From all sides, as the election campaign has ebbed and flowed, an assortment of suggestions has been offered—expropriation, insistence on Canadian staff, retained profits within the country, tax incentives to Canadians, bond issues without voting rights, government loans, and tariff deals. But even with the debate well under way, no simple formula appears to be yet in sight.

To be fair, on the positive side, there have been improvements. Internal investment has been marked by a modification of the traditional Canadian habit of leaving risk ventures to foreign capital. There has been the beginning of a national economic policy with the promise, stated or implied, from both the major political parties—Progressive Conservatives and Liberals—that the proposals of the current and impressively staffed Royal Commission on banking and fiscal policies will be given serious attention. There has been a revival of basic public works of the type needed to stimulate and support industrial growth. And, as the devaluation of the Canadian dollar testified in May, it is slowly being accepted that the luxury of U.S. standards will now have to be diluted with some realities of internal price rationing of imports and a lowering of wage scales.

In addition, to give emotional expression to this nationalism, there have been unprecedented bids by Government, industry, and individuals to foster Canadian characteristics. While still bedevilled by often ludicrous problems of definition (Canadians still cannot agree among themselves even on a national flag or a national anthem), the last five years have seen the creation of a Canada Council to foster music, theatre, and the arts. The period has been marked by the emergence of a variety of philanthropies and foundations to foster special projects (Canadian artists, for instance,

benefit from such things as the Baxter Foundation set up by a former Czech infected with the spirit of his new citizenship). And throughout the nation, slowly and often unsurely, community centres and auditoria are appearing to house fledgeling symphony orchestras, repertory companies, operas, and ballets. Much of this new spirit apes European methods and fashions but the germ of a local culture is at least beginning to be encouraged.

Politically the pot has boiled hardest of all. In the increasingly important field of foreign relations, the old tradition of Canada as, to use Bagehot's phrase, a linch-pin linking Britain and the United States has diminished appreciably. On the one hand, Britain's decline in world councils has reduced the demand for the services of an interpreter-mediator, on the other, the rise of specifically Canadian interests apart from the major Powers, has reduced the intelligibility of the service available. Concurrently, the long-feared show-down over the incompatible elements of Canadian foreign policy is being forced on by specific events. Canada has tried for a bit of each world: membership in the Western Alliance through N.A.T.O. and North American defence schemes, neutralism through votes across Cold War lines at the United Nations, and internationalist flourishes such as her Colombo Plan participation and support of Irish- and Swedish-type diplomacy.

Unfortunately, the inherent conflicts latent in each of these policies have now come to the fore. Washington is pressing, with increasing bewilderment and irritation, for a decision by Canada to accept nuclear warheads for the missiles she has already purchased and installed in Canada and with her forces committed to Europe (the most costly force per soldier of N.A.T.O.). At the same time, the Geneva disarmament strategists of the uncommitted bloc are pressing for a clear-cut declaration of Canadian support for the various nuclear-free zone proposals (some of which include Canada herself). And Canada's independent line of policy is being challenged by the repercussions in the United States of her growing trade with mainland China and Cuba.

One way or another, decisions will have to be made soon and, as with so many of the current Canadian issues, opinions are sharply divided even within cabinets and shadow cabinets themselves. As the Canadian magazine editor, Arnold Edinborough, commented when the election was announced, 'The Liberals themselves have been inconsistent. If Mr Pearson is to pin the label of vacillation on the Tories, he himself will have to announce a firm, consistent stand

for the Liberals.'[1] Unfortunately, throughout the campaigr neither side did make 'such a firm consistent stand'.

Moreover, even as the vexations of foreign questions continu Canadians have had to grapple with important new problems i domestic politics. The ripping away of the post-war veil of pros perity brought to light the extent to which regional and section dissatisfactions exist to challenge the very fabric of confederatior The separatists in the province of Quebec have been the mos colourful manifestation of this dissatisfaction but they have bee but one group among many. Irritated by the growing imbalance c development in competition with 'have' provinces such as Ontari Alberta, and British Columbia, assorted regional 'have-not' rebel on the Quebec pattern have emerged to bargain for what the regard as a fairer share-out of Federal spending on capital facilitie education, social services, and marketing assistance. In additio to adding to the premium value of local politics, this trend ha emphasized the fact that political patronage will play a much great part in Canadian politics in the future. Projects such as the Sout Saskatchewan Dam and the bridge linking Prince Edward Islan to the mainland were notable regional concessions of the last Parlia ment. They are expected to be commonplace in the next one. Bu in so doing, they challenge existing Canadian commitments, es pecially overseas. Otherwise, where will the money come from?

In sum, it is clear now that Canadians are facing a basic review c their whole pattern of social and economic life. This review, by it complex nature, presupposes doubt and disagreement. Even confined to the Canadian Parliament and people, it would be review demanding much time and great patience. Unfortunately, is not so confined. Instead, the present hiatus in Canadian plannin and development is subject to an alarming number of cross currents and influences from the outside world.

It at once becomes evident that Canada is in a unique position i her extreme dependence upon and vulnerability to the decisions c the major Western Powers. In matters of defence, for instanc Canadian policies in both the N.A.T.O. complex and immediat North American systems are at best supplementary. The decision made in Washington, or even London, on weapons, tactics, c strategy can, and do, wipe out months of Ottawa's efforts; (tempe still flare, for instance, at mention of the Canadian-designed Avr Arrow jet fighter plane which was scrapped in favour of America

[1] *Saturday Night*, Toronto, Vol. 77, No. 10, May 1962, p. 5.

Bomarc missiles subsequently pronounced obsolete). Similarly, negotiating policies are essentially required to carry the stamp of approval from the major Western Powers. The combination of economic dependence, a vast and vulnerable common frontier with the Soviet Union, and a domestic electorate constantly conditioned by a barrage of U.S. radio, television, news reports, periodicals, and books, makes long-term independent policies impossible. In fact, it is to the credit of the post-war Canadian administrations that they have kicked over the traces as often as they have.

The hard fact is, fond home-town assumptions notwithstanding, that Canadian ventures into independent politics are basically made on sufferance, usually U.S. sufferance. As the Nobel Prize-winning manœuvres of Mr Pearson during his term as Minister for External Affairs bore witness, the most that Canadians can hope for is some modification of the existing policies of the major Powers. They cannot, in terms either of influence or of available skills, presume to counter the main stream of these policies, except in such exceptional circumstances as those of the Suez crisis, when the major Powers were in disagreement. And, even so, they can do little more than reinforce the thinking of one Power or the other.

The economic position is even more intractable. In addition to a fundamental and inadequately diffuse dependence on international trade, Canada still faces the capital investment problems of an under-developed country. As such, there are forceful outside influences constantly bringing pressure to bear on domestic fiscal policies, flirtations with the idea of nationalization, and many of the other self-help measures which are essayed as a matter of routine by comparable middle-class Powers, such as the Scandinavians. The extent, for instance, to which the public brawl between Mr Coyne of the Bank of Canada and Mr Fleming, the Minister of Finance, damaged the nation's investment prospects is still to be factually determined. But in the eyes of many Canadian economists it cost the country at least a year's supply of foreign capital.

To a certain degree, there is a growing possibility that the very pressures involved in these outside influences may in themselves force the issue. Many of the elements in Canada's present nationalistic surge are wholly emotional—a reflection of the original stubbornness that led to the creation of Canada in the first place, in defiance of all the operative realities of economics and geography. Repeatedly, over the years, Canadians have displayed a clear willingness to pay a substantial price for their independence—

higher taxes, long-term debts, reduced living standards, and so on. In the emotionally charged atmosphere of the moment, circumstances exist which could provide substantial support for a violent reaction against the nation's external masters. As heavy-handed gaffes by U.S. Generals and Senators multiply (the unavoidable price of the United States' unique form of democracy) this support could coalesce behind yet another evangelical 'Canada First' crusader—possibly even an extremist of the resurgent new Social Credit Party.

Mr Diefenbaker swept into power in 1957 on the basis of such an appeal, and ran into $3,000 million in deficit financing as he grappled with its realities. To many people now, he gives the appearance of a man with considerably abated fervour, in itself a factor explaining his electoral decline this year. The present uncertainty may throw up a more vigorous successor to assume the trappings of outright demagogy. Alternatively, the nation may choose the path of economic prudence. The idea of a North American customs union may be actively taken up as a counter to European losses. Imaginative leadership in Ottawa may manage to muster support for a subsequently grander Atlantic Community (Mr Pearson's long-time ambition). The fact of U.S. economic domination may actually be accepted to a more realistic extent.

At the time of writing, the results of the election have largely confirmed advance expectations with the following results: Progressive Conservative, 118; Liberal, 97; Social Credit, 30; New Democratic, 19; total: 264.[1] This total does not include the results of the vote of Canadian servicemen due for counting approximately one week after the election proper. These votes, distributed according to national trends, could result in the defeat of five more Progressive Conservative candidates by the Liberals. This would not, however, change the basic complexion of the tally, with the Progressive Conservatives in all probability forming the minority Government as the largest single party in the House of Commons.

In the results, one surprise did emerge—the strength of the right-wing nationalistic Social Credit Party in the French-speaking province of Quebec (they won twenty-six of their thirty seats there). As nearly as one can determine, this upsurge, in itself sufficient to deprive the Liberals of their chance to oust Mr Diefenbaker, was the result of two unexpected factors: the extent in the province

[1] One constituency, in which the Liberal candidate died during the campaign, will be contested in July.

of separatist sentiment amenable to the mystic nationalist Social Credit campaign ('You've nothing to lose, why not try Social Credit?' was their main slogan), and the calibre of the party's provincial leader, Mr Caouette, already touted as a possible successor to Quebec's former strong man leader, the late Maurice Duplessis.

On the national scene, however, this Social Credit surprise is not expected to have any appreciable effect. The party's votes will probably keep Mr Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservatives in power until a budget can be handed down, but their national leader, Robert Thompson, has already rejected any formal coalition. As a result, by next spring at the latest, it is expected that another General Election will be held in an attempt to end the present stalemate.

The interim period, as accurately as one can judge, presents some serious international problems. Mr Diefenbaker, a ruthless and individualistic politician, has been presented with a challenge both to his national leadership and his position within the Progressive Conservative Party itself. He now is under enormous pressure to work a political miracle sufficient to win back the necessary fifteen to twenty seats required for a majority and, in the process, re-establish his personal hold over his party.

In seeking to meet the challenge of his internal rivals, it is widely feared that he will embark on another of his mystic 'crusades', of the sort that originally brought him into power. While almost certain to be unsuccessful on the hustings, such policies could very easily involve a price which would include bitter and malicious Canadian opposition to Britain's Common Market application (to be aired at the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in September) and vigorous fanning throughout Canada of dangerous latent anti-American sentiments.

As one senior Canadian, prudently anonymous, summed up after the initial results, 'Diefenbaker may well be on his way out as a result of this vote, but it's pretty well certain that in going down, he'll fire every gun and try every device at his disposal. His very defeat, in this lingering manner, could be disastrous for the country.'

DONALD R. GORDON

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Ruanda-Urundi on the Threshold of Independence

WILL a Congo-like situation of chaos and anarchy develop in the twin territories of Ruanda and Urundi when, as seems inevitable at the time of writing, they are granted independence on 1 July? This is the anxious question which is being asked by every European in the country—some have already answered it in the affirmative and have left. Others are preparing to follow suit and it is estimated that by the end of June the European population will have been reduced to a quarter of its present size. The Belgian authorities are trying desperately to stem this rising tide of emigrants but without much success so far. An atmosphere reminiscent of Leopoldville in May 1960 now reigns in Usumbura on Lake Tanganyika, the administrative capital. The value of the currency has slumped to a ridiculously low level and a black market in almost everything is flourishing. Unless the United Nations, which at the time of writing is debating the future of the two territories, can persuade the Governments of Ruanda and Urundi to co-operate with the Belgian administrators who are still left in the country and to agree to a phased withdrawal of Belgian troops, the future looks grim. It might well turn out to be another 'décolonisation ratée', with all its tragic implications.

But this situation cannot be blamed entirely on the Belgians. The ex-German Protectorate of Ruanda-Urundi which they received as a Mandate from the League of Nations in 1923 was no prize territory. It consisted of two feudal kingdoms, Ruanda and Urundi perched on the top of mountain ranges separating the Sudan, East Africa, and the Congo Basin; these were known in antiquity as the Mountains of the Moon and they dominate Lakes Kivu and Tanganyika. Because of the inaccessibility of these high plateaux densely covered with jungle, the societies of Ruanda and Urundi had been completely cut off from any contact with surrounding countries and had preserved, until the coming of the Belgians, a rigid racial feudalism. The tall, aristocratic Tutsis, a pastoral and warrior tribe of Ethiopian origin, invaded the country from the east some four centuries ago and easily mastered the indigenous Hutu societies, patriarchal and agricultural and of Bantu stock; they reduced them to serfdom and established Tutsi monarchies in Ruanda and Urundi under a Mwami or king, the essence of whose

sovereignty resided in a sacred drum decorated with the shrivelled skins of his enemies.

The chief source of wealth of the Tutsis was their herds of big-horned cattle, the 'Yambos'. They were also the instrument whereby they subjected the Hutus, for the latter, in exchange for the use —but not the possession—of a cow, bound themselves to serve a Tutsi lord; they gradually lost all their land to the Tutsis and its ownership passed entirely to the Mwamis. Thus up to quite recent times, a small minority of giant Tutsis, some 15 per cent of the total population, completely dominated the remaining 85 per cent, which was made up 84 per cent of Hutu peasants and 1 per cent of Twa pygmies. These last were looked upon by both Tutsis and Hutus as inferior beings. There was practically no intermarriage between the three races, so that today there are hardly more than 1,000 persons of mixed descent in the whole of Ruanda-Urundi.

Such was the society which first the Germans and then the Belgians penetrated. The Belgians abolished from the start the Mwamis' powers of life and death, which the Germans had acknowledged, regrouped the various districts, and thoroughly reorganized the administration. Their first concern was to stamp out the periodic famines by encouraging the cultivation of such foodstuffs as maize and sweet potatoes, by introducing crop rotation, and by fighting soil erosion. This is the greatest potential threat to Ruanda-Urundi's economy and is a direct consequence of the over-grazing of the pastures by the Yambos.

But the truly revolutionary achievement of the Belgians in the economic field was the introduction of coffee, which has now become the mainstay of Ruanda-Urundi's economy and represents 80 per cent of its exports. Another cash crop introduced was cotton, now the second largest export. The mining of tin-bearing cassiterite ores was also gradually developed: it now provides employment for 9 per cent of the population and is a minor source of national income. These are amongst the few products that can be profitably exported because of the peculiar land-locked situation of Ruanda-Urundi, which means that transport costs to the coast are enormous and justify the export only of those products which are not bulky and of high value relative to size.

The introduction of coffee was revolutionary in another sense as well, since it freed the Hutu, now become a coffee-planter, from his exclusive dependence on the 'cow economy'. Coffee was thus an instrument of emancipation and gave the Hutu the self-confidence

and the economic basis he needed to break his bonds. The other instruments of his liberation were the development of education and the missionary activities of the Catholic Church. In the first two decades of Belgian rule it was almost exclusively the Tutsis who, because of their greater wealth and higher social status, availed themselves of new opportunities of education, but since the end of the second World War and the transformation of the mandate into trusteeship more and more Hutus have attended the primary and secondary schools, in numbers now equal to those of the Tutsis. What is more, they have decisively exploded the myth that they are an inferior race by obtaining as good results as the Tutsis, and this has rid them of any inferiority complex *vis-à-vis* their erstwhile masters.

The development of education has been phenomenal and now absorbs a quarter of the budget of Ruanda-Urundi. But, as in the Congo, it has been concentrated on primary education, and there are today nearly 3,000 primary as against only eleven secondary schools and half a dozen establishments of technical and higher education. This means that Ruanda and Urundi will, after independence, lack the trained *élite* and the essential cadres for running the country. On the other hand they are better prepared for independence than were the Congolese, because, since 1960 when both territories achieved virtual self-government, the africanization of all higher administrative posts has gone ahead and the new incumbents are being trained for their new responsibilities by Belgian officials.

Christianity, and Roman Catholicism in particular, has had an extraordinary success in Ruanda-Urundi and today half the population of the two territories is Catholic, with four native bishops who play a prominent part in the political as well as social life of the country. This success is easily explained, for the message of the Church to the downtrodden Hutus was that their subjection to the Tutsis was not part of the natural order and that all men were equal before God; this was indeed a revolutionary message and spelt the end of Tutsi domination. Moreover, the Churches opened centres of education for women, and the consequent emancipation of Hutu women gave a powerful stimulus to the Hutu fight for equal rights.

In the field of health and hygiene, the Belgian record is outstanding and the rate of infant mortality, for instance, in Ruanda-Urundi is the lowest in Central Africa. The unfortunate result is that the population, which was 4 million in 1952, has now grown to 5 million, and if it continues to increase at its present rate of 3·3 per

cent it will have doubled by the end of the century. Ruanda-Urundi is thus faced with a serious problem of over-population to which there appears no obvious solution. Social services are well developed, however, with progressive social legislation.

In 1952 a ten-year Development Plan was launched by Belgium to improve the infrastructure of the two territories. An international airport and a new harbour were constructed at Usumbura, new roads were built, and water and electric power were extended to many outlying districts. The plan has been mainly financed by Belgium, who provided 400 million Belgian francs a year; loans were also obtained from the International Bank and from the European Development Fund of the E.E.C. Apart from this extraordinary expenditure, Belgium has had to finance the budget deficit of Ruanda-Urundi which has developed since 1958 as a result of extended social services; thus the territories, far from being a source of profit to Belgium, have been in fact a drag on her finances.

In the political field, throughout the period between the two World Wars, the Belgians practised indirect rule through the Tutsi oligarchy and respected the traditional administrative structure which they had found. This had the effect of strengthening Tutsi domination; thus the seventy-nine chieftainships and 1,085 sub-chieftainships (*sous-chefferies*) into which the two territories were divided were nearly all held by Tutsi right up to 1959.

Although Ruanda and Urundi were jointly administered by Belgium, they never lost their separate identities. The monarchy in Ruanda was more centralized and absolutist than in Urundi and the gulf between Tutsi and Hutu much wider. There was also a certain amount of mixed marriage in Urundi, a thing practically unknown in Ruanda. The character of the reigning Mwami of Urundi, Mwambutsa IV, easy going and debonair, has greatly facilitated the peaceful evolution of Urundi from an absolute to a constitutional monarchy. The Mwami has been a unifying element in the country and has acted as arbiter between Hutu and Tutsi.

In Ruanda, on the other hand, when the social progress of the Hutus made some changes in the political structure of the State inevitable, there was far more resistance from the Tutsi oligarchy and the Mwami failed to play the same conciliatory role as his cousin in Urundi: all attempts at reform by the Belgian administration in Ruanda were foiled by the Tutsis. Thus the more educated Hutus were forced to the conclusion that their political advance would only be achieved by their own efforts.

In 1957 the first Hutu manifesto appeared, denouncing the 'political, social, economic, and cultural monopoly of the Tutsis' and asking for greater equality for the Hutus. During 1958 these aspirations took political shape in two parties, PARMEHUTU (*Parti du mouvement d'émancipation Hutu*) and APROSOMA (*Association pour la promotion des masses*). In April 1958 Mwami Mutara of Ruanda and his Council invited the Hutu leaders to formulate their grievances; these were ridiculed by the Tutsi dignitaries and the rift between Hutu and Tutsi came dangerously near to breaking-point. At the same time the Governor of Ruanda-Urundi, M. Harroy, openly declared the sympathy of the Belgian administration for the Hutu claims and promised his support. The reaction of the Tutsis was to form the UNAR party (*Union Nationale Ruandaise*) dedicated to the maintenance of Tutsi privileges. Some progressive Tutsis, however, founded another party, RADER (*Rassemblement Democratique Ruandais*) which advocated co-operation between Tutsis and Hutus.

Even in this rapidly deteriorating situation a clash could have been averted if Mwami Mutara had not died suddenly in July 1959. The more extremist Tutsis seized the opportunity of electing as Mwami, Kigeri V, the young brother of the late Mwami. He was completely inexperienced and became a tool in the hands of the extremist group advocating total intransigence towards the Hutus.

Civil war thus became inevitable and was sparked off by the murder of a Hutu leader by a gang of young Tutsis. The Hutus retaliated by burning Tutsi villages and killing some of the most detested Tutsi chiefs. Hopelessly outnumbered in some parts of Ruanda, thousands of Tutsis sought refuge in the neighbouring Congolese province of Kivu, in Uganda, in Tanganyika, and in Urundi; there are now some 80,000 Tutsi refugees in these areas being cared for by the Christian Missions, and they constitute a real problem .As many Tutsi chiefs had fled, their posts were filled by Hutus.

When order was restored the Belgian Government announced in November 1959 its intention of holding first communal and then legislative elections in Ruanda and Urundi and of granting the largest possible measure of autonomy to the two territories in preparation for independence in 1962. This was welcomed by the two Hutu parties, PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA, and by the progressive Tutsi party, RADER, which joined them in a common front against UNAR. The latter appealed to the Trusteeship

Council of the United Nations against the Belgian decision and refused to collaborate with the Belgian administration. The communal elections which were held in Ruanda in July 1960 were boycotted by UNAR and proved a massive victory for the PARMEHUTU party. Mwami Kigeri and his leading advisers left Ruanda and tried to rally support for their cause first with Patrice Lumumba in Leopoldville, then in Cairo, and finally with the Trusteeship Council in New York. Thereupon the Belgian authorities, now working entirely through the Hutu organizations, set up a provisional Government which was presided over by Grégoire Kayibanda, the leader of the PARMEHUTU party; they also announced legislative elections to take place in January 1961.

The United Nations Assembly in New York, however, adopted a resolution in December 1960 which declared that legislative elections could not be held until a general amnesty had been granted, the Tutsi refugees were resettled in their own country, and a political conference was convened to bring about national reconciliation in Ruanda. A period of acute recriminations between Belgium and the U.N. Commission on Ruanda-Urundi followed. Belgium agreed to postpone the elections and called a conference which met at Ostend in January 1961; it reached no useful conclusions.

Meanwhile news of the postponement of elections was greeted with anger and dismay by the Hutu parties, and at the end of January 1961 municipal councillors gathered at Gitarama and proclaimed the deposition of Mwami Kigeri and the establishment of a republic. Grégoire Kayibanda was appointed Prime Minister. Thus the Hutu movement which had started by demanding reforms within the framework of a constitutional monarchy was led by the intransigence of the Tutsi oligarchy to abolish the monarchy itself and the Belgians could do little other than bow to the *fait accompli*.

Their action was severely criticized by the Trusteeship Council. The period of intense disagreement and complete lack of co-operation between the Belgian authorities and the U.N. Commission happily came to an end, however, with the change of Government in Brussels at the end of April. From then on the head of the U.N. Commission, M. Max Dorsinville of Haiti, established excellent relations with the Belgian authorities, and the elections which took place in September 1961 were duly supervised by the Commission. These elections, as was expected, gave an overwhelming victory to the PARMEHUTU party and confirmed the deposition of Mwami Kigeri. Grégoire Kayibanda was then elected President of the new

Republic of Ruanda.

Meanwhile in Urundi political progress had been orderly because of the better relations between Tutsis and Hutus. Two main political parties were formed, UPRONA (*Union et Progrès National du Burundi*) and P.D.C. (*Parti Démocrate Chrétien*), in which both races were represented. In the communal elections of November 1960 the P.D.C. came top of the poll, but this result was completely reversed in the legislative elections of 1961 which UPRONA won decisively. Its leader, Prince Rwagasore, became Prime Minister of Urundi but was assassinated soon afterwards. The P.D.C. was immediately suspected of the murder and relations between the two parties have now become critical. M. André Muhirwa, the Mwami's son-in-law, has been appointed as Prime Minister and it is to be hoped that tension will gradually diminish and the democratization of Urundi will be allowed to continue. Otherwise the same explosion which swept the Tutsi out of power in Ruanda might well occur in Urundi.

The aim of the U.N. Trusteeship Commission has always been the political unification of the two territories. To this end the Commission met leaders of Ruanda and Urundi at Addis Ababa in April 1962 but failed to convince them of the need to agree on unification. It had no other option therefore but to recommend in its Report, the basis of the Trusteeship Council debate, that the Republic of Ruanda and the Kingdom of Urundi should be regarded as two separate countries. There is however to be an economic union between the territories. The Commission has advised the General Assembly to grant independence to Urundi on 1 July this year but has refused to commit itself about Ruanda. It hopes, however, that the recent formation of a coalition Government with Tutsi representatives will enable Ruanda to accede to independence on the same date.

The greatest problem now facing Ruanda-Urundi is that of internal security: the Belgian forces have been asked by both territories to withdraw after independence and the U.N. Commission has recommended this withdrawal. On the other hand the local gendarmeries are still embryonic and patently incapable of maintaining law and order. Apart from internal strife, an attempt by Tutsi refugees to cross into Ruanda in force and fight their way back to power cannot be ruled out. Moreover, the departure of the Belgian troops would signify, as M. Spaak has warned the Trusteeship Council, the end of Belgian technical aid, as no official would

be likely to agree to stay at his post in either Ruanda or Urundi under these conditions; the families of most officials have, in fact, already left. The U.N. knows perfectly well that this would cause the collapse of the entire administration, especially in Ruanda where the Tutsi administrators have left and their Hutu successors are relatively inexperienced, though with a strong sense of responsibility.

The Commission has admitted that Belgian technical aid by itself would not be enough in view of the growing needs of the two territories and has suggested in its Report that international organizations should make a special effort to meet these needs. It has also recommended the setting up by the U.N. of a special fund for assistance to Ruanda and Urundi. It is clear that they will need outside financial aid for a long time to come: industrialization is still in its infancy and the production of coffee will have to be very greatly expanded if national income is to keep pace with the increase in population.

It is sincerely to be hoped, therefore, that a compromise solution will be found by the U.N. Assembly which will provide for a gradual reduction of Belgian forces consonant with the maintenance of security and under the supervision of the United Nations. Optimism is justified by the extremely co-operative attitude adopted by the Belgian Government, which has promised to abide by all U.N. decisions and which is understandably anxious to avoid a repetition of the Congo tragedy. It is unfortunate, however, that M. Dorsinville was recently replaced as President of the Commission by Miss Brooks of Liberia, who cannot claim to have succeeded as well in her relations with the Belgian administration in the territories. Nevertheless, with goodwill on all sides and not least from the Governments of Ruanda and Urundi, an orderly passage to independence on 1 July is just feasible.

A. L. LATHAM-KOENIG

Indonesia: Retrospect and Prospect

A GOOD deal has been written and spoken about Indonesia as a country and about the Indonesians as a people, but relatively little has been done to bring clarity into the economic and political confusion of the past few years.

In an attempt to elucidate some of the more important trends in the situation, national and international factors must be taken into consideration and it may be logical to deal with the national ones first. The most important of these, the most enduring (and the most frustrating) is undoubtedly the President of the Indonesian Republic. By Western standards—to the extent that these are relevant to a country like Indonesia—the Indonesian President has often behaved with what appears to be a dangerous irresponsibility. He appears neither to know nor to care about economics but, whereas some statesmen without a taste for economics have found able men to assist them, President Sukarno has allowed his two best economists to go into rebellion against him. His administrative record is disastrous, and his anti-Dutch obsessions (though in some respects understandable) have driven him to attach more importance to the 'liberation' of a singularly inhospitable and unproductive half-island than to putting his own house in order. But when all that is said, President Sukarno himself remains as a major fact of Indonesian life, an oratorical spell-binder and an agile politician with a remarkable aptitude for balancing one set of men against another. His supporters claim that he is the only unifying force in the Republic; his detractors point out that he failed to preserve the unity of the Republic in 1958, when some of Indonesia's leading politicians and Army officers proclaimed a rival Government.

The most constructive thing President Sukarno has achieved is, as it happens, one of the most controversial, namely his so-called 'concept' of a guided democracy. Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the concept has been the clear implication that Dr Sukarno himself ought to be the guide. There may well be much to be said for the view that Western ideas of parliamentary democracy—in this instance, on a Dutch model—are unsuitable for an under-developed country with widespread illiteracy, in particular for a country of islands with difficult communications and of Indonesia's ethnic, linguistic, and cultural diversity. President Sukarno is said to have been impressed, during his visit to China in 1956, with what he regarded as the ability of the Chinese Communist leadership to adapt an alien system to China's own needs. Casting about in Indonesia's traditions—much as Field-Marshal Ayub Khan has done in Pakistan—he resurrected the old Indonesian village idea of *Gotong rojong* or 'mutual help'. *Gotong rojong* and 'guided democracy' were recurring themes in his speeches from 1957 on. It was not, however, till early in 1959 that the President's concept began to

be transformed into reality. The instrument he had chosen to effect this transformation was the 1945 or 'independence' Constitution. On 22 April 1959 he outlined his ideas in a speech that has since been much quoted, in which he said that the Constitution should 'fit the soul, character, and personality of the Indonesian people' and help to transform a colonial system into a modern national structure, and that the Assembly should not become 'a place of endless and wasteful debates and a battlefield for political parties or leaders'. There was to be 'consultation', and opposition was to take the form of constructive opinions. More specifically, there were to be a Parliament, to be known as the Council of People's Representatives, a People's Consultative Congress, and a Supreme Advisory Council. Guided democracy was to be supplemented by 'guided economy', economic policy to be in the hands of a National Planning Board. Political parties would not be dissolved, but would be 'simplified', and Parliament—that is, the People's Council—would include not only members of the political parties, but also representatives of 'functional groups', such as farmers, professional people, and the armed forces. A National Front would be created from representatives of the functional groups; this would not be a party, but it would have the right to present its own list of candidates for Parliament.

Neither Indonesia's political parties nor their elected Parliament quietly agreed to such execution. The President's proposals were put to the vote three times, on 30 May, 1 June, and 2 June 1959, and each time failed to secure the necessary two-thirds majority. The President, however, had left on one of his world tours and on 5 July, shortly after his return, he issued a decree abolishing the Provisional Constitution, dissolving the Constituent Assembly, and reinstating the 1945 Constitution. The decree also ordered the creation of a provisional People's Consultative Congress to consist of members of Parliament and representatives of the regions and functional groups, and of a Supreme Advisory Council. At the same time, he reorganized the Cabinet, becoming Head of Government as well as Head of State. Dr Djuanda, who had been Prime Minister, became First Minister under the new dispensation.[1]

The effect of these changes was thus to turn President Sukarno himself into a dictator instead of merely the most influential figure in the country and to abolish the competitive parliamentary system

[1] A further reorganization of the governmental apparatus occurred in March 1962.

as it had until then been practised. The outcome, however, was rather more complex. In effect, both the armed forces and the P.K.I. (the Communist Party) were given political influence, in a formal sense, which neither had possessed earlier; the P.N.I. or National Party retained a good deal of its power but lost ground relatively to the Army and the Communists; the Masjumi, formerly the great moderate Muslim party, and the Socialists were eclipsed; the Nahdatul Ulama, or Muslim Teachers' Party, retained a good deal of influence; and finally, the Murba party, a left-wing non-Communist group, found its fortunes boosted out of all proportion to its real standing in the country.

By far the most important event in Indonesia, as distinct from projects or speeches, during the past few years was the rebellion of 1958. Those who went into dissidence were, on the one hand, regional military commanders or dissatisfied officers, and on the other, prominent figures such as Dr Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, at that time Governor of the Bank Indonesia, and Dr Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, a former Finance Minister and Indonesia's foremost economist. There were three main elements in the rebellion; firstly, regional separatism, that is dissatisfaction, especially in Sumatra and Celebes, at excessive control from the centre and the inadequate share of national revenues allocated to regions that contributed a high proportion of the national income; secondly, opposition both to President Sukarno and to the Army's Chief of Staff, General Abdul Haris Nasution; and finally, the frustration of the able economists mentioned above and of a number of Indonesia's ablest politicians at the corruption and inefficiency they had seen all around them in Jakarta.

The rebellion was thus a crisis of frustrated opposition, as indeed most rebellions are. In military terms, it amounted to very little; it was, indeed, a very amateurish affair. Virtually no military preparations had been made and no thought appears to have been given to the possible consequences of the illegal course that had been taken. The politicians and military men simply gathered together at Padang in Sumatra and, through Dr Sjafruddin, proclaimed a 'Revolutionary Government of the Indonesian Republic' or P.R.R.I. Ill-conceived though it was, the rebellion lasted much longer than readers of the daily press in other countries can have supposed. True, there was virtually no resistance in Sumatra when General Nasution launched a combined operation against rebel positions in March and April 1958; but resistance was far fiercer in

Celebes, and for nearly three years the rebels in both islands controlled large areas of the countryside. Indeed the rebellion did not really collapse until last year, and then by stages. There were military surrenders in Celebes in April, and in Sumatra in June, July, and August. Finally, on 30 August, the politicians began to surrender. On that day, Dr Sjafruddin, the President of the rebel 'Republic', gave himself up, together with Mr Burhanuddin Harahap, one of his 'Ministers', who had been Prime Minister of a fairly successful caretaker Government in Indonesia before the general elections of 1955. Seventy of their followers also handed themselves over to the central Government on that day. Strictly speaking, however, the rebellion is still not over. One of the most determined of the rebel commanders, Colonel—or 'ex-Colonel', as Jakarta puts it—Sumual, is still (as far as the writer is aware) in dissidence in Celebes. So is the financial brain of the rebellion, Dr Sumitro, who has his agents within the Sukarno administration and indeed controls a large clandestine organization.

There was an important difference between the military and the political surrenders, for it was easier for the military rebels to surrender than for the political. The former could simply be reincorporated into the Indonesian forces, whereas return to public life was not open to politicians who had made speeches denouncing President Sukarno and insisting on his removal from office. In practical terms, this meant that the rebel military commanders were, at least temporarily, left in command of their particular areas. Thus Colonel Kawilarang, who had been the rebels' Commander-in-Chief, was left in command of his part of Celebes, although official accounts of the ceremony that marked his return to the fold presented it in face-saving terms as a 'surrender'. The politicians benefited from an amnesty, but there was no question of their being offered official posts. Instead, they were sent to indoctrination camps and agreed to subscribe to two portmanteau words which are supposed to sum up guided democracy: Manipol and USDEK. Manipol is short for 'political manifesto' and refers to President Sukarno's speech of 17 August 1959—on Indonesia's Independence Day—which was later adopted by the People's Consultative Assembly as the basis of State policy; and USDEK is made up of the initials of Indonesian words meaning '1945 Constitution', 'Indonesian Socialism', 'Guided Democracy', 'Guided Economy', and 'National Identity'.

The rebellion has had several important consequences. The poli-

ticians who went into revolt were mostly members of two parties, the Masjumi, one of the two major Islamic groups, and the smaller Socialist Party which, though without a mass organization, has been influential because of the prestige and intellect of its leaders. Two of the leading figures in the Masjumi, Dr Natsir and Dr Sjafruddin, and the Socialist Dr Sumitro went over to the rebels. On the other hand some of their colleagues, though clearly disapproving of President Sukarno's aims and methods, kept out of the rebellion but failed to support the central Government in the ensuing crisis. These included, for instance, Dr Rum, a Masjumi man, and the Socialist leader, Dr Sutan Sjahrir, one of the leading figures in the Indonesian revolution against the Dutch. Despite the restraint of some politicians, the Masjumi and the Socialist parties inevitably became suspect in President Sukarno's eyes and, in July 1960, both parties were banned. Since then, in effect, President Sukarno has depended for support on the old P.N.I., on the P.K.I., and on that section of the armed services which has remained loyal. It would be fair, therefore, to say that the rebellion gave the President the opportunity for personal rule which he had previously lacked.

Another important consequence of the rebellion was the acceleration of the downward trend of the economy. This trend had, however, already manifested itself, and the precise contribution which the rebellion made to an already visible process is almost impossible to assess. Until 1956, foreign trade had been kept roughly in balance, but in that year foreign exchange reserves declined and the domestic budget went more seriously out of gear than previously. In part, these misfortunes were due to an unfavourable turn in the terms of trade, but much was the consequence of corruption and official mismanagement.

Early in 1957 the outer regions, especially Sumatra—which provided 60 per cent of the Republic's revenues with only about one-seventh of its population—and Celebes, took steps towards autonomy in their foreign trade. (That is how it was described in those islands; in Jakarta it was called smuggling.) In this they were assisted, from about May 1957, by Dr Sumitro. In practice, from that time until, say, 1960—when the central Government's naval blockade began to be really effective—a high proportion of the foreign exchange earnings of the outer regions never reached the central Government. This illegal trade was conducted, with the help of Chinese merchants, through offices in Singapore and Hong Kong. There was another factor of great importance: the suppres-

sion of the rebellion caused a stiff increase in the Indonesian defence budget. The spiralling demands of the Defence Ministry were mainly met by the printing press, and the amount of money in circulation rose alarmingly until 25 August 1959, when drastic financial measures cut it down. The improvement, however, lasted only a few months. By the end of 1961, the economic and financial situation was worse than ever and it has deteriorated still further since then. Foreign exchange and gold reserves, which stood at about $300 million at the beginning of 1961, were virtually exhausted by the end of the year; large quantities of gold, including even gold coins, had reached the London market. Money circulation was 25 per cent higher than at the end of 1960. The price of rice had trebled in three months. Export earnings were lower—with the exception of petroleum; the tin industry had been neglected and earnings were down at a time of high prices on the world market.

The rebellion had two other important consequences. Since officially, a state of war existed, the armed forces came to play an important part in politics and administration. The other consequence was paradoxical: the rebels had proclaimed their anti-Communist purpose, but the P.K.I. emerged much stronger at the end of the rebellion. For several years after its abortive uprising in 1948, the P.K.I. had been in the doldrums, but in the middle 1950s it was signally successful in applying the new Communist international line of working within the existing constitutional system and grew enormously in size and influence during the two Governments of Dr Ali Sastroamidjojo. True, it went through some difficult times during Indonesia's dispute with Communist China over the treatment of the Republic's large Chinese minority, and suffered sporadically from measures ordered from time to time by General Nasution. But the rebellion undoubtedly brought the P.K.I. the rewards, or some of the rewards, of its apparent loyalty to President Sukarno.[1]

By far the most important of the international factors in the Indonesian situation is the long-standing dispute between Indonesia and Holland over the future of West New Guinea, which the Indonesians call West Irian.[2] Here again, the rebellion leaves a trail. It was unthinkable for President Sukarno and his Chiefs of Staff to contemplate a military invasion of West New Guinea so long as the

[1] President Sukarno attended the closing session of the P.K.I. Congress on 30 April 1962 and publicly praised the party's patriotism.

[2] See 'The West New Guinea Problem', in *The World Today*, November 1961

rebellion was in progress. Indeed, one of the baits held out to the rebel commanders, such as Colonel Kawilarang, was the joy of brotherhood and solidarity in store when West Irian was brought back to the motherland. From the autumn of 1961, after the rebels had, if not laid down their arms, at least stopped fighting, the bulk of the central Government's forces, which had been tied down by the rebellion, were freed for a potential invasion. Logistically, plans had been laid. These included the massive arms agreement concluded with Russia in January 1961, providing for the purchase by Indonesia of some £130 million worth of arms, including jet aircraft.

On several occasions during 1961 and in several places—London, Bonn, Amsterdam, New York—there were contacts between Indonesian officials and Dutch business men or professors associated with the so-called Rijkens group. Although on the Dutch side the negotiators never had any official status, various interim arrangements for West New Guinea were discussed, usually on the basis of the Dutch allowing the Indonesians to state their case to the Papuans and the Dutch pressing for some kind of business *quid pro quo* in Indonesia. Hopes that these talks would lead to a peaceful settlement were dashed by three events: first, Indonesia's categorical rejection of the Dutch plan for self-determination in West New Guinea, when it was presented in the United Nations General Assembly last November; secondly, the Indian annexation of Goa, which quite possibly stirred a desire for emulation in President Sukarno's heart; and finally, President Sukarno's speeches of 19 and 26 December, in which he announced that a command had been set up for the liberation of New Guinea and rejected Dutch proposals for further negotiations.

Discussions were briefly resumed however at the end of March this year. At the beginning of April the U.S. diplomatist, Mr Ellsworth Bunker, acting as mediator in the dispute at the suggestion of U Thant, the Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations, put forward proposals for a phased transfer of authority from Holland to Indonesia, with an intervening period of U.N. responsibility and culminating in a plebiscite to be organized by Indonesia with U.N. assistance and participation. Meanwhile sporadic fighting broke out in West New Guinea but by the end of May both sides accepted the Bunker plan as a basis for further negotiation.

To sum up, on the political side the opposition has been practically obliterated. The rebel political leaders, with one notable exception, Dr Sumitro, are being re-indoctrinated. All the major

figures of Indonesia's revolution, with two exceptions, Dr Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, were arrested in January. The only political forces that count are the President and his followers, meaning mainly the politicians that are benefiting from his guided democracy; the P.K.I.; and the Army. On the economic front, the situation is, on paper, disastrous.

If one tries to assess Indonesia's prospects on the basis of these disquieting facts, there seems a choice of hypotheses. Assuming a negotiated settlement of the New Guinea dispute, Indonesia would still be left with discouraging prospects, at least in the immediate future. West New Guinea has been running at a net loss to the Dutch of some £13 million a year. It will presumably not cost the Indonesians that much, but there is no reason to believe that it is likely to be an economic asset in the foreseeable future. The need for a huge military establishment would diminish, however, and some saving on the defence budget would then become possible. If the Government then concentrated first on putting its economic house in order, instead of pressing on with building projects under the present eight-year Development Plan (1961–8), then, given Indonesia's enormous potential wealth, a bright future would indeed be in prospect. Unfortunately, however, up to now Dr Sukarno and the politicians who cluster around him have given no sign of grasping the order of priorities that might give Indonesia the future to which her natural riches beckon. Moreover, with the New Guinea issue peacefully solved, the uneasy national unity achieved under the rallying cry of 'Irian Barat' might well soon disappear. Regional problems would reassert themselves and military factionalism might manifest itself again. Much, however, depends on the longevity of the President, who is sixty or so and more robust than his enemies have hoped. Given the failure of the rebellion and of other conspiracies, there seems no likelihood of his being removed by force. General Nasution, sometimes prematurely hailed as the saviour of Indonesia from Sukarno, or from Communism, owes his later career to the President, is loyal, and, moreover, nearly twenty years younger and probably patient enough to bide his time. He is not likely to try to seize power, and he would smash any attempt by the P.K.I. to do so. A military regime seems the most likely to succeed President Sukarno's experiment in guided democracy. And if that future is not too far distant, General Nasution might well be expected to make use of Indonesia's finest economic talent, by bringing back such men as Sumitro and Sjafruddin to run the country's

finances as they did so successfully in earlier years.

Doubtless an awareness of such realities lies behind the Soviet Government's readiness to provide heavy arms for Indonesia and the strident calls for the liberation of New Guinea by the P.K.I. which, in this respect, has clearly been trying to outdo the genuine nationalists in the vigour of their nationalism. If, then, one varies the hypothesis and assumes an attempt to invade New Guinea, the prospects, which were bad enough anyway, suddenly darken. West New Guinea, unlike Goa, cannot be swallowed in one easy military gulp. The terrain is inhospitable and the Dutch defences, though no match for the Indonesian forces, are strong enough to make a short campaign unlikely. If there were a protracted campaign, two unpleasant prospects can be foreseen. One is that General Nasution would be blamed and quite possibly removed from office. The other is that Indonesia would become more and more dependent on Soviet military aid, and at the same time her already serious economic crisis would become really desperate.

BRIAN CROZIER

The Use of World Food Surpluses

ATTENTION is now being focused on world food problems by the Freedom from Hunger Campaign, launched in 1960 by the Food and Agriculture Organization (F.A.O.) of the United Nations as a five-year campaign with the aim of bringing home to all nations the size and urgency of the world's food problems and the need to concentrate effort, research studies, and resources on methods of coping with them. The 'facts' of existing hunger, in so far as they are known, are daunting, and for the future one must take into account the U.N. forecast that the world's population will have doubled by A.D.2000 to over 6,000 million people. Food production will therefore have to be greatly expanded even to maintain the present levels of nutrition, which are inadequate for so many.

Attempts have been made to measure the adequacy of diets both for individuals and for whole populations. To function effectively the human body needs carbohydrates, proteins, fats, vitamins, and various minerals. The prime requirement of the body from its food intake is energy, and the commonly used energy measure is the

(kilo) calorie. An F.A.O. Committee on Calorie Requirements in 1957 worked out the daily requirements of a standard (twenty-five-year-old, fully active) 'Reference Man' and 'Reference Woman' living in a temperate climate as 3,200 calories and 2,300 calories respectively. Proceeding from these reference points and making appropriate adjustments for different body weights and ages as well as for different mean temperatures in varying parts of the world, and also for varying population structures, F.A.O. has arrived at average calorie requirements for the different areas of the world. These requirements can be matched against estimated calorie supplies for these regions, based on total known food output and the calorie yield of different types of food. By this means it has been calculated that, whereas in North America calorie supplies are 119 per cent of requirements and in Europe 115 per cent, the corresponding figures for Africa are 98 per cent and for the Far East 89 per cent. Dr Sen, the F.A.O. Director-General, suggested in a letter to *The Times* last year[1] that between 300 and 500 million people might be getting insufficient calories.

It is necessary to distinguish at this point between under-nourishment, or calorie deficiency, and malnutrition, which is caused by an insufficiently balanced diet. Dr Sen estimated that over and above the under-nourished a further 1,000 million people might be suffering from malnutrition. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has attempted to quantify the amount of food needed to offset both under-nourishment and malnutrition. It estimated the 1962 world gap between actual consumption and minimum desirable nutritional standards as follows: animal protein food equivalent to 1·5 million metric tons of non-fat dry milk, pulse protein equivalent to 150,000 tons of dry beans and peas, fat equivalent to 3 million tons of vegetable oil, and other protein- and calorie-producing foods equivalent to 29 million tons of wheat.[2]

Obviously the figures quoted above are subject to a fair margin of error arising out of their method of computation, and should be treated with reserve. Present information is somewhat slight as to how far the actual activities of human beings in different parts of the world correspond with those of the F.A.O.'s 'Reference Man'. Furthermore there is much less of a consensus of expert opinion on the protein and fat requirement of the human body than there is on

[1] 14 November 1961.

[2] *The World Food Budget: 1962 and 1966.* U.S. Department of Agriculture, October 1961.

calorie requirements. It may therefore be that the food deficiency estimates are unduly pessimistic; rapidly increasing populations and falling death-rates all over the world give rise to hopes that this is so. On the other hand, there is concrete evidence that millions of people are under-nourished, at any rate in certain years or at certain times in most years, and protein-deficiency diseases like kwashiorkor are widespread in parts of Africa and Asia. Life expectation at birth in India is still only thirty-two years.

The conquest of hunger will depend primarily on raising food production and productivity in the developing countries themselves. There is no doubt that the application of the best known techniques to the world's available land would produce enough food to solve the world nutritional problem. Mr Colin Clark has calculated that full cultivation of the world's potential agricultural area (making full allowance for differences in fertility due to climate) at present Dutch levels of productivity would produce enough food to feed 16,000 million people at the consumption levels now enjoyed by people in the advanced countries.[1] To bring about improvements on the required scale is an enormous task and the going is bound to be slow, since progress will largely depend on education and the removal of social obstacles to higher production. Nevertheless it is on such a programme of training and dissemination of new techniques that the F.A.O. pins its main hopes.

At first sight none of the alternative or supplementary ways of combating food shortages seems very encouraging. The limitation of population through birth control would certainly relieve the pressure on food supplies but it cannot be regarded as a major factor in the short term. Migration from areas of land shortage to areas of land abundance is attractive in theory but is not likely to be significant now that political frontiers are becoming increasingly rigid. Trade between areas of abundance and areas of shortage provides only limited possibilities so long as the developing countries lack exportable goods to pay for the food they need. Most of them still depend on the export of primary products for which world demand is sluggish, and since they tend to regard industrialization as the key to their economic development they will be reluctant to use scarce foreign exchange for food imports. Finally, there is the possibility of increasing food aid from countries with production surpluses over and above their requirements and commercial exports.

[1] *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, A.125, Part 3 (to appear).

This study is concerned with the use of food surpluses in raising living standards. Such an approach is not to be seen as an alternative to improving agricultural efficiency in the developing countries, but as a contributor to this end. Too often in the past (and indeed even in some of the present literature of the Freedom from Hunger Campaign) the use of food surpluses has been airily dismissed on the ground that it cannot solve the problem of hunger and is thus no substitute for efforts to make the developing countries more self-sufficient in food. These points may be valid but should not be allowed to obscure the positive contribution food aid can make to development.

Britain is the world's biggest importer of foodstuffs and so she has had to stand on the sidelines in most of the discussions about the accumulation and use of farm surpluses. The scale of her recent surplus of skim milk was ludicrously small in contrast with the amount of publicity it achieved; it represented something like 0·15 per cent of total U.K. milk powder production. The scale of surpluses in other countries is altogether different. The United States holds about 70 per cent of the world's surplus stocks of agricultural commodities,[1] but she is not alone. Canada, Australia, and Argentina all have large stocks of wheat, many European countries have surplus butter, Brazil has too much coffee, and a large number of countries have an excess of sugar. But it is convenient to concentrate on the U.S. situation in view of her dominating position. The inventory of the U.S. Commodity Credit Corporation (C.C.C.) contained, in 1952, 1957, 1960, and 1962, the main commodities listed below in Table I.

This enormous U.S. stockpile is estimated to cost nearly $1,000 million per annum to hold, and if past handling, storage, and transport charges were included the value of U.S. stocks would rise from the $4,700 million in Table I to over $8,000 million.

The present stockpile results from the price-support policies of successive U.S. administrations. In order to hold prices on the U.S. market at a level which would afford a decent income to farmers, the Commodity Credit Corporation is charged with the function of 'buyer of last resort', taking up what cannot be disposed of through commercial channels. Despite simultaneous official policies for the reduction of crop acreages, stocks of the more important commodi-

[1] These agricultural commodities, as Table I shows, are mostly foodstuffs, but also include cotton and tobacco. The term 'food surpluses' is used in this article to cover all surplus agricultural commodities. Cotton, in particular, can be used like food to put idle resources to work without causing inflation.

ties are now more than twice as large as in 1952. It should be remembered, however, that some stocks would probably be held anyway as a national food reserve, and that the existence of a Government stockpile enables the level of commercial stocks to be lower than it might otherwise be.

TABLE I

ESTIMATED U.S. STOCKS OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES*

	million metric tons				*Acquisition cost† of stocks held by U.S. Govt on 4 May 1962*
	1952	*1957*	*1960*	*1962 (forecast)*	*$ m.*
Wheat	7·0	24·7	35·7	36·9	2,221·7
Rice	0·1	0·6	0·4	0·3	neg.
Coarse grains	18·5	44·4	68·0	72·1	1,633·6
Butter	0·03	0·04	0·03	0·1	186·3
Cheese	0·11	0·19	0·15	n.a.	33·0
Condensed and evaporated milk	0·18	0·10	0·10	n.a.	n.s.
Dried skim milk	0·08	0·05	0·14	n.a.	45·3
Linseed and oil	0·41	0·22	0·07	n.a.	n.s.
Edible veg. oils and oilseeds	0·24	0·29	0·40	n.a.	n.s.
Tobacco	1·56	2·0	1·74	n.a.	326·8
Cotton (lint)	0·60	2·47	1·63	1·7	249·4
			Other commodities		3·2
			Total		4,699·3

n.a. = not available n.s. = not specified

* F.A.O., *The State of Food and Agriculture 1961* and *Commodity Review 1962*.

† U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Commodity Credit Corporation Weekly Report of Price Support Commodities*.

A comparison of the figures for stocks in Table I with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's food deficiency estimates suggests that the entire present U.S. stocks would, if properly distributed, meet calorie requirements for over a year but would not add up to a year's supply of the other foods which are in short supply. In other words, whilst under-nourishment could theoretically be tackled this way for a short period—one calculation is that existing surpluses would be sufficient to provide the calorie needs of 450 million people for a year, or could yield 200 calories a day to the population of Asia for three years—malnutrition could not.

Unfortunately even the solution of the limited problem of under-nourishment by distributing food surpluses would run into a host of difficulties. The fact that the world's hungry are not used to eating wheat, the main surplus food, and that they lack ovens and

bakeries to convert it into edible food is one often quoted difficulty. Then there are important organizational and distribution problems. Even where adequate storage and transport facilities exist, one has to consider cost factors very closely. Thus in the case of wheat, ocean transport from America to Asia costs £3–4 per ton and F.A.O. calculated storage charges in India and Pakistan at £4–5 per ton per annum, including interest charges. Taking into account the additional cost of distribution to the consumer, these figures suggest that the cost of getting U.S. wheat surpluses to Indian consumers might be about £10 per ton on top of the present basic wheat price of £24–27 per ton. This naturally prompts the question whether, if aid is to be given, this is the most productive form it can take. Would the funds required for moving food to the needy be better used in building fertilizer factories, for example?

The effects of surplus disposal on other producers must also be considered. There are those who argue that surplus food can act as a deterrent to increased agricultural production in developing countries by depressing food prices or at least preventing them from rising. In fact it is doubtful whether existing price levels impede increased agricultural production more than social, cultural, and technical obstacles, but there is no doubt that indigenous farmers may feel their interests are being harmed. There is also the possibility of food aid disrupting international trade in foodstuffs. U.S. surpluses are of such a size that their speedy distribution could shatter the world price structure unless safeguards were adopted. They could also close a particular market to imports. Large-scale distribution of U.S. grain to Brazil might undermine normal commercial exports there from Argentina, and transfer of food to Asian countries is a potential threat to traditional rice exports from Burma and Thailand. The United States has in fact been very careful to consult extensively with other suppliers prior to initiating surplus food aid programmes, but has not completely succeeded in allaying suspicion and resentment.

Finally, there are the political obstacles. The transfer of surplus commodities from rich countries to poor is only possible on an aid basis, since the needy countries have little foreign exchange available and they tend to give priority in spending what they have to the purchase of capital goods. Thus to dispose of surpluses they must either be sold for 'soft' currencies (including dollars at concessional rates) or given away. There is some strong opposition inside America to large-scale programmes of this kind. Some Americans feel that

U.S. give-aways already cost too much and bring in too little politically or commercially. Many taxpayers want to put an end to the costly price-support system which gives rise to surpluses and fear that food-aid programmes will only delay such a reform. There are also political difficulties at the receiving end. Governments dislike admitting that food is short for their people—an extreme case is China's refusal to approach the United States for help.

In spite of all these actual and potential difficulties, the logic of using surplus food for welfare and development has been accepted and has inspired programmes of impressive size. The United States as the main producer of agricultural surpluses has naturally been in the van, but others have played their part. During the 1950s Canada provided gifts of wheat valued at over $100 million to Colombo Plan countries and Australia has also made donations through the same channel. Switzerland and Canada are amongst those who have given dried milk. But the scale of U.S. programmes has far outstripped those of other countries; total U.S. special food exports under Government programmes between 1953 and 1961 amounted to $10,600 million. For the period July–December 1960 special exports totalled 29 per cent of all U.S. agricultural exports, and during this period 70 per cent of all U.S. wheat exports, 28 per cent of coarse grains exports, 59 per cent of rice exports, and 68 per cent of dairy products exports were accounted for by Government programmes.

The main flow of U.S. food aid goes under the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, subject to later amendments, better known as Public Law (PL) 480, though aid has also been given through other channels such as the Mutual Security Programme. PL 480 was introduced soon after the first big build-up of surpluses in 1952–3, and by the end of September 1961 agreements had been signed under the Act with over one hundred countries. Easily the most important commodities supplied (well over half in value) have been wheat and flour, followed by cotton, fats and oils, rice, feed grains, and tobacco. The leading recipients have been India notably, and also Pakistan, Poland, Spain, Turkey, and Yugoslavia.

Title I, the first section, of PL 480 covers sales of food for foreign currencies, which are loaned back, or sometimes donated, to the recipient Governments for economic development purposes, or accumulate in special accounts. Probably about 60–70 per cent of the proceeds under Title I of PL 480 have represented a substantial

addition to the resources of the recipient countries in either of these ways. But quite an important proportion has been allocated to promoting the demand for U.S. exports, for loans through the Export–Import Bank to U.S. subsidiaries or domestic firms for business development and trade expansion in the receiving country, for U.S. Government expenses in the country concerned, and for miscellaneous other purposes such as military procurement and cultural activities. Title II of the Act provides for grants of food as emergency famine relief or for economic development purposes; Title III provides for surplus foods, which might otherwise be wasted, to be bartered for strategic materials or used to help the needy within the United States or for assistance abroad.

TABLE II

EXPORTS OF U.S. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS UNDER GOVERNMENT PROGRAMMES 1960–1

$U.S. million

Total Agricultural Exports			4,944
of which: Total under Government programmes			1,541
PL 480 Title I	932	Wheat and flour	819
Title II	146	Cotton	230
Title III Barter	132	Feed grains	163
Donations	145	Fats and oils	106
Mutual Security Act	186	Rice	80
		Other products	143
Total	1,541	Total	1,541

Source: *F.A.O. Commodity Review 1962.*

Theoretically U.S. food aid has not represented a foreign exchange saving to recipients, since the surplus disposal programmes operate in conformity with the F.A.O. agreement stipulating that agricultural products made available under special programmes must be additional to ordinary commercial requirements and should not displace normal exports. But in practice it is hard to believe that recipients of PL 480 aid would not have had to purchase at least some of the food commercially if it had not been available on special terms. Against any saving from this cause must be offset some foreign exchange loss occasioned by the fact that PL 480 receipts enable the United States to meet part of her bills for embassy and commercial expenditure abroad in local currencies instead of dollars.

The main benefit to the recipient country is not in fact a direct saving of foreign exchange but is the ability to increase its rate of development without running into inflation, and PL 480 food

imports are making this possible in several countries. In many of them there are large reserves of unemployed and under-employed labour, which has not been put to work for fear of the increased wage bill producing shortages and inflationary rises in the price of consumer goods, especially food grains. The Indian Development Plans in particular have been criticized for their cautious approach to the creation of new jobs, but the caution of the planners is understandable in a country where, according to F.A.O. calculations, up to 90 per cent of the additional income of rural workers is at present spent on food. This compares with other estimates of 70 per cent for Indian town dwellers and the F.A.O. figure of 15 per cent for advanced countries in the West.

Additional supplies of food provided as a gift or long-term loan can neutralize these dangers. The proceeds from the sale of the food can be used to finance labour intensive investments such as rural road building and irrigation works, from which the yield in the form of higher agricultural output is potentially high. The surplus food can also contribute to higher agricultural output by acting as a reserve to back up reforms. Farmers cannot always afford the immediate loss of income which a change in their cultivation methods or acceptance of land reforms would entail, but if their subsistence can be guaranteed by the authorities they may be induced to undertake productive new investment in their land. Surplus food should thus be regarded not purely as a consumption item, but as capital, as Shonfield and others have argued. The concept of food as capital has been widely accepted in the physiological sense that better fed workers are more efficient and that the provision of free or subsidized canteen meals may raise the productivity of labour, but further investigation is now needed of the possibilities of using surplus food to finance investment, especially in agriculture.

Acceptance of the role of food in financing development is already embodied in the existing U.S. PL 480 programmes and in the experimental three-year World Food Programme of the United Nations, approved earlier this year, under which $100 million of food, cash, and services is to be used both for relief and development purposes. The approach remains somewhat tentative however, partly because food surpluses in the advanced countries are still regarded as temporary inconveniences. But in fact it remains unlikely that surpluses will disappear quickly even if positive steps in that direction are taken. Although Canada's and Australia's stocks have suddenly been reduced, largely as a result of the un-

expected emergence of China in the world market, U.S. stocks have remained at a very high level despite increasingly large PL 480 programmes in recent years. If the trends in American agriculture in the 1950s, when U.S. farm output rose about 20 per cent in spite of a 30 per cent reduction in the labour force and a fall in both prices and acreage sown for crops, continue, then the U.S. Administration's official policy of reducing surpluses through restrictions on production can hardly succeed. It is difficult to see how the acreage reduction programmes could keep pace with productivity increases on this scale, and in any case a strong farm lobby would be likely to oppose drastic measures to restrict output. Meanwhile *per capita* consumption of some of the main surplus food products is actually declining in the United States; in advanced countries people tend to eat less wheat and flour, not only proportionately but absolutely, as they become richer.

Another factor making for increased surpluses in America is likely to be increasing self-sufficiency in Western Europe, at present taking about 40 per cent of U.S. farm exports, as the E.E.C. agricultural policy is introduced. The levels of support prices under the policy remain to be fixed but they will be high enough to ensure farmers a reasonable standard of living, and at these levels they may well stimulate increased production at a time when productivity through increased mechanization should also be climbing fast. The E.E.C.'s own experts have predicted that the Six will, by 1965, become net exporters of some foods, such as dairy produce and sugar which they at present import, and that they will cease to be major importers of wheat. Looking forward to 1970 F.A.O. has said that 'the broad (world) trend towards surplus formation (in grains) would seem likely to persist' and that 'the sizeable oversupply of wheat that could emerge by 1970 would be due, in part at least, to a continuing increase in Western Europe's wheat production with the resultant possible emergence of wheat surpluses in the E.E.C.'[1]

The probability of over-supply of foodstuffs in advanced countries at a time when poorer countries can profitably use these surplus products for development purposes has rightly been described as a fortunate coincidence. Food aid is not of course a panacea for the difficulties besetting developing nations. To be used to best advantage such aid may have to be accompanied by an increased flow of foreign funds. It must be carefully administered and wisely used and, until a good deal more research into the most profitable allo-

[1] F.A.O., *Agricultural Commodities—Projections for 1970.*

cation of food aid has been made, there will be mistakes and waste. Conflicts of interest between donors and recipients have arisen, and will do so again, over whether to use funds for general economic development plans or for specific projects. Definite proposals must be worked out for the future use of local currency funds accruing to the donor country, since attempts to convert local currencies back into foreign exchange on the maturity of development loans could well bring disastrous consequences to the recipient economy. Similarly the continuity of supplies must be ensured if effective forward planning is to be possible, as the Americans have recognized in signing their four-year agreement with India.

The capacity of recipient countries to absorb additional food aid may also be a limiting factor. Even though there seems little reason to accept the somewhat arbitrary and apparently unsupported statement by F.A.O. in its booklet *Development through Food—A Strategy for Surplus Utilization* that surplus food represents from one-sixth to one-quarter of the external resources required for economic development in the under-developed countries, it must be recognized that inadequate storage and transport facilities and shortage of capable supervision to administer development projects will certainly impose short-run limitations.

Clearly there is room for extensive research and experimentation before the full potentialities of using food as aid can be exploited. But in addition to more extensive information, a more positive approach is needed by the advanced countries of the West. They should accept the logic of the situation created by their desire to preserve a high standard of living for their farming communities, namely that surpluses are likely to increase and become a permanent feature of their economies. When, as in the United States, farmers have to be paid to take land out of cultivation and the cost of undistributed surpluses is huge, it may well turn out to be as expensive not to produce and distribute surpluses as it is to do so. In such circumstances policies designed to help domestic farmers and to support developing countries can be simultaneously pursued with advantage and without a heavy foreign exchange cost. Has the time not even come for the West to recognize their opportunity and to plan purposefully the production of much larger surpluses specifically for use as aid?

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Notes of the Month

The Mystery of South West Africa

BAFFLED astonishment greeted the communiqué issued on 27 M by the South African Government and the two members of United Nations Special Committee on South West Africa after t visit to the territory. No mention whatever was made of the Gove ment's policy of *apartheid*; instead Drs Carpio and de A respectively Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the U.N. Commit rejected allegations that conditions in the territory constitu threat to international peace, found unproven charges that the te tory is being militarized, and simply recorded the South Afri Government's aim to speed up social and economic developm

Ten days after the issue of the communiqué, Dr Carpio clai he had not agreed to the final text, owing to illness. This effectively refuted by Dr Verwoerd himself in a detailed staten of events in the last days of the visit. Dr Carpio, who is also p manent U.N. representative for the Philippines, was withdrawn his Government to take up the post of Ambassador to Cairo, an was reported that Dr de Alva was also to be withdrawn from Committee by his Government. Whether they will be availabl answer to the United Nations for their final report remains uncl

But the mystery deepens as one pieces together the events of last year. The 1961 Report of the Committee on South West Afri of which Dr Carpio was Vice-Chairman, was a revolutionary do ment. It stated that the Committee was 'convinced that, shor compulsive measures within the purview of the Charter, the pr lem of South West Africa cannot be solved in a manner that will p tect the lives of the indigenous inhabitants of the territory and sure the maintenance of international peace and security in Afri It went on to make a series of recommendations involving revocation of the Mandate and the institution of a course of ac leading gradually to self-government and independence. And the first time, it called upon the Security Council to take 'all s measures as may be required to implement these recommendatic

[1] U.N. Document A/4926.

The moderation and caution of previous Reports of the same Committee underline the significance of this Report.

Following the 1961 Report, the General Assembly adopted a number of resolutions roughly in line with the Committee's recommendations but excluding a specific call for action by the Security Council. Instead they appointed a new Special Committee on South West Africa, with instructions to enter the territory by 31 May 1962. Dr Carpio, the only member who had also served on the previous standing Committee, was appointed Chairman. The terms of reference for the new Committee were specific. They were asked to consult with the South African Government on the following subjects (*inter alia*): evacuation of all South African military forces from South West Africa; repeal of all laws or regulations confining the indigenous peoples to Reserves and denying them freedom of movement, association, and expression, and of all other laws which establish and maintain the 'intolerable system' of *apartheid*; and preparation for U.N.-supervised elections based on universal suffrage.

Dr Carpio then began negotiations with South Africa's representative at the United Nations for a visit to the territory. In the course of a public statement he said 'to allow us into South West Africa would put South Africa in a very good light', and added that it must be realized that 'some of us' do not share the extreme views of some African countries, and would not resort to radical methods. 'We are trying to find a way to implement the General Assembly resolution . . . and do it in a way that would be acceptable to South Africa.'[1] Soon after Dr Verwoerd invited Dr Carpio, together with his vice-chairman, Dr de Alva of Mexico, to South Africa for talks to be followed, if these went well, by a visit to the territory. He refused to invite the whole Committee, since he felt this would compromise the South African non-recognition of United Nations rights over the territory.

Meanwhile, in London on 10 May, Mr J. Kozonguizi, President of the nationalist South West African National Union, regretted the acceptance of the invitation 'on Dr Verwoerd's terms'. He said that Drs Carpio and de Alva had accepted 'on condition that they would not raise the most important points in the General Assembly resolution of last December'. He has not since enlarged upon this statement: was it based on routine suspiciousness of Dr Verwoerd's motives, or did he have information withheld from the rest of us?

[1] *The Star* (South Africa), 7 April 1962.

The visit itself was conducted in conditions of maximum secrecy with an almost total ban on press coverage. It is no exaggeration to say that the communiqué took everyone completely by surprise. Rumours of Dr Carpio's praise for *apartheid*, and other statements made at private meetings, were either denied or not subject to verification. The *Cape Argus* of 26 June 1962, commenting on the news that the two delegates were being withdrawn from the Committee by their Governments, summed up what is widely accepted in South Africa as a ludicrous situation: 'These delegates were not appointed . . . by their government, but by the U.N. . . . it is for the committee and the U.N. to judge them. If their governments take action against them, it will be widely accepted that Mexico and the Philippines have no wish to examine the South West Africa question objectively. . .'

The use of the word 'objective' raises one final question of fact. The *Windhoek Advertiser* of 2 April, reporting the arrival of a special South African troop train at Walvis Bay, said that military spokesmen were not prepared to disclose the present strength of the base, 'the eleventh to be established by the South African Defence Force'. It added that the Commanding Officer said it should be clear 'that the men will undergo training in desert combat'. Yet apparently the United Nations delegates 'found unproven' charges that the territory was being militarized. The mystery deepens; it is profoundly to be hoped that the United Nations will insist on a proper accounting by its delegates as soon as possible.

The French Nuclear Striking Force

AT Ann Arbor, Michigan, on 16 June, the United States Secretary of Defence, Mr McNamara, delivered the sharpest attack that has yet been made by the American Administration on the development by America's allies of independently controlled nuclear forces. Whether or not this attack was also aimed at Britain, it was certainly aimed at President de Gaulle's project of a *Force de Frappe.*

France exploded her first nuclear device in February 1960, and in December of that year enacted a five-year military programme of which the central feature was the creation of the *Force de Frappe.* The law provided for the expenditure over the period 1960–4 of more than N.F.5,000 million (£350 million) for research into and production of nuclear weapons; N.F.850 million (£60 million) for a strategic bomber force; and N.F.1,250 million (£90 million) for research on ballistic missiles.

The programme falls into two parts. The first object, which the sums voted in 1960 are intended to achieve, is the creation by the mid-1960s of an interim strike force, based on fission weapons in the kiloton range, and a fleet of medium-range bombers. France has exploded five nuclear devices, the largest of them in the kiloton range, and it is hoped there will be operational, low-yield atomic bombs ready for delivery some time next year. It is hoped also that by then she will have begun production of the fifty *Mirage IV* jet bombers that are to provide the basis of her interim delivery system. The second part of the programme is concerned with replacing this bomber force by 1970 with a system of intermediate-range ballistic missiles. Recent statements suggest that a seaborne missile force, analogous to the U.S. fleet of Polaris-carrying submarines, is the form that this will take. France is also known to be working on a fusion bomb that will magnify the destructive power of the fission explosives on which she will at first depend.

France's plans for her future as a nuclear Power are a good deal more ambitious than those apparently entertained at present by Britain. The British Government has laid great stress in recent years on its interdependence in nuclear affairs with the United States. The targets of R.A.F. Bomber Command are co-ordinated with those of S.A.C.; the two nations operate a common warning system; and the British Government has made clear, in its abandonment of the *Bluestreak* missile project, and its plan to equip the V-Bomber Force with the American *Skybolt* missile, that it is resigned to reliance on American weapons. France, by contrast, appears determined to make herself a self-sufficient nuclear Power. 'Il faut que la défense de la France soit française,' said President de Gaulle in his address at the Ecole Militaire in November 1959. 'Il est indispensable que la France se défende par elle-même, pour elle-même et à sa façon.'

By contrast, however, France's ability actually to achieve nuclear independence is very much less impressive than Britain's. France is beginning her programme a decade later than Britain, with a smaller industrial and technological base and without the tradition, on which Britain was able to build, of a great strategic air Power. The French *Mirage* bomber force, when it is achieved, will do no more than place France where Britain was several years ago. Moreover, it is difficult to see how France can move forward to her more distant objective of a strategic missile force without large-scale collaboration with other countries. France, of course, has always been

anxious to receive assistance from the United States in constructing her nuclear force, while remaining determined to exert independent control over it. The United States, however, has turned a deaf ear to repeated French requests for the supply of equipment or information in the fields of warhead construction, rocketry, and nuclear-powered engines for submarines. The view that the U.S. Government should relax its attitude towards France in nuclear affairs, or that it should at least cease to practise the discrimination in favour of Britain and against France, that is so galling to French pride, has recently found powerful advocates in America. But it does not seem that the recent decision of the Administration to supply jet tankers to France for the aerial refuelling of her bomber force yet betokens any fundamental change of attitude. The more the United States persists in her present coldness, the more President de Gaulle is likely to turn towards Britain and Germany as potential collaborators.

President de Gaulle's Foreign Policy

'FRANCE,' wrote President de Gaulle in the opening paragraph o his war memoirs, 'is not really herself unless she is in the fron rank; ... only vast enterprises are capable of counter-balancing th ferment of disintegration inherent in her people; ... our country .. must aim high and hold itself straight, on pain of mortal danger. In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without greatness.'[1] The 'vast enterprise' which has occupied de Gaulle and the French nation over the past four years has been that of decolonization, and with the accession of Algeria to independence, the task is virtually complete. Now, as M. Pompidou, the Prime Minister, told the National Assembly on 27 April, 'European policy has become the very foundation of French foreign policy'[2] and this is a new factor of considerable significance, not only for France, but also for her allies.

An exposition of President de Gaulle's conception of Europe, which has lost none of its relevance in the two years since it was uttered, can be found in his press conference of 5 September 1960. 'What is necessary to build Europe,' he said, 'is to proceed, not by following our dreams, but according to realities.' Europe's 'realities', he explained, 'the pillars upon which it can be built', were 'its constituent States'. They were 'the only entities that have the right to make decrees and the authority to act. To imagine that we can create effective means of action ... above and beyond the member States is nothing but an illusion.' It was true, he admitted, that there were 'a number of more or less supra-national bodies' and 'as long as nothing serious happens, they function fairly well without too much trouble, but as soon as something dramatic happens and a serious problem has to be settled, it can be seen that no High Authority has political authority: it is only the States which have it.' Although he rejects a federal Europe in favour of what M. Debré has called *l'Europe des patries*, de Gaulle does not wish to restrict concerted European action to the economic sphere. In the same press conference, he went on to say that 'to ensure the regular co-operation of the States of western Europe is something which France considers desirable, possible, and practical in the political, economic, cultural, and defence fields.'[3]

[1] Charles de Gaulle, *The Call to Honour 1940–2*, London, 1955, p. 9.
[2] *Journal Officiel, Débats, Assemblée Nationale*, 27 April 1962, p. 825.
[3] I have quoted from one of the most accessible translations of the European section of de Gaulle's press conference of 5 September 1960 in P.E.P., *France and the European Economic Community*, London, 30 January 1961, pp. 9–11.

The breakdown last April of the talks on a draft treaty of political union for the European Economic Community shows how far President de Gaulle has been able to carry his Common Market partners with him. The Bonn declaration of July 1961 indicated the willingness of all six Governments to extend their co-operation into the political and cultural fields, but divergences soon revealed themselves as the Fouchet (later Cattani) committee struggled to turn their pious aspirations into a legal document. Opposition, led by Belgium and Holland, to a French draft presented in January[1] centred upon three main issues: the role of the existing European Communities, a European defence policy, and the participation of the United Kingdom. The French proposal to place the existing European Communities firmly under the control of a council of heads of government operating according to the unanimity rule was correctly seen as an attempt to stifle any tendency towards supranationalism, and the proposed European defence policy was interpreted as a threat to N.A.T.O. Although important modifications were obtained on these two points as a result of Italian intervention, the negotiations finally broke down on 17 April because of the Belgian and Dutch refusal to sign any political treaty until the United Kingdom had joined the Common Market.[2]

By attaching such importance to British entry, the Belgian and Dutch Governments clearly revealed their uneasiness, not about *l'Europe des patries* as such, but about the role its architect intends it to assume in world affairs. Everyone, it seems, is agreed that the balance of power within the Atlantic alliance must change and that the days of unchallenged United States supremacy are over. 'This new Europe,' declared Mr Heath at the W.E.U. council meeting on 10 April, 'will be a great power, standing not alone but as an *equal* partner in the Atlantic alliance, retaining its traditional ties overseas and fully conscious of its growing obligations towards the rest of the free world';[3] and President Kennedy, three months before his Philadelphia speech on 4 July, agreed with Professor Hallstein, president of the E.E.C. Commission, that 'the continuing evolution of a strong, closely knit European entity presents to statesmen of the west a historic opportunity to build an Atlantic partnership founded on close co-operation between two *equal* partners'.[4] But there is a

[1] The outlines of the French draft were 'leaked' to the Dutch newspaper, *Algemeen Handelsblad*. A summary appeared in *Le Monde*, 21–22 January 1962.
[2] *Le Monde*, 19 April 1962.
[3] Cmnd. 1720, p. 8 (my italics).
[4] From the text of the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of Pro-

growing suspicion, on both sides of the Atlantic, that President de Gaulle's European policy is aimed, not merely at redressing the balance within the Atlantic alliance or even at increasing French influence in its counsels, but at the creation of a 'third force', under French leadership, between the United States and Russia.

Support for this thesis can be found in some of de Gaulle's recent speeches. At Guéret on 19 May, for example, he said that political union must take place 'so that our western Europe will form an entity, so that there will not only be two opposing colossi in the world, but also a great force and a great diffusion of wisdom, and it is Europe alone which can provide this element'. It would remain part of an alliance as long as a threat remained, he went on, 'but our hope is that the day will come when Europe will play a distinguished role as arbiter of world peace'.[1] However, it is only fair to add that he does not see this 'arbitration' taking place as the result of any diplomatic action, but rather as the inevitable consequence of the evolution of Europe's political structures. 'There will no longer be only the two colossi which we know,' he declared at Limoges on 21 May, 'there will also be Europe and then, in the last resort, when the virulence of regimes has disappeared—for *all* regimes are fated to disappear—the peoples will come together once more and co-operate.'[2] One result of these changes, it appears, is that the Iron Curtain is scheduled for demolition. 'Then, this great Europe—from the Atlantic to the Urals—this Europe, with the help of the New World which is its son, will be able to solve the problem of the misery of 2,000 million human beings in the underdeveloped countries.'[3]

Of course, de Gaulle realizes that this happy state of affairs, if indeed it ever comes about, is several generations distant. In the meantime, he has certain more limited objectives and such talk, by frightening the Americans, may help him to attain them. The most notorious of his immediate objectives is to acquire an independent French nuclear deterrent, which has been roundly condemned by the U.S. Government as 'inimical to the community interests of the Atlantic alliance'.[4] Besides considering it humiliating for a sovereign nation like France to delegate the responsibility for its defence to another country, de Gaulle has practical reasons for not wishing to

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fessor Hallstein's visit to Washington on 12 April and printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 May 1962, pp. 769–70 (my italics).

[1] *Le Monde*, 20–21 May 1962. [2] *ibid.*, 22 May 1962.

[3] Speech at Montbéliard on 17 June (*ibid.*, 19 June 1962).

[4] This was the phrase used by President Kennedy at his press conference on 27 June (*N.Y. Times*, 28 June 1962).

rely upon the United States' nuclear deterrent. 'America and the Soviet Union are capable of striking each other directly and, no doubt, of destroying each other,' he said at his press conference on 15 May. 'It is not certain that they will risk it. Nobody today can know when, how, or why either of the great atomic powers would use its nuclear armament. One only needs to say this to realize that, as far as the defence of France, the battle of Europe, and even the World War as they were conceived when N.A.T.O. was born are concerned, everything is, at the present moment, thrown into question.'[1]

This position is very similar to that of the British Government, although the latter is careful to avoid any suggestion that it believes that the United States might not use her nuclear weapons to defend Europe. In British statements, such an ungentlemanly thought is attributed to the Russians.[2] There are signs that the U.S. Government is trying to allay European suspicions by reviving the Eisenhower–Norstad proposal of a multilateral N.A.T.O. nuclear deterrent, which President Kennedy so conspicuously dropped when he took office. Mr Rusk is thought to have mentioned the idea to President de Gaulle and to the French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville, on the occasion of his visit to Paris at the end of June. If so, it is unlikely to have been greeted with much enthusiasm. Indeed, M. Couve de Murville is reported as having said that it would be premature to consider such a proposal when the French nuclear force was still in its early stages.[3] When it was last put forward, at the end of 1960, the French took the view that an idea was not enough: a precise plan was needed. Even then, like the British, they doubted the feasibility of political control over a multilateral force.[4]

Another of President de Gaulle's objectives is to obtain a greater voice for France in overall Western policy-making. Originally, this took the form of a request that N.A.T.O. should not confine itself to Europe, as the main threat to the Western position was now else-

[1] *Le Monde*, 17 May 1962.

[2] Cf. Mr Watkinson's speech to the N.A.T.O. Triennial Review Committee on 27 June (*Commonwealth Survey*, 3 July 1962, pp. 562–3).

[3] *Le Monde*, 21, 22 June 1962. The French suspicion that the whole idea is an attempt to bury their nuclear deterrent before it is born is characteristic. De Gaulle has shown a similar attitude to the test ban talks at Geneva. As he said in a message to Mr Khrushchev in February, 'the halting of tests would in no way by itself constitute a beginning of disarmament, and the monopoly of the countries that possess nuclear weapons and that would keep this decisive means of domination in their possession would by no means be affected by this' (*N.Y. Times*, 20 February 1962).

[4] Cf. M. Messmer's speech in the Senate on 30 November 1960 and M. Debré's in the National Assembly on 6 December 1960.

where in Asia and Africa, and that France, because of her global responsibilities, should form a directorate with Britain and the United States inside the alliance to formulate global policies. This proposal met with considerable hostility from the smaller N.A.T.O. Powers and, in any case, the intermittent crisis over Berlin during the past three years has shown that, as far as N.A.T.O. is concerned, the chief danger is still very much in Europe. De Gaulle seems, therefore, to have slightly modified his position on this issue. M. Peyrefitte, the French Minister of Information, outlined the current proposals in an interview on Canadian television on 30 June. 'In the absence of an extension of the geographical area of the pact,' he said, 'France proposes that, outside N.A.T.O. and for world problems which N.A.T.O. cannot resolve, the three western powers which have global responsibilities shall co-operate closely. There is no question of a three-power directorate within N.A.T.O., but of a close co-operation of the Big Three outside N.A.T.O. in order to fill N.A.T.O.'s gaps.'[1]

The basis of de Gaulle's claim to be consulted on global policy is the French position in Africa. Although her former colonies in Africa are now all independent, France still preserves a considerable amount of influence in them. In a recent and revealing speech to the Senate, M. Couve de Murville said that, although some of the newly independent States were in the French Community and others were not,[2] 'what is essential in this matter . . . is that France has concluded co-operation agreements with all these States, that relations are good and that we are continuing, at the same time, to give them our help and to develop our influence and our culture among them, thus continuing the civilizing task which was formerly known under the name of colonization.'[3] A recent analysis of these co-operation agreements[4] shows that they are indeed very binding, with their provisions for common diplomatic, defence, and financial policies. Economic assistance, running at about $300 million a year according to *The Economist*,[5] and attempts to maintain as favourable a position as possible for these countries in their relations with the Common Market add material inducements to legal

[1] *Le Monde*, 6 July 1962.

[2] Only the Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Gabon, the Malagasy Republic, and Senegal remain members of the French Community, the proposed new institutions of which have yet to come into operation.

[3] *Journal Officiel, Débats, Sénat*, 12 June 1962, p. 482.

[4] Maurice Ligot: 'Vue générale sur les accords de coopération', *Revue Juridique et Politique d'Outre-mer*, Janviers-Mars 1962, pp. 3–20.

[5] 20 January 1962.

formulae. In return, France has obtained some African support in the United Nations, notably over her atomic tests in the Sahara and her condemnation of U.N. action in Katanga.

But any rational appraisal of the French position in Africa must reach the conclusion that it is built on sand. Two of the new States—Mali and Togo—have refused to sign any political agreements with France. Two others—Cameroon and Upper Volta—have refused to enter into common defence arrangements. Even in the remainder, there is considerable pressure upon their Governments to take an 'African' rather than a 'French' line, as was shown in the General Assembly debate on Bizerta[1] in August of last year. Moreover, this trend is gathering momentum. The Union of African and Malagasy States, formed at Tananarive last September, has as its secretary-general M. Tevoedjre from Dahomey, who is 'a sympathizer of Nkrumahism and the aims of the Casablanca group',[2] while its defence secretariat is situated in Ougadougou, the capital of Upper Volta, one of the States which refused to enter France's West African defence pact. As for North Africa, events in Morocco and Tunisia over the past few years lead one to wonder how long the newly independent Algerian State will tolerate the existence of the nuclear bomb-proof French naval base at Mers-el-Kebir, although the Evian agreement lays down that it must remain in French hands for at least fifteen years.

There can be little doubt that de Gaulle, who is nothing if not a realist, is fully aware of all this. In fact, it is probably one of the main reasons why he is now concentrating upon building up a united Europe under French leadership, as a kind of insurance policy which will enable France to continue to talk to the United States on something like equal terms. At the moment, there is no serious rival to France as the leader of Western Europe. West Germany has been effectively neutralized by means of the 'Paris–Bonn axis' and the close personal relationship between President de Gaulle and Dr Adenauer, in which the former is undoubtedly the dominant partner. Some have even gone so far as to suggest that de Gaulle's 'hard' line over Berlin is specifically aimed at preventing the reunification of a Germany which might threaten French hegemony in Europe.[3] If Britain enters the Common Market, however, he has

[1] See 'Tunisia, Bizerta, and the Sahara', *The World Today*, November 1961.
[2] *West Africa*, 21 April 1962, p. 425.
[3] *Le Monde* thus expressed some surprise at the commitment in the recent de Gaulle–Adenauer joint communiqué to the reunification of Germany, although it noted that this would occur only 'in a situation of general peace' (7 July 1962).

good reason to suspect that French leadership will not go unchallenged and this is why, as the Belgians and Dutch have realized, his attitude towards British membership is the acid test of his intentions.

'Of all the forms of Europe, I like that of the Six best,' de Gaulle is reported as having said at a recent dinner-party, 'but the other five are determined to bring England in',[1] and when he has bothered to mention the possibility of British entry into the Common Market in his speeches, he has usually referred to it as taking place at some indefinite future date.[2] The French Foreign Minister was rather more expansive in a speech to the National Assembly on 13 June. The whole question of the future of Western Europe, he maintained, had been thrown into the melting-pot as a result of Britain's application to join the Common Market. 'It is no longer a question . . . of knowing how the treaty which creates a union of European States will be drawn up,' he declared, 'it is a question of knowing which European States will henceforth belong to this union at the same time as the Common Market.' Limited to the Six, he went on, the Common Market accounted for 23·5 per cent of world trade. If Britain, and as a result of her entry, Denmark and Norway, joined, it would account for 34 per cent of world trade. The Common Market, and with it Europe, would then no longer be a purely regional grouping. 'The weight it will assume, its network of interests and obligations in all continents will be such that it will of necessity become a global system.' Britain must make up her own mind about joining, although, if she did so, 'she must truly enter the Common Market, that is to say become an integral part of it and not be juxtaposed to it.' But whatever happened, he concluded, 'France intends to pursue the task of European construction. A politically united Europe seems indispensable, both to enable the nations which belong to it to play together the role which belongs to them and in order to create an element of equilibrium which is lacking in the world. This united Europe will certainly be more modest, but also more cohesive, if it remains limited to the Six. It will be looser, but perhaps more impressive overall, if Britain and others find their place within it.'[3]

[1] *Paris-Presse-l'Intransigeant*, 29 June 1962.

[2] He spoke at Montbéliard of European unity taking place 'perhaps, one day, with England' (*Le Monde*, 19 June 1962).

[3] *Journal Officiel*, *Débats*, *Assemblée Nationale*, 13 June 1962, pp. 1,664–5. It was at the end of this speech that 289 deputies walked out of the Chamber as a gesture of protest at not being allowed to register their disapproval of de Gaulle's European policy by a vote. The fact that opponents of his policy can now, on paper at any rate, muster a majority in the National Assembly offers

This speech was widely interpreted as heralding a more conciliatory French attitude towards the British application to enter the Common Market, which stemmed from the de Gaulle–Macmillan talks at the beginning of June. De Gaulle was said to have described Macmillan's attitude as a 'revelation' and French officials put out all sorts of stories that Britain was prepared to enter the Common Market at virtually any price.[1] But even if Britain has modified her position, there is no reason to believe that France has. M. Couve de Murville's remark that Britain must become 'an integral part' of the Common Market if she joins, and not be 'juxtaposed to it', is revealing in this respect. The French have always suspected the British of wanting to have their cake and eat it: i.e. of wanting to obtain the benefits of the Common Market while, at the same time, retaining their Commonwealth links and preferences, or of wanting to become part of Europe while, at the same time, preserving their 'special relationship' with the United States. This de Gaulle will never accept. Indeed, if his aim is to keep France the leader of Europe, he cannot afford to accept it.

Now, as a result of the recent Adenauer–de Gaulle meeting, there is to be a renewed effort by France and West Germany to get an agreement on European political union, with a Common Market 'summit' in September. In view of the fact that the British negotiations have struck a sticky patch—Dr Adenauer envisages them dragging on 'deep into 1963'[2]—this can only be interpreted as yet another attempt to reach a political agreement without the United Kingdom. Although, on this occasion, it seems to have been Dr Adenauer who pressed for the resumption of negotiations, President de Gaulle cannot have been unsympathetic. However, if both men are hoping, for whatever motives, to present the British with a *fait accompli*, they will have to win over not only the Italians, but the Belgians and the Dutch, and perhaps some of Dr Adenauer's colleagues in the West German Government as well. They are almost certain to find this a difficult, if not impossible, task.

GEOFFREY WARNER

some prospect of a change in French policy when de Gaulle finally goes.

[1] *The Guardian*, *The Times*, 5 June 1962. These stories were promptly denied by British officials.

[2] *The Times*, 14 July 1962.

The Legal Aspects of Outer Space

THE PROBLEM OF SOVEREIGNTY

ALTHOUGH there is considerable confusion over the legal status of outer space certain points have now emerged sufficiently clearly for discussion. A great deal of the confusion arises from the conflicting interpretations given to the Paris Convention of 1919 and the Chicago Convention of 1944. Both of these Conventions recognize that every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty in the airspace above its territory; on the basis of this sovereignty, a State may exclude foreign aircraft from its territory and, in cases where the entry of such craft is expressly permitted, may control and regulate their passage.

Unfortunately, the meaning of the word 'airspace' was not defined or even discussed at the Chicago Convention. Nor, despite the fact that there had been a few rocket flights of V-2s prior to the time of the drafting of the Convention, was the problem of rockets and satellites in the airspace above a State's territory envisaged or anticipated by the parties to the Convention. Therefore, in the absence of a specific treaty or rule of customary international law clearly defining the exact height up to which a State may claim sovereignty over its airspace, the position is still undecided.

In an attempt to resolve this uncertainty a highly imaginative array of criteria for determining the meaning of 'airspace' has been advanced. One suggestion is that a State should exercise sovereignty over an unlimited height, a suggestion known as the *usque ad coelum* theory. Other proposals include a definition of airspace in terms of aerodynamic lift (namely, up to the height at which an aircraft can fly) or, alternatively, to extend airspace up to the limit of the atmosphere, or up to the height over which a State may exercise effective control. A further suggestion permits a State to exercise sovereign rights up to a height where aircraft might operate and then a second area of up to 300 miles is designated as a contiguous zone in which there would be a right of transit for all non-military flight instrumentalities. One may also note the proposal that sovereignty should only extend over that area whose lower or inner boundary is the lowest altitude above the earth's surface at which an artificial satellite might be put into orbit around the earth.

Many of the above suggestions are manifestly impractical. For example, the proposal to define airspace in terms of the atmosphere only exacerbates the problem, as there appear to be as many

definitions of atmosphere as there are writers who attempt to define it. Even the attractive solution in terms of aerodynamic lift is bedevilled by such inventions as the X-15 which appears to possess characteristics of both aircraft and spacecraft.

Most of the criteria advanced above presuppose that the line must be drawn somewhere and the discussion concerns where it may best be drawn. However, it may be argued that attempts to draw such lines in space are extremely arbitrary, artificial, vulnerable to fluctuation with new scientific data, difficult to formulate in practice, and perhaps even more difficult to enforce. Many writers therefore are opposed to a solution expressed in terms of zones, areas, and demarcation lines and they suggest instead that Governments should concentrate on the regulation of specific activities. Such writers maintain that any extensive projection of sovereignty into the airspace would be contrary to basic astronomical facts[1] and that no claim to sovereignty, no matter how extravagant, would be sufficient to guarantee a State's security. The claims of the Chicago Convention to be applicable here are often summarily dismissed on the ground that, drawn up in 1944, it merely concerned the regulation of aircraft and could not purport to regulate modern spacecraft.

It will be appreciated that the principal objection to the activity criterion is the extreme difficulty there would be to obtain agreement concerning those activities which are permitted and those which are forbidden. Frequently, it would be almost an impossible task to disengage the civil from the military aspects of a particular space activity. It might be quite simple to agree that firing an intercontinental ballistic missile with aggressive intent would not be a permissible activity in space. But what about a reconnaissance satellite? Although a space vehicle of this type might well be intended for peaceful scientific meteorological purposes, yet it also possesses potential military value and on this ground might be considered a non-peaceful instrument.[2] It is also pertinent to ask, in the event of agreement on permissible and non-permissible activities, how one is to ascertain whether a particular spacecraft is engaged in a lawful or an unlawful activity. Some form of inspection system would appear to be necessary, although politically such a solution would stand little chance of success at the moment.

[1] See Jenks, 'International Law and Activities in Space', in *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 1956, p. 101.

[2] See McDougal and Lipson, 'Perspectives for a Law of Outer Space', in *The American Journal of International Law*, 1958, pp. 407–31.

Whether one resolves the sovereignty problem in terms of activities or demarcation lines may be a question of some importance. If, for example, a so-called 'spy in the sky' satellite were to be placed in orbit 100 miles from the surface of the earth, it is important to know if the satellite would be violating the sovereign airspace of those countries over which it passed. If so, certain measures might be taken against it, first for an infringement of State air sovereignty and secondly for a breach of domestic law concerning espionage. If, however, the satellite was outside a particular State's airspace, then any action taken against it by that State would have to be justified on some other basis, such as self-defence. On the other hand, if one adopted an activity criterion and it was agreed that the use of reconnaissance satellites for espionage was an illicit activity, then such an activity would be illegal no matter where it took place. The problem is all the more acute as espionage in peace-time, in the absence of any explicit treaty to the contrary,[1] is almost certainly not a violation of international law.

If one leaves the nebulous realm of academic discussion and embarks on a more down-to-earth discussion by examining the practice of States in this matter, the position is still rather ambiguous. The American Government, through its legal adviser Mr Loftus Becker, has made several statements on its approach to the problem. Inevitably, such statements reflect the conditions in which any Government official has to work; as such, they are studiedly tentative and imprecise and are formulated to preserve for the United States her bargaining power in any future negotiations on outer space. An illustration of this was the statement by the American legal adviser, a few years ago, that it was '... important to note that one of the suggestions that have been made is that the airspace should be defined to include the space in which there is any atmosphere and that astronomically the earth's atmosphere might be said to extend 10,000 miles above its surface. Consequently, it would be perfectly rational to maintain that under the Chicago Convention the sovereignty of the United States extends 10,000 miles from the surface of the earth...'[2] This should not be interpreted to mean that the United States is claiming 10,000 miles; it is merely reserving room for manœuvre for the future.

[1] See Maxwell Cohen, 'Espionage and Immunity—Some Recent Problems and Developments', in *The British Yearbook of International Law*, 1948, pp. 404–14.

[2] See Becker, 'Major Aspects of the Problems of Outer Space', reprinted in *Space Law, A Symposium* (Washington, U.S.G.P.O., 1959), p. 372.

As for the Russian jurists, they have tended to dismiss the relevance of the Chicago and Paris Conventions in this context and they suggest that '... states in deciding the matter of the altitude limit of their sovereign rights will base themselves on the need to guarantee their security, and certainly not on whether there are traces of the atmosphere at a given altitude and what is the precise density of the gas cloud at one or another distance from the earth...'[1]

Despite the Delphic pronouncements of Governments and their lawyers, the plain fact remains that States have not considered it necessary to obtain the prior permission of other States over whose territory a satellite is to orbit. Nor, up to the present time, have States protested against such flights and claimed that they constitute a violation of their sovereign airspace. If one considers that well over 100 satellites have now been placed in orbit, each of which has passed innumerable times through the space above State territory, then it may reasonably be suggested that there is now a rule of customary international law allowing a State to place a satellite in orbit for peaceful technical and scientific purposes. Such a principle, together with the well-established rule of international law permitting a State to exercise exclusive sovereignty in its airspace up to about fifty or seventy miles (the exact height, as already mentioned, is still undetermined), would then form the foundation of the law for regulating space activities.

No doubt States will refer to a variety of interests (scientific, commercial, political, and military) in deciding whether to retain this present position or to attempt to claim a more extensive measure of sovereignty over their airspace or take action against certain offensive activities in space.

It is not suggested that there is a legal vacuum or 'lacuna' in the law concerning those areas over which States do not exercise sovereignty. As on the high seas, legal norms are still applicable. As a Russian jurist has said, 'All universally accepted rules of International Law (inadmissibility of the use of force in solving international disputes, non-injury of foreign citizens and their property, governmental responsibility for the activities of their representatives, etc.) apply to the cosmos as well.'[2] One might add to this list—the principles and provisions of the U.N. Charter and the Inter-

[1] See 'Artificial Satellites and International Law' (Summary of Article by Kovalev and Choprov), in *The Soviet Yearbook of International Law*, 1958, p. 147.

[2] See Korovin, 'International Status of Cosmic Space', in *International Affairs* (Moscow) 1959.

national Court of Justice, the general principles of civilized nations, juridical equality of access to the resources of outer space, respect for territorial sovereignty and integrity, and the right of self-defence.

OWNERSHIP AND LIABILITY

With the constant development of the technique of re-entry and the safe return to earth of satellites, it is pertinent to ask who owns a fallen manned or unmanned space vehicle. Inevitably, the simple answer that most jurists give to this question is that a space vehicle constitutes the property of the State launching it.

In the attempt to determine the legal status of a space vehicle, many picturesque analogies have been advanced. Such vehicles have been compared to balloons, meteorites, bottles in the sea, and bullets. This last analogy is a favourite one, reflecting the view that a satellite, like a bullet, is abandoned by the act of firing. Similarly, it used to be argued that the State which launched a satellite was no longer in a position to exercise effective control over it and so the satellite became a *res derelicta* and was no longer owned by the launching State. But nowadays a State is in a position to exercise such close control over a satellite that the satellite must be regarded as the projection of a State's activity and so belong to the launching State. If, however, the satellite was engaged in an illicit activity and landed by accident in territory not belonging to the launching State, such satellite might well be subject to confiscation. It has also been suggested that spacecraft would fall under the definition of 'aircraft' contained in the Annexes to the Chicago Convention (and so be governed by its provisions) as soon as they re-enter the earth's atmosphere and begin to sustain themselves by 'the reactions of the air'. Such an argument is extremely tenuous however, and the Chicago Convention is unlikely to apply in this context.

It would be difficult to find any aspect of space law so diverse and complex as that relating to the definition and delimitation of the liability of States for space activities causing injury or damage. Who should be liable, whether liability should be joint or several, the type of interest to be protected, the kind of conduct giving rise to liability, the relevance of the place of injury, the delimitation of liability, the machinery to determine liability, and the process of enforcement are all questions which are susceptible to, and have received, varying answers under different legal systems. It is usually submitted therefore that an international Convention is the only solution. One of the most important questions is whether liability

should be based on a 'fault' principle involving negligence or wilful intent or whether some form of strict or absolute liability ought to be applied; most jurists would seem to favour some form of strict liability. It has also been suggested that an International Guarantee Fund should be established to pay for the damage caused by satellites.

TERRITORIAL CLAIMS

The desirability of the principle that celestial bodies should not be susceptible to occupation and should be placed under some kind of international control is reflected in the approach by most writers and statesmen on this subject. This approach could, however, be interpreted to imply that the moon and other celestial bodies may, in the absence of any international agreement to the contrary, be considered as *res nullius* and so subject to occupation in accordance with the classical rules of international law.

On the other hand, one might argue that, as the resources of the moon may be shared by all, therefore the concept of *res communis* (like the high seas) is more appropriate than that of *res nullius*. It may also be argued that the classical principles of territorial occupation were formulated and applied for such a different purpose and in such a different context that it would be absurd to transmute them and attempt to apply them to such a totally new situation as the occupation of the moon. However, mere unilateral declarations of intention or exhortation by States on this subject will not be sufficient to give rise to a legal obligation to allow the moon to be shared by all States, instead of exclusive occupation by one. As an interim solution a treaty comparable to the one on Antarctica is required,[1] 'freezing' all claims to sovereignty for the duration of the treaty.

NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION

What is the most suitable approach to the problem of formulating a law for outer space? It could be urged that, to a certain extent, the law ought to anticipate the facts in outer space and that lawyers ought not to allow *de facto* situations to crystallize to the point where the law can do nothing but canonize existing facts. The extreme advocates of this type of approach suggest the immediate codification of all or several of the legal aspects of outer space. The opposite school, adopting the so-called 'common law' approach, maintain that the law must follow the facts and proceed on a case-by-case

[1] See 'Agreement on Antarctica', *The World Today*, January 1960.

basis. They submit that any attempt at codification would be utterly unrealistic when so little is known of the potential uses of outer space and would only encourage States to make extravagant claims.

However, even if overall agreement is unlikely, some measure of international regulation and co-operation will be necessary for the fruitful exploration of outer space. Such steps as advance notification of launching sites and firing schedules, the filing of flight plans and descriptions of weight, load, and size, the use of agreed radio codes for the reception of data from space, and the widespread dissemination of such data can all play a useful part in achieving some measure of international functional co-operation. In this respect one may refer to the Public Registry established at the United Nations on 14 March 1962. Russia and the United States have already submitted to this Registry details of the satellites they have launched and sustained in orbit. Such a Registry is also a vital factor in the development of some form of 'nuisance' principle to be applied to outer space. That such a principle of 'reasonable use' and 'give and take' is urgently required is manifest from the protests following the launching by the United States of needles into space.

It is encouraging to note the recent foundation of two new European space organizations—the European Launcher Development Organization and the European Space Research Organization. Several of the U.N. Specialized Agencies, especially the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Telecommunications Organization, are also sensitive to the legal problems arising from the exploration of outer space and the need to achieve some measure of functional agreement and co-operation. In 1959 the United Nations established a committee on the peaceful uses of outer space, and in May and June of this year a legal sub-committee of the United Nations committee met in Geneva. Unfortunately, although many topics were discussed, including the rescue of astronauts and spaceships making emergency landings, and liability for accidents, no agreement has yet been reached on any of the proposals submitted.

J. F. McMAHON

General Franco's Political Opponents[1]

THE regime of General Franco cannot be considered within a normal political context. Franco has to a great extent been kept in power by the support of the big landowners and the monopolies which are in control of the Spanish economy; politically they form a coalition of different groups held together solely by loyalty to Franco himself. Since 1957 the Spanish Government has consisted entirely of a coalition of pressure groups, the most important being that represented by the Opus Dei.

It is difficult to attempt a classification of political groupings in Spain because the ideological positions normal in the rest of Europe are confused there by other problems.[2] If we consider, for instance, the loose grouping of various interests which in Italy is called the Christian Democratic Party, we find in Spain: (*a*) the so-called 'Social Christians' grouped around the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Martín Artajo, and the Bishop of Málaga, Angel Herrera, people taking up a position which is not very 'social', purely paternalistic, and not at all democratic; (*b*) others, also known as 'Social Christians', grouped around José María Gil Robles, who is perhaps not very 'social' either, but is openly in favour of a regime on the Western European pattern; (*c*) the so-called Left-Wing Christian Democracy, 'Izquierda Democráta Cristiana', around Manuel Jiménez Fernández, perhaps more to the left than Gil Robles, and with the important difference that Gil Robles advocates a restoration of the monarchy while Jiménez Fernández wants a referendum first.

The position of the monarchists is even more difficult to analyse than that of the Christian Democrats. This difficulty is clear if we consider the composition of the Privy Council of Don Juan, the Chairman of which is the poet, Pemán, and the Vice-Chairman the former Republican, former Falangist Alfonso García Valdecasas, who takes up a more or less liberal position. In the ranks of the monarchists are to be found all sorts of people, ranging from the Opus Dei, represented by Rafael Calvo Serer and Florentino Pérez Embid, to Christian Democrats like Gil Robles. Between these two extremes there are traditionalists like Arauz de Robles,[3] francoist

[1] This article was written before the Government changes announced on 12 July.

[2] The background to this article may be found in 'The Economic Background of the Spanish Situation', in *The World Today*, September 1960, and 'Spain and the Future', in *The World Today*, January 1961.

[3] *In 1959 a group of traditionalists (Carlists) recognized Don Juan as the legitimate King.*

monarchists like the Marqués of Luca de Tena, the owner of *ABC*, classical monarchists like Pedro Saín Rodriguez, and so on. The monarchists, apart from Gil Robles, have no real programme or policy, and Gil Robles is probably in the first place a Christian Democrat and only secondly a monarchist.

The importance of the monarchy stems from the fact that it would seem to have the support of the Army. It is highly probable that Don Juan will eventually become King, since a frontal attack of the left-wing forces is not really likely. Among the monarchists, the so-called 'Unión Española' (Spanish Union) is particularly worthy of note. This is a highly amorphous group of people, ranging from extreme right-wing members like Satrústegui to radicals like Enrique Tierno Galván; they support the idea of a liberal monarchy, some because they believe that only a liberal monarchy has any chance of success today, others because they believe it is the easiest way to get rid of General Franco.

The left-wing opposition comprises the 'Union of Democratic Forces' which has its origins in a coalition of the exiled political groups, who accepted the so-called Pact of Paris of February 1957. Under this Pact most of the political groups in exile, the Socialists, the Basque and Catalan groups, the Republicans, and one of the two sections of anarchists,[1] drew up a programme advocating a provisional Government and a referendum to decide the final regime for Spain. In 1960 the U.D.F. was set up with the same programme and the same support, apart from the Catalans and the anarchists, and with the addition of the so-called Left-Wing Christian Democracy. The Catalan forces refused to enter the Union on the ground that it did not provide for a concrete programme dealing with the Catalan problem; they formed themselves into a separate coalition of all Catalans apart from the Communists. The anarchists have also united into one group, and probably one of the main conditions for such unification was their withdrawal from the Pact of Paris. The various Republican Parties have also been unified under the name of A.R.D.E., 'Acción Republicana Democrática Española' (Spanish Republican Democratic Action). It is noteworthy that all these exiled groups advocate the same solution for the problem of Spain's future regime.

Inside Spain there is one group of the centre which has refused to

[1] The following were excluded: the Communists, the so-called 'pure' anarchists, and some small groups, like the Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista, the Socialist Union, and others.

enter the U.D.F., namely the so-called 'Partido Social de Acción Democrática', founded and led by Dionisio Ridruejo. They consider that the most urgent thing is not to make decisions about the future regime (they take it for granted that there will be a restoration of the monarchy), but to set up a political coalition to organize resistance to Franco and devise plans to deal with the most urgent problems after Franco is overthrown.

Between the spring of 1959 and the autumn of 1961 the opposition inside Spain was not so active as it had been previously. The Stabilization Plan inaugurated in July 1959 made conditions more difficult for the workers, together with the threat of unemployment; moreover, for the most active there was the possibility of emigration. In addition, the utter failure of the attempt at a general strike in May 1959 produced discouragement and disorientation. As for the right-wing opposition, its enthusiasm for opposition was much less keen after the success of the Plan, apart from a small group of intellectuals and another of liberal monarchists. These liberal monarchists have been handicapped in the last few years by the growing collaboration between Franco and Don Juan. In this period of comparative political inactivity, many of the small groups which had previously developed disappeared or merged together: for example the A.S.U. (Universities Socialist Union) split up in the winter of 1960, some of its members joining the F.L.P. (see below), others the Socialist Youth, others retiring from active politics.[1]

The F.L.P., 'Frente de Liberación Popular' (People's Liberation Front), on the contrary has developed a great deal. Originally a small group of mainly extreme left-wing Catholics similar to those belonging to the 'Esprit' movement in France, who did not want to join any of the established Catholic political parties nor any of the political groups in exile, the F.L.P. has gradually attracted a great part of the leftist youth, who also did not want to join any of the traditional parties. The F.L.P. now has a considerable following, as is proved by the many widespread arrests of its members. Its position is one of extreme radicalism, it speaks continually of revolution, and is clearly influenced by many of the recent revolutionary movements in other parts of the world.

The Communist Party is somewhat isolated, though not so much so inside Spain. Since the crisis following the failure of the strike of 1959, it has been very active and has gained ground con-

[1] It has lately been reconstituted.

siderably in the last few years. Its position is comparatively moderate; it advocates a National Front with a limited programme and a referendum on the future of the regime.

It is difficult to assess the political strength of the anarchists; it is a fact that very few have been arrested in recent years, but they may have strong support among the more middle aged, who, in view of past repression, are more cautious than the youth of the country. They may resurrect themselves at the end of the Franco regime.

With the autumn of 1961 a revival of activity took place among the opposition parties. As far as the workers were concerned, the effects of the Stabilization Plan mentioned above, together with a better knowledge of conditions abroad through the tourist trade and reports from emigrants, began to revive a climate of rebellion. It was the same with the students. In the first months of 1962, unrest was widely felt; the students of Madrid and Barcelona launched into what might be called mass action at university level, with demonstrations in the streets; the metal workers in Beasain, the peasants in Cadiz, and so on, followed suit.

But at the same time, a new crisis threatened business circles. The success of the European Common Market, together with the lessening of importance of the Free Trade Area, is a great menace to Spain's economy. In the present conditions the only alternative to association with the Common Market is a great degree of socialization of the economy, together with large-scale planning and what might be called in Marxist terms a democratic revolution. This fact, together with the more liberal social policy of the Vatican, has determined a new dynamism on the part of the right-wing forces, this time far more widely spread than three years ago; their programme aims at the liberalization of the regime, restoration of the monarchy, and association with the Common Market.

The great issues in these right-wing circles have been the question of the monarchy, already considered, and of closer connection with Europe. 'Europeanism' has always been an outlet in Spain for opposition activities, though many people labelled 'Europeanist' have not been 'Europeanist' at all. In recent months a great revival of sincere or pretended 'Europeanism' has taken place for three main reasons: (*a*) the need felt by business circles; (*b*) the popular attraction of the European standard of living; (*c*) the opinion held by many people that association with Europe would mean the end of much of the medieval Spanish social structure. There are many sorts of 'Europeanists' beginning with Ullastres and the Opus

Dei (who are connected with German and other business circles).

Many sectors of the opposition decided to take advantage of the meeting of the European Movement planned to be held in Munich in June 1962 in order to get together. This idea of a meeting of the political forces in exile and those inside Spain, ranging from liberal monarchists to Socialists, dates back to four years ago; it is important to remember this fact in order to set the Munich Conference in the perspective of the general crisis of the moment.

Against this general political background the great strikes began at the beginning of April. These strikes are of great significance; for one thing, they lasted a considerable time; secondly, the first reactions of the regime were comparatively mild, though later there was brutal repression; thirdly, there was a great wave of solidarity all over Spain and also of international solidarity in support of the strikes. Last but not least, the strikes achieved, to a certain extent, a victory for the workers. All this points clearly to a new fact; for the first time in twenty-three years the working class has become one of the main factors in the Spanish political scene.

Immediately, the Munich Conference acquired a new importance, on the one hand because it was the culmination of a great crisis, on the other hand because this crisis precipitated a bold stand on the part of many of the participants and a strong reaction on the part of the regime.

To sum up the situation at the present moment: association with the Common Market, as envisaged by Opus Dei, with no important social change and with the working classes paying the whole bill, is no longer possible; secondly, the working class has appeared as an important factor on the political scene; thirdly, international opinion seems to be decided on opposition to Spain's association with the Common Market unless substantial internal reforms take place; fourthly, it seems clearer than ever that the Church is about to change its position radically, even though the bold positions taken at the time of the strikes have since been repudiated by some Bishops.

There are some unknown facts. What about the six Banks? Their position is not very clear, but one should not forget the four points above. What about the Army? It appears to be united, but one should not forget that the Army's prime consideration is the maintenance of 'order' and in other parts of the Spanish-speaking world the Army has supported the first stages of a controlled evolution; a *pronunciamiento* is not likely. What about the United States? It should be remembered that in most of the Spanish-speaking world

the United States has always advocated a controlled change when dictatorships are in their last stages.

What of the future? The regime's first reaction to the crisis was violent, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs said it marked the end of five years of Spanish diplomacy (European foreign policy). However the first insults in the press against 'those of Munich' have disappeared; there is general talk of an abolition of the Falange, the end of the influence of the Opus Dei, and a Government of the extreme right-wing of Christian Democracy (the Herrera group). The following facts point in this direction: the strikes, the Munich Conference, and the beginning of a change in the attitude of the Church have made a great impact, and large sectors of the bourgeoisie and the middle classes are thinking in terms of economic reform and political change; secondly, the huge accumulated reserves might cover two years of controlled inflation and this, together with the 'mirage of the Common Market', might perhaps permit the Government to deal with the re-awakening of the masses; thirdly, the Church, business circles, and the United States are interested in a controlled evolution; lastly, the unity of the Army could guarantee such gradual evolution if the Army could be converted to this idea. The real problem is Franco himself; it is doubtful that he could be convinced of the need for gradual change, but he has always been an extremely realistic man. Within the opposition groups an attempt is being made to convert the declaration of Munich into a political coalition of Gil Robles and the Socialists (together with some liberal groups), under the leadership of Gil Robles. There are still difficulties, but it would seem that this is bound to happen sooner or later. At the same time the forces of the left are very actively reorganizing themselves and trying to build up a real force inside Spain.

The whole situation is fascinating. The right-wing forces are trying to bring about a formal change, without any real change of power and with the left-wing forces tamed, and they are very powerful and very intelligent. Most of the left-wing forces also want peaceful change, but they aim at a fully democratic regime with substantial changes that would bring Spain in line with the progressive countries of the world. Who will win is an open question.

VICENTE GIRBAU-LEÓN

The Political History of Cameroon

THE unification of the two Cameroons in October 1961 has caused even more confusion than before concerning the correct name of this country or congeries of countries. The changing nomenclature reflects its political history. 'Cameroons' is the traditional English form (derived from a Portuguese plural) and is correctly used for the pre-colonial area so named (originally the Wuri Estuary or Rio dos Camaroes—'River of Prawns'), which was under British influence in the nineteenth century up to the German occupation in 1884. The form without an 's', 'Cameroon', was also loosely used, mainly as an adjective. From 1884–1914 the German official form for the name of their protectorate was 'Kamerun'. In 1916 there was a provisional Anglo-French subdivision of the conquered German territory, confirmed (with some modifications) by the granting of League of Nations Mandates to the two Powers in 1922. The British Mandate was called by the full English form 'Cameroons', the French by the gallicized form 'Cameroun'.

The British Mandate consisted of mere strips of territory on the Nigerian border, shaped like two penknife blades pointing at each other, the smaller down from the north, the longer up from the south. They did not touch however, the space between being occupied by the northern Nigerian town of Yola. For administrative purposes the 'British Cameroons' (as the Mandate was generally, if not correctly, called) was divided into the Northern Cameroons and the Southern Cameroons. This introduced a further complexity for the gazetteers: the Southern Cameroons consisted only of the southern half of the southern strip—not the whole of it—while the Northern Cameroons consisted of the northern half of the southern strip, *plus* the isolated northern strip.

This basic pattern of nomenclature survived to 1960. However, neither the Northern Cameroons nor the Southern Cameroons, for most of the period of their existence, formed administrative units under those names. The terminology, 'Northern' and 'Southern' Cameroons, was a classifying device made necessary in reports to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League, and ultimately to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. In the inter-war period, and up to 1949, the Southern Cameroons was called 'Cameroons Province' (a province of the Nigerian Southern Provinces; then of the Eastern Provinces; then of the Eastern Region). From 1949 to 1954 it was divided into two: a smaller

Cameroons Province, and Bamenda Province. The Northern Cameroons was never separately administered until 1960, forming until then part of three provinces of the Northern Region of Nigeria. From 1954–60 the 'Southern Cameroons' existed for the first time under that name as a semi-autonomous unit in the Federation of Nigeria, its two provinces being abolished. All discussion of Cameroons unification primarily involved the (British) 'Southern Cameroons' and the (French) 'Cameroun'.

'Cameroun' shared in the political development of the French West African territories and proceeded by stages to independence on 1 January 1960.[1] From this date appears an official English form for the ex-French territory: 'Cameroun Republic'. On 1 October 1960, with Nigerian independence, the whole British Cameroons was separated from Nigeria pending a United Nations plebiscite to decide its future. During this period of separation the 'Northern Cameroons' became, for the first time, a separately administered entity (in theory, at least, if not in practice). In February 1961, the Northern and Southern Cameroons voted separately in a plebiscite, by which the 'Southern Cameroons' elected to join the 'Cameroun Republic', and the 'Northern Cameroons' to rejoin the Federation of Nigeria. The putting into effect of these decisions resulted finally in the present nomenclature. In July 1961 the Northern Cameroons was incorporated anew in the Northern Region of Nigeria, its new-found unity being perpetuated as 'Sardauna Province'. On 1 October 1961, the 'Southern Cameroons' and the ex-French 'Cameroun Republic' united into a bilingual federal State of which the official English-language title is the 'Federal Republic of Cameroon'. As a final contribution to the historical geography of the area, the old 'Southern Cameroons' is now the 'West Cameroon' state of the Federal Republic, while the old 'Cameroun Republic' is the 'East Cameroon' state. There are official French forms for all these terms. Neither the form 'Cameroons' (with the 's') nor the German form 'Kamerun' now has any official status. The former retains in English its historical and non-political connotations in discussion of the whole area; the latter has strong political connotations as will be seen. (It remains to add that it is always 'the' Cameroons, never 'the' Cameroon.)

Cameroon is situated where the West African coast turns south (what has been called the 'hinge of Africa'.) It was in the nineteenth century the last outpost of the British-dominated Niger Delta trad-

[1] See 'Political Prospects for the Cameroun', *The World Today*, July 1960.

ing zone. In 1884 however Bismarck chose this borderline area for one of his hit-and-run African colonies. The number of German traders in the area was an indicator of its marginality in the trade of the dominant British interest. This can be ultimately traced back to the fact that, in the Cameroons hinterland, the belt of dense populations lying behind the long Guinea coast comes to an end. There is, for all practical purposes, only one compact block of population—the inland Bamileke and Bamenda plateau peoples, numbering nowadays upwards of 800,000 people. The change in demography is at least partly due to a change in terrain. Considerable stretches of Cameroon are mountainous and the southern part of both states is heavily forested. The total population of Cameroon is about 4 million (East Cameroon: 3,200,000, West Cameroon 800,000).

The Germans made heroic efforts with their colony, although for some years after the annexation it suffered from inadequate finance and from inexperience in colonial administration. One of their solid achievements was the establishment of a highly organized plantation industry on the fertile slopes of Mount Cameroon. This enterprise involved a *laissez-faire* attitude to the dispossession of the small coastal population, and constant pressure for the recruitment of labour from the denser inland populations. The social upheavals started then still have their repercussions. After 1907 and a change in Berlin colonial policy, numerous irregularities were corrected and the German administration had, by 1914, entered a period of consolidation.

Through the long period of the French and British Mandates the policy on both sides was to assimilate the new territories to their existing colonial systems. The French did not acquire such a liability as the British: the development of their sector was energetic and their road network in the 1930s excited the reluctant admiration even of German colonial irredentists. The British Mandate was slightly smaller than had been hoped by some, but it was mainly an exercise of 'infilling' on the Nigerian border, and only incidentally took into account certain historical and sentimental claims. It was never intended that the 'British Cameroons' should be separately administered, and the administrative pattern arose which has been described. The (British) Northern Cameroons people soon forgot the period of German rule which was extremely brief there, and the process of merger with their ethnically related Muslim neighbours in Northern Nigeria was almost complete. Only in 1960 were the links briefly, but not seriously, threatened.

The case of the British Southern Cameroons was somewhat different. It was both compact enough to permit and inaccessible enough to demand a separate Provincial Administration. It contained, as provincial headquarters, Buea, a former capital of the German Protectorate, together with most of the German plantation zone. It possessed a coastal, Creole-type middle class (dating from the old English Baptist settlement of the nineteenth century), together with a small and heterogeneous population given some unity by a tradition of labour migration to the coast. The new province never benefited, except at the coast itself, from the economic relics of German rule. The plant and establishment of the estates were kept on a care-and-maintenance basis until the final decision on Mandates was reached in 1922. Then followed two years in which attempts were made to find British buyers for the estates, which failed—partly because of a lack of plantation experience among the traditional British trading interests in Nigeria (who were the natural buyers), partly because of doubts as to the future of the Mandates. In 1924 almost all the estates were bought back into German hands. For two or three years afterwards the returned owners had to build up again from scratch, to be faced almost immediately by the economic crisis of the 1930s, and, after a recovery from this, by the outbreak of war and the internment of the almost entirely German managerial staff. Another period of care-and-maintenance followed, and it was not until the purchase and vesting of the estates in a public body (the Cameroons Development Corporation) in 1949, that the estates began to develop again and (under the terms of the Corporation's charter) to bring their profits to the Southern Cameroons administration. In the Southern Cameroons, therefore, there was a genuine impression of economic stagnation after the German period, despite the sound basis of administration and social advance which was to be the main contribution of the British period, and which produced a strong pro-British sentiment. By 1951, the year of the Macpherson Constitution in Nigeria, which introduced ministerial government and confirmed the development of semi-autonomous regions, there was still only a dry-season connection between coast and hinterland in the Southern Cameroons, while at no time has there been a road connection with the Northern Cameroons.

Political consciousness in the Southern Cameroons began at the coast, under the leadership of an intelligentsia almost entirely educated in Nigeria, with the support of a small body of educated men

rom the inland areas, including the more densely populated but hen extremely undeveloped Bamenda plateau. With the operation f the 1951 Constitution these men were elected to the House of Assembly of the Eastern Region. Under the provisions of the Constitution certain ministerial portfolios there and at the Federal entre in Lagos were reserved to Trust territory representatives. The Cameroons members feared the highly sophisticated N.C.N.C.[1] Government in the Eastern Region, and were only too conscious of he backwardness and political immaturity of their small territory. It was during this period that there came into being what I have alled the 'Kamerun Idea'.[2] The orthography is significant; it symbolized the theme which singled out this special area from the nainstream of Nigerian political development by stressing its ormerly separate colonial history, and it also carried with it the ideal f the reunification of the 'two Cameroons'. The German 'Kamerun', like ancient 'Ghana' elsewhere, became a political idea rather han a historical concept. Ogoja Province of the Eastern Region ad similar reasons to fear the rapid political advance proceeding nder the leadership of the Ibo people. The Southern Cameroons rovinces (by then two) had a means to hand of organizing themelves. The Kamerun United National Congress, although a petty ocal party in Nigerian terms, had a tiny drop of the power of the Jnited Nations in its veins: the reserved ministerial seats were ultinately a concession to the United Nations Trusteeship status of the erritory.

It was the force of this idea that achieved the separation of the Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region, as a quasi-federal erritory of the Federation of Nigeria of 1954, under the leadership f Dr Emmanuel Endeley—not however without splitting his party, or Southern Cameroons politics had to contend with a contrary tream. The long British and Nigerian connection had created genuine ties of interest and sentiment, which for some politicians vere strong enough to counteract their local patriotism. At each tage of constitutional advance the 'Kamerun Idea' lost the support f politicians who considered that Southern Cameroons interests ad been adequately safeguarded. In 1953 the K.P.P. (Kamerun People's Party) split off and opposed the creation of a separate utonomous Southern Cameroons. They lost, but the victorious and renamed) K.N.C. (Kamerun National Congress) began to

[1] National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons.
[2] *West Africa* (Nos. 2147, 2148), 1958.

split almost immediately after 1954 into a group who wished the territory to develop into a full Region of the Federation of Nigeria but no further, and a group who wished to secede from Nigeria and then to unify with the French Trust territory. The Premier, Dr Endeley, was the leader of the first group (the majority); the other group crystallized eventually under the leadership of J. Foncha, a representative of the rural hinterland. In the years after 1955 the latter gradually built up a following which in 1959 won him the premiership of the Southern Cameroons on the platform of secession. At various times after this his party (the Kamerun National Democratic Party) showed signs of strain. There was a strong vein of opinion that secession from Nigeria alone should be the party's policy, if necessary with a period of continued British Trusteeship. In this matter neither Mr Foncha nor Dr Endeley was an entirely free agent. The United Nations General Assembly dictated the pace of the later stages. Despite confusion of aim, in the plebiscite of February 1961, unification with the Cameroun Republic (by then independent) was the party's stand, and it carried the day.

The 'Kamerun Idea' always resided with the quasi-Left of Southern Cameroon politics. In this unsophisticated area, the term 'Left' can only mean the party most able to mobilize inarticulate mass feeling, in which fear of the over-educated and over-sophisticated was a dominant strand. This feeling could be expressed as anti-Nigerian feeling, or, within the territory itself, as suspicion on the part of the numerically powerful Bamenda rural population of the polished remoteness of Dr Endeley and the coastal intelligentsia. Mr Foncha, unlike Dr Endeley, always remained in touch with mass feeling; with each incipient split in his own party he hopped nimbly to the leftward. There is strong evidence that he had not originally expected to have to make the last leap into outright reunification so soon. The grading of various degrees of differentiation from or opposition to Nigeria was the only public issue to give shape to Southern Cameroons political alignments, which otherwise followed local, even village, lines. K.U.N.C., K.N.C., K.P.P., K.N.D.P., K.P.P.-K.N.C. Alliance, C.P.N.C.: all these initials represented various permutations of this issue. Significantly enough the 'K' of Kamerun occurs throughout, until, at the 1961 plebiscite, Dr Endeley led the pro-Nigerian elements unequivocally against the 'Kamerun Idea', and dropped the 'K' for the 'C' of 'Cameroon'.

It has been necessary to speak of a 'quasi-Left' because Mr Foncha's party was in fact highly traditionalist and conservative in

its image. The language of anti-imperialism was Dr Endeley's. In the French Trust territory of Cameroun, however, there had developed in the 1950s a movement that was quite explicitly and internationally of the Left. In the early nationalist politics of French West Africa the R.D.A. (Rassemblement Démocratique Africain) movement, which had an overtly Marxist ideology, also dominated Cameroun. The Trust territory, almost certainly because of the opportunities it offered to gain a hearing at the United Nations, was always of special interest to the Left. When the R.D.A. virtually developed into national parties for each territory and renounced a Marxist ideology, part of the Cameroun group under the leadership of Dr Roland Moumié retained its left-wing affiliations and split off as the U.P.C. (Union des Populations Camerounaises). In 1955 it staged an abortive rising and was driven underground. Dr Moumié received asylum, with some dozen supporters, in the Southern Cameroons, where, in 1957, they unsuccessfully contested an election, before being deported by the Nigerian Government. He kept in contact with operations from Cairo, and later from Conakry, eventually being poisoned in Geneva, under mysterious circumstances, in November 1960. The U.P.C.'s organization, methods, and propaganda were formed on the Communist Party model; its policy was one of revolutionary action against French imperialism, and the underground party embarked on a ruthless programme of terrorism. U.P.C. also had the 'Kamerun Idea': unification of the two Cameroons was part of its policy. Despite the French 'C' in its name, the party literature always referred to the two Trust territories as 'East and West Kamerun'.

The entry of the U.P.C. cross-current into British Southern Cameroons politics in 1955–6 has been stated incorrectly[1] to be the source of J. Foncha's ideology of unification and reason for the foundation of his K.N.D.P. party. This is not true: as we have seen, it represented a position on the 'quasi-Left' of Southern Cameroons politics which had once been occupied by Dr Endeley and then abandoned. Later some of the actual terminology of unification, stripped of its Marxist elements, may have percolated through from U.P.C. literature. The U.P.C. itself, and its naturalized successor in the British Trust territory—the One Kamerun Party (O.K.P.)—made little headway in the Southern Cameroons. One of the paradoxes of the situation was that despite the genuinely traditionalist outlook of K.N.D.P., its position on the 'quasi-Left', as defined

[1] *Africa Report*, December 1961.

above, drew to its support younger intellectuals to whom the extremism of the ideological Left was repellent. At the final stage these intellectuals (outside the party) played a role in stiffening the party's resolve.[1]

In the French Trust territory, the U.P.C. under its underground leader and general secretary Reuben Um Nyobe, terrorized large areas, while the 'legitimate' nationalist movement, first under André Mbida and then under Ahmadou Ahidjo, progressed to local autonomy (1 January 1959) and then to independence (1 January 1960). Throughout these years U.P.C. terrorism continued, first against the French imperialists, and then against the independent Government, who were denounced as 'puppets'. The movement was much weakened by Reuben Um Nyobe's death in 1958, and then by the loss of its indefatigable world-propagandist Dr Moumié. The terrorist methods it employed stirred up among the Bamileke a ferocious tribal war in which the ideological content was soon submerged. The U.P.C. eventually split, part accepting an amnesty and becoming a legal political party. By 1961 there were three U.P.C.s: the group 'ralliée au Gouvernement', a group in the parliamentary opposition described as 'de tendance légale', and the extremist rump who still continue terrorism.

The political developments in the Southern Cameroons proceeded almost as if these bloody events were not occurring. A correspondent of *Le Monde* in July 1961 marvelled at the contrast between 'one side of the mango tree' (at the border) and the other. The continued insouciance of unificationist leaders in the Southern Cameroons in the face of the terrorist problem in the neighbouring territory, and indeed concerning the actual form or content of unification, can only be understood in the light of the peculiar isolation of Southern Cameroons politics, and of the place of the 'Kamerun Idea' there as a mainly symbolic concept.

The plebiscites in British Northern and Southern Cameroons in February 1961 showed that the North, much desired by President Ahidjo in order to counterbalance his own U.P.C.-infiltrated South, had been lost; the Southern Cameroons had been gained—an area persistently, though wrongly, considered a terrorist area and potential U.P.C. stronghold. On 1 October 1961, formal unification took place. The Constitution by which the Southern Cameroons became West Cameroon had been negotiated in an atmosphere confused by wild rumours of an intended *coup* by the terrorists to take

[1] *West Africa*, 12 August 1961.

over the new State, which did not occur. The experiment in unification was begun and the 'Kamerun Idea' received expression in the Federal Republic of Cameroon. Ironically enough the form 'Kamerun' itself did not come into use, for, tainted by U.P.C. association, it was already banned in the ex-French territory by decree.

The Constitution provided for two federated states, each with its own legislature and Prime Minister appointed by the Federal President. By Article 9, the President and Vice-President were not to be nationals of the same federated state. By Articles 51 and 52 Ahmadou Ahidjo became first President and J. Foncha Vice-President. By Article 9, the post of Vice-President, like that of President, was defined as incompatible with any other functions, but, by Article 52, it was made compatible with the Prime Ministership of the State of West Cameroon, during the term of office of the first President. The competence of a federated state is less than that of a Nigerian region. Only primary education is a state matter, for example, in West Cameroon; in the old Southern Cameroons competence included secondary schools. The Republic has two official languages, English and French. A Federal Legislature is provided for, which, until direct elections take place after 1 April 1963, consists of members appointed from the two state assemblies, ten for West Cameroon, forty from East Cameroon. Provision was made for organs at federal level to consider problems of uniting the two different legal, social, and economic systems, but their functions were left undefined. The shape of the Constitution provided for the initial continuation of the *status quo* but with a greater degree of federal control in the future.

On 30 December 1961, elections to a new enlarged West Cameroon Legislative Assembly gave Mr Foncha's K.N.D.P. clear support with twenty-four seats out of thirty-seven; Dr Endeley's C.P.N.C. won only ten seats. Notable in this election were the large number of 'independents' who stood, two of whom were elected. In addition, one member of the O.K.P. was returned for the first time; this did not justify O.K.P.'s recent claim to have been responsible for the plebiscite vote for unification, however. Politics at the national level have barely begun: the first meeting of the Federal National Assembly was convened only on 24 April of this year.

Customs barriers are still retained between the two states: but customs are not a state matter, and West Cameroon recently appealed to the Federal Government for a deficit of £288,000 to be made good, this deficit being attributable to loss of Customs

Revenue. The Federal Government accepted this liability. The changeover to a franc (C.F.A.) currency in West Cameroon with effect from 2 April 1962 occurred smoothly. There was some doubt expressed in financial circles as to whether the C.F.A. franc at an exchange rate of 688 to the pound was not over-valued.[1] In the event conversion occurred at the only slightly higher rate of 692 to the pound. East Cameroon politics are still distorted by the old tragic conflict. In February there were reports of a planned judicial inquiry into the accidental death of twenty-five political prisoners being moved by train from Douala. In July, Mayi Matip of the legitimate U.P.C. and other opposition leaders were arrested on charges of plotting insurrection.

It is too early to consider the many detailed practical problems to be solved in this new unit in Africa. The economic and financial adjustments have begun in a commendable spirit of compromise, as was shown on the recent visit to Britain of M. Betayene, the Federal Foreign Minister, and Mr Jua, the West Cameroon Minister of Finance. The educational, linguistic, and legal adjustments are mostly still to be made. The outcome is hopeful: in the Western sector at least, there has been a vein of idealism, which has shown itself, like Vice-President Foncha's nerve, to be remarkably tough and unshakeable. West Cameroon hopes to play a stabilizing role in the Federal Republic, an aim for which all will sincerely wish success. The momentum of the 'Kamerun Idea' is by no means spent.

EDWIN ARDENER

Enlargement of the Common Market: Denmark, Norway, and Ireland

... Therefore, after long and earnest consideration the Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to make a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations with a view to joining the Community if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth, and of the European Free Trade Association.

MR MACMILLAN'S historic words to the House of Commons on 31 July 1961, and the formal application a few days later to join the

[1] *Financial Times*, 8 September 1961.

European Economic Community, presented the other non-member countries in Western Europe with equally important decisions to be taken on their respective future relationships with the Common Market. It was in fact Britain's firm decision to stay outside the Common Market, when it was first being set up, which made it possible (and in some cases advisable) for other countries to do likewise. Similarly, when the 'big Free Trade Area' talks broke down in December 1958 the other industrial countries, and Portugal, were able to group themselves with Britain in E.F.T.A.[1]—a more or less satisfactory second best, according to their position in relation to E.E.C. Of those excluded from both groupings the Irish Republic, being over-ridingly dependent on trade with Britain, was unperturbed as long as the latter stayed outside E.E.C., since E.F.T.A. had no common tariff wall. Significantly enough two of the other outsiders, Greece and Turkey, felt obliged to apply for association with the Six;[2] only Spain and Iceland took no action at all.

When both economic and political factors finally convinced the British Government that Britain's future lay inside the Common Market, E.F.T.A. did at least provide the industrial countries with a guarantee: having linked themselves together for mutual support, the Seven now gallantly agreed that none should climb aboard the Common Market boat unless the others could be hauled in too. In the words of the Declaration made public at the E.F.T.A. Council meeting in London on 27 and 28 June 1961, and confirmed at a further meeting in Geneva the day the British decision was announced,

> ... Ministers agreed that ... the Members of E.F.T.A. should co-ordinate their actions and remain united throughout the negotiations. Ministers resolved that the European Free Trade Association ... would be maintained at least until satisfactory arrangements have been worked out in negotiations to meet the various legitimate interests of all Members of E.F.T.A. and thus enable them all to participate from the same date in an integrated European market. . .[3]

There was, however, never any serious suggestion of an E.F.T.A.–E.E.C. negotiation: it was up to each of the non-member countries to take its own decision and to negotiate its own terms with the Six.

[1] See 'The Outlook for European Trade after the Free Trade Area Negotiations', *The World Today*, March 1959, and 'The Outer Seven: Buying Time in the European Trade Dispute', *The World Today*, January 1960.

[2] See 'Greece and the European Economic Community', *The World Today*, April 1961.

[3] See *E.F.T.A. Bulletin*, Vol. II, No. 7, July 1961.

The E.F.T.A. guarantee was like the climbers' rope—it was intended to stop them falling, but not for one to pull the others up.

The case of the 'three neutrals' (Austria, Switzerland, and Sweden), who have decided to apply for association only, will be dealt with in a later article. Two E.F.T.A. countries, however, have followed Britain's lead in seeking full membership of E.E.C. and consequently of the other two Communities (Euratom and the Coal and Steel Community). Denmark made her decision without hesitation, the formal application to join being submitted on 10 August 1961. The Norwegian application, on the other hand, though expected from the start, was not eventually made until 2 May 1962. As for the third candidate, Ireland, the British decision left her very little option, and in fact she even jumped the gun, her formal application being received by the E.E.C. Council on 3 August 1961 in a letter dated 31 July.

ATTITUDES AND MOTIVES

The decision has caused least stir and heart-searching in Denmark. She would most probably have been prepared to join E.E.C. as a founder member in 1958 and was restrained only by her trading and traditional links with Britain and her Scandinavian neighbours, all at that time firmly opposed to any idea of membership. One is tempted to see in this a reflection of the fact that Denmark, like the Six, was an occupied country during the war, and saw on the one hand her institutions rendered powerless and on the other the horrors of war and occupation (whereas for Britain and the neutrals the war had the reverse effect of strengthening faith in national institutions). More important, however, was Danish realism: they knew that if the Six were ever to work out a common agricultural policy, it would be vital for Denmark to be inside, not outside, the Common Market. In fact, the British decision came only just in time: 1962 will see the practical application of the Six's policy; and Danish farmers will feel its effects at once and in no uncertain fashion, unless some way is found to bridge the gap until her accession.

For Norway the decision to follow the British lead was not so easily taken. Outside observers generally concluded that Norway would choose accession once Britain and Denmark did so, and the Norwegian Government also worked on that assumption. But in keeping with the democratic traditions of the country, the problem was thrown open to the widest public and parliamentary debate,

whilst the Government itself consulted labour, management, and trade organizations. The debate proved to be more violent than had been expected, and lasted throughout the autumn and winter of 1961–2, with petitions and public demonstrations by a number of lively opposition groups. An underlying explanation for this—apart from the sturdy independence and determination to be different which marks the Norwegian character—is undoubtedly the fact that Norway's existence as an independent State dates only from the last century, when she was freed from Danish rule; anything which might imply renewed limitations on that independence is regarded with suspicion. In addition the opposition played, unsuccessfully, on the residue of anti-German feeling dating from the Occupation.

In the end, however, the arguments in favour of accession carried the day. Norway's major trading partners, Britain and Denmark, were joining; and with no considerations of neutrality to deter her, there was every reason for her to choose membership, which would give her a say in the crucial question of fisheries policy, and also in agricultural policy, rather than merely association. In the spring of 1962 the Government presented to the Storting a detailed White Paper dealing with the reasons for choosing membership and the problems which would arise. On 27 April, after a three-day debate in which practically every single member of the Storting took part, the decision to apply for accession was approved by a majority of 113 out of the 150 members.

The situation in which the British decision placed the Republic of Ireland was a particularly interesting one. From the purely economic point of view, as will be seen, she had little option but to follow suit: as Mr Lemass, the Prime Minister, told the Dail on 3 August 1961, 'If all the other countries of Western Europe with whom we have trade relations get together in an economic union it would really be suicide for us to stand aside from that union.'[1] In fact, however, the decision was far from being taken merely because it was unavoidable. The whole trend of Irish policy since the war has pointed to her wanting to be a full member of the new Europe. As Mr Lemass himself expressed it in his speech putting the Irish case to the Ministers of the Six in Brussels on 26 January 1962:

The Irish nation has always had a strong sense of belonging to Europe. We are also very conscious of the great advantages which can accrue to all

[1] Quoted in *The position of certain European countries other than the Six in the event of the United Kingdom's accession to the European Economic Community*, a study made by a working party of the Council of Europe Secretariat and published in Strasbourg in November 1961.

> the countries concerned and to world peace from a strong and united Europe. These considerations were an important factor in the decision taken by the Government in July. That decision was discussed at the time in our National Parliament and, I am happy to say, met with almost unanimous approval. But long before the formal decision was taken the European Economic Community and our position in relation to it were matters of wide public interest and debate. I can therefore say that our application not only represents a deliberate decision on the part of the Government but also corresponds to the sentiments of our people generally.

This is certainly confirmed by the fact that Ireland has been one of the most active and diligent members of the Council of Europe, where Irish M.P.s have played a lively part in the debates of the Consultative Assembly.

The real significance of the decision for the Republic of Ireland, however, lies in its implications for the future of the island as a whole. If both the United Kingdom and the Republic become members of E.E.C., economic barriers between North and South will go down. The political importance of this was emphasized by Mr Lemass in the speech to the Dail on 3 August 1961 (already quoted above): '. . . in the context of an accession to the European Economic Community, all economic arguments in favour of partitition would disappear, and the North and the South of Ireland would have exactly the same problems and the same possibilities in a wider European market.'

ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Joining the Community poses no really major problems for Denmark in the economic field. Like Britain, she has formally stated her acceptance not only of the aims and objectives of the Rome Treaty but also of the text of the Treaty as it stands (save for the minor adjustments necessitated by an increase in the number of members), believing that any special arrangements which may be justified in her case can be adequately provided for either within the framework of the Treaty or by means of protocols. As a primarily agricultural country, relying on the export of foodstuffs (above all meat and dairy produce) her major concern is with the common farm policy of the Community: but with a farming economy as efficient as any in Europe she has little to fear (and probably much to gain) from a wider market, and has accepted without question the main lines of the policy worked out by the Six. She did request permission to conclude long-term contracts with other member States for a

transitional period—a right which the Six enjoyed until the end of the first stage of the Common Market—but it is not sure that this will be granted. More important, she is seeking some guarantee about the levels of feed-grain prices, for, unless special compensatory measures are allowed, the rise in these prices following on accession might have a detrimental effect on the competitiveness of her exports of animal products (pigmeat and dairy products) to third countries.

Denmark's major immediate concern, however, has been with the 'gap' between the time when the Six's common agricultural policy—and above all the levy system for pigmeat and eggs—starts functioning and the date when she becomes a member. The application of the levies does indeed look like dealing her export trade to the E.E.C., and above all to Germany, an immediate and damaging blow; moreover, these are markets where it might prove difficult, after accession, to regain ground lost to Dutch competitors. The Six have so far refused to make any concessions on this point, and the Danes are waiting to see how far their contracts with German importers will be affected when the policy starts being applied at the end of August.

Agriculture apart, Denmark is seeking special arrangements, or has drawn attention to her special position, in connection with a number of other points. First, with regard to tariff cuts, she accepts the level of the Common External Tariff (save on a short list of items where she would like to see it reduced) but asks to take as base year for tariff cuts towards her future partners the year 1960, when she made considerable changes bringing her own tariff largely into line with the C.E.T. She is prepared to make the full intra-Community tariff cut (now 50 per cent) on joining for all except a list of goods which account for some 15 per cent of her total trade with the E.E.C. These are goods produced by industries which are being developed with a view to increasing the share of manufactures in her export trade, in order to remedy her balance of payments difficulties. The Six refused the idea of a generalized special arrangement for the list proposed, and the goods involved are now being examined separately by the negotiators to determine what concessions can be granted.

Secondly, with regard to movement of labour, free movement already exists amongst the Scandinavian countries and Finland in the 'Nordic labour market', and the Danes have insisted on the need for finding ways of maintaining both this situation and their own

advanced social service system. This is a problem which is common to Denmark and Norway, and a joint examination of it with these two countries is planned now that Norway has applied to join E.E.C. It seems unlikely to pose any major problems.

Lastly, Denmark has asked for special arrangements to be made for Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which, though under the Danish Crown, are self-governing in many respects. The problem is a minor one—the population involved totals little over 30,000—and can probably be solved by means of a protocol.

The Danish negotiations began in November 1961 and have been running parallel to those between the Six and the United Kingdom. They could almost certainly have been rapidly concluded, had not all concerned wanted to be sure first that the British negotiations would succeed: certainly there should be no obstacle to Denmark's acceding to the Community at the same time as the United Kingdom (or possibly even before, in view of her concern about the common farm policy, should her E.F.T.A. partners be agreeable).

Norway had less economic incentive to join the E.E.C. and at first sight will not reap much positive gain from joining. She is not a major exporter of agricultural products (though she is, of course, of fish), and her industry is generally on too small a scale to benefit from the vast market of the enlarged E.E.C.; indeed it is liable to prove vulnerable to increased competition. There is also the more general consideration that Norway already faces major development problems, accentuated by vast distances (from Kristiansand in the south to Hammerfest in the north is farther than from Rome to London) and severe climate, and in the single European economy will find herself on the periphery. The north of Norway, like the south of Italy, will clearly be a major candidate for aid from the European Investment Bank. Mr Halvard Lange, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, spelt out in his speech presenting the Norwegian case (on 4 July 1962) the need to maintain State aid and other measures destined to keep the population from leaving the isolated west coast districts.

The following are special problems which Norway hopes to have taken into account within the framework of the Treaty or by means of protocols. Firstly, agriculture: the adaptation of Norway's agriculture to the common policy will require special measures and, above all, action by the Community in connection with the maintenance of farmers' incomes. Here the 'residual guarantee' on which the British negotiators have successfully insisted may prove of importance to Norway.

Secondly, fisheries: fish and sea-foods amount to about 20 per cent of Norway's total exports. The need to have a full say in shaping the fishery policy of the enlarged Community (the Six not having so far even begun to elaborate such a policy, which is not laid down in the Rome Treaty) was one reason why Norway sought membership rather than association. Mr Lange insisted that such a policy should be worked out as soon as possible, and that it should cover safeguards for national resources, market organization at the Community level, and guaranteed incomes for fishermen. (Fishing policy is incidentally of even more vital interest to Iceland, for some 90 per cent of her exports are fish, and over 50 per cent of the total goes to future members of the enlarged Community. It has even been suggested[1] that despite the problems which full membership might raise for her tiny economy [population 170,000] Iceland might decide to apply for membership of E.E.C. in order to have a voice in deciding policy in this sector.)

Thirdly, natural resources: Norway is prepared to adapt her existing strict legislation on the exploitation of natural resources to meet the 'right of establishment' rules of the Community, but feels that, whilst there should be no discrimination on the basis of nationality, special regulations should be maintained. Fourthly, in view of the pressing need for development capital, Norway has asked for a special examination of the possible effects of the Community's rules about free movement of capital.

Fifthly, with regard to tariffs, Norway accepts the Common External Tariff, but will need to apply escape clauses (under Art. 226) for some vulnerable industries and to obtain tariff quotas for some imports, mainly of foodstuffs. She has also asked that her views be taken into account over the level of the C.E.T. for some products on which the United Kingdom has asked for a reduction of duty: this applies particularly to aluminium and wood-pulp, for in both cases Norway, as a major supplier, would find a vast protected market in the enlarged Community if the present duty were retained. For the intra-Community tariff cuts Norway has asked that her tariff as set in 1959 should be taken as the starting-point. As regards shipping, receipts from this industry go much of the way to cover Norway's persistent deficit in her balance of trade, and she will naturally have a big interest in Community policy in this sector. It should be noted that the Council of Ministers of E.E.C. has yet to decide whether shipping is to be included with road, rail, and inland-waterway

[1] In the Council of Europe study mentioned above.

traffic under the common transport policy now being worked out.

The Norwegian case was only put to the Six on 4 July 1962, and the official negotiations will start in the second half of October, but before then there will be unofficial contacts between Norway and the Community to clear up minor points.

The over-riding fact about the Irish economy is that 75 per cent of her exports—and 80 per cent of her exports of foodstuffs—go to the United Kingdom. All Irish exports to Britain enjoy the same preferential treatment as those from Commonwealth countries, and the Republic grants preferential treatment to that part of its imports (some 50 per cent) which comes from the United Kingdom.

In his speech in January putting the Irish case, Mr Lemass said that, whilst it would be untrue to suggest that Ireland had no agricultural problems (he referred to the horticultural industry, which is in its early stages, and to the need to speed up the structural reorganization already begun), she would seek no special arrangements which would be inconsistent with the common agricultural policy of E.E.C. It is clear that in view of the importance of the British market the outcome of the British talks will be of vital interest. Incidentally, as a member country Ireland may expect to benefit from the eventual abolition of Commonwealth preference upon which the Six are insisting.

In the industrial sector Ireland is in the throes of a rapid development programme (including special facilities which are attracting an increasing flow of capital from Western Europe) and this is destined to yield a better-balanced economy. In view of this, Mr Lemass's major request to the Six, in the event of Irish accession, was for an appropriate general rhythm of tariff reductions between the time of entry and the end of the transitional period, plus special conditions either under Art. 226 (safeguards) or under a protocol for certain developing industries which, although potentially sound, are not yet in a position to face rapid tariff cuts.

The Irish Prime Minister made a point of stressing that Ireland would not expect special financial aid—merely access to the facilities of the European Investment Bank and the Social Fund on an equal footing with other member countries. This assurance, combined with Ireland's readiness to accept the common agricultural policy, did much to combat the original tendency amongst the Six to look on the Republic as a less-developed country for which some form of association might be more appropriate than full membership. In fact, assuming she can be afforded adequate special arrange-

ments to enable her to face the obvious strain involved for a weak economy in joining the highly industrialized Community, membership should offer Ireland the best possible opportunity of achieving sound economic development and raising her level of income per head, which at present lags behind that of most West European countries. No date has been set for the start of the negotiations.

INSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS

'It is generally thought,' the Norwegian Prime Minister told the Storting on 6 August 1961, 'that a change in the constitution is necessary before Norway can, if need be, join E.E.C.'; and any change in the Constitution has to be proposed during one legislature and adopted during the following one by the newly elected Storting. The Norwegian Government acted in good time by proposing on 29 September 1960 various alternative amendments on which the Storting which was elected in September 1961 will pronounce: these would authorize the Storting to agree, by an ordinary parliamentary Bill, to the limited transfer of Norwegian sovereignty to a given organ for international co-operation, where this is necessary 'to ensure international peace and security or to promote international legislation and co-operation'. The Bill approving accession to the E.E.C. will require either a two-thirds or a four-fifths majority, depending on which amendment the Storting adopts.

In Denmark, too, the Constitution imposes certain restrictions on the right of the authorities to delegate to any foreign authority any of the powers conferred on them. Normally, any change in the Constitution requires the approval of two successive Parliaments, but a clause was inserted in the present Constitution (which dates from 1953) to make the process less complicated in the event of Denmark's joining bodies like the European Coal and Steel Community. Any such measure needs a four-fifths majority in the Folketing, or, failing that, it may be made the object of a referendum where a simple majority of those voting (provided they total 30 per cent of those registered) is all that is needed. Both Denmark and Norway have expressed willingness to take part in the kind of political union which the Six are planning, and have accepted the aims set out in the Bad Godesberg declaration of July 1961.

Accession raises no constitutional problems for Ireland, but there are several points worth making about her participation in a political union. Since its creation the Irish Republic has maintained a policy of strict neutrality, which, it has been stated, will be followed until

the division of the island is ended. Ireland is therefore not a member of N.A.T.O.—and it has been suggested that this might prove an obstacle to membership of E.E.C. In his speech putting the Irish case, however, Mr Lemass emphasized that Ireland accepted the principles of the Bad Godesberg declaration and was prepared to play her full part in any political union. He added, moreover, that 'while Ireland did not accede to the North Atlantic Treaty we have always agreed with the general aim of the Treaty. The fact that we did not accede to it was due to special circumstances and does not qualify in any way our acceptance of the ideal of European unity...' It would seem in fact that Ireland would be prepared to join N.A.T.O. if it proved necessary.

The Irish application is formally dependent on the success of the British negotiations; and the same is true in practice of the Norwegian, if not perhaps of the Danish, candidature. Assuming that Britain and these three countries become full members, this is bound to mean, besides a vast increase in the power and influence of the Community, certain changes in its character, which are too hypothetical to examine in detail here. It is however worth mentioning one field where British and Scandinavian influence may be greatest. These countries, with their long traditions of parliamentary control and stable government, may be expected to insist on the development of a more valid system of democratic control over the Common Market institutions than exists at present. That this may well mean a transfer of power and influence from their own national Parliaments to a directly elected European Parliament is one of the many fascinating aspects of the new Europe, in the creation of which these three countries, with Britain, have decided to join.

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Note of the Month

Berlin: One Year of the Wall

On 22 August the U.S.S.R. announced the abolition of the office of Soviet Commandant in Berlin. The following day the East German authorities appointed their own military Commandant in the city. Both these moves have come after more than a week of violent demonstrations in West Berlin on the first anniversary of the erection of the East German wall. As yet it is too early to say what their long-term significance will be. Certainly the immediate effect is to make contact between the Soviet Union and the Western Powers a great deal more difficult. The functions of the Soviet Commandant have been transferred—temporarily—to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces in East Germany, and the three allied Commandants in West Berlin will now presumably have to approach him through the Western military missions in Potsdam rather than deal with the new East German Commandant, General Poppe.

The Russians will of course be anxious to represent their action as a decisive step in the process of transferring sovereignty in East Berlin to the German Democratic Republic itself. Since November 1958 Moscow has repeatedly announced its intention of handing over the remaining Soviet functions to the East German authorities by signing a peace treaty with the G.D.R. One 'automatic' consequence of the peace treaty would be the ending of the allied occupation of West Berlin and its reconstitution as a 'free city'. In the face of a total Western refusal to accept this argument and to negotiate over what the West believes to be its essential rights, the Russians have made no progress towards their goal. The Western garrisons remain in Berlin and Berlin preserves its links with the Western world.

It is difficult to see how the latest Soviet move can radically change the situation. While the Russian action is no doubt final, the four-power *Kommandantura* has largely been a fiction since the Berlin blockade of 1948–9, and the U.S.S.R. has never pretended otherwise. At the same time, the Russians have been careful to pre-

serve control over potentially explosive matters, such as Western access, in their own hands and there is no indication that they intend to relinquish these functions. The apparently complete abdication of responsibility within Berlin therefore may well be simply a gesture to the East German leadership. For nearly four years, East Germany has been promised her peace treaty but nothing has yet come of it. The so-called withdrawal which the Russians speak of as a major step towards the treaty may in fact prove to have no more substance than many previous Soviet promises.

This is not to say that the Western position in Berlin is unaffected. On the contrary, the allied garrisons remain as exposed to Soviet pressure as ever. What one would suggest is that Moscow may now be less ready to exert that pressure as a result of the events of the past year. In the first place, the wall has failed in one of its major purposes: to squeeze the life out of West Berlin.[1] During the first six months after the wall was put up, many Western commentators feared that West Berlin was doomed to a lingering death. The disappearance of the 50,000 *Grenzgänger* who crossed over daily from the East was a serious blow to the city's economy and by the end of 1961 the outflow of workers to the Federal Republic was nearly double the intake. Lately, however, the situation has changed for the better, thanks to various incentives from Bonn and Washington, and exports to West Germany in the first half of 1962 were 5 per cent up on those for the corresponding period of last year.

Secondly, the reaction of the Kennedy Administration has made it plain both that the United States is prepared to take seriously the military challenge implicit in the Berlin crisis and also that it is ready to negotiate a new status to replace the present Agreement. The prompt response of Washington in strengthening the American garrison in Berlin and in enlarging its capability for fighting a conventional war during the months immediately following the building of the wall can only have impressed Moscow with the need for caution. But while 'standing firm' on Western rights, the Administration has not yielded to its more hard-boiled supporters. Thus in January of this year, President Kennedy successfully resisted the alleged proposal of General Clay, his envoy in Berlin, to breach the wall as a demonstration of U.S. authority, and, indeed, withdrew the General in April.

Far from seeking to precipitate fresh crises, President Kennedy

[1] See 'The Barrier across Berlin and its Consequences' in *The World Today*, November 1961.

has striven to keep open the channels of negotiation with the Soviet leadership. Above all, he seems to be trying to break away from the arguments which have been used to justify the Western position in Berlin for so long. Throughout the post-war period, the Western allies have based their presence in Germany on the Agreements reached by the European Advisory Commission in 1944 and 1945.[1] Their access rights to Berlin, which survived the blockade, derive from the four-power communiqué of 5 May 1949 which brought it to an end. Since then, although each side has paid lip-service to quadripartite status and although the West has been compelled to fall back on it owing to its weaker geopolitical position, both East and West have consciously flouted that status in building up their respective German protégés.

There seems no good reason, therefore, why the outdated basis of the Western presence should not be replaced by a new statute, provided the essentials of the allied position are preserved. These are: the continued existence of British, French, and American troops in West Berlin; free access to West Germany by road, rail, and air; and the right of the people of West Berlin to choose their own way of life. Unfortunately so far Washington has not been able to persuade the Government in Bonn that this is feasible. The Federal Republic is especially sensitive about the degree of recognition of East Germany which the American approach would entail. In his interview with the editor of *Izvestia* in November 1961,[2] for example, President Kennedy mentioned the possibility of an international authority to control the access routes to Berlin, and in April of this year it was discovered that the G.D.R. would take part in the authority under the terms of new American proposals. This provision, among others, Bonn refused to accept and U.S.–German relations reached perhaps their lowest pitch since the war with the departure of the Federal Republic's ambassador from Washington in May.

The Soviet Union also appeared to be pushing her German ally towards reluctant *rapprochement* when the G.D.R. in June applied for credits from Bonn. On the face of things, both East and West then seemed more favourably disposed towards a new Berlin settlement than at any time since the Geneva foreign ministers' conference of 1959, when a Western interim solution was put forward. It now remains to be seen whether the relative gains of the past year

[1] See 'The Powers and Berlin' in *The World Today*, December 1958.
[2] U.S.I.S., 29 November.

can survive the tumult on either side of the wall, and what bearing the events of the past few days will have on the final outcome in Berlin.

ERRATUM

The World Today, August 1962, in the article on 'Enlargement of the Common Market: Denmark, Norway, and Ireland', p. 353, line 8, should read 'Norway's existence as an independent State dates only from the turn of the century, when she was freed from Swedish rule.'

A Soviet-Yugoslav Rapprochement?

NIKITA KHRUSHCHEV'S pursuit of Josip Broz-Tito has been consistent and costly. It has been a part of his policy since 1955, and the main cause of the alienation of Albania and one of the causes of the rift with China. Up to now it has also been unsuccessful and has in fact led to disaster and rebuff.

Disaster came in October 1956 when Communist Poland and Hungary almost succumbed to the disease of revisionism of which Yugoslavia was the major source. Rebuff came in April 1958 when, after a long enough period had elapsed since 1956 for tempers to cool and for new possibilities of reconciliation to be explored, the League of Yugoslav Communists approved at Ljubljana its new Party programme, which more or less consecrated the heretical nature of its ideology.

Mr Khrushchev, both from personal choice and from force of circumstances, has pursued a far less rigid policy towards his allies in the Communist bloc than did Stalin, and has allowed them a considerable degree of internal autonomy. But on two things he has insisted: that they should all be loyal to the foreign policy of Moscow, and that any member of the bloc practising some kind of internal deviation from the accepted norm should not attempt to hold this deviation up as an example for others to follow.

Marshal Tito's Yugoslavia has failed to meet both demands. Her foreign policy, though not differing essentially from that of the Soviet Union, has been independent of it, and Tito has always been anxious to proclaim the universal Communist validity of his system of workers' councils. On these points he has made little attempt to compromise, and it has been these issues, together with his own immense personal and national pride, which have been the main obstacles to reconciliation. Mr Khrushchev and his allies have, therefore, been forced to adopt, in their policy towards Yugoslavia, the tactic of differentiating between State relations and Party relations. Inter-State relations can be as cordial as possible, Party relations must remain cool until the Yugloslavs put an end both to their heresy and to their proselytizing tendencies.

The differentiation is, of course, artificial, since in States where, theoretically at least, the Party is supreme in all fields, there can be no real separation of State and Party. And it has been clear that when Party relations between Yugoslavia and the socialist bloc have been at their worst—after April 1958 and especially after October 1956—

the so-called State relations have been just the opposite of cordial. Conversely, when State relations *have* been cordial there has been a noticeably sharp decline in Party ideological polemics between the two sides.

It is not easy to pinpoint just when the latest bout of improved relations began. A suitably dramatic date would be September 1960 at the gala session of the United Nations Assembly in New York when Mr Khrushchev met Marshal Tito. Subsequently, of course, Yugoslav revisionism was attacked by the Soviet Union several times, most notably in the Declaration of the eighty-one Communist Parties in December 1960 and at the 22nd C.P.S.U. Congress in October 1961. But it is probable that, though Mr Khrushchev would, of his own volition, have wished to criticize the Yugoslav Party, pressure from China or a desire not to expose himself to Chinese-inspired charges that he himself was a revisionist prompted him to resort to the severity of the language he used.

In 1962, having dismissed Albania from at least the Soviet end of the socialist bloc and apparently feeling that he could disregard the reactions of China, Mr Khrushchev seems to have stepped up in earnest his attempts to win back Marshal Tito. In July 1961, the Yugoslav Foreign Minister, Koca Popovic, visited Moscow; his visit was returned in April 1962 by Mr Gromyko. In May 1962 the Moscow Patriarch Alexei, one of the best diplomats the Soviet Union has, visited Yugoslavia. Marshal Tito has been invited to spend a holiday in the Soviet Union; the Soviet Head of State, Mr Brezhnev, is scheduled to make an official visit to Yugoslavia in September. But the most dramatic evidence of the new Soviet offensive was contained in the remarks made by Mr Khrushchev during his tour of Bulgaria in May. Speaking in Varna, he declared:[1]

> . . . We now have normal relations with Yugoslavia—I would say even more—good relations. . . We as a country that is building socialism shall do everything to co-operate with Yugoslavia and thus help her peoples to consolidate their socialist positions. . .

His Bulgarian hosts were forced to follow his lead and from First Party Secretary Todor Zhivkov and Premier Anton Yugov came the friendliest words about Yugoslavia uttered by any Bulgarian leader since the Cominform break with Tito in 1948.

It is beyond the scope of this article to try to calculate the motives of either side in making these friendly noises to the other; this would need a study in itself. One might only say that the present

[1] *Rabotnichesko Delo*, Sofia, 17 May 1962.

situation of Yugoslavia is such that Mr Khrushchev may consider a renewed probing well worth the effort. Yugoslavia's internal economic situation is drifting dangerously towards crisis; externally the progress of the Common Market presents a real threat, while growing exasperation in Washington with Marshal Tito makes American largesse less certain than it used to be. A harassed Yugoslav leadership might well look eagerly to promises of Soviet help. Politically also, Yugoslavia is now perhaps more vulnerable than ever before. The nationalities problem is once again causing concern. Marshal Tito is seventy and the whole country is becoming increasingly aware of the fact that he cannot live for ever. Questions, fears, and ambitions about his succession are already weakening a Party once renowned for its unity. Factions in the Party have, in fact, already formed, moderates and 'stalinists', pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet, centralizers and decentralizers. Only Tito's towering authority and prestige are keeping them in check. It is hardly surprising if Mr Khrushchev now considers that many a Yugoslav Communist would not be averse to taking shelter once again inside the Communist fold, thus solving or mitigating some of the great problems which are looming up.

Despite these facts and the factors behind them, however, one should not take a Soviet-Yugoslav *rapprochement* for granted or, at least while Tito is alive, even as imminent. There may be very good reasons why Yugoslavia should gravitate more and more back to the Soviet Union, but there are still serious difficulties to be overcome. There is the pride both of Tito personally and of the Yugoslav Party in the independent role they have carved out for themselves. Then again, 'Leader of the Neutralists' is a self-proclaimed title of which Marshal Tito is very proud—it may also be another important reason why Mr Khrushchev is anxious to recapture him—and it is a title which he would lose if he re-entered the fold. Economically, though the present position is bad and bodes worse, the Yugoslavs may hope they can survive it and resume their reasonably prosperous enjoyment of material benefits from both East and West. Finally, there is the vexed and far from unimportant question of ideology. Can the still proud Yugoslav Party renounce its Ljubljana Programme, which the Soviet Union and the whole Communist camp still brand as revisionist? Can Mr Khrushchev agree to take it back if it does not? However friendly the noises now being made may be, it is clear that before any real action takes place there will be some very hard bargaining, and Marshal Tito, as the party being

courted, will be the one to set the stiff conditions. In the meantime, neither side seems to be in a great hurry. Koca Popovic may have entertained Gromyko in April but he was very willing to be entertained by Dean Rusk in May. Tito himself has shown no haste to visit the Soviet Union in any capacity. And Mr Khrushchev, contrary to all expectations, did not repeat, during his Rumanian tour in June, the exceedingly friendly references to Yugoslavia which he had made in Bulgaria. Thus, perhaps the most that can be expected in the near future is a closer Yugoslav identification with the Communist bloc in economic and foreign policy—not full bloc membership but some kind of 'associate' membership or 'observer' status.

POSSIBLE REPERCUSSIONS ON THE BALKANS

But even if Yugoslavia simply permits herself the luxury of 'associate' membership, the impact on the Balkans, of which she is the largest country, may well be considerable. The Balkan countries have always been sensitive to the slightest change in their relations, a generalization which has lost none of its validity since 1945 when all but one of them passed under Communist rule. From the point of view of the Western Powers a possible Yugoslav-Soviet *rapprochement* would have the most important repercussions on Greece.

Greece herself barely succeeded in staving off Communist domination, and she remains the only free democratic country in the Balkan peninsula. Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria, and Rumania have all become Communist and the three latter countries, in keeping with the expansionist aims of the Soviet Union, have all regarded Greece as the object of political penetration and propaganda. With two of these countries, Albania and Bulgaria, Greek relations have been aggravated by factors which have nothing to do with Communism. Greece and Albania are still technically in a state of war and the great obstacle to any normalization of relations is the persistent Greek claim to the southern section of Albania, known (at least by the Greeks) as Northern Epirus. With Bulgaria the difficulties are more complicated but, ostensibly, stem mainly from the Bulgarian refusal to pay the Greeks any part of the $45 million compensation awarded to Greece by the peace treaty after the second World War. Only when the Bulgarians show signs of paying something, the Greeks assert, will there be any hope of better relations.

This hostility, often disguised by purposeful blandishments from the north, has obviously caused successive Greek Governments

great concern. Though a part of the Western military alliance, Greece has naturally been eager for friends closer to home and, despite her close alliance with Turkey, she has sought some support on the Balkan peninsula itself. Since 1948, it has been to Yugoslavia that she has looked, and with considerable success. Relations have been cordial, often friendly and close. The Balkan Pact, signed between Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey in 1953 at the height of hostility between Moscow and Belgrade, is perhaps the most spectacular example of this closeness, but there has been a whole series of top-level exchanges of visits, and the existence of bitter memories and completely different regimes was never allowed to obtrude on the cordiality. It was a case of two isolated nations, with very little in common, holding each other's hands in distress.

Obviously a Yugoslav *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union would end these good relations and increase the isolation of Greece in the Balkans. Not only this, but once Yugoslavia had been won over or 'neutralized', the whole of the Communist political and propaganda offensive in the Balkans would be turned on Greece, especially on Greek public opinion. Even as it is, the offensive has been pretty heavy. It has, of course, been a 'peace' offensive, designed to get the Greeks out of N.A.T.O., to prevent the establishment of rocket bases on their territory, and in the end to leave them so isolated and without allies as to be an easy prey for Communist pressure from both inside and outside. The Rumanian Government has been the main spearhead of this offensive. The first important move came in 1957, with an appeal that the Foreign Ministers of all Balkan countries (including Turkey) should meet to discuss a general *détente* in the area. In 1959 came the second Rumanian proposal for a denuclearized zone in the Balkan area—later to be extended to the Adriatic. There followed a Bulgarian proposal to Greece that the two countries should sign a non-aggression pact. Greece rejected all these suggestions and Turkey has spurned all the blandishments which have come in her direction. To the two Rumanian proposals Marshal Tito gave a diplomatically evasive answer. But during his recent visit to Rumania, Mr Khrushchev put new life into the Rumanian plan for a denuclearized zone, and it is quite possible that a new initiative will be forthcoming. Will Yugoslavia again be diplomatically evasive or will her reply this time be in the affirmative? The answer to this question not only will give an indication of how far Marshal Tito is prepared to go to meet Mr Khrushchev; it also will give an indication to Greece as to how far

she can now rely on her former ally. If Yugoslavia deserts her, Greece may be forced to back down in some degree from her stubborn resistance to the advances of her Communist neighbours.

Even before the signs of a Yugoslav-Soviet *rapprochement*, relations between Belgrade and Athens had fallen slightly from their previous friendly level. This was precisely because of the new situation created in the Balkans by the isolation of Albania from the Soviet bloc. The ostracism of Enver Hoxha has left Albania in a precariously exposed position, a target for any designs which her more powerful neighbours may have on her. Yugoslav interest in Albania is, despite the protestations of Belgrade, only too well known; the claims of Greece on Northern Epirus have been mentioned. Rivalry between the two countries is probably not so much a matter of either having immediate predatory designs on Albania but a fear by the one that the other might have. There is no direct evidence of such designs but much unofficial reporting points to it, and it was certainly no coincidence that immediately after the Soviet break with Albania sharp words were exchanged between the Greek and Yugoslav Governments over the question of those Macedonians of northern Greece whom Belgrade calls the Macedonian, or even the Yugoslav, minority, but whom the Greeks deny are a minority at all. This issue had been dormant for several years during the era of good relations. That it should come up now, directly following on the changed status of Albania, shows how sensitive the balance of power in the Balkan area still is.

The Albanian Communist leaders—and here they will have the vast majority of their people behind them—must be viewing the recent Yugoslav-Soviet developments with great alarm. It was Enver Hoxha's chronic fear of just such a *rapprochement* which was the main cause of his defiance of Moscow. Now that this defiance has resulted in his expulsion from the Soviet community of nations he finds himself, having burnt his boats, much more at the mercy of Yugoslavia than ever before. (The boats from China would be very slow ones indeed.)

Just what Marshal Tito's intentions are towards Albania it is impossible to tell. It seems pretty certain that in 1955, when the first Tito–Khrushchev reconciliation took place, Hoxha was very high on Tito's demolition list. He would almost certainly be so again, the Yugoslavs' aim being no crude annexation of the country (reports of Belgrade–Athens bargaining to partition the country are too wild to be credible), but the installation in Tirana of a leadership

amenable to themselves, a sort of resurrected Koce Xoxe. The last thing Tito would want to see in Albania is the collapse of the Communist regime as such. The new Albania, no matter how backward and poverty-stricken she might be, would prove an irresistible attraction to the 700,000-strong Albanian minority in southern Yugoslavia. Better Hoxha than that! In fact, Hoxha has, in one important way, been very useful to Marshal Tito in the past and, if a Soviet *rapprochement* fails, could still be useful again. The Albanian leader's 'dogmatist and sectarian' defiance has called forth the rage of Mr Khrushchev and taken a good deal of the heat off the 'revisionists' in Belgrade. It has fitted in well with Tito's balancing act between East and West—and the time for balancing might still not be over.

Though not in the same way nor in the same degree, the Bulgarian leaders must also be feeling apprehensive about the recent turn of events. The hostility between Bulgarians and Serbs over Macedonia is well known. Again it has nothing to do with Communism and has persisted strongly into the Communist era. As long as Yugoslavia still holds the greater part of this territory there will be resentment on the part of many Bulgarians, including many Communists. Before 1948, when Marshal Tito seemed to be Stalin's protégé, many of them greatly feared his plan for a Balkan Federation which, though supported by the great internationalist Georgi Dimitrov, must have seemed nothing but old Serb chauvinism writ large. When the break with the Cominform came, real Bulgarian feelings on the subject showed themselves and have been showing themselves ever since. Mr Khrushchev has recently been to Bulgaria and said the kindest things about Yugoslavia heard from a Communist leader for many years, and when the Patriarch Alexei visited Yugoslavia he said things in Skoplje about Macedonia which could have given the Bulgarians no comfort.

Mr Khrushchev's choice of Bulgaria as the country in which to express these sentiments was deliberate, and the Bulgarian leaders have had, as before 1948, no option but to follow his lead. The Bulgarian First Party Secretary, Todor Zhivkov, with a subservience to Moscow which has always characterized him, immediately declared that relations with Yugoslavia were 'getting better every day'. The Bulgarian leadership will, of course, go along with Moscow but the effect on the Party is bound to be unsettling, and it comes at a time when the Bulgarian Communist Party is in a state of sad disarray. The second bout of de-Stalinization, initiated by Mr Khrushchev

at the 22nd C.P.S.U. Congress, created a confusion and an uncertainty which still exist and which were among the main reasons for Khrushchev's sudden decision to visit Bulgaria. The leadership's immediate reaction was to dismiss Vulko Chervenkov last November from his positions in the Politburo and as deputy Premier. Chervenkov was Bulgaria's 'little Stalin' from 1950 to 1956 and has always been considered one of Marshal Tito's arch enemies. In April 1956 he lost his position as Premier partly as a result of the Khrushchev–Tito reconciliation. His comprehensive purge last year seriously divided the Party, and the Zhivkov leadership, by putting up a brave front to the new Yugoslav policy, might only make these divisions deeper. Coming on top of a most serious economic situation, it could lead to crisis.

In the case of Rumania, the repercussions are likely to be much less grave than in the other countries mentioned. Rumania has never had any serious traditional differences with Yugoslavia and even in the Communist era when Yugoslav-Soviet relations were at their worst, Rumanian comments on the Belgrade Government were less vitriolic than those of any other Communist country, except, of course, Poland. This was not because the regime of Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej had any sympathy or anything in common with the relatively liberal administration of Marshal Tito. It was mainly due to the canny realization by Mr Gheorghiu-Dej that the policy of the Kremlin undergoes bewildering changes and that it is never wise to commit oneself too much to a Soviet 'zig' in case one is caught off balance by the 'zag' which almost inevitably comes. Nor, in terms of power relationships, should Rumania have much to fear from a Yugoslav-Soviet *rapprochement*. In 1945 Yugoslavia was undoubtedly the most powerful State in the Balkans. Today, with approximately the same population as Yugoslavia, Rumania is considerably stronger economically, still has great resources to be exploited, and is becoming one of the most powerful of the Soviet satellites. If Marshal Tito is still cherishing the ambition of dominating the Balkans he may find a considerable obstacle in the prosaic but extremely competent railway worker from Moldavia.

These, then, are some of the most important repercussions which could arise in the Balkans as a result of any *rapprochement* between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. It may be argued that one important repercussion has been left out, namely the possibility of the Communist Parties of Bulgaria and Rumania, and of the rest

of the bloc for that matter, again being ideologically contaminated by Tito's revisionism as they were in 1956. The defence against this argument is, of course, the simple one that 1962 is not 1956. The tragic failure of the Hungarian Revolution practically destroyed the appeal of Yugoslav revisionism in Eastern Europe. And now Mr Khrushchev himself has emerged as the supreme revisionist. Against such competition Marshal Tito becomes almost irrelevant. The Soviet leader is evidently confident that this is the case and that the satellite Parties of Eastern Europe are now immunized against a disease which less than a decade ago proved almost fatal. This is one repercussion, therefore, which can reasonably be discounted; but, as can be seen, the other more probable repercussions could well prove to be serious.

J. F. BROWN

Independence for Uganda

UGANDA is due to become independent on 9 October 1962, almost exactly one hundred years after Speke's discovery of the source of the Nile first directed the world's attention to the area. British colonial administration there has lasted for an even shorter period—only sixty-eight years. These facts must be remembered, both to account for some of Uganda's peculiar problems and also to give a just estimate of the territory's achievements.

The biggest political problem that faces Uganda's leaders today is that of national unity. Divisions in Uganda are tribal, linguistic, religious, and economic, as well as political. The country contains four kingdoms and ten districts, each of which is jealous of its own identity. As a result, the Constitution of independent Uganda is to be a federal one, under which powers are reserved from the central Government to regional Governments in varying measure. It will not be an easy Constitution to work if parochial views remain dominant for long, and it may present an obstacle to Uganda's inclusion in an East African federation in the future.

The greatest difficulty for the constitution-makers was to fit the kingdom of Buganda into the Uganda pattern. Buganda occupies the centre of Uganda in all but the strictest geographical sense.

Comprising about a quarter of the total land area, it includes some 2 million of the country's 6½ million people and is the richest part of the country. It contains the Government and commercial capitals, and such national assets as Uganda's international airport (Entebbe), its University College (Makerere), and its impressive new 860-bed hospital (Mulago Hospital, which is to be opened during the independence celebrations). In addition, Buganda had the advantage in the past of being the place from which external influences, those both of the missionaries and of the British administration, spread to the rest of the country; and it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the British Government under a series of Agreements that guaranteed the position of its traditional ruler, the Kabaka, and his Government. This favoured position has provoked envy and emulation in the other parts of Uganda and has been the root cause of constitutional and political difficulties in recent years.

The development of Buganda separatism was reinforced by the events of 1953–5,[1] when the Kabaka was exiled by the British Government. The result was to advance African political demands, but at the same time to turn the Baganda in upon themselves. For example, the first effective political party in Uganda, the U.N.C. (Uganda National Congress), founded in 1952, recruited a big popular following as a result of backing the Kabaka; but it became an essentially Buganda party. The growth of political parties on a territorial scale was stunted by Buganda's preoccupation with its own affairs. Moreover, there was in Buganda, after the Kabaka crisis, a renewed emphasis on traditionalism that ran counter to the development of Uganda nationalism on the normal pattern of colonial territories.

The movement towards Buganda separatism reached what may prove to have been its turning point on 1 January 1961. On that date the Buganda Lukiko (Parliament) declared that the kingdom had seceded from the Uganda Protectorate. In fact it was a rhetorical secession only. No practical steps were taken to make it a reality; indeed, the Kabaka's Government—which seemed all along to have been in two minds about the proposed gesture—immediately announced that its relations with the Protectorate Government would remain unaltered, pending further negotiations. However, the 'secession' demonstrated to the British and to the Uganda politicians how dangerously far the build-up of Buganda separatism had gone. The Secretary of State for the Colonies, in a message to

[1] See 'Contemporary Trends in Uganda', in *The World Today*, July 1955.

the Lukiko in December 1960,[1] was firm in refusing to allow the unilateral secession of one part of Uganda. On the other hand, Mr Macleod stated that the British Government had not ruled out the possibility of a federal Constitution for Uganda. This was the first sign that the British might depart from their previously held position that the future Uganda would be a unitary State.

Meanwhile, during these Buganda manœuvres, the rest of Uganda prepared for her first general election. It had been foreshadowed by the Wild Committee Report, published at the end of 1959,[2] which recommended democratic elections, on a common voters' roll with no minority safeguards, for the choice of the next Legislative Council. In all parts of Uganda except Buganda the registration of voters was highly successful, and even in those areas where no direct elections had ever been held before large numbers of men and women—upwards of 75 per cent of the potential electorate—turned out to register. Inside Buganda the story was very different. The Buganda Government had declared that it would not agree to elections being held before it received an assurance that the future Constitution would be a federal one and would guarantee its special position. Since the Colonial Secretary would not give this assurance, and refused also to put off the elections, the Buganda Government boycotted them. The low figure of registrations in Buganda—under 4 per cent of the potential electorate—demonstrated how strong a hold the Kabaka's Government had over the mass of its subjects.

This was the position in Uganda when a Commission, under the chairmanship of the Earl of Munster, was set up in December 1960 to devise a workable constitutional framework for Uganda, and in particular to advise on the best relationship of the different parts of the country to the central Government. The Relationship Commission's Report was published in June 1961,[3] and cleared the way for a constitutional conference to be held in September. Up to the last moment before the conference was due to open in London, however, it remained uncertain whether the Buganda representatives would attend.

The decisive factor in bringing Buganda into the London conference was probably the pact made between the leading Buganda politicians and the Uganda People's Congress just before the conference opened. At first sight this was a surprising alliance of

[1] *The Times*, 10 December 1960.
[2] Entebbe (Government Printer).
[3] Entebbe (Government Printer).

opposites. Admittedly the U.P.C. was by remote origin an offshoot of the old U.N.C.—in one of the many splits the U.N.C. suffered, Mr A. M. Obote and some followers broke away from it—but in March 1960 Obote's group merged with a bloc of non-Baganda Legislative Council members calling themselves the U.P.U. (Uganda People's Union) to form the U.P.C., and the new party was distinctly anti-Buganda, both in the sense that it drew its main support from the northern parts of Uganda where feeling against the Baganda was strong, and in the sense that its leaders were African nationalists of the normal type who did not have much time for the neo-traditionalism of Buganda. Gradually the U.P.C. gained support, until in the election campaign of 1961 it emerged as one of the two major political parties in Uganda. The other major party at this time was the Democratic Party, led by Mr Benedicto Kiwanuka. This was a Catholic-orientated party, formed in 1956, which enjoyed some support on religious grounds even inside Buganda. (Mr Kiwanuka is himself a Muganda, whereas Mr Obote comes from Lango, to the north of Buganda.) In 1961 elections were fought out largely between these two parties, and the D.P. won, with 43 seats to the U.P.C.'s 35, although the U.P.C. polled a larger total of votes. The basis of the D.P.'s success lay in rural Buganda, where the few voters who braved their Government's ban on the elections tended to be D.P. supporters; in spite of tiny polls the D.P. therefore had twenty Buganda members on its side in the Legislative Council. Outside Buganda, and in the main towns, the U.P.C. won ten more seats than the D.P. In effect therefore there were three power blocs in Uganda politics: the D.P., the U.P.C., and Buganda, and to a great extent this analysis remains true today. In 1961 the D.P. held the majority in the Uganda Legislative Council, because of Buganda's attitude towards the elections, and Mr Kiwanuka became Chief Minister. In the week before the London conference, however, Mr Obote struck his bargain with the Buganda politicians that virtually ensured the triumph of the U.P.C. over the D.P. at the next general election.

By 9 October 1961, hard bargaining both at the conference table and in parallel negotiations between the Colonial Secretary and the Buganda delegation, produced an agreed draft of the Uganda Constitution, and also a new version of the Agreement between Britain and Buganda. The Constitution provided for a democratic system and a strong central Government of Uganda to replace the Protectorate Government in a year's time; but it also guaranteed the

position of the country's traditional Rulers and their Governments. It granted Buganda federal status, and made a major concession in allowing the Lukiko an option of indirectly electing the members to represent Buganda in the central legislature at the time of the next general election—to be held in April 1962, following the granting of internal self-government to Uganda on 1 March. Indirect elections for Buganda had been agreed to by the U.P.C. in its deal with Buganda before the conference began; but the D.P. opposed this concession to the end, staging a walk-out from the conference to mark its support for 'undiluted democracy'.

It was a condition of the London arrangement that, before exercising its privilege of indirectly electing the Buganda members of the Legislative Council, the Buganda Lukiko must itself be democratized by means of direct elections. These Lukiko elections were held in February 1962. They resulted in a sweeping victory for Kabaka Yekka, a Buganda 'national front' which included the chief Buganda politicians and was supported by the Kabaka's Government. The D.P. contested every constituency, but K.Y. won 65 out of the 68 elective Lukiko seats. This victory virtually dictated the result of the second Uganda general election, held in April 1962, because it meant that the twenty-one Buganda members of the National Assembly would be Lukiko nominees, and would support K.Y.'s ally, the U.P.C. Thus it was pretty certain that the D.P. Government would give way to a U.P.C.–K.Y. coalition.

Ever since the London conference, though, a growing demand had been heard from the kingdoms of Ankole, Bunyoro, and Toro, and from the district of Busoga, that they too should have the federal status granted to Buganda. The D.P. tried to improve its support outside Buganda by backing this demand, but since the U.P.C. also expressed itself in favour of federal status for the three kingdoms and Busoga, little gain accrued to the D.P. At the elections held in April 1962 the U.P.C. won its expected victory, and Mr Obote became Prime Minister at the head of a U.P.C.–K.Y. Government. After the addition of Specially-elected Members to the Assembly, party strengths were: U.P.C. 43, D.P. 24, K.Y. 24. The elections were followed by the Independence conference in London, which ended on 29 June.

At the Independence conference the final arrangements for 'uhuru' on 9 October were made. The three kingdoms and Busoga were granted the federal status which they had demanded in imitation of Buganda. The danger that such an extension of federal status

would drive Buganda's demands higher was just avoided, though Buganda did get a more favourable financial relationship with the central Government than the others. The danger that a devolution of powers would weaken the central Government was also avoided: notably, the central Government retained control of law and order and police for the whole of Uganda. Other important decisions were also made, one being that Uganda would remain in the Commonwealth after independence; and the chapter of the Constitution on fundamental human rights was made stronger than it had been in the previous year's draft.

But two major political and constitutional problems were left unsolved by the Independence conference. One is that of the long-standing dispute between Buganda and Bunyoro over the 'lost counties'. A Privy Council Commission, under Lord Molson, investigated the dispute earlier this year and recommended[1] that the two counties in which the population was predominantly Banyoro should be transferred from Buganda to Bunyoro. Failing agreement on these lines by the parties to the dispute, the Colonial Secretary announced at the Independence conference that the two counties would not be transferred, but would be administered by the central Government for two years, after which time a referendum should decide whether they were to revert either to Buganda or Bunyoro or remain under the central Government. This solution, imposed by Mr Maudling, was accepted by the Prime Minister and the conference, but not by the Bunyoro delegation, who walked out in protest against it. Obviously, the solution is an imperfect one, since it invites the protagonists to keep their quarrel alive for the sake of the future referendum and it does not ensure absolutely that the referendum will ever take place. This 'lost counties' dispute shows how deeply felt local loyalties still are in Uganda. It is in fact only one of numerous boundary disputes, but it is the most serious because of its disruptive potentiality. The U.P.C.–K.Y. alliance could break on this issue; Mr Obote has yet to declare how he intends to implement the Maudling formula. Further, the possibility of violence in the area cannot be overlooked, although to speak in terms of a Congo-like situation is a gross exaggeration.

The other unsolved problem is that of the future Head of State. On Independence Day the Governor will become a Governor-General, but if in future Uganda desires an indigenous Head of State it is difficult to see where he is to come from. There are already

[1] Cmnd. 1717.

four hereditary Rulers in Uganda, but it is unlikely that any one of them would be acceptable to the others, or to each other's subjects, or to the non-monarchical parts of the country, as Head of State, even if the plan was for each to serve in turn. Further, it is difficult to imagine the Baganda (and to a lesser extent the other monarchs' subjects) allowing a President precedence over their Kabaka. It may be that popular feeling on these matters will change more rapidly than now seems probable, but meanwhile the issue is a barrel of powder under Mr Obote, which could be exploded by any Buganda Guy Fawkes raising a cry on behalf of the Kabaka.

In the light of past and present political divisions it is not surprising that Mr Obote sees his first task as that of promoting Uganda's unity. He claims, indeed, that constitutional squabbles and boundary disputes are already a matter of past history. As yet, this must be taken as hopeful propaganda rather than hard fact, but by now the need for unity must be clear to all. It is desirable not only for domestic reasons but so that Uganda can present a solid front to the outside world. She is a country with no natural frontiers, except Lake Victoria in the south. Even the Ruwenzori Mountains on the west are not proof against frontier disputes with the Congo, and Uganda's frontiers with Kenya and the Sudan are as arbitrary as any in Africa. Already Uganda has had a tough problem in dealing with more than 35,000 Rwanda refugees who have crossed her south-western border, and her westward trade has suffered considerably because of the situation in the Congo. Relations with Kenya, and the political climate prevailing there, affect Uganda's prospects most vitally, because her main link with the outside world is by way of the Kenya railway and the port of Mombasa. So far there has been no overt move towards the East African Federation which Mr Nyerere advocates, and it is hard to say what Uganda's exact response will be when the issue is next raised. In the past the U.P.C. was more closely linked with PAFMECA (Pan-African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa) than was any other group in Uganda; and at a recent U.P.C. conference, delegates urged that Uganda should align herself with the Casablanca States. However, the present Government has not yet committed itself to any specific decisions on foreign policy.

Uganda unity is also essential to ensure financial stability and economic progress. In common with other African countries, Uganda has lost a good deal of capital investment as the date of independence approaches. The present Government, however,

seems fully aware of the need to reassure investors both at home and abroad. Already its sensible conduct may have had some effect on confidence, and there seems no reason why capital that has gone abroad should not return and new capital should not be attracted from overseas investors.

The aspect of this problem that affects Uganda most closely concerns the position of the local Indian community. The Indians are quite numerous—about 76,200—and their prominent role in trade and industry, and in the middle ranks of government, gives them greater importance than their numbers indicate. For instance, cotton ginning and most branches of retail trade are still predominantly in Indian hands. Since Uganda has no white settlers—there are only about 11,700 Europeans in the country, and few of them regard it as a permanent home—the Indians have been the target of any racial animosity that has been aroused. They went through a bad period in 1959–60, when there was an anti-Asian trade boycott of shops and transport facilities in Buganda. Many of the small shopkeepers outside Kampala were driven from their homes by terrorism, and even some of the bigger retailers and wholesalers went out of business. A recurrence of this sort of situation is just what the present Government wants to avoid, and Mr Obote stated in a recent speech[1] that economic problems would be approached by his Government on a non-racial basis. Uganda badly needs the skills and capital of her Indian residents.

The professional and managerial skills of European expatriates are important to Uganda also. A Report of Uganda's Commissioners for Africanization[2] (both Africans) emphasized that the danger was not that too many expatriates would stay and block the path to promotion for Africans, but that too many would depart too soon. As things stand at present, about 400 out of 1,600 European civil servants have left or are leaving, and the Commissioners for Africanization advise that the departure of the remainder should be slowed down by offering them various inducements to stay. However, according to this Report, it should be possible for Uganda to africanize all but a few Government scientific, technical, and teaching posts within five years, and the rest within ten years.

The greatest hindrance to africanization is the shortage of secondary education. In 1960 the numbers of children at secondary

[1] At the U.P.C. annual conference at Mbale, 4 August 1962.

[2] Part I, *Africanization, Retention of Expatriates, and Scholarships*. Entebbe (Government Printer), 24 July 1962.

schools amounted to only 0·7 per cent of the total population between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. In that year 639 pupils passed the Cambridge School Certificate examination and 24 the Higher Certificate examination; these figures rose to 660 and 50 respectively in 1961. The obstacle to an expansion of secondary education is the shortage of teachers. In 1959 all but 28 of the 246 teachers in grant-aided secondary schools outside the towns were expatriates. The following year there were only seven graduates and twenty-eight non-graduates taking education diplomas at Makerere University College. In this situation the only hope was to recruit more teachers from overseas. During 1961 and 1962 a total of 300 teachers will have come to Uganda under the 'Makerere Scheme' sponsored jointly by Makerere College, the Uganda Government, the United Kingdom Department of Technical Co-operation, and the United States Government. About two-thirds of the teachers recruited under this scheme are American. The plan is for them to teach in East African schools for two years, with the possibility of a further two-year contract. Uganda secondary schools benefit from this scheme, which is at present the only means of holding the line in secondary education, and provides the only hope for its rapid expansion.

The present Government is committed to an ambitious economic programme, directed towards the creation of a welfare state in Uganda. The details of this programme are as yet unrevealed, and it remains somewhat chimerical. What is known now is that the country is in the first stages of a development plan, based on that devised by the World Bank survey mission that visited Uganda in 1960.[1]

The need for economic development is obvious. Though not the poorest territory in East Africa, Uganda has a *per capita* income of £22, and a population rising at the rate of 2½ per cent per year. The principal exports are coffee and cotton (together they make up 70 per cent or more of the country's total export values), and world prices for these commodities have fallen since the boom period of the 1950s and seem unlikely to undergo a spectacular improvement. The World Bank therefore recommended that Uganda should aim at an increase of the gross domestic product by 3–4 per cent a year, chiefly by concentrating on agricultural production. The conditions for such development, as defined by the World Bank Report, were

[1] I.B.R.D., *The Economic Development of Uganda*, Entebbe (Government Printer), 1961.

that national and government income should be increased; social service expenditure (apart from expenditure on some branches of education) should be pegged; capital expenditure on administration should be held down; and the evolution from a subsistence to a monetary economy should be encouraged. The Report emphasized that the main opportunities for economic growth lie in agriculture. It would be essential for Uganda to concentrate on cotton production, but also to diversify her agricultural output, especially by improving her livestock industry. Some idea of the scope for agricultural improvement may be obtained from a recent local estimate that only one acre in six in Uganda is being cultivated profitably.

It is obvious that the World Bank's recommendations are less ambitious than the U.P.C.'s, but at present it looks difficult enough to finance the World Bank's development plan. The total cost of financing the World Bank programme for 1961/2–1965/6 would be £52 million and the Report suggested that Uganda should be able to find half this total internally. It is now doubtful whether this can be done, because the Price Assistance Funds which the World Bank considered able to contribute £5 million have been considerably run down since 1960, and it is unlikely that the recurrent budget can provide as much as £2 million a year. Thus, even counting on British aid, and other overseas aid and investment, the economic outlook is not altogether rosy.

Nevertheless, there is something in Mr Obote's claim that, given political stability, the country's economic problems will not be insuperable. Uganda has an economic potential to exploit. She has also some hard-won political experience. Sectional interests of all types remain the principal dragons in the path of independence, but in the long run the vestiges of present divisions may be transformed into helpful limitations on the excessive growth of a monolithic State. Meanwhile, it can be said that Uganda is approaching her independence with less innocence than Tanganyika and less bitterness than Kenya.

JENNIFER CARTER

President Kennedy's 'Grand Design'

The United States and a United Europe

SINCE the beginning of this year a great deal has been heard of President Kennedy's so-called 'grand design' for the Western alliance. This is the most comprehensive attempt yet made by Washington to deal with a situation which has been developing for some years now and which presents a number of formidable problems for the United States. The main elements of this situation had all emerged as early as the end of 1958. In the first place, the past four years have witnessed a significant shift in the balance of economic forces within the Western community. The U.S. economy, on the one hand, has continued to suffer both from an alarmingly slow rate of growth and from a substantial annual balance of payments deficit. Western Europe, by contrast, having made a spectacular recovery under the aegis of the Marshall Plan, is now binding itself into the powerful European Economic Community, a competitive market larger than that of the United States secured by a common external tariff. Even in the most favourable circumstances, European recovery would have implied a challenge to the United States: in view of her comparative economic weakness the challenge is considerably more acute. U.S. exporters have had to face the possibility of a high European tariff discriminating against their goods in what is potentially one of the most valuable markets in the world at a time when U.S. trade badly needs the stimulus of liberal conditions of access. The trade problem also has a great bearing on the balance of payments position. Unless the United States can significantly expand her export surplus or persuade her European partners in the alliance to assume a share of the burden of defence and aid expenditure commensurate with their new prosperity, these commitments may well have to be reduced with inevitably serious consequences.

The second principal factor causing concern in Washington has been the movement in the terms of world trade against primary commodities which began in 1957. Many countries in which the United States has a special interest—especially in Latin America—are almost entirely dependent for their livelihood on the export of one or more such commodities. The possibility that the Common Market tariff might also discriminate against them and give preference to the produce of the European Community's African associates has raised fears for the stability of the countries concerned.

The problem is all the more pressing in the light of the Soviet trade and aid drive in the under-developed areas which has grown significantly since it was first launched by Mr Khrushchev and Mr Bulganin in India in the autumn of 1955.

But although the economic difficulties which a resurgent Europe could place in the way of the United States and her dependents are powerful, there is no doubt that for Washington the main dangers are political. Two such dangers have arisen from developments in Europe since 1958. Firstly, the split between the Common Market and the European Free Trade Association marked, in the U.S. view, a serious weakening of Western solidarity. This was all the more so since Britain in the E.F.T.A. was associating herself with neutral nations having no part in the Western alliance. As a result, ever since the formation of the E.F.T.A. the United States has consistently worked against the inclusion of neutral States in a united Europe. Secondly, some European statesmen, notably President de Gaulle, have created the impression of wanting Europe to emerge, after political union, as a 'third force'. Such a force would be independent of both Eastern and Western Power blocs, and equipped not only with its own economic but also with political and even military policies. The United States, however, did not revive Europe to enable it to have this degree of independence and American policy has been strenuously directed at containing the new Europe within the framework of the Atlantic alliance.

The reaction of the Eisenhower Administration to the changed situation which confronted it from the end of 1958 onwards may best be seen in the activities of its Under-Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, Mr Douglas Dillon. It is interesting to note that Mr Dillon was the only senior member of President Eisenhower's Cabinet to take office under President Kennedy (as Secretary of the Treasury) and this suggests a certain continuity between the foreign economic policy of the two Administrations. Nowhere is this more evident than in the field of Latin American affairs. The Alliance for Progress proclaimed by President Kennedy in the spring of 1961 was the direct successor of the Act of Bogotá which Mr Dillon promoted so ably the previous autumn. While the links between the Republican and Democratic attitudes to the Common Market are nothing like so obvious, at least some elements of President Kennedy's policy were foreshadowed in President Eisenhower's last two years and they seem worth tracing.

It was at the ministerial meeting of the General Agreement on

Tariffs and Trade in October 1958 that Mr Dillon initiated one approach to the new problems facing the United States.[1] His Government, he declared, was 'prepared to participate in tariff negotiations with the members of the European Economic Community and with other countries, to the end that mutually beneficial tariff concessions may be agreed upon'. With the latest extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act timed to expire in the summer of 1962, the Americans were obviously anxious to make use of the intervening years to strike an advantageous bargain with the Common Market. Furthermore, Mr Dillon also called for a reduction in the E.E.C. tariff on 'a number of tropical products imported from many of the less-developed countries which are contracting parties to the General Agreement'. The formal American request for a tariff conference was made soon afterwards, and in May 1959 it was agreed to convene it in Geneva, opening in September 1960.

Shortly after the October 1958 meeting of the G.A.T.T., Europe split in two with the collapse of the free trade area negotiations, and during 1959 the breach became wider with the formation of the E.F.T.A.[2] Moreover, by the close of the year the U.S. balance of payments position had become even worse, and the Draper Committee in its Report to the President urged that Europe be requested to take a much larger share of the defence and aid burden. It was against this gloomy background that Mr Dillon came to Europe in December 'in order to familiarize himself in greater detail with the implications of both agreements (those of the E.E.C. and the E.F.T.A.) and the possibility of their working together'.[3] But if, as some optimistically felt, this meant that the United States had come to act as mediator between the two rival groupings, they were disappointed. The United States most certainly had no intention of bringing the Six and the Seven together to work out joint measures of discrimination against her imports, and the Dillon mission may well have been designed to forestall such a juncture.

If anything, the United States seemed to be veering towards recognition of the Common Market as a permanent factor in world trade. As early as June 1959 President Eisenhower stated his approval of the Community 'and the concept of increased European

[1] The text of Mr Dillon's address is printed in the *Department of State Bulletin*, 10 November 1958.

[2] See 'The Outer Seven: Buying Time in the European Trade Dispute', in *The World Today*, January 1960.

[3] *D.S.B.*, 14 December 1959.

integration underlying it on political, economic and security grounds'.[1] This support, of course, was no doubt given in the hope that the E.E.C. would evolve into a liberal outward-looking body working in conjunction with the United States. From the American point of view there were encouraging signs that some European representatives were thinking along similar lines. The E.E.C. Commission, for instance, in its memorandum of 18 September 1959 to the Rey Committee,[2] argued that special consideration in any solution of European trade problems must be given to the United States and the under-developed countries. Moreover, the chairman of the Commission, Dr Hallstein, speaking in Washington in November, implied that the United States must be consulted before any agreement could be reached and his view was echoed by the French Foreign Minister, M. Couve de Murville.

The proposals outlined by Mr Dillon in January 1960[3] reflected an American concern to project European problems into an 'Atlantic' context and to associate Europe more closely with the United States in carrying the burden of aid. In the first place, he suggested that a successor to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (O.E.E.C.) should be established in which 'the United States is prepared to play a full and active part'.[4] Secondly, pending its formation, the major industrial countries on both sides of the Atlantic should come together in a 'development assistance group' to co-ordinate aid policies, with a view to giving Western Europe a greater role in the provision of aid to the under-developed areas. Thirdly, the 'special economic committee' of thirteen nations which Mr Dillon was addressing should continue in being to discuss the European trading problem. In fact, the 'Dillon committee', as it came to be called, did nothing to bring the Six and the Seven closer together. The main importance of the Dillon proposals is that they marked the close of the period of European development begun by the Marshall Plan and laid the foundations for a wider Atlantic partnership in which both the United States and Canada had become full members.

[1] *Third Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program*, Washington, 1959, p. 7.

[2] The text of the memorandum is in *Bulletin of the European Economic Community*, October 1959, pp. 13–20.

[3] Text in *D.S.B.*, 1 February 1960. See also 'The Paris Economic Conferences of January 1960', in *The World Today*, February 1960.

[4] In 1961 O.E.E.C. became O.E.C.D. (The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development). So far it does not seem to have lived up to its expectations. See 'O.E.E.C. into O.E.C.D.', in *The World Today*, May 1961.

For the time being, however, Washington was clearly relying on the forthcoming G.A.T.T. conference at Geneva in September 1960 to produce liberal solutions equally acceptable to the E.E.C. the E.F.T.A., and the United States. Meanwhile, American support for the Community moved much more into the open in March when President Eisenhower welcomed the acceleration of its tariff changes as 'a major contribution towards a general lowering of world trade barriers'.[1] A further step towards recognition of the Community as a durable entity came in a letter from Mr Dillon to Dr Luns, the Netherlands Foreign Minister, some time in April.[2] The Eisenhower Administration, Mr Dillon intimated, was ready to give its blessing to the acceleration plan, provided the Community was willing to negotiate a 20 per cent tariff reduction with non-members in the framework of the G.A.T.T. conference or, preferably, to reduce by 20 per cent at one stroke. Not surprisingly perhaps, the E.E.C. chose the former alternative and both sides entered the conference pledged to concede reductions up to this figure.

The negotiations at Geneva were still in an early stage when the Kennedy Administration took over at the beginning of 1961. Since then the situation has been transformed by Britain's application to join the Common Market. There can be little doubt that this was partly a result of American pressure. British membership of the E.E.C. would please the United States for a number of reasons. For example, the provisions of the new Trade Expansion Act, which allow for the reduction or elimination of all tariffs on products in which the E.E.C. and the United States together account for 80 per cent or more of world trade, would lose practically all their meaning if Britain were to stay out of Europe. The main attraction of British accession to the Community, however, is the added guarantee of European political reliability which it brings with it. Mr Dillon himself, speaking in April 1961,[3] went so far as to say that the United States 'can pay some price in the form of added trade barriers to earn the political dividend of a more united Western Europe'. British membership of the E.E.C. would in the first place mean the end of the E.F.T.A. with its 'unhealthy' tinge of neutrality. It would also presumably counteract any European pretensions to 'third force' status and help to weld Europe more firmly into the Atlantic partnership, of which American spokesmen have come to speak so often and which representatives of Britain and the E.E.C.

[1] *Public Papers of the Presidents, 1960–61*, Washington, 1961, p. 293.
[2] *The Guardian*, 1 May 1960. [3] *ibid.*, 26 April 1961.

Commission have welcomed.[1] At the moment, with British accession in the balance, it is too early to say what the outcome will be. France apparently raises the biggest obstacles to British entry and President de Gaulle himself has poured scorn on the efforts of the 'Federator' (that is, the United States) to found a United States of Europe in its own image. Obviously without Britain the new Europe could be at best only a recalcitrant ally.

But if British membership of the E.E.C. is vital to the United States, a great deal more publicity has been given to the second prerequisite of the 'grand design', President Kennedy's Trade Expansion Act.[2] This measure arose directly out of the frustrations of the G.A.T.T. conference. The so-called 'Dillon round' of negotiations within the G.A.T.T. dragged on for eight months—from May 1961 until January 1962—before an agreement could be reached between the United States and the E.E.C. In part this was simply due to the cumbrous bargaining machinery on both sides. The U.S. delegation was merely empowered to negotiate reductions of up to 20 per cent on individual items, while the E.E.C. was handicapped by the need for continuous consultation between its members. By far the biggest stumbling-block, however, was the question of American agricultural imports into Europe on which the United States failed to obtain satisfaction. Nor did she make any greater headway over the matter of the commodity exports of the under-developed countries, which, as we have seen, are of almost equal concern to her.

Nevertheless, if the Trade Expansion Act passes unscathed through Congress, it will show that the United States has drawn the appropriate lessons from her experiences in Geneva. At the ministerial meeting of the G.A.T.T. on 30 November 1961, Mr Dillon's successor at the State Department, Mr George Ball, called for linear percentage tariff cuts in future, to replace the slow item-by-item reductions which have so far been the traditional method of conducting tariff negotiations; in addition, he made a powerful plea for less discrimination against the trade of the under-developed countries.[3] Both of these suggestions have a place in the new Act which the President introduced early in 1962. In the first place, the Administration has asked for power over the next five years to

[1] Cf. Mr Heath's speech to the Ministerial Council of Western European Union on 10 April 1962, text in *The Times*, 13 April 1962, and the joint communiqué issued by President Kennedy and Dr Hallstein on 12 April 1962, text in *D.S.B.*, 7 May 1962.

[2] For a detailed analysis of the Act, see 'President Kennedy's Programme for Expanding Trade', in *The World Today*, March 1962.

[3] *The Times*, 1 December 1961.

reduce or eliminate all tariffs on imports by up to 50 per cent on a linear basis; secondly, to reduce or eliminate all barriers to the import of tropical products. Both concessions will be subject to reciprocal action. So far the Act has passed the House of Representatives virtually intact and now stands before the Senate. Although it is hardly the millenial measure which some of its sponsors appear to claim, it should go a long way towards securing the continued liberalization of world trade that seems necessary to guarantee American prosperity and fashion the outward-looking Europe which the United States wants as her partner in the Atlantic alliance.

For the ultimate objective which the Kennedy Administration has set itself is nothing less than an Atlantic partnership of equals, the United States and a united Europe. In the words of the President himself, speaking at Philadelphia on Independence Day:[1]

> We believe that a united Europe will be capable of playing a greater role in the common defence, of responding more generously to the needs of poorer nations, of joining with the United States and others in lowering trade barriers, resolving problems of currency and developing co-ordinated policies in all other economic, diplomatic and political areas.

As Mr Kennedy went on to admit, this is a long-term vision which may not be realized for over a generation. At the moment the biggest problem is to persuade the legislators of the United States and the leaders of Europe that it is both in their interests and in the interests of the Western alliance. The next few months should show whether or not this can be done.

JOHN MAJOR

Constitution-Making in The Congo

THE absence of a workable Constitution has been a major factor in the Congo disaster. The Republic's legal framework is provided by the *Loi Fondamentale* of May 1960 which was conceived as a transitional Constitution until the Congo Parliament could adopt one of its own making. After more than two years of tortuous negotiations the point has now been reached where the Congo leaders are broadly

[1] *The Times*, 5 July 1962.

agreed on objectives—a unified Congo within a federal structure—but there is much less agreement on how these objectives should be reached. The prolonged negotiations leading up to this point, and the sharp partisanship as between Leopoldville and Elizabethville, have obscured and confused the issues involved. What follows is an attempt to describe the course of events with as little direct comment as possible.

There appear to have been three distinct phases in the negotiations.

(i) *The round-table discussions in Brussels (January–February 1960).* Right from the start Congolese politicians were divided between those supporting the principles of confederation, federation, and a unitary State. President Kasavubu's Abako Party was the first to favour confederation, later abandoning it in favour of federalism. Mr Tshombe's Conakat Party, however, staunchly upheld it. The late Mr Lumumba's Party favoured a unitary form of government.

At the round-table conference agreement was reached by the various Congolese leaders in a series of resolutions setting out the bare bones of a Constitution midway between a federal and a unitary system. A political commission of six Congolese was appointed to work with the Belgian Minister and his legal advisers in order to draw up a provisional Constitution based on these resolutions. It was agreed that this *Loi Fondamentale* should be passed before independence as a Belgian law, since the Congo had no political institution of her own, and should act as the Constitution of the Congo until a permanent Constitution could be drafted by a Congolese constituent assembly.[1]

The *Loi Fondamentale* (contrary to a general impression) does not provide for a unitary Constitution, although it does allow for a strong central Government. The delineation of powers between the centre and the six provinces are in many ways comparable to Central Africa's federal Constitution. The respective competence of the central and the provincial Governments is explicitly defined in Articles 219 and 220. Article 223 provides for the procedures to transfer powers between the central and provincial authorities. The sixteen provisions of Article 220 help to explain many points at issue in subsequent negotiations. These provisions give the provincial

[1] The *Loi Fondamentale* was a Belgian law but as, at the time it was passed, the Congo was still a colony it needed no ratification by the Congolese to become effective. Unless specifically repealed or amended it would continue in force after independence.

authority competence in the following fields: the internal political structure of the province; the provincial police; judicial police officials attached to courts within the provincial jurisdiction; nominations of lower rank magistrates; nomination of administrative bodies; provincial finance; education other than higher education, and the appointment of education inspectors; granting of agricultural and forestry concessions; granting of mining concessions, subject to general laws relative to such grants which belong to the central authority; exploitation of hydraulic energy; provincial and local railways, roads, and public works; control of local institutions; and determining penalties necessary to enforce edicts. All other powers belong to the central authority, with the exception of social legislation and a national minimum wage; these are the only two collateral powers (Article 221).

The late Mr Lumumba and Mr Tshombe were among the Congolese leaders who accepted the *Loi Fondamentale*. The only objector at Brussels was Mr Kasavubu, who later modified his position.

(ii) *Attempts to reform the Constitution.* The secession of Katanga on 11 July 1960 marked the beginning of the struggle to transform the Constitution. After the break-up of the first Central Government on 5 September 1960 the initiative in constitution-making passed for a short time into the hands of the confederalists. Thus at the Tananarive conference in March 1961, Mr Tshombe persuaded a large number of Congolese leaders (but not the Lumumbists) to accept the idea of a confederation of sovereign states. But within a month this agreement was repudiated, and when Mr Tshombe tried to insist on his confederalist views at the Coquilhatville conference in April 1961 he was arrested.

The Coquilhatville conference then proceeded to draw up nineteen resolutions on which the future Constitution of the 'Federal Republic of the Congo' should be based. These envisaged a much looser federal structure with twenty separate states each responsible for its own political institutions, police, and gendarmerie. The conference set up a Government Constitution Committee under the chairmanship of Marcel Lihau, one of the few Congolese to have studied law, with the job of drafting a Constitution based on these resolutions. This Committee, with the help of various deputies and senators and with legal advice from the United Nations and elsewhere, worked solidly on and by the summer of 1962 had completed a draft law for a federal Constitution. The future of this Constitution, however, depended entirely upon the outcome of the

negotiations between Mr Adoula, since August 1961 the Prime Minister of the Central Government, and Mr Tshombe.

(iii) *The Tshombe–Adoula talks.* The current series of talks between Mr Adoula and Mr Tshombe began in Kitona in December 1961 following the two rounds of United Nations military intervention in Katanga. Under the eight points of the Kitona Agreement[1] of 21 December, Mr Tshombe agreed *inter alia* to accept the application of the *Loi Fondamentale*; to recognize the indissoluble unity of the Congo and the authority of the Central Government over all its parts; to place the Katanga gendarmerie under the President's authority; and pledged himself to respect, and facilitate the implementation of, U.N. decisions.

Mr Tshombe later complained that he had signed this Agreement under duress. Nevertheless, on 15 February 1962, the Katanga Provincial Assembly passed a resolution in which it accepted 'the draft declaration of Kitona . . . as a potential basis of discussion with a view to the settlement of the Congolese conflict. . .'[2] The following day Mr Tshombe submitted this resolution to Mr Adoula and proposed new talks 'for the purpose of bringing about a solution in the spirit of the Kitona declaration'.[3] This led to the first round of the negotiations in Leopoldville on 18 March 1962.

Mr Tshombe immediately raised two major issues, namely that he was not empowered to make a final decision at the talks, and that the *Loi Fondamentale* must be modified.[4] Faced with a breakdown of the talks, on 6 April Mr Tshombe made two vital submissions to Mr Adoula. '1. I am empowered and prepared to renounce the absolute sovereignty of Katanga. 2. In return I would request you to confirm to me formally the internal sovereignty of Katanga.'[5]

On 16 April Mr Adoula submitted the Central Government's proposals to Mr Tshombe in the form of draft conclusions on the Leopoldville talks.[6] Article 1 proclaimed that the Congo 'remains one and indivisible within its frontiers of 30 June 1960. Nevertheless, as the President of the Republic stated on 24 March 1962: "Unity in no way signifies any desire to disregard the *particularismes* of the various regions of the country. On the contrary, the unity of the country is made up of the contribution, the strength and the ideas of each of the distinctive regional identities." '

Article 2 affirmed the maintenance of the unity of the State 'while

[1] U.N. Document S.5038. (All references below are to this Document and its Annexes.)
[2] Annex 2, p. 2. [3] *ibid.* [4] Annex 4, p. 1. [5] Annex 8, p. 1.
[6] Annex 9.

ensuring that the provinces enjoy a broad measure of administrative autonomy'. It listed the items of competency for the central authority, which broadly follow the original provisions in the *Loi Fondamentale*. This was the first time during the course of the negotiations that any concrete suggestion had been made for preparing a draft federal Constitution, ensuring 'a broad measure of genuine autonomy' for the provinces. Article 3 defined the 'administrative autonomy' of the provinces broadly along the same lines as the *Loi Fondamentale*. It also proposed the creation of a Constitutional Court responsible for upholding the division of competence between the central and provincial powers, specifying that no modifications may be made without the consent of all the Provincial Assemblies. Article 4 provided for special legislation to define the financial competence of the Central and provincial Governments, and to organize the Constitutional Court.

Article 5 emphasized that the *Loi Fondamentale* remains applicable throughout the Congo Republic and that it should be immediately applied in Katanga, that national defence falls within the exclusive competence of the Central Government, and that the Katanga gendarmerie should be integrated into the Congolese National Army.

No immediate response was forthcoming from the Katanga delegation to these proposals, and the negotiations were suspended. There followed the interlude in which the United Nations forces were obliged to intervene to frustrate an attempt to prevent Mr Tshombe from returning to Elizabethville. Mr Adoula's subsequent explanation of this affair was that Mr Tshombe had not notified the Government of his intention to leave Leopoldville, and that the attempt to restrain him amounted to no more than a desire to obtain an explanation from him for his 'abrupt departure'.[1]

On 21 April Mr Adoula addressed the nation. After outlining the scope of the proposals made to Mr Tshombe (stressing that they offered the provinces 'a very large measure of autonomy to manage their own affairs') he announced the Government's willingness to seek a 'provisional arrangement concerning the distribution of State revenue among all the parties involved'. He added that the Government was becoming increasingly convinced that Mr Tshombe came to Leopoldville 'not to seek an agreement, but rather to gain time. . . Elizabethville are continuing actively to strengthen their military preparedness.'[2] He issued a warning which

[1] Annex 13, p. 3. [2] *ibid.*, p. 5.

has since become a refrain: 'Our intention to end the secession of Katanga by every means—I repeat by every means—is irrevocable. . . .'[1] There was still time, he said, for a resumption of negotiations, but without the 'previous equivocations'.

In the interval between the first and second round of the Leopoldville talks, the National Assembly enacted a law establishing criteria for the creation of provinces and for the organization of their territorial assemblies. The measure was signed by the President on 27 April 1962 as part of the *Loi Fondamentale.* Its thirteen Articles put no limitation on the number of provinces that might be carved out of the original six. For a region to be set up as a province it must, however, fulfil two conditions: (*a*) comprise at least 700,000 inhabitants, (*b*) show that its economic situation is capable of sustaining its ordinary budget. The new legislation recognized, however, that there might be social and political necessities justifying the creation of a new province, even if it could not fulfil these two conditions. To enable it to act and create such a province, the Central Government must be presented with a petition supported by the signatures of two-thirds of the elected members, national or provincial. Should this petition give rise to a dispute, a referendum was to be organized among the people concerned.[2]

Mr Tshombe agreed to return to Leopoldville for talks on 3 May, in anticipation of which he presented his revised text of the draft conclusions on the first round of talks in Leopoldville. Article 1 of Mr Adoula's proposals he accepted in full, but exception to the proposals as a whole was taken on eight separate counts.[3] Mr Tshombe demanded a more specific assurance that the draft Constitution would be *adopted* by the National Assembly, and not merely *submitted* to them. He asked for definite assurances that the territorial integrity of Katanga would not be interfered with *before* the new Constitution was enforced. He wished for more effective control over the provincial police and for powers to ensure administrative control and co-ordination. He questioned the conditions laid down for justifying action by the National Army in the provinces, and rejected the proposal that the Katanga gendarmerie should immediately be brought under national control. (This last point was a repudiation of the Kitona Agreement.) He rejected the conditions

[1] Annex 13, p. 7.

[2] Since the promulgation of this law the President has given his agreement to the creation of two new provinces—North Katanga and South Kasai. Four more have been mooted but have not yet been agreed.

[3] Annex 18.

for assistance by foreign technicians to the provincial authorities. Finally, he questioned the whole concept of taxation in Katanga by the Central Government.

For all these reasons he claimed that there was no reason to think the two sides were yet so close to agreement that action was possible. He concluded: 'Katanga is prepared to proceed with genuine negotiations, but not to listen to a monologue by the Central Government in which it seeks to impose on Katanga—which has already gone through two wars without abandoning its ideas—a constitution even more centralized than the *Loi Fondamentale*...'

In a separate memorandum[1] on 1 May, the Katanga Government commented on Mr Adoula's offer to submit a draft 'Federal Constitution'. 'Only one word has been added, presumably to please President Tshombe, or perhaps to deceive him about the Central Government's real intentions. Yet the proposed new Constitution for the Congolese State has not changed one iota.' The one word was, of course, 'Federal'. The Central Government's reply[2] to this was to state that the word 'Federal' should not be interpreted lightly. 'In fact, it clearly indicates the type of political and administrative organization with which the Congo would be invested under the draft Constitution... The use of the word Federal represents a major concession... [it] ensures the granting of real autonomy to the provinces ... the word has both a constitutional and a juridical meaning. It is a compromise between a confederal State and a unitary State.'

These arguments covered up the widespread distrust and unwillingness to compromise on both sides. Something of the spirit prevalent among the Katangese leaders emerges from the summary record[3] of a meeting held at Mr Tshombe's residence on 2 May when U.N. representatives tried to find a basis for reconciliation.

'Mr Munongo [the Minister of Interior] said he had been shocked at the use of the word "province" to describe Katanga. In his opinion Katanga was an entity, as had been proved by the shedding of Katangese blood in September and December 1961 before the eyes of the country and of history.'[4]

Following this meeting the Katanga Government submitted further proposals on 3 May as a basis for agreement.[5] It now insisted that instead of 'provinces' the federal arrangement should

[1] Annex 19, p. 1. [2] Annex 20, p. 1. [3] Annex 21. [4] *ibid.*, p. 2.
[5] Annex 22.

be between 'States', Mr Munongo's view clearly gaining an ascendancy. It proposed that, while the President of the Republic should be *the* Commander-in-Chief of the Army, 'the President of each State should be Commander-in-Chief of the Army'. (How this was to be interpreted only emerged in later stages of the negotiations.) The list of concurrent powers was extended to include national public works as well as higher education and control over the radio. But disagreement still remained over such questions as the gendarmerie, the right of the Central Government to intervene in a 'State', the right to employ such foreign technicians as each 'State' might require, etc. These proposals found little favour with the Central Government. In a memorandum[1] commenting on Katanga's views it accepted (by usage) the substitution of 'State' for 'province', and a number of minor points. But on such questions as financial powers and the gendarmerie it remained adamant.

The Katanga Government's response was to submit two complementary drafts[2] in place of its earlier proposals. These constituted a new approach to the problem, with the suggestion that the agreement should be divided into two parts, the first relating to the final period, the second to a transitional period. This revised document retracted considerably from commitments which Mr Tshombe had previously shown himself willing to accept. The emphasis now was on the States' rights; for example, 'The States shall be governed by their own laws and shall be subject to the federal authority only in the matters of which a limitative list is given below.'[3] There was now a flat insistence on each State maintaining its own gendarmerie.[4] While the Federal Assembly was to be responsible for the Budget, 'each State shall contribute, in an equal proportion, from its own revenues.'[5] Thus wealthy Katanga would contribute no more than under-developed Equatoria. While the National Army was to be subject to federal authority, the President of each State 'shall *ipso jure* hold supreme authority over the Army contingent stationed in his territory'.[6] The list of concurrent powers was greatly extended to include national public works, higher education, judicial organization and procedure, information, basic legislation concerning energy and mining, and air, sea, and other communications of national importance.[7] During the transitional period, Katanga claimed *inter alia* the right to fill three

[1] Annex 23. [2] Annex 24. [3] *ibid.*, Article II, Clause 2.
[4] *ibid.*, Clause 7. [5] *ibid.*, Clause 8. [6] *ibid.*, Clause 9b.
[7] *ibid.*, Clause 10.

major ministerial posts—Foreign Affairs, Finance, and National Defence.[1]

Faced with this considerable retrogression in the negotiations, the U.N. senior representative, Mr Robert Gardiner, prepared a draft[2] of his own in an effort to bridge the gulf between the two sides. Thereupon the Katangese Government produced a fresh revised version[3] of their proposals; these, however, made no substantial changes beyond a willingness to concede that 'the federal authorities may impose federal taxes, which shall not exceed X per cent of export and import duties, royalties and rents payable for the exploitation of underground resources or agricultural, forestry and mining concessions.'[4]

This was the stage reached on 17 May when Mr Tshombe agreed to return to Leopoldville. On the eve of his departure he issued a statement to the press[5] containing a bitter attack on Mr Adoula. He said he had lost confidence in Mr Adoula, who was not the man who could act as a 'valid spokesman' for the Congolese. Mr Adoula was pursuing 'a purely personal and selfish interest'; he was 'clinging to power', and following a path which was 'to lead him to absolute despotism'. Having added that 'so much duplicity cannot take him very far', Mr Tshombe ended up by saying: 'I am prepared, however, to trust him once more.' This inauspicious start to the second round of negotiations was not altogether improved by Mr Adoula's directive to the United Nations representative[6] that the whole of Mr Tshombe's party were for security reasons to 'remain permanently in their apartments and not be allowed to go out in the city'. U.N. representatives, however, helped to smooth things over sufficiently to enable both sides to reach a basis for a resumption of the talks.

The attitudes of both sides at the beginning of this second round were summed up in a working document[7] prepared by the U.N. representatives. It stated that, on his side, Mr Tshombe maintained that his proposals for the transitional period were based on fear that unconditional acceptance of the *Loi Fondamentale* might be considered a betrayal of Katanga; on the resistance likely from his gendarmerie if he were to hand over their control immediately; on the desire to avoid hasty action that might affect the Katanga franc; on the wish to safeguard Katanga's administrative structure;

[1] *ibid.*, Article X. [2] Annex 26. [3] Annex 27.
[4] *ibid.*, Article IIA, Clause p. [5] Annex 30. [6] Annex 29.
[7] Annex 33, p. 2.

and on hesitation to become involved with the rest of the Congo, pending the rehabilitation of the country's economy. 'His fear and mistrust of the Congo are at the root of these reservations.' Mr Adoula, for his part, it was stated, maintained that Mr Tshombe's demands for special concessions were legally and constitutionally indefensible; that Parliament would not accept such an arrangement; that international, particularly Afro-Asian, public opinion would regard acceptance of such demands as a total surrender to foreign financial interests; and that such an arrangement would set a dangerous precedent for other provinces. 'These arguments,' said the U.N. document, 'are motivated by Adoula's suspicion that Tshombe is seeking to strengthen his position and has no intention of uniting with the Congo.'

Progress at the talks was slow and there were frequent complaints on both sides about incidents which at various times led to the suspension of the talks. Nevertheless after forty-one meetings it was agreed to set up four Commissions with agreed terms of reference: namely, on communications and transport, and on military, economic and fiscal, and monetary questions[1]. The Military Commission is required 'to integrate the armed forces of all parts of the Republic . . . in an effective manner'. It is also required to determine the measures necessary to integrate all military and paramilitary forces in Kasai and Katanga into the Republic's armed forces. (Para-military obviously relates to the gendarmerie, which is not, however, mentioned by name.) The Economic and Financial Commission agreement commits Katanga to participating immediately in the Republic's expenditures pending the adoption of a new Constitution. The Monetary Commission is required to take the necessary technical measures to establish a single monetary authority.

But, as was the case at the end of the first round of talks at Leopoldville, neither side would agree on a draft of the final joint communiqué. The Central Government's draft[2] insisted that the four Commissions should start work not later than 10 July 1962. The Katanga draft,[3] however, stipulated seven conditions as prerequisites to the opening of the Commissions. These included such measures as 'a proclamation of the lifting of the state of war in Katanga . . .' and 'freedom for Katanga to recruit the technicians needed for the smooth functioning of its administrative services'. It ended with a statement that 'the Katangese Constitution of

[1] Annexes 38, 34, 41, and 42. [2] Annex 43. [3] Annex 44.

5 August 1960 will remain in force until the adoption, and the acceptance by Katanga, of the new Federal Constitution under which the member states are assured a genuine autonomy.' Mr Tshombe departed from Leopoldville on 26 June 1962 to arrange for the formal celebration of 'Katanga's second anniversary of independence'. None of the Commissions has so far started work.

What is omitted from this account is the incessant political manœuvring that has accompanied all these negotiations, with party and provincial leaders constantly seeking to make new alliances and undermining old ones. Throughout these talks neither the position of Mr Tshombe nor that of Mr Adoula has rested on secure foundations. In Katanga the Kimba–Munonga faction has grown more obdurate; in the Central Government the Bomboko–Kamitatu–Mobutu groupings have increased their pressure for more direct action to compel an agreement.

COLIN LEGUM

Temperate Foodstuffs and The Commonwealth Conference

'OTTAWA 1932 : Brussels 1962.' Many a sub-editor must have toyed with some such headline during those July days when Britain and the Six appeared to be making definite, if fitful, progress in digging the grave of Commonwealth Preference. Yet despite an arduous additional stint from 1 to 5 August, the grave remains only partly dug.

One reason for this is simply that there was insufficient time to finish the job. A deadline had been imposed on the Brussels negotiations in an attempt to produce an outline agreement which the British Government could present to the Conference of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in September. However, the problem of Commonwealth exports of temperate foodstuffs—which had long been recognized as the most difficult question to solve—proved too intractable, and not even repeating the famous device of stopping the clock for a few days was enough to enable complete agreement to be reached.

The original British bid to secure 'comparable outlets' for the wheat, meat, and dairy produce from Canada, Australia, and New Zealand which have hitherto found a ready market in the United Kingdom never had any chance of succeeding, but the White Paper (Cmnd. 1805) reporting the final session of the talks suggests that the Six were persuaded to come quite a long way towards a constructive compromise. For the transitional period (to 1970) 'a framework was worked out for the treatment which could be applied to all individual commodities for which there would be an intra-Community preference', and there is an offer of consultation with Commonwealth countries if the operation of intra-Community preference should lead to 'sudden and considerable alterations in trade patterns'. The main long-term decision is 'to take an early initiative to secure world-wide agreements for the principal agricultural products', and the scope of such agreements 'would include the price and production policy to be followed by the exporting and importing countries, the minimum and maximum quantities to enter international trade, stock-piling policy and the special aspects of trade with developing countries'. If world-wide agreements proved impracticable, the Community would 'conclude agreements for the same purpose with those countries who wished to do so and, in particular, with Commonwealth countries'.

As the Six have still not agreed among themselves about price levels, the White Paper can go no further than to say that it would be 'desirable' for the Community to pursue a 'reasonable' price policy, but this desire appears to be given at least some hope of fulfilment by the undertaking that the Community's policy 'would, within the framework of world-wide agreements, be the subject of a confrontation with the price policy of other producer countries ready to take part'. There was also agreement on an 'explicit' statement that 'the policy which the enlarged Community intended to pursue would offer reasonable opportunities in its markets for exports of temperate foodstuffs', and a general recognition of 'the particular difficulties affecting New Zealand', with an expression of 'readiness to consider special provisions to deal with these difficulties'.

With this much to show for it, Mr Heath and his colleagues are unlikely to think they have been wasting their time, but it is equally unlikely that the Commonwealth Prime Ministers will be satisfied. As a member of the Community, Britain would be in no position to make what Mr Macmillan called 'satisfactory arrangements' to meet

the 'special needs' of the Commonwealth. Whatever arrangements can be made will have to be firm before the United Kingdom signs the Treaty of Rome, and it is for this reason that Mr Diefenbaker, Mr Menzies, and Mr Holyoake are likely to want rather more than just the one 'explicit statement' mentioned in the White Paper. They will no doubt offer their own interpretations of such deliberately vague terms as 'reasonable opportunities' and 'special provisions', and these interpretations will show Mr Heath just how much or how little room he has for manœuvre when he returns to Brussels in October.

The key problem remains the volume of foodstuffs to be produced in the Community. Overall production there is now about one-third higher than it was pre-war, with the rise in crop production (maize up 70 per cent, wheat 40 per cent, and sugar doubled) far more striking than that for animal products (about 20 per cent for cattle, pigs, and poultry). Altogether, the Six produce about 90 per cent of their own food—and more dairy products, sugar, pigmeat, and vegetables than they need.

The list of commodities for which production outstrips demand is likely to grow as a result of the reforms planned under the common agricultural policy.[1] This is why the White Paper's contention that 'the Community's future price policy . . . would largely determine the volume of production' needs some qualification. Greater technical efficiency on the land inevitably results in higher production. Also, lowering prices as a means of damping down production can have precisely the opposite effect: the reaction of British dairy farmers to lower milk prices was to expand production because they needed to sell more to maintain their incomes at the same level.

No one is more conscious of the ramifications of this over-production problem than the French. M. Pisani, their Minister of Agriculture, has made no secret of the fact that France was in a spot over 'une production agricole . . . en constante augmentation', and that the Common Market is counted on to save the day. 'Aucune agriculture n'a jamais connu la situation priviligiée que donne aujourd'hui à l'agriculture française l'ouverture du Marché Commun agricole.'[2] To have privileged access to the United Kingdom market as well would make M. Pisani breathe still more easily.

[1] See 'New Deal for European Agriculture', in *The World Today*, March 1962.
[2] Communauté européenne, *Bulletin mensuel d'information*, février 1962.

For the French Government's difficulties are formidable. Once having instigated a technical revolution to set French agriculture on the road to realizing its vast potential, any attempt to contain production now would pose a most painful dilemma. 'Que faut-il contingenter? La production de ceux qui produisent le plus, c'est-à-dire souvent de ceux qui produisent le mieux—ce qui reviendrait alors à accomplir un acte anti-économique—,ou la production de ceux qui produisent le moins et souvent le plus mal—ce serait alors accomplir un acte inhumain?'[1]

Eventually, this inhuman act will have to be undertaken. The more efficient an area's agriculture becomes, the fewer farmers and farmworkers it needs. Several countries, including Canada, West Germany, and the Netherlands, have appreciably reduced the number of people working on the land in the past ten years. In Britain, only about 4 per cent of the working population is engaged in agriculture, and the proportion is still declining. The Community's agricultural policy aims at consolidating fragmented holdings—about 5½ million farms are under twelve acres—and resettling the displaced people in other industries. To do this on the scale necessary in France, where about 25 per cent of the labour force still works on the land, will in any case be an expensive and socially disruptive process: to attempt to do it quickly would be to invite total upheaval. The French Government wants the operation to be as gradual and painless as possible. Its determination to obtain the widest outlets for French produce, which is also reflected in its thinking about the disposal of surpluses to developing countries, is at least in part an attempt to buy time for social adjustment.

It is against this background that the offer of reasonable opportunities in the Community's markets has to be considered. Farmers in every country take an autarkic attitude—if they can produce what is needed, why buy it elsewhere? The French have extended this idea from the national to the Community plane, and the fact that any offer at all was made to exporting countries is something of a surrender to those who, like Dr Mansholt, the architect of the common agricultural policy, maintain that the Community should not aim at complete self-sufficiency. Nevertheless, what is reasonable from the French point of view may seem small opportunity indeed to a Commonwealth exporter.

Any bargaining over access to the Community's markets affects others besides the Commonwealth. President Kennedy explained

[1] Communauté européenne, *Bulletin mensuel d'information*, février 1962.

the American position to the National Association of Manufacturers last December.

> . . . We send to Western Europe in agricultural exports nearly $2,000,000,000. . . We take in in agricultural exports from Europe only about $80,000,000, a balance of trade for us of nearly $1,920,000,000, and yet, as the Common Market begins to get more and more developed, with all of these countries beginning to face surplus problems, there isn't any doubt that one of our most important problems in maintaining this kind of dollar flow will be to maintain the free flow of our agricultural commodities into the Common Market. There's going to be no more difficult task than that and therefore we have to recognize that this, too, may affect our balance of payments.[1]

What is at issue is in fact the future pattern of production and trade in temperate foodstuffs throughout the free world. Forecasts for 1970 by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the U.N.[2] suggest that meat will provide the smallest bone of contention. The high-income countries are expected to increase their production by about a third but this should be matched by a comparable increase in consumption. There should therefore be no overall surplus, only competition between the different types of meat. As people seem to prefer it, beef is in the strongest position and may account for as much as 50 per cent of the increase in meat consumption. The one big change in the pattern of recent years will be increasing French production, which could limit any expansion of exports to Western Europe from Argentina and Uruguay. Lamb should continue to hold its place in the traditional markets, but new areas would have to be persuaded to acquire a taste for it before any large expansion of trade could take place. Poultry meat may take 20 per cent of the increase in consumption, probably at the expense of pigmeat. The under-developed countries produce barely a third of the world's meat, although they have two-thirds of the world's population, but there seems no imminent prospect of their being able either to buy more meat from the exporting countries or to develop their own livestock industries rapidly enough to meet demand.

Consumption of milk and dairy products is already relatively high in high-income countries, and cannot be expected to catch up with the rapid expansion of milk production. Butter will continue to be the principal surplus product, but it is unlikely to

[1] *New York Times*, 7 December 1961.
[2] F.A.O., *Agricultural Commodities—Projections for 1970.*

find any appreciable outlet in the developing tropical countries, where butterfat is used only in the form of ghee.

By 1970 the developed countries could be producing as much as 30 million metric tons more wheat and 20 million metric tons more coarse grains than they need. For wheat there is very little chance of narrowing the gap between production and consumption, but more coarse grains are likely to be needed for livestock feeding in North America and Western Europe. Any substantial expansion of outlets must, however, be looked for in the developing countries.[1] But they are not the most obviously attractive markets. They cannot afford to pay a commercial price, and during the past few years 80–90 per cent of wheat imports into the main under-developed regions have been at concessional rates. They also want to step up their own agricultural production—perhaps to the ultimate exclusion of imports. Many developing countries are, however, counting on grain imports at concessional rates in their long-term planning. Productive capacity in the richer countries is well able to cover any food aid programme, but there are three basic limitations on the extent to which surplus grain can be used in this way: the amount the high-income countries are prepared to pay to continue and to expand this form of aid; the facilities for ensuring efficient distribution and use of the grain by the receiving countries; and the need to avoid disturbing both the domestic markets of the receiving countries and the trade of third countries.

It would therefore be optimistic in the extreme to imagine that aid deliveries alone can solve the problem of surpluses. There remains the possibility of restricting production. Sowing a smaller acreage is already part of United States policy but, as any unusable wheat surplus arising by 1970 would be at least partly the result of an expansion of Western European production, the United States can hardly be expected to 'go it alone' in a policy of restriction. Limiting production seems to be the only alternative in the case of milk. The developing countries are unlikely to be able to absorb excess supplies, even through concessional channels, and in particular they offer no outlet for butter. One measure being considered in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian countries is to shift emphasis away from butterfat content in determining milk subsidy payments to farmers. In Australia there has been a proposal to amalgamate small farms producing less than 8,000 lb. of butterfat per annum, which is regarded as the minimum

[1] See 'The Use of World Food Surpluses', in *The World Today*, July 1962.

required to ensure a reasonable income, and several countries are encouraging a switch from milk to beef production.

Policies of restriction are naturally unpopular with farmers, and one of the possible advantages which Governments may see in world-wide agreements is that they may ease the acceptance of restrictions on either production or price. For instance, many United Kingdom farmers would like to grow sugar-beet, but the acreage is limited under the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement, and the limitation is accepted. The other side of the coin is that production quotas can set a rigid pattern that is not easily changed, and Mr Heath has been careful to draw attention to the need for flexible arrangements. Whether substantial progress can be made in further discussions between Britain and the Six seems highly doubtful. The two sides went a long way towards outlining what should be done, but they are not in a position to do it themselves. The question 'Who is to produce how much of what?' needs to be discussed by all the Governments concerned, whether exporters or importers, developed or developing.

It also calls for some constructive thinking. The French approach was adumbrated by M. Baumgartner in the G.A.T.T. Ministerial Meeting of November 1961. In view of the paradox of hunger alongside surpluses and what he called the 'ruinous price war' in which the producing countries are engaged in order to sell their produce, M. Baumgartner stressed the need for 'some degree of market organization' and suggested that 'a means and an opportunity for organizing world trade in agricultural products more satisfactorily might be found in the results that would follow on the application of the common agricultural policy provided for in the Rome Treaty, combined, *inter alia*, with the food donation method which was started several years ago by the United States under their generous "Food for Peace" policy.'[1] He thought that if the Six were to base their agricultural policy on 'normal prices' it was 'hardly conceivable' that the other countries exporting agricultural products would 'continue to sell at lower prices. In this respect the levy technique should have a salutory effect by encouraging exporting countries to raise their prices.' The common agricultural policy 'should result in a trend both towards standard world prices and a concerted policy of food aid'. M. Baumgartner ended by asking for an inquiry into 'the question of level of a standard price for exports to the wealthy or highly developed countries which would be the

[1] Press Release, G.A.T.T./633, 28 November 1961.

same as the production price in these same countries and the question of ways and means of preventing over-production'.

No detailed proposals have yet been put forward to show how this approach could be implemented. The Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference will have the opportunity to consider it. Mr Marshall, New Zealand's Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Overseas Trade, has declared that raising prices would reduce trade in dairy products. He is not satisfied with the argument that New Zealand could get the same income from a smaller quantity of exports, because this 'ignores the problems of unsold surpluses, of employment, of the use of capital and the resources of the marginal producer, of the costs of unsaleable production, or of not producing to capacity'.[1] How far higher prices are compatible with finding ways of preventing over-production must be a matter of some doubt, and the feasibility of arriving at a standard price at all has also been called in question.

A world-wide conference has been suggested as the best means of tackling these and many other complications. Under whatever auspices such a conference might be held, it would have to consider the feasibility of the Brussels decision 'to take an early initiative to secure world-wide agreements for the principal agricultural products'. The recent tendency to bandy international commodity agreements about as a panacea has not unnaturally evoked a certain amount of scepticism. It has not escaped comment that it was the weather, rather than being party to an international agreement, which enabled Canada to reduce its wheat stocks. Nevertheless, the International Wheat Agreement, with its bid to stabilize trade in wheat through an agreed price range, is widely considered a progressive measure. How far agreements could be made to cover all the ground proposed in the White Paper is not only a matter for discussion but also a severe test of international confidence.

That 'a good deal of work remains to be done' on arrangements for temperate agricultural products has become a classic understatement. Before it can get on with its other plans, the free world is going to have to solve the fundamental problem of feeding itself.

TREVOR PARFITT

[1] *The Times*, 21 June 1962.

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The First Year of the Alliance for Progress

THE Alliance for Progress quietly slipped into its second year on 17 August, without the fanfare and grandiloquence that had accompanied its launching and its first brave but uncertain steps. This deliberately unostentatious observance of the first anniversary of a programme, designed as the major instrument in the conduct of United States' foreign policy in Latin America, was in tune with Washington's painfully acquired awareness of how rocky is the road ahead of the Alliance before even its first objectives are met.

Before the completion of one year of the Alliance, the programme experienced its first political shocks when the Kennedy Administration was faced with the immensely difficult decisions of how to act towards the new military Governments of Argentina and Peru. These Governments, through the overthrow of the constitutional regime, had in effect undermined the fundamental philosophical concept of the Alliance that material progress in the American hemisphere must be wedded to democratic institutions. This experience was both disturbing and inconclusive, inasmuch as it resulted in clashes between principle and political realism which, by their very nature, could not and perhaps never can be fully resolved. It served to underscore the weakness and the vulnerability of the Alliance's political foundations and it pushed the United States into inconsistencies that possibly were inevitable but that by the same token did little to strengthen the programme as a dynamic and inspiring policy.

Thus, when the Argentine military ousted President Arturo Frondizi last March,[1] because they felt that he was responsible for the victories of the followers of the former dictator Juan D. Perón in the congressional and gubernatorial elections, the United States came out on the side of political realism and grudgingly accepted the rationalization that the *coup d'état* was somehow constitutional. This was done even though for nearly four years Washington had

[1] See 'Conflicting Forces in Argentina', in *The World Today*, April 1962.

gone all out in support of Señor Frondizi's economic programmes and the Kennedy Administration had put its faith in his tortuously Florentine policies on such matters as dealings with Cuba. While the United States Government had announced a loan of $150 million to Argentina on the eve of the hapless March elections in an effort to help President Frondizi overcome the *Peronistas* who had helped him to victory in 1958—and it is useful to note that this loan obviously did not impress the two-and-a-half million *Peronista* voters—it took the step three months later of extending credits to the military-backed regime of President Guido. The self-conscious, not to say slightly desperate, reasoning behind this was the conviction that, so long as the Guido Government and its gun-toting sponsors had become an accepted fact of life in Argentina, a refusal to aid it financially in an extremely difficult situation could only further weaken the already shaky national structure and, presumably, benefit the *Peronistas* and their extreme Left-wing friends, who were lying low but were alert to any opportunity to exploit the situation. To be sure, the argument in favour of assisting Argentina, despite her travesty of democracy, was a powerful one in terms of political realities that the U.S. Department of State could not very well ignore.

But the principles of the Alliance for Progress suffered in the process, not only because the starry-eyed nobility of the fundamental concept of the Alliance was impaired, but primarily because Communist propaganda in Latin America was enabled to make some capital out of the fact that the United States was not abiding by her promises of limiting her aid to democratic regimes. It goes without saying that the Communists, for whom the Alliance for Progress ranks high in Latin American demonology, have the peculiar propaganda advantage of being able at times to have it both ways—denouncing the United States for insisting on representative democracy, which they describe as farcical, and also for failing to respect it—and this, of course, is part of the U.S. dilemma in reconciling principle and realism. In Argentina, for example, the Communists are quietly pleased about the disappearance of the Frondizi Government, but elsewhere in the hemisphere they have been righteously and loudly indignant over its replacement by a strongly anti-Communist military quasi-dictatorship. The problem in this context is to avoid being caught in the tortuousness of Communist policy, and this is quite a tall order for the United States, who favours stability and the maintenance of the democratic *status quo*,

modified as it may be in part by domestic social reforms, in the Latin American Republics.

As it happened, however, Washington chose to announce the resumption of financial aid to Argentina on 7 June, three days before the presidential elections in Peru, where it was a virtual assumption that the military would not let Victor Raul Haya de la Torre, the leading candidate, take office. It is a moot point whether this loan to Argentina conclusively convinced the Peruvian generals and admirals that U.S. warnings that she would react forcefully in the case of a *coup* were not seriously meant, but a good case could be made for this argument. In effect, the military in Peru struck on 18 July, after five weeks of an excruciating, slow-motion crisis in which the outcome was all too predictable. The U.S. response was pained, instantaneous, and violent. Diplomatic relations were suspended, as were economic aid under the Alliance and military assistance under the special defence agreements. Washington indicated that Peru might also be deprived of her freshly approved sugar quota, as the previously prepared contingency plan against the Lima military Junta unfolded further. President Kennedy on 19 July issued a completely unprecedented public statement on Peru's domestic politics and put forward the charge that the military *coup* had damaged the fundamental concepts of the Alliance.

The events of that July week thus added up to the unveiling of a totally new U.S. policy in Latin America, predicated on the theory that authoritarian regimes emanating from the overthrow of democratic systems should be ostracized and, in effect, excluded from the terms of the Alliance for Progress. Liberal opinion throughout the hemisphere and other democratic Governments fearing similar military *coups* applauded President Kennedy's action; but barely a few days passed before the new policy, launched with the thrust of a ballistic missile, began to run out of fuel and momentum.

In the first place, the Peruvian nation, on whose democratic behalf the brave new policy was initiated, evinced singularly little interest in having its elected institutions protected from afar by the United States. The so-called economic and political *élites*, including most of what had been regarded as the pro-democratic press, had no trouble in making their peace with the Junta, which, incidentally, turned out to be a great deal more sophisticated than the traditional Latin American members of the species. The two losing presidential candidates, Señor Fernando Belaunde Terry and a former President, General Manuel A. Odria, accepted the *coup*. Señor Haya

de la Torre's APRA party, a leftist but violently anti-Communist group against whom the military had nourished resentment for the last thirty years, chose to negotiate about its future rather than to shed tears over the past and the present, although it had been deprived of the power it had won at the polls. An attempt at a protest general strike fizzled out because most of the *Apristas* were not prepared to sacrifice their wages for the elusive concept of democracy. The Communists had no quarrel either with the Junta, preferring it to APRA. And, last but not least, the articulate U.S. business community in Peru made its influence felt in Washington in opposition to the sanctions against the Lima military regime.

With the exception of six or seven Governments which had powerful reasons for approving the Kennedy show of anger, the other Latin American Governments went through the usual process of paying lip-service to democracy and then turned on the United States with accusations that she was practising 'intervention' in the hemisphere. The curious politico-intellectual patterns of Latin American thinking implied, in effect, that the United States had something of a divinely ordained obligation to supply Alliance aid to them regardless of their own attitudes. The corollary was, of course, that denial of aid, because Washington detected in the *coups d'état* a violation of the solemnly signed Alliance compacts, constituted a form of intervention. Inevitably, and not very elegantly, hints were issued in Lima that if Washington was obtuse enough to persist in the policy of sanctions, then trade and aid would be sought elsewhere.

Within a month of its inception, the new policy evaporated, because it simply had no place in the context of Latin American response, and a somewhat embarrassing process of rethinking was undertaken by the Kennedy Administration, which by then had developed nagging doubts about the wisdom of its pro-democratic undertaking. Upon the receipt of assurances from the Lima Junta that new elections would be held next year and that the elected President would then be allowed to take office, the United States unenthusiastically resumed diplomatic relations with Peru on 17 August and sent Alliance aid money flowing again. Because his support of the original Washington policy had displeased the Junta, the U.S. Government agreed not to send back its Ambassador, James Loeb.

The *dénouement* of the Peruvian crisis has evidently raised a series of basic questions involving the character and future of the Alliance.

If on the one hand the United States had set a precedent of sorts by striking out at Peru for her violation of the democratic principles of the Alliance, her grudging readmittance of the Peruvians to the fold, for reasons of overwhelming political realism, repeated the other precedent, that of Argentina. This action would suggest that Washington cannot really afford to ignore any Latin American Government, no matter what emotions its actions arouse in Washington. It is possible that a further test of how to reconcile principle with realism may come soon if the Argentine generals stage another *coup d'état*, as they almost did in August, to replace their puppet Guido regime with a purely military Government.

The problems of democracy in connection with the Alliance for Progress and the specific cases of Argentina and Peru have been discussed at some length here because the first year of the programme has demonstrated that its political aspects are absolutely fundamental to its ultimate success. This relationship between the political and the purely developmental facets of the Alliance has been doggedly ignored by the United States in launching the programme, despite the historical truth that political motivations reign supreme in Latin American attitudes.

Although the keystone of the policy of the Alliance is the concept —which, really, is the central question of our time—that material development is both desirable and possible without recourse to totalitarianisms of the Left or the Right, the United States has persisted in ignoring her own definition of the problem. Whereas unquestionably the whole Alliance idea, going back to its pre-Kennedy origins in mid-1960,[1] was intended as an antidote to the Castro revolution in Cuba—which was as much a political revolution *sui generis* as a social and economic revolution—Washington inexplicably set aside the political rationale and concentrated solely on economic planning and on pressure for the domestic reforms which the Latin Americans had promised in exchange for massive financial aid. When Cuba's delegate Major Ernesto (Che) Guevara appeared at the conference at Punta del Este, where the Alliance Charter was signed in August 1961, he was loudly censured for bringing politics into what was alleged to be a purely economic meeting. Yet, events since Punta del Este have proved conclusively that politics and economics are inseparable in Latin America as they are almost everywhere else.

This, of course, is true on all levels. Since what the United States

[1] See 'President Kennedy's "Grand Design"', in *The World Today*, September 1962.

was proposing, in effect, through the Alliance was a democratic social revolution for the hemisphere—land and tax reforms designed to lead to more social justice within a democratic framework and shored up by effective economic development schemes—it would have seemed logical that the entire exercise required a powerful dose of political stimulation, not to say mystique and dynamism. In order to force the long-entrenched economic interests in the Latin American Republics to give up their privileges and accept the sacrifice of higher taxation and land distribution, it would have been vital to place them under irresistible political pressure from articulate democratic groups based on support at the grass-roots. But because the Alliance has not thus far succeeded in communicating the excitement and the faith of its aims to the Latin American masses—and even to the leadership of political, labour, student, and other groups—this crucial phenomenon has not taken place in the vast majority of the Republics.

Consequently, the Latin American failure in the context of the Alliance, which comes under most criticism from Congress and public opinion in the United States, namely the failure of most of the Republics to implement the necessary social and economic reforms, can be traced in a large degree to the fundamental political and psychological weakness of the programme. In addition, it must be noted that Latin America is now undergoing a series of revolutionary processes or, at least, moods, and that political structures everywhere threaten to break up in the midst of the prevailing disorientation and ideological confusion. Brazil, caught in the worst crisis of her history, and Argentina, going through the convulsions of Peronist and militarist pressures, are the most striking examples of this state of affairs. Elsewhere, the dangers are no less, even if they are not quite as spectacular at this moment. Haiti is in the throes of a brutal and medieval dictatorship,[1] in a situation that is made worse by the Negro Republic's economic near-collapse. The United States has since 2 August suspended all her economic aid to the Haitians because such aid has become politically and economically indefensible. The Dominican Republic, emerging from thirty-one years of the Trujillo dictatorship, is making desperately slow progress towards economic development and political democracy as she faces dangers from both the Left and the Right. Venezuela, Ecuador, and Honduras fear military *coups*. Chile, unwilling to initiate social

[1] See 'The U.S. "Colonial Experiment" in Haiti', in *The World Today*, October 1961.

reforms, is drifting dangerously towards the extreme Left. And, with a few exceptions, similar dangers exist throughout the hemisphere.

Under the circumstances, then, it is necessary to evaluate the achievements of the first year of the Alliance on a mainly political basis because it is axiomatic that a rational and comprehensive programme of this kind cannot function, let alone succeed, in the midst of violent upheavals. Although at first the idea persisted that economic and social improvements would bring about political stability, it is becoming increasingly clear that these programmes run the danger of destruction at their very inception if a modicum of stability and broadly based support for the Alliance is not immediately obtained.

It follows from the foregoing that there is no time for the United States and the Alliance to wait comfortably for the fulfilment of their ten-year programme in order to see the results in material progress transmuted into political stability. Time, in fact, is running out and the United States is becoming faced with the need, for which she remains unprepared, of launching a campaign of political and psychological warfare with all the means at her disposal, if she is to see the Alliance succeed and, with it, the entire U.S. policy in the restless Latin American region.[1]

Development projects with an immediate impact—water-wells, roads, schools, and low-cost housing—are needed as a part of this 'crash-programme' approach, while long-range plans for refurbishing the economic and social structures of the hemisphere begin to bear fruit. In this field, however, the United States must contend with the twin obstacles of the massive and immensely slow bureaucratic machinery of the Alliance and of the Latin American shortcomings in planning and implementing the use of American resources.

In terms of the actual planning and investment operations of the Alliance, much of the current criticism seems unjustified, particularly when it is remembered that only a certain amount can be accomplished in any one year in an enterprise of this scope with its tough, uphill progress. On paper, the United States has authorized over $1,500 million to Latin America under all the Alliance programmes—this includes Export–Import Bank loans authorized beforehand, balance-of-payments assistance, food grants, and special development projects—and well over 30 per cent of this total has

[1] See 'U.S. Difficulties in Latin America', in *The World Today*, January 1962.

already been disbursed since President Kennedy proposed the Alliance in March 1961.

Three countries, Colombia, Chile, and Bolivia, have submitted their comprehensive ten-year development plans. The Colombian plan has been approved by the Alliance's review panel of 'Nine Wise Men', and Colombia, one of the few bright spots on the Alliance map, is reasonably well advanced in preparing her development with outside assistance. Bolivia is receiving important aid for impact as well as long-range projects, such as the modernization of her tin industry. But her suspension of membership of the Organization of American States early in September over a frontier river dispute with Chile may now complicate her participation in the Alliance.

A $130 million emergency programme has been launched in north-east Brazil to alleviate the misery of the 23 million inhabitants of that area, and assistance has been made available for low-cost housing in Rio de Janeiro. But overall financial aid to Brazil had to be interrupted when successive political crises threw the country into a state of complete drift with virtually no Government. In view of the uncontrolled and skyrocketing inflation there, Washington believes rightly that further loans to the central Government would be money down the drain.

On a wider scale, the efforts backed by the United States have resulted this summer in a world coffee agreement, signed on 25 August in New York, which promises to stabilize the prices of what is the most important single Latin American commodity. The Latin American argument has long been that their losses in export revenues, due to falling commodity prices, by far exceed the aid through Alliance funds. But the Latin American Governments themselves have found no solution yet for the increasing flight of domestic and foreign capital from their countries at a rate far higher than that of investment through the Alliance. Fear of revolutionary instability, expropriations, and higher taxation is the motivation behind this money exodus. The work of the Peace Corps in a half-dozen Latin American Republics is beginning to lay the vital foundations for a community development spirit and method, without which the national development under the Alliance cannot function properly in the agricultural regions. The Inter-American Development Bank is also available as the source of project loans for Governments and private enterprise.

In sum, then, the tools and instruments of the Alliance for Pro-

gress are becoming increasingly available, but what is dangerously lacking in Latin America is the political and psychological climate in which they can be put efficiently to work. The conclusion to be reached at the end of the first year of the Alliance is, therefore, that the key to its failure or success lies in its ability to cope, on the immediate political level, with the hectic realities of present-day Latin America.

Washington, D.C. TAD SZULC

The Soblen Case

BACKGROUND—LITHUANIA AND THE UNITED STATES

DR ROBERT SOBLEN was born in Lithuania in 1901 of Jewish parentage. He studied medicine at several European universities and at Moscow. In 1940, shortly before the Soviet annexation of the Baltic States, he, his brothers, and some fourteen other relatives obtained permission to leave Lithuania for the United States. At the end of the war Dr Soblen worked as an interpreter for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, and in 1947 he became an American citizen thus becoming eligible to resume his professional calling as a psychiatrist. In 1957 his brother, Jack Soble, was charged with espionage. He pleaded guilty, co-operated with government inquiries, and received the relatively mild sentence of seven years' imprisonment. From that time on Dr Robert Soblen was watched by the F.B.I. and, although aware of this fact, made no attempt to leave the United States. In August 1961 charges were brought against him; he was found guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment.

The crime with which Soblen was charged was not—contrary to popular belief—espionage, but conspiring at espionage. It was alleged that he had conspired with eighteen co-conspirators to obtain and transmit defence information. Normally, before a crime can be shown to have been committed, it is necessary to prove both intention (*mens rea*) and execution (*actus reus*). In a charge of conspiracy, however, the mere agreement of two or more persons to commit a crime is enough to constitute the offence. The dangers to which this legal practice is open are apparent, and the comment of an English

judge is pertinent: 'There is a growing tendency to charge persons with criminal conspiracy rather than with the specific offence which the evidence shows them to have committed. It is not to be encouraged.'[1] Only two of the alleged co-conspirators were indicted with Soblen—one Johanna Becker and one Floyd Miller. They both decided to give evidence for the prosecution. The other named conspirators, though resident in the United States, were not charged. Soblen thus appeared as sole defendant on a charge of conspiracy.

The indictment accused him of passing information to the Russians during the war and afterwards, though the only evidence offered was of his activities during the war years. The reason for this is probably to be found in the fact that there exists no adequate provisions for trials to be held *in camera* in the United States; it may therefore not be possible for the prosecution to bring evidence of recent espionage activities without endangering national security.

The main evidence against Dr Soblen was given by his brother, Jack Soble—a convicted spy, and a man who had received mental treatment at several institutions. The rest of the evidence relied on the testimony of Mrs Johanna Becker. She told the Court that from 1943 until the end of the war she collected reports from two Germans attached to the Office of Strategic Services (the then U.S. intelligence agency) and passed them on to Soblen. Most of these concerned biographical details of personnel, but one, in June 1945, allegedly concerned military matters. In a memorandum which Dr Soblen subsequently sent to the British Home Secretary, he admitted passing biographical information to Russian diplomats in the U.S.A., but denied ever passing any information concerned with national defence. The information on personnel appears to have consisted of the handing over to the Russians of names and political affiliations of persons formerly from Communist countries now living in the United States, whose relatives remained behind the Iron Curtain. Dr Soblen claimed that Dr Hirschfeld, head of the Chancellory of the West Berlin Senate, would have appeared as a defence witness if the defence could have reached him; and that the prosecution, though they did know where he was to be found, did not subpoena him. Dr Hirschfeld has since communicated with the British Home Secretary, informing him that he would be willing to come to England to offer evidence on oath in favour of Soblen.

Bail was granted to Soblen, primarily on grounds of ill health, and was fixed at $100,000, the bulk of which was put up by Dr Soblen's

[1] Humphreys, J., in *R. v. West and Others* [1948] 1 K.B. 709 at 720.

wife and by personal friends of the Soblen family, and the balance of which was raised by the efforts of certain individuals who were concerned with the humanitarian issues involved. Soblen's conviction was upheld by the United States Court of Appeal in March 1962, and in June the Supreme Court declined to order a retrial. The life sentence term of imprisonment was due to commence on 27 June. On 26 June Dr Soblen was reported missing.

The recounting of these events in the United States is not meant to—nor can it—infer judgment on Soblen's innocence or guilt. Indeed, Soblen's innocence or guilt, from the point of view of the treatment to which he was entitled by law in Israel and England, is irrelevant. However, this factual background may serve to explain the climate of opinion which surrounded the case at its later stages; it seems also to indicate that, guilt or innocence quite apart, there were certain grave deficiencies in the initial trial at which Dr Soblen was convicted.

THE SOBLEN AFFAIR IN ISRAEL

On 28 June it was reported that Dr Soblen had arrived in Israel, and had been arrested on a charge of entering that country under a false name. He had passed through immigration on the Canadian passport of a dead brother. The United States requested his return, and Israeli law undoubtedly authorized the expulsion of anyone found on Israeli territory without a valid permit. However, from the point of view of the Israeli authorities, the situation was complicated by two factors.

The first of these was the Israeli Law of Return of 5 July 1950. This law may be said to epitomize the basic philosophy of the State of Israel on the question of immigration from the Diaspora. It provides that any Jew may claim citizenship in Israel. However, in 1954, following the Sydney Stanley affair and other similar incidents, an Amendment to this law was introduced which precluded the right of immigration to Jews who were convicted felons or who had a communicable disease. It was not entirely clear that the Amendment reference to convicted felons was meant to cover *political* cases; if it was not, then it did not apply to Soblen. Those who were against any unnecessary limitation upon the right of all Jews to settle in Israel argued that the Amendment was not aimed at political refugees but at common criminals only. Certainly all the previous cases of refused immigration under this provision had concerned Jews convicted of non-political felonies. Moreover, it seems that to inter-

pret the Amendment as applying to political offenders as well as to ordinary criminals—forbidding Israeli citizenship to both—is inconsistent with the purpose of the usual provisions on extradition, which allow sanctuary for political offenders. It is doubtful whether an interpretation of the Amendment, which would in effect render the law of extradition null and void, is to be preferred. None the less, general public opinion at the time was anxious that Israel should not acquire the reputation of being a harbour for criminals fleeing from justice in their own countries, and was fairly solidly in favour of expelling Soblen. This public opinion was later to swing sharply about when evidence arose showing that the expulsion had been mishandled by the government authorities.

The second major problem facing the Israeli Government was that although the United States had requested Soblen's return, political offences are not extraditable. An extradition treaty between Israel and the United States has in fact been drawn up and initialled; however, it has not yet been ratified. None the less, the outcome remains the same, as the principle that political offenders are not subject to extradition is a long-accepted rule of general international law. The fact that Soblen had entered Israel upon another person's passport facilitated the solution of the problem for the Government. It was able to deport him on 1 July for breach of its own laws, without the question of extradition for political offences being involved at all.

The Israeli authorities emphasized, for these reasons, that Soblen was not being extradited. In expelling him, and not extraditing him, they were merely concerned that he left Israeli territory, which he had entered illegally; they were not handing him back to the U.S. authorities. However, once aboard the plane, Dr Soblen was accompanied by the chief of U.S. Marshals. Not only had the United States been informed of his journey but so had the Greek and British authorities, and they were prepared to bar his entry even though he had been given a temporary Israeli travel document valid for all other countries. His lawyer learned of the expulsion only when the plane was halfway to Greece.

While there had been little support in favour of Soblen's permanent admission to Israel, the Ben Gurion Government now found itself under severe attack for its handling of the matter. On 10 July the Opposition parties presented motions of no confidence in the Knesset, which Mr Ben Gurion survived by a vote of 53 to 28, with 15 abstentions. He insisted throughout that both he and his Minister

of the Interior were unaware of the presence of the U.S. Marshal on the plane, and that the Israeli chief of police had been properly instructed to inform Soblen's lawyer of the deportation order before his departure. On 4 July the Israel High Court had dismissed applications calculated to bring Soblen back to Israel. His lawyer had disputed the legality of his expulsion, contending that it was in fact extradition in everything but name.

London was a scheduled fuel stop for the El Al airline carrying Dr Soblen towards America. Shortly before the plane was due to land at London he cut his wrists and stabbed himself in the abdomen with a knife.

THE SOBLEN AFFAIR IN ENGLAND

When the plane touched down at London Airport on 1 July 1962, an immigration officer boarded the aircraft with the intention of serving notice upon Soblen that he was refused permission to land. Unable to do so, due to Soblen's physical condition, he served notice upon the U.S. Marshal, who declared Soblen to be in his custody. He was taken to hospital and on 3 July, when his condition had sufficiently improved, he himself was informed that he did not have permission to land. Representations were made to the Home Office by the U.S. Government, and the Home Secretary indicated that he would order the carriage of Soblen to America by El Al to be resumed as soon as medically possible.

On 6 July British lawyers made an application for leave to apply for a writ of *habeas corpus*. It was granted, and a hearing was set for 16 July, later amended to 17 July. The case which ensued is of considerable legal interest, and merits a detailed examination. In the High Court Soblen's lawyers contended[1] that on 1 July he had received implied permission to land, and was therefore now being illegally detained, and should be released. They argued that notice of refusal had not been served on him at the time of his arrival, and that the service of notice two days later was ineffective, as permission to land was to be implied from the events of two days before. That the immigration officer had arranged transport and hospital facilities was further evidence of the implied leave to land, and the fact that the arrangements had been made for humanitarian reasons was irrelevant. The relevant provisions governing this controversy are to be found in the Aliens Order, 1953.[2] Article 1 (1) of the Order

[1] *R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex Parte Soblen* [1962] 3 A.E.R. 373.
[2] S.I. No. 1671. Statutory Instruments 1953, pt. 1, p. 94.

states: '... an alien shall not land or embark in the United Kingdom except with the leave of an immigration officer...' Article 8 (4) provides: 'An Alien to whom leave to land is refused may be detained, under the authority of an immigration officer, pending the giving of directions in his case under para. (1) of this Article...' The Attorney-General contended that action was being taken under Article 8 (4), and was authorized. Soblen's counsel maintained that Article 8 (4) only authorized detention when the alien had been refused leave to land under Article 1 (1), and that this had not occurred. The Court's decision is of importance: it held that leave to land within the meaning of Article 1 (1) did not only involve a grant for mere physical landing upon English territory, but involved a grant to go as a free man in this country. This had never been given, and was not to be implied, as Soblen had throughout been in the custody of a police officer. It held further that an express refusal was valid if it was given as soon as reasonably practical. This interpretation of the Aliens Order, 1953, seems justifiable, though the Court went beyond this in holding that the onus to show permission to land was always on the alien.

An appeal was then made to the Court of Appeal.[1] Here Soblen's counsel took up the statement of the Court below regarding the onus of proof, and contended that where the liberty of an individual is concerned, the onus is on the Crown to show that detention is justifiable. In giving its judgment the Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to pronounce on this point. The argument was raised that under Article 5 (1) of the Aliens Order, 1953, it is possible to have given leave to land subject to certain conditions, and that if Soblen was in fact permitted to leave the airport for medical treatment, but for no other purposes, this was the correct clause under which action should have been taken. The immigration officer could have acted under Article 5 (1), but did not do so, and had failed to fulfil the requirements of Article 1 (1). Detention under Article 8 (4) was therefore invalid. The Court of Appeal sustained the view of the Court below that the right to land must be taken to mean the right to land as a free man, and that this had never been granted. It held that the question of refusal had been in suspense from 1 July to 3 July, but was given as soon as reasonable. The appeal was therefore rejected.

With a judicial finding that Soblen did not have permission to be in England, and was legally detained, the matter for the time being left the Courts and returned to the hands of the Home Secretary.

[1] *R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, Ex Parte Soblen* [1962] A.E.R. 379.

As we have seen, Article 8 (4) of the Aliens Order—which had now been declared legally applicable—allowed the detention of an alien 'pending the giving of directions in his case under paragraph (1) of this Article'. Article 8, paragraph 1, entitled 'Removal of aliens refused leave to land', states:

Where leave to land is refused to an alien, an immigration officer may . . . give directions:

(a) to the master of the ship or commander of the aircraft in which the alien arrived in the United Kingdom, requiring him to remove the alien from the United Kingdom in that ship or aircraft;
(b) to the owners or agents of the said ship or aircraft, requiring them to remove the alien from the United Kingdom in any ship or aircraft of which they are the owners or agents;
(c) to the said owners or agents, requiring them to make arrangements for the removal of the alien from the United Kingdom in any ship or aircraft bound for a country specified in the directions, being either—
    (i) a country of which the alien is a national or from which he embarked for the United Kingdom; or
    (ii) a country to which there is reason to believe that the alien will be admitted.

There are several observations to be made on these provisions. There is no doubt at all that, once Article 8 (4) is shown to be applicable, they entitle the Home Secretary to order El Al to remove Soblen as an alien refused permission to land, and who travelled to the United Kingdom on that airline. The provisions of paragraph (c), however, are ambiguous: it is not clear from them whether the Home Secretary has the right to insist upon sub-paragraph (i) in preference to sub-paragraph (ii). May he insist upon ordering the alien to be returned to the country of which he is a national if the alien wishes to go elsewhere, and would be admitted by a third country?

On the question of nationality, it may be noted that when Soblen arrived in England he gave his nationality as 'doubtful': the Attorney-General, having established Soblen's U.S. nationality from correspondence with the U.S. authorities, was later to chastize him for this mispresentation. No doubt it was in Soblen's interests, in the light of Article 8 (1) (c) (i), to raise doubts about his U.S. nationality; but his counsel was quite justified in replying that it is common for States to withdraw naturalized citizenship upon conviction of treason or espionage.[1] Indeed, the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 explicitly provides for loss of nationality,

[1] See Oppenheim–Lauterpacht, *International Law*, Vol. I (7th ed. 1955), pp. 655–6. British Nationality Law is more lenient in this respect.

on the part both of naturalized and native-born citizens, for committing any act of treason against the United States. It seems that in this case it was to the advantage of the U.S. authorities to decline to deem espionage a treasonable act.

Soblen applied for asylum and this was refused. Asylum remains a right to be offered at discretion by the host country, and not a right to be demanded by a refugee.[1] The refusal by the Home Office was completely in order. The Home Secretary then ordered El Al to take Soblen to America. Now, although a request to El Al to remove Soblen was perfectly justified under the Aliens Order, the right to order the airline to take him to America was highly doubtful. And, for its part, while caring little about the legal niceties of a British Statutory instrument, the Israeli Government was extremely anxious not to be involved in any action which could be interpreted as an extradition of Soblen to the United States. El Al was instructed not to comply with Mr Brooke's directions. On 4 August the Israel Ambassador conveyed his Government's objections to the Foreign Office and explained that Israeli law had only required the expulsion of Soblen from its territory, and not his return to the United States. The furore which had occurred in Israel immediately after Soblen's expulsion on 1 July undoubtedly influenced the Ben Gurion Government in the rigorous line which it now followed. The vote of no confidence had been followed on 22 July by a Cabinet order for a ministerial inquiry into the circumstances of Soblen's expulsion; and on 26 July Mr Moshe Shapiro, the Minister of the Interior, refused an application made by Soblen (now in England) for an Israel visa. The course of action now being pursued by the Israeli Government was legally correct. El Al further announced that it would not use a convenient loophole suggested by Mr Brooke, namely, the transferring of Soblen's ticket to another airline to act as El Al's agent. The Government of Israel, while acknowledging that it is a custom of international law that carriers bringing unwanted aliens to a foreign country are obliged to remove them, offered to take Soblen back to Israel on an El Al plane, though refusing absolutely to take him to the United States. The deportation order against Soblen in Israel was still in effect, though legal procedures there had not been totally exhausted. This offer, apparently falling within the terms of Article 8 (1) (*a*) and Article 8 (1) (*c*) was rejected by the Home Secretary. The Israeli Government was by this time under

[1] For a full statement of the law on asylum, see the *Asylum Case, I.C.J. Reports* (1950), 267.

considerable pressure from various sources, and is to be con gratulated, after its unfortunate debut in the Soblen affair, for ad hering to the letter of the law in the face of these pressures.[1]

By 12 August the Home Secretary had given up the hope of forcin El Al to comply with his directives. He now took a step which was t embroil the case in yet further legal controversy: he issued a de portation order. The reason for doing so is apparent—the provision of the 1953 Order relating to deportation carry no restrictions as t which carrier may be ordered to remove the alien from the territor of the United Kingdom. Article 20 provides:

20 (2) A deportation may be made in the case of an alien in the followin circumstances, that is to say—

. . .

(*b*) if the Secretary of State deems it to be conducive to the pul lic good to make a deportation order against the alien.

Article 21 (1) adds:

An alien in whose case a deportation order has been made may be place under authority of the Secretary of State, on board any ship or aircra which is about to leave the United Kingdom.

It will be observed that aliens who have not received permission t land may be expelled from this country under Article 8 (1). Th Attorney-General had fought two legal cases to obtain a Cou verdict that Soblen was a person to whom the provisions of Artic 8 (1) properly applied. Yet the Home Secretary now was attemptin to rid England of Soblen under the deportation provisions, whic applied to persons legally in this country.

Soblen's lawyers immediately applied for, and obtained, leave t issue a writ of *habeas corpus*. Appearing before Stephenson, J., in th Vacation Court,[2] they argued that a deportation order was merely a order to get out and stay out; it could not include a directive to a airline (in this case Pan-Am. or BOAC) to return a national to h country. No such power was provided for in the deportation pro visions of Article 20. Moreover, Soblen's offence was of a politic nature, it was argued, and not extraditable.[3] To allow a deportatio

[1] El Al was subject to prosecution under Article 25 of the Aliens Order, ar stated that it had suffered substantial economic loss through cancellation United States bookings at this time. It may also be noted that Israel relies on grant of $60 million per annum from the U.S. Government, and the U.S. Jewi Community gives the same sum, as well as buying $50 million worth of Isra Government bonds each year.

[2] *R. v. Governor of Brixton Prison, Ex Parte Soblen.* No Law Report citation y available.

[3] See S. 3(1) of the Extradition Act of 1870, which states 'A fugitive crimir shall not be surrendered . . . if the offence is of a political character.' British ar Foreign State Papers, Vol. 60 (1869–70), p. 145.

order to carry directions for his return to the United States was tantamount to extradition for a political offence. His counsel also raised other objections, insisting that Article 20 (2) (*b*) could not be applied until the Home Secretary had held an inquiry at which the alien would be given an opportunity to make representations. *R.* v. *Venicoff*[1] was authority to the contrary, but the Court's attention was drawn to the fact that, since then, the practice had grown up in the Home Office of referring certain cases of deportation to the Bow Street magistrates. Moreover, the subject of a valid notice of refusal to land could never be the subject of a deportation order; and at the time of the present case the Home Secretary had not cancelled the notice of refusal to land.

At the resumed hearing on 22 August, Soblen's counsel suggested that the Aliens Order, 1953, was wholly *ultra vires*, as the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914,[2] from which it derived its validity, was only operative in time of war, and had therefore been defunct in 1953 when the Order was made. The argument (which could hardly be expected to be popular with a Vacation Court judge) was correctly rejected, as the Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act of 1919 clearly extended the powers of the 1914 Act to peace-time situations.

The Attorney-General contended that a deportation order was an executive act which was not subject to judicial review. It was solely for the Home Secretary to decide if such an order would be conducive to the public good.[3] It followed from this, he argued, that Crown Privilege could be claimed by the Home Secretary for documents containing the communications between himself and the U.S. Government on the Soblen question. He also cited authority to show that the Home Secretary was entitled to select a particular vessel for the alien to depart on, even if this had the effect of returning him to the custody of the law officers of his own country.[4]

The Court held: (1) that the lack of opportunity to make representations was irrelevant. The old case of *R.* v. *Venicoff* was thus preferred to more recent custom. (2) That it is not necessary that an order under Article 8 be cancelled before an order under Article 20 can come into effect. This finding seems to make it possible to deport an alien who has been declared not legally here at all. (3) That the power to deport is executive, and is not subject to review by the

[1] [1920] 3 K.B. 72.
[2] British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 108, Pt. 11 (1914), p. 3.
[3] It may be noted that Donovan, L.J., had offered the opinion (*obiter*) in the Court of Appeal that Soblen had done nothing to justify deportation.
[4] *Duke of Thierry's* case [1917] 1 K.B. 922.

Courts. It has been noted above that the claim to Crown Privilege made it extremely difficult for Soblen's lawyers to prove that the deportation order was a sham, covering an agreement to extradite. The layman will be forgiven for implying those facts from the very desire to hide behind Crown Privilege. As a point of constitutional law, it is of interest that the Court rejected entirely the suggestion of Soblen's counsel that Crown Privilege was not available in *habeas corpus* cases, where the liberty of the individual was concerned. (4) That while the Secretary of State cannot make an order that an alien shall be deported to a specific country, yet he has the power to select the ship or aircraft on which the alien is to be placed, with the probable result that he must disembark at the place to which the carrier is going, even if that is his own country.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of the Court below on all points, and stated that the only situation in which it could 'look behind' a deportation order would be if the Home Secretary were quite obviously acting in bad faith. It explained this to mean that if the sole purpose of the order was to please the U.S. Government, then it was unlawful; but if the Home Secretary thought Soblen's presence not conducive to the public good, then the order was lawful. It seems to the present writer that by any objective standards the facts reveal lack of good faith in the making of the order. If the onus of proof on the alien to show bad faith is placed higher than this, the right which the Court has reserved itself to 'go behind' the order is a hollow façade.

CONCLUSIONS

The Court of Appeal decision has both blurred the traditional distinction between deportation and extradition, and has given the Home Office far more protection than is legally necessary or politically desirable on the question of the execution of its administrative powers in good faith.

Both Israel and the United Kingdom have insisted that they were not invoking procedures of extradition. However, it is not yet entirely certain that the offence of espionage is in fact a political offence within the sense of the usual exemption from extradition procedures. The rule of non-extradition for political offences is found in section 3 of the 1870 Act, and also in the Treaty of Extradition which exists between the United Kingdom and the United States.[1] However, neither of these instruments nor indeed general

[1] Ratified 4 August 1932. Cmd. 4928.

international law provides any adequate definition of what is meant by a political crime. It is necessary to rely on case-law as a guide, but even here the authorities are sometimes conflicting. In *Re Meunier* the Court held 'that there must be two or more parties in the State each seeking to impose the Government of their own choice on the other, and the offence (must be) committed by one side or the other in pursuance of that object'.[1] To extend this dictum to cases of espionage from within in the case of the Communist Party in the United States is to stretch it to absurdity. Yet if one looks at the more recent French case of *Re Giovanni Gatti*, the definition applied would cover the Soblen case, for there it was stated that: 'What distinguishes the political crime from the common crime is the fact that the former only affects the political organization of the State... while the latter exclusively affects rights other than those of the State... The offence does not derive its political character from the nature of the rights it injures.'[2] The growth of totalitarian, and especially Communist, systems of government has led to an increasingly flexible interpretation of the term 'political offence', in order to be able to refuse the extradition of persons who have fled from Communist rule and whose return is demanded on the grounds of some non-political crime they are purported to have committed, often in the course of their escape. If one wishes to continue to protect persons such as these, and possibly also persons who have been engaged in espionage for the West behind the Iron Curtain, then the law must also protect spies for the Soviet Union against extradition to the countries of their nationality. Yet the Attorney-General has seen fit to deny the political nature of espionage in this context, and Stephenson, J., in the Vacation Court supported this view.

How far was the Court of Appeal bound by previous authority to rule that Soblen's deportation order could legitimately include the choice of a BOAC or Pan-American flight to the United States? It is submitted that such a conclusion could have been avoided, if wished. In *Duke of Thierry's* case the Court of Appeal undoubtedly allowed the Secretary of State, when making the deportation order, to place the alien upon a boat which was sailing to the country which had demanded his presence. But, as Pearson, L.J. commented when the Soblen case was before the Court of Appeal, in 1917 it was always possible—and, indeed, frequently happened—that the alien escaped by jumping overboard outside the three-mile limit on to a

[1] (1894) 2 Q.B. 415 at 419. [2] *Annual Digest* (1947), p. 145.

waiting boat. As he was being deported, and not extradited, nothing could be done to prevent him from doing this. However, as Soblen's counsel wrily remarked, nowadays Pan-Am. and BOAC do not provide parachutes for such purposes. It must also be noted that neither this case not the *Sackstedar* case,[1] which was also cited as authority for the Court's decision, can be said to have concerned political refugees.[2] Moreover, none of these cases was on the 1953 Order but on the Act of 1914: their binding application today may be doubted, and it is regrettable that the Court of Appeal did not take the opportunity to protect the essential distinction between deportation and extradition procedures.

The Court did, however, reject some of the more extreme claims of the Attorney-General. No support was given for his proposition that an alien need not be given notice of a decision to refuse him leave to land; and the Vacation Court rejected the assertion that even if the deportation order were invalid, what was done in this case was an 'act of state', and that a non-resident alien could have no right whatever to resort to the Courts against the Crown. The Court thus refused to accept the illiberal argument that an alien physically present in this country was prevented from a right of seeking *habeas corpus*.

It is well known that Soblen died after a self-administered dose of barbiturates had prevented his deportation from being effected. His lawyers did all that could be done, giving their services free throughout, and requesting legal aid only for his appearance before the judge of the Vacation Court. Both the anxiety shown by the United States to have Soblen back in her jurisdiction, and his own determination to avoid this, may indicate that the U.S. authorities hoped to extract further information from him while he was serving his sentence. The actions of the Home Secretary, however, and, in the latter phases of the case, the findings of the Courts of Law, would seem in many ways regrettable. They have forfeited principles more important than the close co-operation of two friendly nations.

ROSALYN HIGGINS

[1] (1918) 1 K.B. 578.

[2] Both cases concerned the return to France of Frenchmen who were unwilling to serve in the French army. Their desire to avoid conscription does not seem to have been based on any political motive, but rather on the discomforts of army life.

The Struggle for Power in Algeria

SEEN from the outside, and despite a great deal of understandably tendentious French propaganda, the long fight for Algerian independence appeared to have the whole-hearted support of the vast majority of the Algerian population and to have a leadership solidly united in their revolutionary fervour and aims. That the Algerian people were, in their hearts, utterly desirous of their independence was, and is, true. But it became apparent, some time before victory was gained, that there were cracks in their leaders' solidarity. Today, after less than three months of independence, the men who led the revolution, soldiers and politicians alike, are engaged in another struggle, the struggle for power and position which seems inevitably to follow a successful revolution. But whoever comes out on top in this present stage—at the time of writing M. Ben Bella seems the best bet—is unlikely to remain there for long. The new Algeria is almost certainly destined to pass through long months of uncertainty and crisis before anything like its final definite shape emerges.

The roots of the clash of personalities and policies, which emerged so sharply into the open as the aftermath to independence, go back to the early days of the revolution. Ranks were closed, differences buried, as the nation united to fight the one great enemy, the French. When the National Liberation Front, the F.L.N., was formed in 1954 the relatively small group of men, who were all that a population of around 9 million could produce in the way of potential national leaders, agreed formally upon their aims and objectives. These were: the restoration of a sovereign, democratic, and social Algerian State, within the framework of the principles of Islam, and the preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of race or religion. The revolution was implacable in its objective, independence; but it was moderate in its subordinate aims. Tracts were circulated from the beginning which declared that, after independence had been attained, French economic and cultural interests would be respected, and French citizens who wished to become Algerians would be enabled to obtain Algerian nationality and would enjoy the same rights and obligations as their Muslim brothers.

In the early days of the revolution the fight against the French was haphazard and carried out by guerrillas who were gradually organized into the Army of National Liberation, the A.L.N., the F.L.N.'s military arm. For convenience, the country was divided

into six military units and they were given the name of the old Turkish administrative divisions—*Willaya*. But any overall military command was almost impossible because of poor communications, the enormous difficulties of obtaining arms and ammunition, and the general lack of money and of an efficient organization. This led to the A.L.N. being equipped and trained outside Algeria, in Tunisia mainly but also in Morocco. Then, as the French poured new divisions into Algeria and erected an electrified, fortified barrage all along the frontiers with those two countries, it became almost impossible to get the new trained troops back into Algeria. This had two consequences, which are a strongly contributory cause of the present struggle inside the new independent State. In the first place, the political leaders had, for safety's sake, also left the country and were directing the revolution from Tunis, Rabat, and Cairo, and although they were, with a few exceptions, former guerrilla leaders, they were frequently accused of losing touch with public opinion inside Algeria and with the men fighting on the spot. Secondly, the local commanders in each *Willaya* began to attain wide importance, despite the fact that, for this very reason, they were often changed and were to some extent supervised by an F.L.N. watch-dog—a political officer whose task it was to instil the correct political ideas and aims in the civil population.

The difficulties and indeed dangers of this situation quickly became apparent, and, to try to overcome them, meetings attended by the politicians-in-exile and the local commanders were arranged in places outside Algeria, and it was from these consultations that the National Revolutionary Council, the C.N.R.A., was born to become the sovereign body of the revolution. Its composition was fluid because of the difficulties experienced by the military leaders inside Algeria in leaving their zones of command, but there were usually three representatives from each of the *Willayas* as well as officials of Algerian organizations in France and the politicians from Tunis and Cairo.

During the autumn of 1958, after General de Gaulle had assumed power in France, and when F.L.N. fortunes were at a low ebb, the C.N.R.A. decided to appoint a Government in exile to head the revolution in place of the Executive Committee which had been the responsible organ. An intelligent, moderate, francophile chemist, M. Ferhat Abbas, who was a late-comer to the revolution and had not been a guerrilla fighter, was nominated Prime Minister, and the provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, G.P.R.A., was

established in Tunis. The most important Ministry in that Government was that of Communications and Supplies under Abdul Hafid Boussouf, who by the beginning of 1961 became a dominant figure in the military triumvirate with Ben Kassim Krim, the Foreign Minister (who resided in Cairo), and Ben Tobbal, Minister of the Interior. Boussouf was instrumental in appointing Colonel Boumedienne as Chief of Staff of the A.L.N. It was because of rivalries between these three men, combined with objections from M. Ben Bella from his prison in France, that M. Ferhat Abbas—who to many people outside Algeria had become almost the symbol of the revolution and who had made approaches to the French to open negotiations—was replaced as Premier in August 1961 by M. Ben Khedda. But although Ben Khedda has the right background, was one of the original leaders of the revolution, and may well make a good national leader in the years to come, he at present lacks the forceful personality which can make the dissident, jealous revolutionaries work together; and this is indeed true of most of the present leaders.

Quite apart from any basic political differences or divergent views on military planning, the clash of personalities amongst the Algerian leaders is easily understandable. They worked in a hot little house in the Rue des Entrepreneurs, a side street of Tunis. The front door, guarded by wild-looking soldiers who had nothing to do but play alarmingly with their revolvers, gave on to a dingy hall out of which opened various rooms, one labelled 'Ministry of the Interior', another 'Information Ministry'. Contrary to popular belief, the Ministers were miserably paid and lived in tiny apartments or bedsittingrooms in second-rate hotels. The troops, with pay of NF.30 (just over £2) a month, were even worse off. After the Bizerta crisis in the summer of 1961 their relations with their host, President Bourguiba, became even more strained, largely because he had taken the opportunity of his quarrel with the French to lay claim to a large slice of Algeria crossed by the pipeline from the Edjele oilfields. There is no doubt, too, that President Bourguiba was becoming increasingly uneasy about the 20,000 well armed, equipped, and trained Algerians who were camping on Tunisian territory, unable to enter Algeria. There was, indeed, cause for alarm, for, had it not been for the repercussions on public opinion in the Arab world and the likelihood that it would have led to a cessation of financial and material assistance from Czechoslovakia, the A.L.N. might well have taken over Tunisia in the summer of 1961. It be-

came apparent long before the signing of the Evian Agreement in March 1962 that the A.L.N. units in Tunisia were no longer a revolutionary army intended to drive the French from Algeria but a force ready to conquer Tunisia and incorporate it with an Algeria freed both of the French and of the long electrified barrier separating the two countries.

It should be remembered that during the later years of the revolution the A.L.N. did not include the Algerians fighting in Algeria but was specifically the two divisions in Tunisia and Morocco, the first of which was commanded by Colonel Boumedienne. The F.L.N. had come to mean, loosely, the Algerians, guerrillas and civilians, opposing the French inside Algeria. And many of them felt, not without reason, that, because they were actually fighting the battle for freedom, they were suffering far more privations as well as casualties than their brothers in safe exile in Tunisia and Morocco.

Thus the struggle for power which opened after independence had been attained was not so much to appropriate the Government and administration posts as to obtain control of the one political party that mattered at all, the F.L.N. This manœuvre came into the open at the meeting of the C.N.R.A. which took place in Tripoli in the last days of May, before independence but when the likelihood of its achievement was clear enough. The meeting was of supreme importance but, owing to the great secrecy which surrounded it, few reliable accounts of what took place have been available. By tradition the meetings of the C.N.R.A. had always been held in secret and, to prevent the presence of French agents or journalists who might reveal 'military secrets', the Libyan Government had always refused to grant entry visas to foreigners for some weeks before they took place. Although, after the Evian Agreement, these reasons for excluding outsiders were no longer valid, the exclusion was continued. There are therefore various versions of what actually happened at the May meeting, which was in fact the curtain-raiser to the months of internal struggle which followed the day of independence.

Directly the meeting opened, military representatives of the A.L.N. and supporters of M. Ben Bella subjected the Evian Agreement to severe criticism. When they were reminded that Ben Bella had, in fact, given the Agreement his blessing, the reply was that he had done so under duress and while in a French prison. It was emphasized that his subsequent behaviour on his release, when he kept the G.P.R.A., of which he was a Vice-Premier, waiting in Rabat

while he embarked upon a lengthy tour of the Middle East capitals was intended to underline his disapproval of a good deal of the rebe Government's activities. Then the A.L.N. representatives claime that they should have been allowed to fight to the end until th French had been driven from Algeria. In fact an Egyptian who ha managed to be present at the meeting informed me that the famou words 'unconditional surrender' were used, and Ben Bella's sup porters on the Council claimed to have taken an oath not to retur to their homeland until the last French soldier had left—an oat which, if indeed taken, was hardly honoured.

A proposal to appoint a Political Bureau which would have th task of transforming the F.L.N. into a single political party—th National Democratic Party, P.N.D.—resulted in a complete dead lock. All observers agree, however, that the names put forward in secret ballot would have given a majority to the Ben Bella group and would have allowed him to take control of the party and subse quently the State by appointing his men to stand on a one-party lis for election to the Constituent Assembly envisaged by the Evia Agreement. No vote was taken. Supporters of the Prime Minister M. Ben Khedda, declare that, as it was evident that no majorit could be found for either side, the meeting was adjourned unti October, but the Ben Bella faction insist that there was no such de cision and they just woke one morning to find that Ben Khedda an his Ministers had already left Tripoli for Tunis. In any case, th meeting broke up and the breach between Ben Bella and Be Khedda widened.

It is suggested in some Algerian circles that the split was betwee Ben Bella and Ben Kassim Krim, rather than between Bella and Khedda. That is to oversimplify the problem. Both Bella and Krim were revolutionary and guerrilla leaders in the opening stages of the fight against the French. Both believed they had an enormous following in the country, and Krim certainly knew he had full and whole-hearted backing in his own area, the Kabylie. Krim had been one of the principal negotiators of the Evian Agreement, to which Bella took strong exception. Krim, too, believed in the necessity of co-operation with France and the gradual introduction of reforms which would fulfil the political and social objectives of the revolution. Ben Bella, on the other hand, wished to make a new Algeria overnight, introducing sweeping reforms, including something very like nationalization of the land, which were not always favoured by his entourage, especially by the brilliant lawyer Maître Boumend-

jel, who was later to become his official spokesman. Ben Bella is, of course, violently anti-French, a foreseeable result of the shameful manner in which he was captured and of his subsequent frustrating years spent in French prisons while the revolution, of which he was one of the original leaders, was being fought and won. Publicly he declares he is willing to accept aid and technical assistance from any country, but his vitriolic hatred of the French drives him to look to the Eastern bloc for help. In fact, he is likely to model himself on President Nasser in a good many matters.

These facts are unknown to 90 per cent of the Algerians, who are, therefore, unable to understand quite what the dispute amongst their leaders is about and who have had no local Arabic language newspaper since the revolution opened. The G.P.R.A. information services have, perhaps with reason, made no mention of the differences in their midst, but, with less cause, have never publicized their political programme, which was unanimously agreed at the Tripoli meeting before the Political Bureau issue arose. From the few generalized but clearly inspired leaks that have appeared concerning the programme, it seems reasonable enough and based mainly on the continuation of the Constantine Plan. There is perhaps too much stress on industrialization, which the Algerian leaders, like their brethren in most newly independent economically backward countries, see as the answer to all their development problems. The G.P.R.A. programme does contain slow and cautious land-reform projects, and, for the benefit of M. Ben Bella and his friends, whose theme song is 'independence is only a stage in the revolution', there is also emphasis on 'the continuing revolution'.

The atmosphere in Tunis in the days immediately preceding independence was tense in the extreme. The two groups were hardly on speaking terms, but at least at that time they had the good sense to refrain from multiple and contradictory public declarations or mutual recriminations. They did reveal their bitterness and their forebodings in private to their friends and particularly to Egyptian diplomats and journalists, who, throughout the crisis, have received the confidences of both sides—indeed, of all factions in the struggle, for it was not long before there was a third challenger for power in the field, Colonel Boumedienne.

The evening before the referendum which was to make Algeria independent, the G.P.R.A. committed the fatal error of issuing an order which they had no power to enforce: on 30 June they dismissed Colonel Boumedienne from his post of Chief of Staff and

virtual commander-in-chief of the A.L.N. Their reasons were well founded, for there is little doubt that this powerful military leader was plotting to take over the authority of the new State, backed, as he would have been, by a strong, disciplined army of 35,000 men, probably the most efficient fighting force in North Africa. During the short interval between his dismissal and the declaration of independence, I passed through Tunis on my way to Algiers and I was able to confirm that the entire A.L.N. had rallied completely behind Boumedienne and would refuse to accept orders from anyone else. Boumedienne had hardly been heard of outside Tunis, except possibly in the Algerian countryside, until his dismissal. He is a man of remarkable intelligence and strong personality, educated at El Azhar University in Cairo and impregnated with Nasserian philosophy. After his dismissal by the G.P.R.A., he immediately came out as a supporter of M. Ben Bella and it was he who organized the sea landing of A.L.N. troops at Bone and the simultaneous rising in Constantine, which did much to strengthen Ben Bella's position. He takes much the same view of the Evian Agreement as Ben Bella and was most anxious to lead his men into Algeria to drive out the French. He has ordered the abolition of the independent *Willaya* commands as the first step to the unification of all Algerian armed forces and their transformation into a national army, which he would presumably command. This is clearly a sensible and a necessary move, but one to be approached warily by the political leaders, for it would make Boumedienne one of the most powerful figures in the new Algeria, especially as the continued postponement of the elections for the Constituent Assembly and the subsequent formation of a proper Government deprive the country of a strong and stable political leadership.

Directly independence was ratified by the result of the referendum of 1 July, M. Ben Khedda and the members of his Government, minus Ben Bella, moved rapidly from Tunis to Algiers. They received a tumultuous reception from an overjoyed population, unspeakably thankful that the seven years of war and misery were over and desperately grateful to the heroic leaders who had won them their freedom. They had no more idea of the disagreements amongst those leaders than they had of the unhappy fact that independence did not mean, as they expected, the dawning of a new era of prosperity and plenty. The O.A.S. campaign of destruction and sabotage, the complete breakdown of the civil service, and the flight back to France of tens of thousands of French settlers and officials,

coming on top of the long, harsh years of fighting, with all the economic and social deprivation they brought in their train, meant that independence was accompanied by widespread economic distress and anarchy, intensified by lack of any clear, strong central authority. For the moment, however, there was only overwhelming joy at the return of peace and at the hard-won victory. Celebrations lasted three days and it was only with great difficulty that the crowds were eventually persuaded to disperse, but the extraordinary discipline which the Muslim masses had shown throughout the period of O.A.S. provocation was maintained.

The G.P.R.A. were immediately conscious of their uncertain position in relation to the forces of law and order in the country as a whole. Many observers, with hind-sight, now say that they should have rushed to Constantine, Oran, Bone, and the other large towns to hold meetings in order to spread the popular support they then enjoyed in Algiers. Such tours were, in fact, planned but abandoned —with the exception of a brief visit to Tizi Ouzou, a mere two hours' journey by car—because the Cabinet feared to leave the capital. They were not at that time apprehensive of assassination but rather that the Ben Bellists would take over in their absence.

A few days later the military authorities of the Autonomous Zone of Algiers organized a mass demonstration at the Stadium, which is in the heart of the Muslim suburbs which had so vigorously welcomed M. Ben Khedda and his Cabinet. The attendance was poor, possibly because the people were tired of demonstrations and many were already expressing anxiety that the administration should begin to function and the factories open their doors. This meeting marked the 'watershed' of the military support in the Autonomous Zone for the G.P.R.A. A few days later, the Political Officer there told me that he regretted having called the meeting and having come out so openly for Ben Khedda.

During this period M. Ben Bella was dashing around by plane from Tripoli to Cairo and Cairo to Rabat. Colonel Nasser advised him, at that time, against attempting to march on Algiers with the Algerian Liberation Army. This force was, in any case, chronically short of transport and such a march would have been slow and difficult.

While M. Ben Bella was in Rabat the Minister of Information in the G.P.R.A., M. Yazid, who despite his well-known pro-Western leanings (his wife is an American) has maintained a strong personal friendship with M. Ben Bella, made an attempt to bring about a

reconciliation, but failed in this and in his efforts to persuade Ben Bella to return with him to the Algerian capital to discuss difficulties with the G.P.R.A. on the spot. M. Ben Bella decided instead to enter Algeria from Morocco and he addressed enthusiastic meetings in Tlemcen and Oran (where he spoke in French and Arabic).

By mid-July there were two capitals in Algeria, neither of which functioned so far as the administration was concerned. M. Ben Bella had established himself at Tlemcen with his entourage of about seventy people and the dismissed Chief of Staff, Colonel Boumedienne. He was joined there by the former Prime Minister, M. Ferhat Abbas, and many important Muslims rushed to pay their respects, whilst some of the civil servants who had entered the country with the G.P.R.A. found pressing reasons to leave the political scene and visit relations or friends in the countryside. They admitted to their intimates that they wanted to be out of sight until the struggle was over.

On 22 July M. Ben Bella's spokesman, Maître Boumendjel, officially announced the creation of the Political Bureau, which would 'assure the direction of the country, the reconversion of the F.L.N. and the A.L.N., the construction of the State, and the preparation for a meeting of the C.N.R.A. at the end of 1962'. Naturally, M. Ben Bella was the leader of the Bureau and his second-in-command was the brilliant M. Khider (who, unlike Ben Bella, had resigned from the G.P.R.A. just before independence. He alone can be said to have behaved throughout the crisis with some logic.) The other members were MM. Bitat, Boudiaf, and Ait Ahmed, as well as two former *Willaya* commanders, Hadj Ben Alla and Mohemed si Said. The composition was changed later, but with one or two exceptions the names proposed or chosen were all supporters of Ben Bella. The creation of the Bureau was but a step in M. Ben Bella's efforts to obtain power by legal means through ensuring that a majority of his supporters were elected to the Constituent Assembly.

As he gained ground the support for the G.P.R.A. crumbled and on the afternoon of 24 July the military authorities informed M. Ben Khedda that they could no longer be responsible for the protection of the Cabinet. At this point the Ministers just disappeared from the Aletti Hotel which had been their headquarters. M. Ben Khedda rather bravely remained alone in the Summer Palace and it was noticeable that there was only one sleepy soldier left guarding the huge grounds where there had been at least a hundred the previous week.

The way seemed open for M. Ben Bella to move to Algiers, but he delayed until *Willaya* 4 took over command of the greater Algiers area on 29 July. The Autonomous Zone was abolished, the guards on all the public buildings were changed and increased in size, and the city was prepared once again to welcome a returned hero. There now seems little doubt that in those few days before M. Ben Bella arrived, the leaders of *Willaya* 4, who have rightly been described as 'young firebrands with no political or military experience', tasted power and discovered how easy it was in a modern State to grab it. They took charge of the radio station and the administrative buildings, but withdrew this control when the Ben Bellists arrived. Plans were immediately announced for the elections and the candidates for the single list were chosen, giving roughly 70 per cent of the seats to the military.

Power slipped from M. Ben Bella as it had from M. Ben Khedda and it took him just about the same time, a month, to discover that the leaders of *Willaya* 4 would no longer co-operate with him. They were supported by the leaders of *Willaya* 3, though not because the two leaders, Colonel Si Hasan (aged twenty-eight) and the highly experienced Ben Kassim Krim, have anything in common, apart from their hatred for Ben Bella. *Willaya* 3 is in the Kabylie, where M. Krim can count on the support of the population. It is unlikely that Colonel Si Hasan can count on the support of even a small section of the population of Algiers.

The outcome is likely to be an unsatisfactory compromise in which M. Ben Bella, as Prime Minister, will be virtually the political prisoner of Colonel Boumedienne and the military leaders who brought him to power.[1] It will be a poor Government, but if through it order is restored and the economy of the country revived before the winter sets in, much dreadful suffering will be averted.

CLARE HOLLINGWORTH

[1] Since the time of writing a single list, chosen by Ben Bella's Political Bureau, of 196 Deputies for the National Assembly was presented to the electorate on 20 September.

Issues at the U.S. Congressional Elections: President Kennedy at Mid-term

IN theory the off-year congressional elections—those which do not coincide with a presidential contest[1]—give the American voters a chance to show what they think of the President whom they chose two years earlier. In practice the results depend mainly on local questions—whether the town's aircraft plant has won a defence contract, how hogs are selling, the attitude of the incumbent Congressman to the latest scandal, and so on. Voters have to choose a Representative, probably a Senator and/or a Governor (thirty-nine Senate seats out of one hundred, and thirty five Governorships out of fifty are at stake on 6 November), members of the state Legislature, and perhaps other state and local officials; they may also have to express their views on several amendments to the state Constitution, half a dozen referenda, and a collection of state and local bond issues. After all that, they do not have much time left to make up their minds on national matters, nor do the candidates have much incentive to discuss them seriously.

The Republicans will inevitably criticize President Kennedy, in general terms, for failing to keep his promise to 'get America moving again', for being 'anti-business', for extravagant spending, for being 'soft on communism'. But they will pass on quickly to more detailed charges against their particular opponents and to more specific promises to their immediate constituents, for they are very conscious of the President's immense popularity, far greater than it was two years ago, and they will not want to alienate voters by attacking him personally.

Mr Kennedy himself is, of course, well aware of how little positive impact his intervention can have on the campaign. Nevertheless he is preparing to take a much more active part than has been customary for Presidents in recent years. General Eisenhower was no politician; Mr Kennedy is the epitome of one and could not bear to keep out of the election arena. He will not be trying to purge his enemies—he knows that any interference of that kind would boomerang—but to help his friends. Their gratitude will be worth having if the voters send them to Washington or put them into state offices, and in his speeches on their behalf the President can explain and en-

[1] The whole House of Representatives (435 seats this time) and one-third of the Senate are elected every two years.

list support for the programmes which the outgoing Congress has been so reluctant to implement.

Most of those who have opposed Mr Kennedy in Congress are sure to be back there next January; Southern Democrats and conservative Republicans seldom get defeated. With only a third of the Senate seats at stake—Senators have six-year terms—plus a few which have been vacated by death, there is no chance of the Republicans upsetting the Democratic majority there—sixty-four to thirty-six at present. There are only about fifty seats in the House of Representatives where the contests will be close, and it is even more unlikely that the Republicans will win the forty-four seats which they would need for a majority there than it is that the Democrats will add to their present margin, 263 to 174, something which it is almost unprecedented for the party in power to do in an off-year election. For this reason even a Republican gain in the House, provided it is only a small one, will still be interpreted as a vote of confidence in Mr Kennedy, and for the Democrats to maintain their present majority would very greatly strengthen the prospects for his programme at the next session. Congressmen would no longer feel as certain as they have for the past two years, ever since Mr Kennedy just scraped into the White House, running far behind most other Democratic candidates, that they know better than the President what the voters want.

Whether or not this autumn's election delivers a judgment on President Kennedy, it will undoubtedly do so on the Republicans from among whom, by all present indications, his opponent in 1964 will be chosen. For all these men are running for state Governorships. If Mr Nixon beats the Democratic Governor Brown in California, his failure in 1960 will look less final. If Governor Rockefeller increases his majority in New York, in spite of his divorce, his chances of the nomination will be excellent. If Mr Romney wins in Michigan and Mr Scranton in Pennsylvania, these dark horses will be well and truly entered in the presidential race. These and other gubernatorial candidacies have also a more general importance for the Republican Party; all are progressive liberals and if they do well, their influence will counteract that of the conservatives in Congress who have dominated the party's policies and publicity since Mr Nixon's defeat two years ago. Already the reactionary right wing led by Senator Goldwater seems to be losing ground even with the young people to whom it appealed so strongly.

At the moment the Republican presidential nomination in 1964

looks as if it might perhaps be worth having, although to defeat an incumbent Democratic President seems almost impossible. But Mr Kennedy is in difficulty on every side, most notably in Congress, which is why the coming election is so important to him. He, who knew Congress so well and was supposed to be able to manage it so much better than President Eisenhower, has been even more frustrated than his predecessor. Partly this is because he has tried to manage it too much: complaints are heard continually of tactless young men from the White House trying to teach elderly Congressmen their business. Partly it is because the progressive Democrats, who should support Mr Kennedy, have been disappointed by his comparative lack of liberalism and have been revolting against his leadership; their delaying tactics on the communications satellite Bill were an example of this. Partly it is because the official Democratic leaders in both House and Senate have changed and the new ones have neither the authority nor the art of their predecessors.

But the main reason why President Kennedy has been so frustrated by Congress is that he has tried to do more than President Eisenhower did and has come up against the same old conservative coalition of Southern Democrats and agricultural Republicans, to whom it makes no real difference what party the President belongs to. There is no 'New Frontier' spirit in these men, particularly not in the ones who, by reason of their long tenure of office, control the committees which in turn control the way Congress does business. The tendency of such Congressmen is to consider the interests of their constituents before those of the country as a whole, and to conduct the business of legislation as a bargaining operation between members of the same club. A President comes and goes but they go on for ever—or practically for ever—and are dedicated to preserving the independence of the Legislature and of the states from the encroachment of executive power. They are also dedicated to balancing the Budget at a low level and to keeping government spending down.

Thus almost the entire time of Congress is spent in fighting a series of delaying actions—usually very successfully as the past session has shown—against the modern trend of government. Members may be excused for lacking the courage to deal with the farm problem. This has been allowed to drag on so long that it can now be solved only by such drastic treatment that the remedy, forcing farmers to change their whole way of life, might be worse than the disease. Maybe Congress can be excused also, although

here it is more difficult, for refusing to hurry the process of obtaining equal rights, in education, in employment, in housing, for Negro citizens. It has taken steps, reluctantly and slowly it is true, to help Negroes to vote—most recently by approving the abolition of the poll tax by constitutional amendment—and this is the basic civil right which is supposed to lead to all the others. Farmers and Negroes are two groups of voters whose reactions in November will be put under a microscope after the election, by Congressmen and their critics alike.

The President hopes that the voters will also make the conservatives pay for refusing to allow the Federal Government to help the states to improve their schools and to provide medical care for old people, and for refusing to set up a department of urban affairs to handle the housing, transport, and other pressing problems of the expanding cities. All of these measures were rejected on the grounds both that they would be too expensive and that they would interfere with the independence of local authorities, arguments which were put forward very effectively by the lobbyists against the Bills, most notably the American Medical Association. In addition the school legislation was stifled at birth by the religious issue—the demand that church schools should be helped—which involved the constitutional issue of the separation of Church and State.

On taxes, which have taken up so much of the time of Congress at this session, a compromise was reached after it became clear that the voters did not want lower taxes if these meant increasing the deficit in the Budget. Their view might have been different if it had been put to them that lower taxes would be a way of avoiding a recession, but in fact, in the present confused economic situation, it is not yet clear that a reduction is needed for that purpose. President Kennedy finally decided that it was not needed, mainly because he knew Congress would refuse to give it to him, but he will press for a major measure of tax reform at the next session; this will include tax reduction to sweeten the general tightening up of the system, which will be one of the purposes of the new legislation.

Its other purpose will be to speed economic growth. This year's much-modified tax Bill, which is in the last stages of its passage through Congress as this article is being written, is a first instalment. It offers tax concessions to encourage businessmen to invest more in capital equipment—allied concessions have already been introduced by executive action—and thus to provide more jobs at home and improve their competitive position abroad. These are the basic needs

of the American economy today, as everyone—the Administration, Congress, the business community, the trade unions—is agreed. The need has been underlined by the disappointing economic statistics of the current year. It began with a boom apparently well under way but this levelled off almost at once. The fear that there will be a recession in 1962 has now abated; expansion is still continuing but at a disappointingly slow rate and many forecasters expect a down-turn next year. This repeats the pattern of recent economic cycles; the United States appears to have learnt how to prevent the recurrence of boom and bust but only at the cost of checking long-term growth. The most serious aspect of the situation is the heavy unemployment, which has become chronic at about 5 per cent of the labour force—with a much higher proportion in mining and other industrial areas, including such famous centres as Pittsburgh and Detroit, which are being left behind by technological change.

President Kennedy's apparent inability to do anything about this has greatly disappointed his trade union supporters. This explains their recent decision to make a thirty-five-hour week their basic policy in order to spread the available work. This is not intended as an immediate aim but as a threat to needle the President and Congress into more activity. Congress has, in fact, done quite a lot about unemployment this year—a new public works Bill, allowances for retraining, etc.—but not enough. The President and his advisers, and in this he has worked hard to get the co-operation of both business and labour, are convinced that to expand the productive capacity of the country is the only answer. But this means expanding demand as well. With Congress refusing to provide all the money needed to fill the unsatisfied demands at home—for schools, roads, houses, parks, and so on—the great opportunity lies abroad.

From the point of view of the American voter, this is the chief argument for the Trade Expansion Bill. The surprise of this session of Congress, and the President's only real Congressional success this year, was the way in which this Bill sailed through the House of Representatives with practically all its provisions intact for reducing tariffs by negotiating with other countries, notably those of the European Economic Community, and for easing the impact of increased imports on the domestic economy.[1] The Senate has still to act, and protectionist influence is stronger there, but there seems no

[1] See 'President Kennedy's Programme for Expanding Trade', in *The World Today*, March 1962.

doubt that Mr Kennedy will get his imaginative and constructive Bill through in a satisfactory form.[1]

Indeed, the only place where Mr Kennedy can feel that he has made real progress is in the foreign economic field. For the ingenious and diversified efforts of his Treasury experts seem also to have got America's international balance of payments under control and to have checked the drain on gold without having to use the final, and to Mr Kennedy almost unthinkable, remedy of cutting military spending abroad and reducing foreign aid. Congress may curtail the latter more severely than usual this year—the appropriations are still being debated as we go to press—but it is difficult not to sympathize with the feeling of Congressmen that America's allies, now as prosperous as she is, are not doing their share and that in any case foreign aid is not now doing much good to the United States abroad. Disgust at developments in Latin America, and particularly in Cuba, are largely responsible for the latter feeling. The whole system of foreign aid was supposed to have been thought out afresh in last year's legislation, but in fact the outcome seems, so far at least, to have been merely following the same pattern—except for the Peace Corps, an achievement of which the Kennedy Administration is rightly proud.

The United Nations is another form of co-operation in the international field about which many Congressmen have serious doubts, but to which the Administration is giving whole-hearted support.[2] This is part of President Kennedy's determined effort to keep open all channels of communication between West and East in the hope, and the belief, that sooner or later the Russians will want a more satisfactory way of international living. But at mid-term he has received little encouragement for this conviction. Vietnam and Laos may be comparatively quiet at the moment, but the Berlin issue is boiling up again and Cuba has already boiled, just in time to become an issue in the elections. A new series of atomic tests is under way, into which the President has been drawn with regret, and competition in space is mounting, in both scope and cost.

Thus President Kennedy has not managed to seize the initiative abroad any more than he has at home and in neither respect does the coming election seem likely to help him much. But after all, as he has certainly not forgotten, the American pioneers had desperately

[1] The Senate passed the Bill on 19 September by 78 votes to 8.

[2] On 19 September the Senate gave final Congressional approval to President Kennedy's request for authority to buy up to $100 million of U.N. bonds; the Bill limits U.S. purchases to matching the purchases of all other member nations.

long and hard journeys across the plains and deserts in their covered wagons before they found their new frontier—and no easy time even after they settled there.

NANCY BALFOUR

The Neutrals and the Common Market

THE Treaty of Rome allows two possibilities for European countries wishing to participate with the existing members of the European Economic Community in working for economic integration: accession, under the terms of Article 237, or association, under Article 238. The reaction of Denmark, Norway, and Ireland to Britain's decision to join the Common Market was to follow suit;[1] for three of Britain's other partners in the European Free Trade Association, however, the position was more complicated. Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland are all advanced industrialized countries, with high living standards, and to join in a single Western European integrated market would pose no insurmountable economic problems for them. Moreover, all three rely on the E.E.C. as a major trading partner, that is, as a more important market than that provided by their E.F.T.A. partners: the Six take some 67 per cent of Swedish exports, 50 per cent of Austrian exports, and over 40 per cent of Swiss exports. Economically, therefore, accession would seem to be the solution. The reason that all three countries have preferred to seek association instead lies in their neutral status. The aims of the Common Market, though this may not be explicitly expressed in the Treaty, are as much political as economic; and the implementation of the Treaty results inevitably in a growing degree of 'supra-national' decision-making—by majority vote—which is binding on the member countries. It was therefore concluded by the three neutrals that membership would commit them to political aims and involve them in cessions of sovereignty which would be incompatible with their continuing neutrality.

On 15 December 1961, once the negotiations between the Six and the United Kingdom were under way, Austria, Sweden, and

[1] See 'Enlargement of the Common Market: Denmark, Norway, and Ireland', in *The World Today*, August 1962.

Switzerland applied to the E.E.C. Council to open negotiations with a view to becoming associated with the Community. The Council gave only a formal acknowledgment (on 21 December) and it was not until the spring of 1962 that the neutrals were finally invited to present their views, it being made clear that this would be a 'hearing' intended to enable the Council to decide how to act, and *not* the beginning of negotiations. The Austrian and Swedish 'hearings' took place on 28 July, and the Swiss Government will present its views on 24 September.

The question of what limitations the neutrality of the three countries would impose in the event of their association with, or even membership of, the Common Market is a complex one. As M. Paul Struye, a Belgian Senator, pointed out in a Memorandum to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in May 1962,[1] neutrality has no single accepted meaning. Quite apart from the fact that the Soviet notion of neutrality differs from that of the West, there are within the latter several different kinds of neutrality. Occasional or temporary neutrality implies merely a decision to abstain in a particular case of conflict between States. Permanent or *perpetual* neutrality, on the other hand, involves a commitment to remain neutral at all times, and this in turn implies duties in time of peace, which M. Struye summed up as follows: 'in peace-time a perpetually neutral State is bound to abstain from any act which would prevent it from fulfilling in war-time the duties imposed upon it by neutrality'; in brief, abstention from intervention, and impartiality, especially in trade relations.

Whilst Austria, Sweden, and Switzerland are all clearly perpetually neutral in this general sense—as the behaviour of the two latter in the World Wars went to prove—their concepts of neutrality differ considerably in their origins and bases. It is sometimes said that Austria's neutrality is imposed, Sweden's is voluntary, and Switzerland's is constitutional. Swiss neutrality was for long a tradition and a basis of policy essential to safeguard the national cohesion and political independence of an ethnically heterogeneous State. In 1815 Switzerland succeeded in obtaining both recognition of this neutrality and guarantees for it from the Powers at the Congress of Vienna,[2] and her neutrality was reaffirmed in 1919 in

[1] Document 1420 of the Consultative Assembly. The Memorandum contains a wealth of detailed references to writings on the legal aspects of neutrality in several languages.

[2] Declarations by the Powers on 20 March and 20 November 1815 and Swiss Declaration of 27 May 1815.

Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles. Such a policy of neutrality is thus extremely deep rooted both in Swiss political traditions and in Swiss public opinion.

Austrian neutrality, on the other hand, is of much more recent vintage. It dates back to the Constitutional Law adopted by the Austrian Parliament on 26 October 1955 after the withdrawal of all Occupation troops. Article I of the Law consists of the following declaration:

> Austria, affirming the permanent nature of its independence with regard to foreign affairs and the inviolability of its territory, *freely proclaims its perpetual neutrality*. Austria shall maintain and defend its neutrality by all the means at its disposal. With these aims in view, Austria shall not join any military alliance and shall not allow the establishment, on its territory, of foreign military bases.

This declaration of neutrality was notified to foreign Powers and recognized by them. It is emphasized by the Austrians that although there was of course a political link between the last phase of the negotiations on the Austrian State Treaty and the Austrian-Soviet talks in Moscow (12–15 April 1955) on the one hand, and the Declaration of neutrality on the other, Austria herself remains sole judge of what is compatible with the neutrality she freely chose.

Swedish neutrality has never been formally stated, nor recognized by the international community: it is merely a traditional policy which has almost unanimous support in the country. For this reason it is considered by M. Struye not to qualify, from the strictly legal point of view, as perpetual neutrality, since policy is liable to change.

The conclusions which M. Struye draws from his purely legal analysis of the neutrality of Switzerland and Austria in relation to the Treaty of Rome and their eventual membership of the E.E.C. are worth noting. His argument is that Austria is bound merely to determine whether the Treaty of Rome constitutes a military alliance, as referred to in the Constitutional Law, and that Switzerland must merely ask whether membership would prevent her from carrying out the duties of a neutral in time of war: and in both cases he maintains that the answer is negative. He points out that a perpetually neutral State remains free to delegate powers to a supranational body—this being one of the attributes of sovereignty—save in fields affecting neutrality; and his conclusion is that 'neither the independence nor the neutrality of the States in question would be threatened by their participation in the E.E.C.' Such a view seems

over-simple however when confronted with the arguments which have been used during the past year by both the neutrals themselves and the Six.

Even before it had been decided that all the E.F.T.A. countries would seek arrangements of one kind or another with the E.E.C., the 'three neutrals' had agreed to work out as far as possible a common approach to the Community, at least over the problems arising from neutrality. Such a common front could be expected to strengthen their hand, and might also be of considerable value to Austria in defending whatever action she took against Russian criticism. High officials and ministers of the three countries have therefore met on a number of occasions during the past year, both before and after the presentation of the requests for negotiations, and they succeeded in reaching agreement on the derogations or special arrangements which any agreement for association would have to contain in order to accommodate their neutral status.

Their assumption that the sole problem was that of finding some way of allowing for their neutrality accounted in part for the suspicious and sometimes hostile reactions which occurred within the Community. The speech of the Belgian Foreign Minister, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, in the Consultative Assembly's debate on the neutrals' problems in May 1962 was revealing, and reflected the views of many people in the Community. After recalling the efforts and sacrifices which the Six had made to create the Common Market, M. Spaak went on: 'This edifice has existed for five years now, and the Common Market is working; it has formed habits and acquired traditions, and then suddenly nine or ten countries come to us simultaneously and say: now you must rethink it all, for we want to join or be associated; each of us wants to join or be associated and bring you his particular problems. You must realize that you put us in a very difficult position.'[1] M. Spaak went on to echo M. Struye's suggestion that there was nothing in the Rome Treaty to prevent accession of the neutrals, and to ask them seriously to consider this. Lastly he warned the neutrals that much would depend on the impression that they made at their 'hearings'. If the presentation of their views were to be made 'incautiously, if the Six should have the feeling that you are asking them to make too many sacrifices, then an atmosphere might be created which would not be favourable at all'. The first of the phrases quoted reflects the fear on the part of the Community that the influx of new members, let alone association

[1] Cf. verbatim report of the Assembly proceedings, 16 May 1962.

with countries not accepting the Community's political aims, may dilute its political and economic dynamism. The argument is sometimes put even more strongly by the French, who maintain that the Community should be intransigent and refuse any association giving the neutrals the benefits of economic integration, unless they accept the long-term political aims.

The debate has become complicated owing to the widespread belief that the U.S. Government was opposed to making special allowances for the neutrals, on the ground that, though the United States was prepared to accept the 'discrimination' against her implied in the reduction of customs barriers within the Common Market area, since the Community brought greater political strength to the West, she was hostile to the granting of preferential status to countries not prepared to throw in their lot with the West. Indeed, Swedish officials and politicians visiting Washington found their case coolly received.[1] The official American position has been and remains, however, that the United States will be satisfied with whatever solution the Europeans work out amongst themselves.

The neutrals are not without their answer to these criticisms. The Austrians of course have the simplest case, in that the U.S.S.R. has let it be known that she would consider Austrian accession to E.E.C. as a violation of neutrality and a hostile act: Austria is too dependent upon trade with Eastern Europe (accounting for 13 per cent of her exports) to be able to risk this. All three neutrals point out that they stand clearly within the Western democratic camp (although, they sometimes add, exclusion from the integrated market might force them, for purely economic reasons, to look elsewhere), and both Sweden and Switzerland spend large sums on defence. A further argument on the part of Sweden is that her neutrality is essential to the maintenance of the present political *status quo* in the Baltic area. Were she to join the Common Market, she argues that the U.S.S.R. would in all probability feel obliged to limit Finland's commercial freedom of action in order to restore the balance, and there is a very strong feeling of responsibility in Sweden for maintaining Finland's links with the rest of Western Europe. The Swiss also point out that their neutrality enables them to play a role in many fields (finance and mediation for example) which is of value to the West and would not be possible if they joined the E.E.C. Lastly, all three countries have a powerful argu-

[1] See 'Die amerikanische Haltung gegenüber den Neutralen: Die Reaktion Schwedens' in the *Neue Zurcher Zeitung*, 12 May 1962.

ment in the fact that neutrality has the support of a vast majority of their population. M. Gunnar Lange, the Swedish Trade Minister, was able to tell the Six on 28 July that his Government's determination to maintain neutrality 'is backed by a virtually unanimous Swedish political and public opinion'.

Nevertheless, the general tough reaction on the part of the Community would seem to have had considerable effect. Although little was made public about the meetings of representatives of the three countries, the indications were, during 1961 at least, that the three countries were thinking in terms of a form of association which would fall far short of acceptance of the Rome Treaty. At the time of the E.F.T.A. Council meeting on 2 March 1962, however, it became clear for the first time that they would be prepared to accept all the essential economic aspects of the Rome Treaty: the impression was given that the main problems resulting from neutrality were institutional ones. When the time came to present their views to the Six on what form association might take, it had become clear that the neutrals had realized that, if they were to persuade the Six to give sympathetic consideration to their claims based on neutrality, they must go as far as possible in accepting the economic side of integration.

THE SWEDISH AND AUSTRIAN CASE

When on 28 July, therefore, Mr Gunnar Lange put Sweden's views to the Council of E.E.C., he emphasized Sweden's acceptance of the provisions of the Rome Treaty, and her willingness to apply at once the full level of internal tariff cuts. More remarkable still in view of his previous insistence on Sweden's position as a low-tariff country, he said she was ready to harmonize her tariff with that of the Community (apart from a small list of exceptions, such as are now becoming traditional). He also stressed that none of the special conditions sought in an attempt to allow for neutrality would be a disguised attempt to avoid the economic implications of integration. The points he made about neutrality were that a neutral country must be able to suspend wholly or partly, or even to withdraw from, the association in the event of war or international crisis; that it must be able to safeguard sources of supply (notably of foodstuffs) which would be vital in the event of war; and that it must be free not to participate in measures which, though economic, are dictated primarily by political considerations. Lastly, on the crucial point of the common commercial policy, acceptance of

which the Community considers essential, while the neutrals maintain that they must retain liberty of action, Mr Lange was conciliatory. It is worth quoting the relevant paragraph of his speech:

> As a neutral country, we would have to keep a certain liberty of action and to reserve the competence to negotiate and sign agreements with third countries in our own name. On the other hand we are prepared, within institutional arrangements for consultation, to co-ordinate our tariff and trade policy closely with that of the Community. Experience leads us to expect that there should in practice be no significant divergences between Sweden's policy and that of the Community. This expectation is strengthened by the fact that both the Community and Sweden are inspired by the wish for liberal trading conditions in the world. But we are nevertheless willing to discuss how the functioning of the integrated market and the interest of the Community could be safeguarded if divergence were in fact to occur on some point.

Dr Bruno Kreisky, putting the Austrian case on the same day, was equally firm about acceptance of the Rome Treaty, although it is generally known that there are sectors of the Austrian economy which would find the competition tough; he did, however, leave Austria the possibility of seeking a slower rate of tariff cuts. The first three points Dr Kreisky made about neutrality correspond to those put by Mr Lange. On trade policy, whilst also asking for a certain freedom of action in relations with third countries (meaning those of E. Europe) he said. 'it will certainly be possible to find means of preventing the running of the E.E.C. market from being upset': Austria would be prepared to take any necessary steps to prevent imported goods passing on into the E.E.C. market.

Switzerland is to put her case on 24 September. It may be assumed that she will fall in step with the other neutrals in her acceptance of economic integration, though her economic situation puts her under less urgent pressure to do so. Her main insistence is likely to be upon the difficulties arising over the acceptance and application of common measures in many fields owing to the country's constitutional system: the Cantons have considerable power and on many matters must agree to the steps the Confederal authorities wish to take. A particular difficulty is the power of the Cantons to hold a referendum on the acceptance of measures in a wide range of fields.

FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

It is still far from clear how the problem of the neutrals and their relations with the E.E.C. will be solved. The Community itself has

yet to agree on its policy and seems unlikely to do so until the negotiations with those seeking membership are further advanced. On the other hand, the E.F.T.A. countries are bound by the London Declaration of June 1961 not to sign agreements with the Six until all their number are assured of attaining satisfactory arrangements; indeed the Declaration talks of all the agreements being concluded simultaneously.

As far as longer-term developments are concerned, and always assuming that a form of association is negotiated, the crucial problem seems likely to be the institutional one. It has been suggested, by the neutrals themselves and amongst the Six, that there would have to be a Council of Association. The associated States would naturally be consulted during the elaboration of Community policy and decisions, but the formal decisions would have to be taken first in the E.E.C. Council and later in the Council of Association. The associated countries would then have the formal right to vote against them. It is significant, however, that Dr Kreisky, in his speech of 28 July, said, 'From the point of view of Austrian neutrality, even decisions taken by the organs of the Association by majority vote seem acceptable to Austria in all matters concerning the implementation of the practical obligations created by the Treaty of Association and the control of its application.'

It is difficult to forecast whether the neutral countries, having once accepted a wide degree of integration, would find it a great handicap to have no voice in the Council, and no membership of the Commission. This was, however, a point which the Sveriges Industriförbund (Federation of Swedish Industries) made forcibly towards the end of 1961, in a publication in which it was argued that, as far as the practical effects for industry and the Swedish economy were concerned, there would be little difference between membership and association, save in this absence from the decision-making bodies.

In line with this view, and since the way in which the whole problem will be settled is far from clear, reference may be made to a study entitled 'The Concept of Neutrality in Contemporary World Society',[1] which, though unpublished, has been made widely known in interested quarters. In it the suggestion is made that, if a clear-cut distinction were to be made between membership of the E.E.C. and membership of the future European Political Community, there would then be no obstacle to the neutrals joining the E.E.C.

[1] Emanating from the Council of Europe Secretariat.

Two final remarks are perhaps apposite. No rapid evolution of public opinion in the three neutral countries is to be expected and therefore whatever settlement is reached must make allowance for neutrality. Also, as the United Kingdom–E.E.C. talks have shown, starting positions may be left far behind as each side achieves a better understanding of the problems and principles which the other holds to be fundamental.

POSTSCRIPT: THE FINNISH PROBLEM

The fate of Finland is closely tied up with the solution to the problems of the three neutrals. On the one hand, a solution for Austria acceptable to the Russians might well lead to a similar solution for Finland. On the other, the course which Sweden takes is of immediate importance to Finland. At present she is linked with the members of E.F.T.A. in a free trade area parallel to E.F.T.A. but legally separate from it in order to provide for the contingency which is now occurring. If the members of E.F.T.A. reach satisfactory arrangements with the Six, understanding and a realization of the political implications will be required, on the part of the Six, to enable the Finland–E.F.T.A. association to remain in being, thus providing, without the risk of provoking Russia, an empirical solution to the problem of ensuring that Finland is not suddenly isolated from the Western European economy.

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Notes of the Month

Cuba: A U.S. Election Issue

On 16 October Mr William P. Miller, Chairman of the Republican Party National Committee, made it clear that, in this year's mid-term elections—in contrast to most campaigns in the last twenty years—politics would not 'stop at the water's edge'. He said: 'If we were asked to state the issue in one word, that word would be Cuba —symbol of the tragic irresolution of the Administration'.

The seal of party approval was thus set on the sustained attacks on the Kennedy Administration's policy towards Cuba made by Republicans of high and low degree in preceding weeks. From Mr Nixon down they had variously demanded that Cuba should be quarantined, and that the U.S. should act against Dr Castro in concert with the Latin American republics; declared at least for a blockade of arms shipments, and hinted at the desirability of a naval blockade and for U.S. troops to be used to suppress Communism in the island. Several prominent Democrats have also raised their voices with these and similar demands.

The immediate background to this agitation was provided by official statements in Washington in August that Soviet military aid to Cuba, already known for many months, had suddenly and greatly increased, and by confirmatory announcements from Havana and Moscow, on 2 September, that the Soviet Union had agreed to provide Cuba with arms and military instructors. Both announcements also reported Soviet agreement to help Cuba to build a new steel plant, to expand existing plants, and to supply irrigation and engineering specialists. The Moscow announcement laid most emphasis on the economic aspects of the agreement. The Havana version played up the military aspect, and it was this that immediately raised the political temperature in the United States.

The Administration first met the attacks on its Cuban policy by a series of statements, mainly from President Kennedy, designed to calm the growing excitement. Condemning 'rash talk', the President spoke of the 'very serious consequences' to which 'casual' suggestions that Cuba should be invaded could lead. While the U.S. would use 'whatever means may be necessary' to prevent Cuba from

following aggressive policies in the Western hemisphere, Soviet military aid to Cuba was primarily defensive in character. There was no evidence of any organized Soviet combat force in the island, of the existence of Soviet bases, of the presence of offensive missiles, or of violation of the 1934 treaty on the U.S. base at Guantánamo. For the moment unilateral U.S. military action was 'neither required nor justified'. The President added, however: 'If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way', the United States 'will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies'.

The President intended to show that he would not be rushed into precipitate action against Cuba and that his Government was well informed on events there. But on 23 September Dr Castro announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to help Cuba to build a new port for a joint Atlantic fishing fleet. Political excitement in the United States now rose to fever pitch. Previous attacks on the Administration were renewed with increased vigour, supported now by Mr Eisenhower, who had declared at the end of August that 'by no means should we make Cuba ... an object of partisan fighting in this campaign'.

In face of these revived attacks the Administration, while still opposed to U.S. military action against Cuba, virtually accepted some of the policies being pressed upon it by its critics, in particular by attempting to enlist support from the Latin American and European allies of the U.S. for certain forms of concerted action against Cuba. Through the Organization of American States it was more or less firmly proposed to the Latin American republics that they should join the U.S. in creating a defensive association in the Caribbean against attempted subversion from Cuba. But although a meeting of the O.A.S., hurriedly called in Washington early in October, reflected awareness of the need for common action in face of the creation of a Communist base in Cuba it also reflected Latin American reluctance to translate that awareness into practical action.

Parallel approaches by the U.S. to her European allies were hardly more successful. The Administration sought their support for what amounted to an embargo on shipping to Cuba. In particular it was desired to prevent the carriage of strategic materials, regarded in Washington as including steel and electrical equipment. These approaches were backed by a statement from the U.S. Maritime Commission that merchant vessels of twenty non-Communist countries—of which British, West German, Norwegian, and Greek

ships accounted for two-thirds—had made 185 voyages to Cuba between the beginning of June and the end of August.

Turkey, Greece, Italy, and Western Germany—all dependent on U.S. goodwill—either totally embargoed trade with Cuba or placed it under control. But Sweden, Norway, and the United Kingdom, whose ships have carried no arms to Cuba in the recent past, were unwilling to accept what they regarded as a restriction on the freedom of the seas. In the British view the use of British shipping for normal trade, and on charter terms, with other countries is a legitimate form of maritime enterprise, and it is not regarded as justifiable in law to impose a complete trade ban on a country with which Britain maintains normal relations.

Under continued pressure at home the Administration therefore decided to 'go it alone'. At the time of writing the final lines of action had not been laid down, but it had been authoritatively stated that, by executive order, President Kennedy would (1) close U.S. ports to all ships of any country if any one of its ships carried arms to Cuba in future, and to any single ship which, on the same voyage, delivered a non-military cargo to Cuba; (2) prohibit the carriage of U.S. Government cargoes, including those financed under the foreign-aid programme, in any foreign ship if any vessel of the same ownership is used in future in general trade between the Soviet bloc and Cuba; and (3) forbid all U.S. ships to trade with Cuba.

It is too early to say whether this kind of action by the Administration against Cuba will satisfy its critics. Much will depend, of course, on the strength of the Republicans in Congress after the elections, or on whether Washington receives more alarming news of Soviet activities in Cuba. But it is worth considering some of the possibilities inherent in the situation as it is at the time of writing.

One such possibility is that the U.S. embargo might fail. There are those who think that shipping resources in any case available to the Soviet bloc are sufficient to nullify its effects—unless it became a full naval blockade which, it is known, the Soviet Union would challenge. Yet any failure of the embargo would cause the U.S. to lose face in Latin America, where anti-American elements would be encouraged, while in the United States there would be even more vociferous demands for forcible action against Cuba.

In face of the Soviet warnings, this year and last, that any attack on Cuba would be the beginning of nuclear war, any direct attack by the U.S. on Cuba might be thought unlikely. A more definite possibility is that Washington would underwrite, in every respect, some

indirect attack on Cuba—a replica, perhaps, of the Guatemala operation of 1954. A pointer in this direction has been provided by the Administration's attitude to the threat by Cuban *émigrés* to attack all ships trading with Cuba. To representations from London that 'a serious view would be taken of any attacks on British shipping going about its lawful business', the State Department replied that while it did not 'sanction' the *émigrés*' activities there were difficulties in guaranteeing peace in the Caribbean. Yet on television on 30 September Mr Rusk said, 'We have very great power in that [Caribbean] area'. Even more significant has been the reported decision of the Pentagon to create special units of the U.S. forces in which Cuban *émigré* volunteers will be instructed in Spanish by, it is said, former Cuban officers.

It is in any case difficult to see how either the proposed embargo or any other U.S. action against Cuba can be reconciled with the O.A.S. Charter, of which Article 15 lays down that 'No state or group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other state'. But the fact is that Dr Castro and his policies have provided but the latest phase in the great American debate on Cuba which goes back to the days of Franklin and Jefferson. 'Cuba must be ours' was a slogan of the Democrats in elections exactly 101 years ago, and the U.S. case against the Spaniards then, as the U.S. case against the Soviet Union now, was based on the Monroe Doctrine.

U.N. Spotlight on Southern Rhodesia

WHO speaks for Southern Rhodesia at the United Nations? The problems inherent in that question represent only part of the British Government's embarrassment since the 'anti-colonialist' spotlight focused on Southern Rhodesia. The other part may be expressed in the question: Why not 'one man—one vote'? But this is by comparison easy, because familiar: the same question has been posed and answered many times before in the United Nations Committee on Non-self-governing Territories. The resignation on 11 October of Britain's representative to the Fourth Committee, Sir Hugh Foot, highlights the complexity of these two apparently simple questions.

For forty years—since 1923—Southern Rhodesia's sovereignty has been divided: a locally elected Legislative Assembly determines most policies normally concerned with internal affairs, while the British Government is legally responsible for external affairs and

defence, and *some aspects* of internal affairs. For those non-Britishers unversed in the power of British political conventions, the situation is complicated by the fact that convention forbids the use of Britain's power in internal affairs. 'Self-governing' therefore means what it says, except for external affairs. Thus while Southern Rhodesia is not a 'non-self-governing territory', her Government may not speak up for its policies at the United Nations. Britain speaks for Southern Rhodesia, but cannot be held responsible for her internal policies. It is hardly surprising that the subtleties have not been easy to grasp in terms familiar to Britain's friends—and enemies—in the General Assembly.

Sir Edgar Whitehead's frustration is symbolized by his problem in finding a way, as Premier of Southern Rhodesia, to present his Government's policies before the Fourth Committee. If he goes as a petitioner, he accepts the same status as Mr Joshua Nkomo, unofficial leader of the African nationalist opposition. If he joins the British delegation, he admits Britain's right to speak on internal affairs. There is in fact no provision for the Committee to hear a defence of Sir Edgar's policies by the man responsible for them.

United Nations involvement in Southern Rhodesia followed the initiative taken in January 1962 by Mr Nkomo, when he conceived deadlock to have been reached on the implementation of the 1961 Constitution for the territory. His major objective—and that of his Zimbabwe African People's Union (Z.A.P.U.)—is to forestall elections under the new Constitution by focusing world attention on its disadvantages for the African people. He prevailed upon the General Assembly on 23 February 1962 to request the Committee of Seventeen[1] to consider whether Southern Rhodesia has attained 'a full measure of self-government'. Britain, in the person of Sir Hugh Foot, voted against this move, claiming self-governing status for Southern Rhodesia, and Britain's consequent inability to demand or transmit information, or comment on her internal affairs.

Nevertheless the Committee of Seventeen, under its Indian Chairman, Dr C. S. Jha, came to London for consultations in the first week of April. It received high-level, careful attention, and its meetings with the British Government were described as 'cordial and useful'. However, in June the Committee agreed by 9 votes to 7 to ask the General Assembly to debate the situation in Southern

[1] Established in November 1961 to make recommendations on the implementation of the 1960 Resolution demanding immediate steps towards the independence of all colonial peoples.

Rhodesia. In agreeing to do so the Assembly confirmed the general U.N. feeling that however understandable Britain's position on the status of the territory might be, Southern Rhodesia cannot be regarded as self-governing by United Nations standards. The British delegation considered inscription of the item on the Assembly's agenda by a simple majority as 'throwing away the rules'; and feeling was heightened when Britain's representative, Sir Patrick Dean, duly arrived for the debate to find himself virtually alone in the chamber and the debate unceremoniously postponed.

On 18 June the Assembly debated a resolution calling for a conference representative of all political parties to draw up a new Constitution for Southern Rhodesia. Before the vote, in which the British delegation took no part, Sir Patrick explained that 'the question of competence was fundamental', and the United Nations had no right to intervene in Southern Rhodesia. The resolution was passed, nevertheless, by 73 votes to 1 (South Africa) with 27 abstentions.

Meanwhile, African pressure through the United Nations was matched by pressure at home. On 14 May a general strike in Salisbury, backed by Z.A.P.U., resulted in riots, three deaths, large-scale police action in the African locations, and many dismissals. Political meetings were banned for three months in Salisbury, Umtali, and Marandellas. There followed isolated but regular reports of arson and apparently politically inspired violence from several parts of the territory. In August the Government introduced amendments to its Unlawful Organizations Act and its Law and Order (Maintenance) Act. These were passed in September, and they gave the Government the power to ban any organization if the Governor considered it to be derived from an already illegal organization, or if it had substantially the same office-bearers as an illegal organization. African fears that this would be used against Z.A.P.U., successor to the National Democratic Party which had been banned in 1961, were proved justified at the end of the month with the outlawing of Z.A.P.U. Amendments to the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act give the Government greater powers to act against individuals considered subversive or engaged in intimidation. To coincide with the banning of Z.A.P.U., Sir Edgar's Government issued a White Paper giving details of alleged cases of intimidation and violence by members of Z.A.P.U. against political opponents.

Clearly the situation had produced a high state of tension. A plea

in August from the leaders of five Churches to Sir Edgar and Mr Nkomo to come together and 'break the deadlock' was followed, on the contrary, by tougher intransigence on both sides. Outbreaks of arson and sabotage in August increased the tension; and in September the so-called 'Zimbabwe Liberation Army' surfaced with sets of leaflets signed by one 'General Chedu', calling for hatred of the white man and violence against his life and property. It scorned the Z.A.P.U. as too moderate. Asked to condemn both the acts of violence and their advocation by the 'Liberation Army', Mr Nkomo refused on the ground that to do so would imply accepting a degree of responsibility for them. Z.A.P.U. was banned two days later and its leaders, including Mr Nkomo, restricted.

It was against this background of unrest and incipient violence that the General Assembly again decided in October to debate Southern Rhodesia. On 11 October Sir Hugh Foot resigned his position as British representative on the Trusteeship Council, clearly, though not overtly, in protest against the British stand against any United Nations interest in Southern Rhodesia. The following day—12 October—the General Assembly adopted a resolution by 84 to 2 (South Africa and Portugal), with 11 abstentions, calling for the release of Mr Nkomo and his lieutenants, and the lifting of the ban on Z.A.P.U.

Thus the British Government finds itself, *faute de mieux*, ranged with Sir Edgar Whitehead and the Governments of South Africa and Portugal against an almost united General Assembly—and without having expressed any very definite views on the merits of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Sir Hugh's resignation highlights his Government's isolation. Despite Lord Home's assurances that British policy on Southern Rhodesia remains the same, the position is not relished. It would be surprising if some discreet pressure were not applied on the Southern Rhodesian Government for respectable concessions on the African franchise and/or African political organizations. To speak for Southern Rhodesia at the United Nations is no longer the sinecure it used to be.

Brazil: Democracy's Last Chance?

ONCE more, Brazilians have gone to the polls in a major election. Polling was exceptionally heavy, yet one cannot escape the impression that the voters turned out in great numbers prompted more by despair than by democratic enthusiasm.

Since August 1961, when President Janio Quadros abruptly resigned after barely eight months in office, Brazil has been virtually without a Government. For weeks after Senhor Quadros's resignation, the country was perilously near to civil war. The reason was that constitutionally he should have been succeeded by the Vice-President, Senhor João Goulart. Senhor Goulart, who was reared by the Vargas regime, was regarded with very deep suspicion, not only by the army, who had overthrown Vargas in 1945, but also by moderate Brazilians who considered him to be an opportunist far too involved with the extreme left-wing element in the country. His party, the Brazilian Labour Party, which was founded by Getulio Vargas, derived its main support from the more militant left wing in the unions. One of his nicknames, 'Little Perón', was an indication of what many Brazilians felt about some of his political attitudes. He has even been charged from time to time with more than merely courting the Communists. For the Conservatives of the extreme right, and the Church, the prospect of Senhor Goulart as President was purely and simply a national disaster.

Paradoxically, strong as the feelings were against Senhor Goulart, a great many Brazilians were even more appalled by what then seemed to be the inevitable alternative, a military takeover. While the bulk of the armed forces were strongly against Senhor Goulart as President, he did have a strong measure of support in the army, particularly in the garrisons of southern Brazil where he was born and reared. Another prospect which loomed, therefore, was a clash within the military itself. But Senhor Goulart had long nursed presidential ambitions and his strongest card now was the Brazilians' newly acquired and still fierce determination to defend their Constitution; and in Congress, even those members who had no wish to see him in office were even more determined to preserve the Constitution from being tampered with, particularly by the army. This, they feared, could well have led to an open or a behind-the-scenes military dictatorship such as existed, and still does, in Argentina. Brazilians, like most Latin Americans, have acquired from experience a distaste for soldiers in politics, even though, in Brazil, the

armed forces have acquired a sense of responsibility; and on occasions, when the politicians have been dangerously at loggerheads, they have exercised their stabilizing role effectively but with restraint. It was thanks to the army that Brazil did not disintegrate into civil war in August 1954. Then, the former dictator, Getulio Vargas, who had returned to power as an elected President, seeing his graft-ridden Government collapsing in a cloud of unsavoury dust, committed suicide.

Nevertheless, the crisis appeared insoluble. Here, it seemed, were all the ingredients of civil war including, for the first time in Brazil's history, an ideological factor, a real, head-on clash between the moderates and the right, and the extreme left. But Brazilians have qualities other than resilience to crises and a healthy distaste for violence. They have a peculiar adaptability and a genius for improvization and compromise which have been their salvation time and time again. Their solution this time was to amend the Constitution, which Congress did in September 1961, by introducing a parliamentary system of government. The considerable personal powers of the President were severely curtailed and greater power was apportioned between Congress and a Cabinet. It was a makeshift arrangement and it has not worked, for Congress has not been able to exercise effective control, as no single party had an overall majority. But it did avert what had seemed inevitable: the real prospect of civil war.

The election on 7 October 1962 of a new Chamber of Deputies, two-thirds of the Senate, ten of the twenty-two state governors, and a host of local state and provincial officials, was particularly important because the new Congress and Cabinet will reflect and act on the new political currents in the country which have emerged from this election. These are rather more leftish than they were, but, on the whole, still moderate. But more important still, it will be this new Congress and Cabinet which will preside over the referendum which has been called for 6 January 1963. Brazilians will then decide whether the parliamentary system of government should be continued, or whether the old presidential system should be restored. It seems likely that Brazilians will vote for the latter, for the simple reason that once again no party has any really decisive say in Congress and ordinary Brazilians have become thoroughly sickened with the ineffectual Government they have had for so long. Thus Senhor Goulart would have full powers of President bestowed on him, and his term of office is only due to expire on 31 January 1966.

In the circumstances it would seem that, politically, Brazil is back where she was in August 1961. To what extent the prospect of Senhor Goulart as President will reawaken all the old suspicions and conflicts is anybody's guess. It is likely that there will be a good deal of hard feelings in the army, in Congress, and among the right wing, and even among more moderate Brazilians. The feelings of ordinary Brazilians, however, are summed up very simply this way: they feel it is better to have a Government that can act, even if it means having Senhor João Goulart at the head of it, than have no Government at all. Furthermore, Brazilians are confident that not only will the army keep Senhor Goulart from committing any excesses: he himself, they hope, will have learnt from experience the nature and the strength of the forces which will be breathing down his neck. If Senhor Goulart and his more extreme followers have not learnt this lesson, then it is likely that the referendum of January next year may well spell the beginning of the end, for some time at least, of Brazil's democratic system.

To understand something of the confusion and apparent contradictions of Brazilian political thinking today, and why it is possible that the fate of their democracy may now be at stake, one does not have to go back very far into history. Ever since the reinstatement of democracy, after the overthrow of the first Vargas regime which had lasted from 1930 to 1945, politics and politicians have played an increasing and often a disruptive part in Brazilian life. Brazilians have a saying that their country progresses at night when the politicians are asleep. In the process of her political evolution since 1945 Brazil has experienced a succession of crises, and has had some hairbreadth escapes from being pushed off the road to democracy altogether. The political immaturity of the man in the street has also provided heaven-sent chances for demagogues and other opportunists to add to the confusion. Yet, contemplating this seemingly persistent atmosphere of political confusion, one comes to the conclusion that Brazilian nights must be very long indeed; for despite the political distractions and at times apparently crippling economic difficulties, the country has achieved a remarkable degree of material progress, particularly in the past two decades.

To compare Brazil today with what she was in the 'thirties is to see a completely different country. Even up to the end of the last war, Brazil was not only a backward agricultural country—almost every activity in the land had become geared directly or indirectly

to the growing and selling of coffee. Coffee earned Brazil a fortune, yet the country had one of the lowest standards of living in all Latin America.

After the end of the war, Brazil embarked on what to many onlookers seemed a presumptuously extravagant ambition to industrialize. Yet in not much more than ten years she succeeded in putting into motion the machinery of industrialization. In five years, between 1955 and 1960, her industrial output was more than doubled. Today she is self-sufficient in goods for which she was once entirely dependent on foreign suppliers, and is beginning to export her manufactures. In the shop windows of Chile and Argentina now you will see goods labelled 'made in Brazil' displayed alongside the products of Germany and England. Brazil is turning out a remarkably wide variety of goods that are increasingly high in quality. The expansion of her motor, electrical, heavy engineering, and steel industries has been prodigious. It can be argued that this industrialization has been too precipitous and consequently too great a strain on an economy which has never been properly balanced. Nevertheless, it is evidence of the energy and initiative of Brazilian private enterprise. Industrialization has also radically changed the conditions of life of many Brazilians, and their mentality. Yet in this vast country, almost the size of Canada but with only about 70 million people, there are still great areas where living conditions are pitifully low. Brazil has always been a country of oases of prosperity in deserts of poverty. The difference today is that the oases are infinitely larger than they were twenty years ago and they are growing larger all the time.

Politics, however, are still the greenfly of Brazil's economic growth. Brazilians recognize this, and their impatience with politicians and with Governments which have often sacrificed policies to politics culminated in the presidential election of 1960 which brought Janio Quadros to power.[1] A fierce independent, he began his campaign without any support from the traditional party machines, yet he won the largest majority any Brazilian President has ever had. He was also the first presidential candidate ever to beat the government machinery in an election. The symbol of his campaign was a broom with which he promised to sweep Brazil's economic, and particularly her political, house clean. Once in office, he began to wield his broom with devastating effect and even Brazilians who had not voted for him began to have the glowing

[1] See 'Brazil's New President', in *The World Today*, December 1960.

feeling that here was a man who was ignoring the politicians and getting things done. His proclaimed foreign policy, which was to transform Brazil into an independent Power, friendly but cautious in her relations with both the Eastern and the Western blocs but committed to neither, exactly matched the Brazilians' mood. They felt, and still do, that their country had become too involved with American policies and too dependent on American financing. Janio Quadros seemed to have all the qualifications which the Brazilians had been looking for in a President, including showmanship and a sense of humour, two qualities which delight Brazilians immensely. Yet eight months later, giving only the most confused reasons for his decision, he resigned. Brazilians had never felt quite so betrayed before.

I was in Brazil in 1961, just six months after Senhor Quadros had taken office and I could sense the atmosphere of purpose and great expectations all around me.[1] It was not just in the cities, the oases of prosperity. I found the same feelings in the interior and even in that traditionally distressed and forgotten region which has become the most socially explosive area in the country: the north-east. Brazilians did feel that at long last they had a President who, however unconventional and unpredictable, had the country's interests at heart and was determined not to be distracted by politicians or other interests.

I visited Brazil again almost exactly a year later. Senhor Quadros had resigned nine months before and the changed atmosphere, of bitterness and disillusionment, was as bewildering and frightening as a sudden violent storm at sea. It was this disillusionment, this feeling that a trust had been betrayed, that made the crisis which followed Senhor Quadros's resignation psychologically the worst that Brazil has ever experienced. Brazilians are remarkably resilient in crises. But what was specially dangerous about this one was that Senhor Quadros alleged that his efforts to bring about long-overdue social reforms were being systematically sabotaged by Congress; in short, by the politicians and the right-wing interests which dominated Congress. This was by no means wholly true. But as the weeks went by and Brazilians had time to reflect, they came to the conclusion that Senhor Quadros, or 'Janio', as he was known throughout the country, was perhaps right. The politicians had driven him out after all. They still felt that he had been cowardly to give in; in

[1] See 'Brazil: The Reawakening of the Giant', in *The World Today*, August 1961.

fact, Brazilians still refer to 25 August, the day Senhor Quadros resigned, as 'the day Janio ran away'.

In the months that followed, Brazil presented a depressing spectacle. Many of the measures which Senhor Quadros had introduced to clean up the administration and to control public spending were quietly dropped. His campaign to end corruption and abuses in the civil service was forgotten. Brazilians began to view the political confusion, the conflicts within Congress itself and between Congress and the President and the Cabinet, with apparent apathy. But under the surface, bitterness and resentment smouldered and swelled. On more than one occasion it seemed that these political polemics would explode in open conflict with, once again, the prospect of the army stepping in. Prime Ministers resigned: one did so within twenty-four hours of his appointment. Legislation remained pending, often because different factions in Congress refused to co-operate with each other lest any side should seem to gain even a moral victory. At other times, absenteeism was such that it was impossible to muster a quorum in the Chamber of Deputies.

All this time, Senhor Goulart, who had become known as 'the President with his hands tied behind his back', continued his struggle with Congress for a restoration of the presidential system as the only way to break the deadlock. His manœuvres were firmly resisted, but all these political comings and goings took up a great deal of time and the business of running the nation remained pigeon-holed. Responsible political leaders were in despair, for, not unnaturally, this turmoil was beginning seriously to affect not only the country's economic affairs but also her financial status abroad. Yet the polemics continued.

By the middle of this year a great many Brazilians had come to the conclusion that there would be no elections in October. They felt that it was almost inevitable now that the army would step in to put an end to this disorderly political cock-fight. Many of them had a sneaking feeling that perhaps it might be a good thing; even some sort of military government would be better than this. It was about this time too that a growing sympathy with Senhor Goulart's dilemma and his suggested solution—a return to the presidential system—became apparent in the country. He had proposed that the referendum on this issue should be held simultaneously with the elections of 7 October. As a compromise, Congress, after a great deal of heart-searching and sleepless nights, agreed that it should take place on 6 January. An uneasy peace was restored and on Sunday,

7 October, Brazilians went to the polls to elect the Congress which would prepare the nation for a decision which already seemed a foregone conclusion. Even some of Senhor Goulart's bitterest opponents had become reconciled to having him as President. After all, it seemed the only solution. The political crisis had not, however, been solved, merely postponed.

But another and more radical change is taking place in the political reasoning of a great many Brazilians. They are beginning to ask themselves if democracy such as they know it really works. For a people who have been so proud of their relatively new democratic system, and who have tried so hard to preserve it, it is an agonizing question. The reasons for it, however, are understandable. Looking back only seventeen years, they saw the overthrow of the Vargas dictatorial regime, to be replaced by the peaceful but ineffectual Government of General Gaspar Dutra. Five years later it was followed by the return of Getulio Vargas, this time as a freely elected President. His Government crashed in a tangle of political and other discredit. Vargas himself had become a legendary figure as the champion of the under-dog, a title he had earned very easily by giving Brazilians for the first time such basic rights as an annual holiday with pay and a limitation of their working hours, even though for a great many other Brazilians his regime had meant often ruthless persecution. When he committed suicide before his term was up, he, too, in a dramatic—although some might call it wicked—last letter to the country, blamed, among others, certain political factions in Congress for hampering his Government and for hounding him to his death.

The next elected Government was that of President Juscelino Kubitscheck, whose slogan was: 'Fifty years' progress in five'. Although during his five-year term in office Brazil's progress, particularly in industry, did take a leap ahead, it left the country on the verge of bankruptcy and stoked new fires of political strife.

Brazilians, looking back at all this, and yet seeing the degree of progress that they have achieved despite political mismanagement and what seems at times even sabotage, are beginning to ask themselves a still very tentative question. How much more might they not achieve, and how much quicker might they eradicate those dangerous pockets of poverty, if they had a really strong President not restricted by the constitutionally decreed five years of office or dependent for his effectiveness on the whims of ambitious foes, and even 'friends' in Congress?

Brazil does not have any real party system. The popularity of a party more often than not depends on the personal appeal of a few of its leaders rather than on its policies. At election times, parties split to support candidates with quite conflicting views but who seem to have more chances of success than the party's own candidates. One hope of the advocates of the parliamentary system was that it might take the overriding personality factor out of Brazilian politics. That system has not worked either.

Most Brazilians will assure you heatedly that they would spill their blood in the streets to fight any potential dictator. Yet they are beginning to contradict themselves. They want a Government that will give them a respite from inconclusive political cock-fighting so badly that they are even prepared to accept Senhor Goulart now with full presidential powers. Even eighteen months ago, had Janio Qadros, when his prestige was at its highest, been more patient, he might have rallied sufficient support in the country for what apparently was his aim: to restrict or even dissolve Congress and set up an authoritarian Government. He had argued, and still does, that a Government, unhampered by politicians, was not just a medicine but the surgery that Brazil needs. Many Brazilians, looking at the vast wealth of unrealized potentialities of their country, with progress apparently only possible at night when the politicians are asleep, are reluctantly beginning to agree with him.

Although the continuing disruptive political turmoil would seem to prove Senhor Quadros right, Brazilians have not forgiven him for trying to force his point in the way he did. They feel that he behaved just as irresponsibly as the politicians whom he had so often condemned. In this last election, Senhor Quadros, who stood for Governor of the State of São Paulo, suffered a humiliating defeat; it was his first election defeat in his political career. Brazilians today, in their impatience and disillusionment, are in a dangerous mood. Their feeling is that it is the politicians who have been digging democracy's grave. If, after next January's referendum, the political rough house continues, the army may be forced to intervene.

ANDREW MARSHALL

Nigeria Two Years After Independence

I. The Economic and Political Scene

TWO years after independence events are beginning to gather mo mentum in Nigeria. The first phase has passed, issues have crystal lized, and this giant among African States has begun to tense it muscles before taking its next step. The direction of that step ha now been indicated, but it is still uncertain whether or not it will b taken. The issues raised are so great, and their resolution so unpre dictable, that it is impossible at this stage to do anything other tha to state them as clearly as possible and to show how they are relate to our central theme, namely the National Plan for economic de velopment. This Plan, covering the period 1962–8, is the first of series, and it is hoped that at the end of the series, in perhap twenty years' time, the Federation of Nigeria will be at the poin of 'take-off', capable thenceforward of self-sustaining economi growth. The new States of Africa—like all other under-develope countries—have an enormous task in front of them, that of increas ing their own wealth and raising the standard of living of thei people. Those 'developed' countries which realize that their ow self-interest is inextricably linked with the dictates of humanit have begun to devote part of their resources (though as yet an in sufficient part) to helping this effort. What are the implications o this in the case of Nigeria?

PLANS FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The Nigerian National Plan for 1962–8, the first which co-ordi nates the efforts of all three Regions and the Federal Governmen envisages a total expenditure of nearly £1,200 million, and an in vestment of 15 per cent of the total national income every year. Th Federal and Regional Governments are to invest £676½ million finding half abroad and raising the other half inside the country. Th broad object is to maintain (or surpass) a yearly growth of 4 per cen in the gross domestic product. Put in rather more concrete terms the Federal part of the Plan will concentrate on providing the electri power essential for development (£68 million to be spent on th Niger Dam and its hydro-electric installations and £30 million o developing the national grid); developing agriculture and industr (including an expenditure of £30 million on an iron and steel 'com plex'); investment in education (£29 million) to meet future traine

manpower needs; and development of communications and transport (£35 million on roads and £20 million on railways). The Plan for the Western Region, with a capital cost of £90 million, is to devote a third of this to trade and industry, with £10 million for large-scale industries and £5 million for a Development Bank. Public works and transport are to absorb £17¾ million, education £12¾ million, land and housing £11¼ million, and natural resources £9½ million. Eastern priorities are different. Almost half of that Region's capital investment of £75 million is to be in agriculture, with only £13½ million devoted to industry and £8·9 million to transport. Education has been allotted £29 million, but part of this will have to be found outside the Plan. The Northern Plan, involving as it does about half the total population of the country, envisages capital costs of £98 million and a greatly enhanced importance attached to the Northern Region Development Corporation, through which will be channelled £32½ million, and which would be instrumental in setting up a Development Bank. The development of communications in this vast area would take up £22½ million, and education, in this the Region with the highest level of illiteracy, £29 million.

Such are the bare bones of the first National Plan. Its most notable feature, apart from its sheer magnitude in African terms, is its implications for the relations between the Federal Government and those of the Regions. Nigeria's constitutional history up to independence was above all the history of the development and application of the federal principle. The fundamental questions after independence must be: can the Federation last, and, if it does, will there be a change in the balance of power between the central Government and the Regions? The constitutional revision of 1954 marked a decisive step, when all powers, including those over primary education and agriculture, were given to the Regions, except for a definite list reserved to the centre and another which contained powers concurrent to all Governments. The Independence Constitution of 1960 marked another stage, since it enhanced the position of the Federal Government, at least by implication. This was, after all, now *the* Government of Nigeria, with exclusive powers in such important spheres as national defence and foreign affairs.

The publication of the National Plan in 1962 now enables us to see the powers of the centre growing, not by constitutional revision but by the logic of events and the implications of economic development. First of all, it is now possible to see how important it is that

the constitutional division of powers leaves the power to raise mone abroad almost completely in the hands of the Federal Governmen (Regional Governments may raise foreign loans, but only on th security of their own reserves, and for not more than a year at time.) It is the Federal Government which is to raise more tha £300 million abroad and allocate it to the Regions, and this has ob vious implications for their relative significance. Secondly, an again with regard to the allocation of resources, it is the Federa Government which collects much of the annual revenue and the hands it over to the Regions; about 60 per cent of Eastern revenue for example, comes from Federal sources. In the last few years ex port duties, which are entirely shared among the Regions, hav tended to yield less, and import duties, only 30 per cent of which g directly to the Regions, have yielded more. This has increased th relative economic strength of the centre. Thirdly, it must be re membered that under the new Plan the expenditure of the centra Government and its agencies is to be about £412 million, nearl two-thirds of the total; again this must increase its significance, bot within Nigeria and in the eyes of the outside world. Next, the centr can be seen extending its influence directly into the Regions. Certai of its projects, such as the Niger Dam at Kainji and the new Nationa Development Bank which is planned, will affect not only the Federa Government but the Regions as well. Economic development doe not respect constitutional delimitations, and the Federal dam can not be prevented (even if the North wanted to do so) from creatin an artificial lake and a fishing industry in that Region, or from givin work to many Northerners. An even more direct extension of influ ence are the Federal grants being made for what constitutionally ar Regional matters: £25 million to agriculture, £3 million for North ern primary education, nearly £2 million for special new 'National High Schools' in each Region, and £4 million to the new Regiona universities. Lastly, the Banking Amendment Act of 1962 gives th Central Bank new powers to control the liquidity ratios of the com mercial banks, whose deposits have risen from £46½ million in 195 to almost £77 million in 1961. This in turn means that Federal control over credit is much extended, thus giving indirect control over the Marketing Boards which buy the cash-crops from the producers, and the prices they set each season. It remains to be seen to what extent and in what ways the Federal Government will choose to exert this new control. However, the assumption of such control is further indication of the trend towards increased

central power, which is bound to follow the adoption of large-scale schemes for economic development based to a considerable extent upon money raised abroad.

POLITICAL ISSUES

Other less obviously economic factors will affect relations between the centre and the Regions. An element of uncertainty is introduced by the fact that since the elections of December 1959 the Federal Government has been a coalition between the Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.) and the National Convention of Nigerian Citizens (N.C.N.C.—formerly the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons). It is a matter for some surprise that the N.P.C., the ruling party in the North, should have worked so closely and so long with the N.C.N.C., which controls the Eastern Region. The N.P.C., led by the Sardauna of Sokoto, has since 1951 derived its main strength from the support of the emirs and traditional aristocracy of the ancient states of the far North, though it has also gained the support of most of the newly educated classes and of leading figures among the peoples of the 'Middle Belt' area of the North. Though in no way opposed to change as such, the N.P.C. does not at first sight appear to be the sort of ally which would appeal to the N.C.N.C., the old nationalist party led by Dr Azikiwe, before he became Governor-General of independent Nigeria, and now led by the equally modern-minded Dr M. I. Okpara. The continuing coalition between the two parties at a Federal level probably bears witness to two things; firstly, the essentially pragmatic approach of Nigerian politicians, concerned with power rather than with ideology; and secondly, the closeness of the personal relationship between N.C.N.C. Federal Ministers like Chief Festus Okotie Eboh and N.P.C. ones like Alhaji Inuwa Wada.

It will be of crucial importance to the Nigerians, as well as of enormous interest to outsiders, to see whether or not these allies can implement their ambitious plans for development over the next six years without quarrels over their different Regional interests. Grumblings about 'Northern domination' are sometimes heard among N.C.N.C. backbenchers, and in November 1961 an N.P.C. Whip in the Federal House launched a bitter attack, which was not however followed up, upon Jaja Wachuku, the N.C.N.C. Foreign Minister. The N.P.C., which after the 1959 election had, together with its allies, 148 seats in the Federal House of Representatives out of a total of 312, now has a slight overall majority as a result of by-

elections and other changes. Though it has shown no sign of wishing to rule the Federation alone, any injudicious moves on its part could precipitate a quarrel with the N.C.N.C. If, as seems probable, the N.P.C.'s main interest in power at a Federal level is to make sure that nothing is done in Lagos which might harm what its leaders consider to be the North's special interests, then, in the context of the National Plan, questions of Regional development might precipitate a Federal crisis. The days are long past when the North threatened secession from the Federation because of its fear of the South. With every year of the Plan the secession of any Region will appear less likely, as the three Regional economies are integrated into a national one. If secession ever becomes a live issue again, however, it may very well be because it is threatened by either or both of the two southern Regions, disgruntled because the N.P.C. appears to be using its dominant Federal position to favour the North over the other Regions. On the other hand, continued Federal power may have an interesting effect on the N.P.C., for some of its leaders may become more concerned with Federal issues than with Northern. The Sardauna has so far resisted all suggestions that the N.P.C. should change its policy of officially restricting its membership to Northerners. Nevertheless, there are N.P.C. Federal Ministers who are not Fulani and not as devoted to the memory of the empire of his ancestor Uthman dan Fodio as he is.

There are two other political issues which may affect relations between the Federal and Regional Governments and should therefore be mentioned briefly. These are the issue of the creation of a Mid-West state, a fourth Region to be carved out of the West, and the adoption of a new republican Constitution for the Federation of Nigeria. The Mid-West state, the main plank in the platform both of the Action Group and of the N.C.N.C. in the area in 1959, has now become a bone of contention between them, since their definitions of its boundaries differ and the Action Group Government of the West feared that the whole effort of the N.C.N.C. and N.P.C. to create the new Region, most recently renewed in March this year, was a subtle way of menacing their control of the Western Region. The issue has now been somewhat submerged by the political crisis in the West, as has the issue of the transition to a republic. There is considerable popular feeling that it is not consonant with the dignity of an independent nation to have as its Head of State a foreign Queen, but the main debate as to what kind of republic would be best is yet to come. In July Alhaji Sir Abubakar Tafawa

Balewa promised that his Federal Government would shortly publish a White Paper on the subject, but at the time of writing it had not yet appeared. This may very well prove to be another issue which could cause dispute between the N.P.C. and the N.C.N.C.

These are relatively long-term issues, and until May of this year a crisis in relations between the Regions appeared to be somewhat remote. Indeed, the very fact that, after keen bargaining, all four Governments had been able to agree on a National Plan for development seemed to augur well. In May, however, the whole political position changed dramatically, and in a way which makes it very difficult to tell at present what will be the outcome. Towards the end of May the Action Group, which had controlled the West since 1951 but had since February been showing signs of internal stress, finally split into two factions. The leader of one faction was Chief S. L. Akintola, who had become Premier of the West at the end of 1959 when Chief Obafemi Awolowo, the Action Group's Federal President, moved to Lagos to become Leader of the Opposition in the Federal House of Representatives. The Governor of the West, the Oni of Ife, a senior Yoruba chief, dismissed Chief Akintola, an action which the Federal Supreme Court has since decided was unconstitutional, and Chief Awolowo's faction of the party, which controlled the central executive and nearly all the Action Group Members of the Western House of Assembly, nominated another Premier. When the House of Assembly met on 25 May, however, disturbances broke out in the House, and the Members had to be dispersed by the police, who used tear-gas. The Federal Government stepped in, and used its constitutional powers to declare a state of emergency in the West on 29 May. The Action Group Government was dissolved and a Federal Minister appointed as Administrator, assisted by Commissioners responsible for the various portfolios. Chiefs Awolowo and Akintola (the latter having been expelled from the Action Group and forming the 'United People's Party') and many of their supporters were placed under house arrest, many of them far from their homes. Leading members of the N.C.N.C., the opposition party in the West, were also detained. It was announced that the state of emergency would last until the end of the year, when new Regional elections would be held.

The implications of all this are enormous. First of all, the intervention by the Federal Government represents a powerful assertion of the overriding power of the centre over the Regions. The Federal Government had powers under the Constitution and chose

to use them, albeit on a pretext which the supporters of Chief Awolowo hold to be flimsy. Henceforward the Regions cannot be regarded as strongholds of the different political parties, retained by them even if defeated in a bid for power at the Federal level. The decisive action of Sir Abubakar's central Government demonstrated in one dramatic stroke on the political level what we have already seen to be happening slowly on the economic level, namely that in the Federation of Nigeria the future pattern is almost certain to be a gradual increase of the power of the Federal Government at the expense of the Regions. Secondly, the events of May 1962 destroyed, probably for ever, the political pattern which had prevailed in Nigeria for over ten years, the control of one Region by each of the three major parties, which then used it as a base to try to win power at the centre. Paradoxically perhaps, it was the Action Group itself which had previously sought to disrupt this balance by campaigning (particularly in the period 1957–9) for the creation of at least three new states, one to be carved out of each Region. Now that party, by its internal quarrels, has given its opponents a perfect opportunity to assert their legal power in a way which would seriously damage it. If the N.C.N.C. and the new U.P.P. come to an agreement not to split the anti-Action Group vote by both opposing it in the same constituency in the forthcoming election, as seems likely, then there is a very good chance that the Action Group will be defeated and an N.C.N.C.–U.P.P. coalition Regional Government formed. It is most unlikely that the Action Group would ever recover from such a defeat. The balance of parties which has been the most important single feature of Nigerian politics since the first elections in 1951 would be destroyed and the N.P.C. and N.C.N.C., at present allies, would be left face to face without their mutual dislike of the Action Group to bind them together. Thus further strain would be thrown upon the coalition Federal Government.

If the Action Group is destroyed as a political force in Nigeria, the next Federal election, due to be held by the beginning of 1965, will be more than usually interesting. There is little doubt that the N.P.C. will win the vast majority of the Northern seats; in the Regional election of May 1961 it won 160 seats out of the total of 170. There is also little doubt that the N.C.N.C. would win a majority in the East; in November 1961 it won 106 seats out of 146, the Opposition in fact doing rather better than before. The Action Group won 15 seats, the Dynamic Party 5, and the other 20 went to rebel N.C.N.C. 'Independents'. Everything would depend on the West,

where the N.C.N.C. might reasonably be expected to win a majority if the Action Group was sufficiently demoralized, with the U.P.P. getting some seats. Here a further factor of uncertainty intrudes. With the present delimitation of constituencies the N.P.C. could, indeed probably would, get an overall majority by winning seats in the North alone. If its alliance with the N.C.N.C. had lasted until this new Federal election, it would probably renew it and form another coalition Federal Government. If the two had quarrelled the N.P.C. might seek to form the Government merely with the aid of a few small allies in the South. An N.C.N.C. which controlled both southern Regions would bitterly resent this, and the future of the Federation might be thrown into real jeopardy.

However, the present delimitation of constituencies may not prevail by the time of the next Federal election. The preliminary returns of the census made earlier this year indicate that the superiority in population of the North over the rest of the country combined may not be as great as was previously thought. Indeed, the North may prove not to have more than half the population of Nigeria, and it would therefore lose its claim to more than half the Federal constituencies. The power of the N.P.C. would thus be reduced and that of the N.C.N.C. correspondingly increased; it would be interesting to see whether the N.P.C. leaders would lose interest in the Federal Government under these circumstances and seek to restrict their activities to the North alone. Alternatively, the N.P.C. might be forced for the first time to extend its activities and membership in a decisive manner into the South, and seek to win seats there in its own name. In other words, the stage would have been set for the battle suggested earlier between 'Federal'- and 'Regional'-minded factions in the N.P.C.

It was this very issue which largely contributed to the possibly fatal split within the Action Group. Up to the time of the Federal election of December 1959 that party had displayed a great capacity for collective leadership and strong discipline. Its failure to win a majority in that election, despite its confident expectations, led to a quarrel, first openly manifesting itself at the Party Congress at Jos in February this year, between those led by Chief Awolowo who wished to continue the struggle for Federal power, and those led by Chief Akintola who wanted to give up all hope of such a victory and concentrate on maintaining Action Group control of the West. Chief Rosiji, Federal Secretary of the party until he was replaced by one of Chief Awolowo's supporters at the Jos Congress, in fact sug-

gested at one point that each of the major parties should continue to hold its own Region, but that all three should come together at the centre to form a national party and Government. On a number of occasions, however, Dr Okpara, the N.C.N.C. President, has stated that his party would never countenance the admission of Action Group Ministers into the Federal Cabinet.

DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ACTION GROUP

The first division within the Action Group was thus one between those like Chiefs Akintola and Rosiji, who might be called the 'Regionalists', and Chief Awolowo and his supporters, who might in contrast be labelled the 'Federalists'. The former found support among some of the Western Ministers and traditional rulers and also among the richer men who had been backing the party and now felt that their 'investment' in the 1959 election had been wasted. Not surprisingly Chief Awolowo was supported not only by many Westerners but also by leaders of the party from outside that Region whose future lay with its activity in Federal politics—men like J. S. Tarka, leader of the Tiv people, who provided seven of the nine Action Group seats in the Northern House of Assembly, or S. Ikoku, Leader of the Opposition in the Eastern House.

The second division within the party was linked to the first but was more 'ideological' in character. On Independence Day, 1 October 1960, the Action Group had published a new manifesto, entitled *Democratic Socialism*. This represented an attempt by Chief Awolowo and his supporters to provide the party with a programme, which analysed Nigerian society on class lines and made suggestions for future reforms centred upon public ownership. There can be no doubt that these suggestions alarmed the more conservative members of the party, despite an assurance by Chief Awolowo that the interests of Nigerian business men would not be threatened. There can also be no doubt that the enthusiasm of the younger members of the party was roused by this new programme, which was designed to meet the changing economic and social conditions in Nigeria after independence. This group triumphed at the Jos Congress: S. Ikoku became Federal Secretary in place of Rosiji, and Bola Ige, a young lawyer who had returned from his studies abroad less than a year earlier, became Federal Publicity Secretary. Their triumph was cut short by the declaration of a state of emergency in the West; Ikoku is now in voluntary exile in Ghana and Ige was one of those detained.

The third schism within the Action Group, and again one which was inextricably linked with the others, was the personal rivalry between Chief Awolowo and Chief Akintola. Close political associates for more than twelve years, Chief Akintola was the obvious choice as Premier of the West when Chief Awolowo went to Lagos to lead the Federal Opposition. Once the two most influential leaders of the party were separated, however, disputes between them began. It would appear that Chief Awolowo wished to retain some control over the policies of the Western Government and that this, perhaps not unnaturally, was resented by Chief Akintola. Indeed, the final crisis in May this year was apparently precipitated by the latter's attempts to replace officials of various government agencies with men whom he regarded as his supporters, the incumbents having been appointed during Chief Awolowo's term of office.

At the time of writing, the Coker Commission appointed by the Federal Government is holding an inquiry into the conduct of the affairs of the different government Boards in the Western Region. It is too early as yet to anticipate the findings of the Commission, but it is obvious that, during its ten years' control of the West, the Action Group made little attempt to preserve a strict division between its own funds, government funds, and those of party supporters. (It is only fair to point out that, as in many other countries, such a distinction is not really recognized in practice by most politicians in Nigeria and that this observation could probably be applied with equal truth to the other major parties in their Regions.) The new Administrator for the West announced in August that it had become apparent to him in June that, unless immediate action was taken, the wages and salaries of government employees could not be paid or completed contracts honoured. A serious financial crisis was imminent, and a deficit of at least £9·1 million was to be expected at the end of the financial year. Since February 1961 the Western Government had consistently inflated the balance of its Capital Account and its investments by £6·4 million. When we add to this the evidence given to the Coker Commission by the Chief Accountant of the Western Marketing Board that it had an accrued interest of £1·3 million owed to it which had been left outstanding, it can be seen that the finances of the West, potentially the richest Region, are in a somewhat precarious state. The Western part of the National Plan can thus be seen to be in danger. The crisis in the West has not only changed the political balance of the relations between the centre and the Regions, it also looks like jeopardizing the Plan which is in-

tended to initiate real economic and social progress throughout Nigeria.

The present situation is therefore somewhat paradoxical. On the one hand, the power of the central Government appears to be increasing, mainly for economic reasons but also because of its swift action in the West. On the other hand, the crisis in the West, the issue of the transition to a republic, the Mid-West question, and the possibility of renewed North–South rivalry all cast doubts on Nigeria's future. In a second article an attempt will be made to describe certain issues which underlie not only the National Plan but also all the questions raised above, and which will be of vital importance in the future, and also to put Nigeria into her international setting.

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U.N. Action for Peace

I. Barrier Forces

THE endeavour of the United Nations to encourage and facilitate peaceful international relations has often found expression in the establishment of U.N. 'presences'. Forces designed to 'hold' a situation may be regarded as one species of these. In common with other presences, holding forces have two important characteristics: in the first place they go to States only after having received their permission; and, secondly, they are not dispatched with the object of fighting, even defensively, against States hostile to their hosts. Hence the U.N. force which from 1950 to 1953 fought in Korea in a successful attempt to check North Korean aggression against South Korea is not to be regarded as a holding force. Holding forces are, however, composed of troops, and this distinguishes them from the kinds of U.N. presence which are not military in their make-up, such as the U.N. Mediator for Palestine, who was appointed in May 1948 and, after his assassination in September of that year, was succeeded for a year by an Acting Mediator, and the U.N. Observation Group in the Lebanon, which, during the latter

part of 1958, had the task of ensuring that there was no illegal infiltration of personnel or arms across the Lebanon's borders.

The U.N. has so far established three holding forces, each of which is still in being. The requests for each of them arose out of quite different situations, but, when classified according to the nature of their immediate tasks, the forces fall into two categories: the first comprises those forces whose function is to erect themselves as a barrier between two States—barrier forces; and the second those whose job has to do with the keeping of order within a State or territory—law and order forces. This article will examine, with particular reference to the single barrier force which has so far been established, the potentialities of this kind of U.N. holding force. A second article (to appear in the December issue) will discuss holding forces of the law and order type.

BARRIER FORCES

The attack on Egypt by Israel, France, and Britain in the last days of October 1956 was the situation which gave rise to the U.N.'s first holding force. By a resolution of the General Assembly's first emergency special session, adopted on 5 November, it was decided that a United Nations Emergency Force (Unef) should be set up to 'secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities', and, a cease-fire and the consent of Egypt having been obtained, the Force began to arrive in Egypt on 15 November. At first it was made up of about 6,000 troops drawn from ten countries, but for the past three years the number of contributing countries has been seven and the strength of the Force nearer 5,000.[1] Since the withdrawal of the last invading troops in March 1957 Unef has deployed its men along the Egyptian side (Israel has refused to have them on her side) of the Egypt–Israel border, hoping that the erection of this human but neutral barrier will prevent a resumption of hostilities.

Relative peace and quiet has prevailed along the border during the six years of Unef's presence, and it has probably contributed to this result in three ways. In the first place, there has been a reduction in both the number and seriousness of frontier incidents, and this may plausibly be attributed to the fact that the whole length of the frontier has been under almost constant observation by Unef. Hence the danger of war being provoked has been much lessened.

[1] At 31 July 1962 these were, in decreasing order of magnitude of their contingents: India, Canada, Yugoslavia, Brazil, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden: see U.N. Doc. No. A/5172.

Secondly, if either side has been of a mind to invade the other the presence of Unef must have been among the factors which made it decide that this would not be a wise course. Unef is not a barrier which it would be very hard to remove or scale, for, quite apart from its small size, it is not intended to be, and is therefore not equipped as, a combat force. But, as it represents the U.N., its violation would have unwelcome repercussions, which might be all the more ominous because of their uncertain nature: condemnatory resolutions would almost certainly follow; a number of U.N. members might break off diplomatic relations with the aggressor; some might organize an economic boycott; and others might even give military assistance to the attacked State. Thus the deterrent strength of Unef is probably greater than its physical strength alone suggests. Thirdly, its presence is a *prima facie* indication that the current intent of both Egypt and Israel is peaceful, and by giving rise to this impression the Force may have helped in keeping tension at a relatively low level, without necessarily or apparently reducing the fundamental antipathy between the two sides.

It does not follow, however, that Unef has been, as the Acting Secretary-General of the U.N. has recently claimed,[1] 'the decisive influence in the maintenance of' peace. That Unef has remained on the Egypt–Israel border for so long is probably more a reflection than a cause of the absence of high tension. Should either side decide that its interests would be served by taking a stronger line with its adversary, perhaps with a view to provoking or initiating war, it is quite probable that Unef would not remain on the scene for long. It might well be advised, asked, or told to leave, and whatever might be argued regarding the impropriety in law of such a demand by Egypt and the complete legal irrelevance of any such communication from Israel, it is unlikely that the hint or order would fail to be taken. Even if the Force was not withdrawn as a whole by the U.N., the States whose contingents make it up, not having any very important interest in its staying in Egypt, would probably withdraw their men so as to avoid the possibility of a loss of life. If, surprisingly, these circumstances did not lead to the departure of the Force, or if one side wished to attack without giving, in effect, notice of its intention, the physical strength of Unef would be no deterrent to a renewal of the conflict, and its symbolic strength, as representative of the world Organization, probably an inadequate one. In so far as

[1] In his report on Unef to the seventeenth session of the General Assembly: U.N. Doc. No. A/5172.

they have been tempted to think of settling accounts by a resort to force, both sides have probably been restrained by calculations other than those which arise from the presence of a barrier force: Egypt chiefly by the fear that she might be unsuccessful, and Israel by the knowledge that if she did embark on another invasion she would this time have to do without Anglo-French assistance and would be as likely as in 1956 to incur the wrath of both the Soviet Union and the United States, not to mention that of the surrounding Arab States. Unef has been more of a deterrent to frontier incidents than to a direct attack. But even if it had not been on the frontier since 1956 there might still have been fewer incidents, and greater forbearance, than before that date on account of a recognition by both sides that it would be imprudent to risk a war.

It therefore seems that large claims for the prophylactic qualities of Unef are out of place. Egypt and Israel have remained the major operators on the local scene, and it can be more confidently said that Unef has helped them to implement their disposition to live, for the time being at least, in peace, than that it has caused them to be so disposed.

In other tense border situations U.N. holding forces of the barrier type might be as valuable as Unef has been. But it is not likely that peace will often be threatened or breached in a manner which permits of the dispatch of such a force. A number of States are unlikely to ask for them: great Powers, for example. That Unef was allowed to go to Egypt at all was not just a consequence of that country's permission. The other warring participants in Egypt, particularly Britain and France, also had to agree. They did so, but it is not often that Powers of some consequence, having gone forth to war, will cry halt and then withdraw to make way for a U.N. para-military force whose objects are almost sure to be very different from those with which they went into battle. Had it, for example, been suggested to India in December 1961 that she leave Goa and receive protection from provocative Portuguese acts by the stationing of a U.N. force around the sea and land frontiers of the colony, it is no more likely that the proposal would have found favour than that the Soviet Union, five years earlier, would have withdrawn her troops from Hungary if she had been offered a face-saver in the shape of a U.N. holding force of the Unef type to patrol Hungarian borders. These were cases as was, at first, the Anglo-French expedition to Suez, where the Powers concerned thought that the only way their interests could be protected was by the exercise of their superior

military strength. In such circumstances, the interruption of the act by second thoughts is, and probably will remain, an unusual event.

It is also highly improbable that a U.N. barrier force will play a significant role in situations where at present the forces of East and West confront each other across international frontiers. Any inclination which either side might feel to violate the other's territory is already deterred to the maximum possible military extent by the strength of each, and neither is of the view that it would be additionally secure if a few thousand U.N. troops were strung out between it and its enemy. Nor is there any evidence to suggest that either side thinks that an accidental war might be averted if a U.N. force was on the spot to try to sit on the spiral. If East and West agreed that foreign troops should be withdrawn from central Europe the U.N. might be asked to patrol the borders of the disengaged zone. But there seems no immediate likelihood of any such agreement being reached, and if it were, it is more probable that supervision by bloc representatives, perhaps with a neutral chairman, would be preferred. There remains, in this context, the possibility that a U.N. force might play a part in Berlin. Mr Khrushchev has recently[1] returned to the Soviet proposal that in exchange for Western withdrawal from West Berlin, U.N. troops, drawn from non-N.A.T.O. countries, could be temporarily stationed there in order to allay doubts about the security of the city's freedom in the absence of Western forces. The West would regard this as a very bad bargain indeed—as little, if anything, short of a retreat—and therefore, in the present political climate, there seems no likelihood of an agreement being reached along these lines.

Nor is it likely that a State which regards itself as a friend of a great Power would ask the U.N. if it could have a barrier force, were it in need of assistance to bolster up its borders against a threat from a State unfriendly to it and its powerful friend. Such a force would be considered, for all its symbolic strength, as much weaker than a detachment from the great Power, and therefore the request for help would first be made to the latter. What would be wanted would not be a neutral, non-combatant force, but one prepared, if necessary, to fight with a fair prospect of success in defence of the host country. Hence in 1958, when Lebanon felt a need of help to preserve her independence, she asked not that the U.N. Observer Group, then in the country, be supplemented by a U.N. barrier force, but that the United States give her assistance. Iraq's demands

[1] See *The Times*, 20 August 1962.

on the newly independent Kuwait in June 1961 led to the prompt arrival of a British, and not a U.N., force; and when it withdrew in the following October it was an Arab, not a U.N., force which took its place. Likewise, this year it was U.S., and not U.N., troops who were successfully sought by Siam when Pathet Lao forces had advanced close to the Siamese frontiers.

There seems little likelihood that, presented with requests of this nature, great Powers will get into the habit of passing them on to the U.N. for attention. That course, even if it led to the receipt of any assistance, would not produce the sort of force which either the suppliant State or its great Power friend would want to see, and would also give the appearance of physical and moral weakness on the part of the great Power concerned, which would have adverse repercussions on its relationships with its other friends. It is also highly unlikely that either of the two major Powers, for reasons stemming from the reluctance of each to have its bloc's internal problems discussed in and dealt with by the U.N., would be willing to approve the use of holding forces of the barrier type to facilitate the settlement of disputes which might arise among their allies.

There remain, however, plenty of situations in which one of the States involved would be glad to ask for a U.N. barrier force. But it should not be assumed that any request of this nature would necessarily meet with a positive response from the U.N. Such an answer would be most probable if all the parties whose frontiers were involved agreed that the presence on them of a U.N. barrier force would be beneficial. But even in these auspicious circumstances the practical obstacles lying between the decision to send such a force and its dispatch might not be insignificant. In the first place, obtaining the requisite number of troops of the right sort might not be easy. The practice adopted in the formation of Unef of not including contingents from the permanent members of the Security Council would probably be followed in future, and it would also be prudent to take account, as was done in 1956, of any objections which the host country or countries might have to the inclusion of troops of particular nationalities. Further, contingents which would be welcome might not be made available by their Governments. Even if these difficulties were overcome, the force would still have to be transported to its destination, and paid for. The financial problem, in particular, would probably not be disposed of easily. With the unfortunate monetary aspects of its ac-

tivities in Egypt and the Congo in mind,[1] the U.N. might, before embarking on any future holding operations, wish to obtain a financial guarantee so as to avoid bankruptcy and/or inglorious withdrawal. Such a guarantee might well, however, be difficult to secure.

Much more likely than agreement between the parties to a dispute that it would be beneficial for them to be separated by a U.N. barrier—the U.N.'s problem then being primarily a practical rather than a policy one—is the case of the parties not so agreeing and the request for a holding force coming from only one party, the weaker, with the other disputant questioning the alleged need for it. This difference of opinion would inevitably be reflected in the U.N., with the result that the practical difficulties of establishing such a force might never be reached because of stultifying disagreement over policy. It might be that the objecting party would be very much in the minority and deem it wise to accept the will of the majority. Israel, in 1956, was not happy about the dispatch of Unef to Egypt, and was the last of the three invaders to withdraw her forces, only doing so after considerable pressure had been brought to bear on her, particularly by the United States. But a State which is strongly opposed to the proposal that a barrier force be sent to the far side of one of its frontiers is in most circumstances unlikely to find that its objections carry as little weight as did those of Israel in 1956 and 1957. It is quite probable that such a State would be able to obtain sufficient support in the U.N. to ensure that the resolution embodying the proposal was not adopted: it might fail to gain the necessary seven votes in the Security Council; or, if it did, this majority might be frustrated by a veto; or, if the resolution was put to the General Assembly, or transferred to it from the Security Council in consequence of a veto, it might be opposed by at least a third of the States who participated in the vote.

Any one or more of a variety of reasons might endow an objecting State with a vote-gathering capacity which is adequate to bring about this result. In the first place, some U.N. members—having regard to the possibility that at a future date it might be used

[1] At 31 August 1962, 27 per cent of the 1957 Unef assessments were still outstanding, as well as about the same percentage of each of the following four years' assessments, making a total of approximately U.S. $25 million; at the same date 39 per cent of the 1960 Congo assessments and 33 per cent of those for 1961 were also unpaid, a total of approximately U.S. $51 million: see U.N. Doc. No. ST/ADM/SER.B/163/Rev. 1. These arrears are almost as large as the Organization's regular budget (which does not include the holding force accounts) for 1962, which amounts to approximately U.S. $82 million.

against them—might not wish the Organization to establish a firm precedent in favour of the dispatch of a barrier force in circumstances in which this action amounted to supporting one disputant against the other. Secondly, if the appellant State was a colonial Power, appealing in that capacity, or a State wedded to unpopular racial doctrines, many States would not wish to see it given aid and support and would approve instead the policy which led it to feel threatened. Had, for example, Portugal sought such a force for Goa last year, India's objections would surely have been upheld. Thirdly, if a dispute has any smell of the cold war about it, this would mean that the objecting party would not be without support. Laos, in September 1959, asked for a U.N. emergency force to check the alleged infiltration of North Vietnamese troops, but the ideological affiliation of the other party resulted in Laos obtaining only a committee of inquiry, and she was lucky to get that. This committee reported that North Vietnam had been encouraging and assisting dissident Lao elements, but this did not produce proposals for the dispatch of a barrier force: a visit from the Secretary-General was the maximum extent of the U.N.'s further activity. Even a dispute among uncommitted States might have, or be given, some cold-war colouring, with the consequence that the objecting party would by no means be isolated. In the fourth place, the influence of the objector (or that of its supporters), or the fact of its membership in a regional grouping, might be expected to lead some States to sustain its objection. If Pakistan asked the U.N. for a barrier force to patrol part of the border she shares with India—in Kashmir, say—India would probably be able to persuade a number of her Afro-Asian friends that the request was misconceived. Or, had the precedent of Unef been available in 1954 and been appealed to by Guatemala when she complained of aggression by Honduras and Nicaragua, it would not have been at all likely to have been followed, for the United States, the home of the 'foreign monopolies' which were alleged by Guatemala to have instigated the attack, would have marshalled adequate support for her certain opposition to such a proposal. A fifth and final consideration militating against the dispatch of barrier forces would be the fact that, in many contentious situations, they could by no means be counted upon to carry sufficient deterrent power to achieve their purpose. This is the factor which would probably carry a good deal of weight at the U.N. Many members would think that there would be no point in organizing a barrier force if there was little expectation that its

presence would prevent a recourse to war, or even if there were some danger of the enterprise being unsuccessful. Refusal in such a situation would be justified not only as the prudent course, but also as the one which best served the long-term interests of the U.N. For, it would be argued, if the U.N. wished to prosper it would be wise for it not to invite a reverse, particularly the sort of reverse which might involve loss of life. This view would surely be held with especial vigour by those who might be asked to make up the force, and this would decrease still further the likelihood of a decision being taken in favour of dispatching a force to a situation in which war was threatening. Moreover, if fighting had broken out, there would be no question of sending a holding force until at least a cease-fire agreement had been reached.

The potentialities of the barrier type of U.N. holding force are not, therefore, very impressive. Such forces may sometimes be able to make a useful or valuable contribution of a limited character towards assisting quarrelsome neighbours to live in peace. But as they cannot by their very nature inspire much confidence as a deterrent to aggression, they will usually be asked for only when a more substantial barrier cannot be obtained. They will therefore generally be second-best expedients sought by States who are disputing from second-best positions, and the strength of the opposite party to the dispute is likely to be demonstrated not only in its not needing such a force on its side of the frontier but also in its ability to dissuade the U.N. from agreeing to its rival's request. It is in any event likely that the preparedness of the U.N. to send a barrier force will be in inverse proportion to the imminence of the threat to peace or the magnitude of the State alleged to be threatening it. This is a consequence of the fact that such forces are not designed to hold frontiers by fighting invaders but simply to mark them with men, men whose principal armour consists of a modern and as yet unestablished talisman, the U.N. badge.

ALAN JAMES

The West Indies: A Kaleidoscope of Territories

FROM the time of its discovery by Columbus the Caribbean area has been of great importance to Europe. For the Spaniards its fortresses commanded the approaches to Spanish America and were the basis of their grip on the New World; for the English, French, and Dutch it represented the challenge of entry into El Dorado. In its waters part of the eighteenth-century struggle for colonial power was decided. The strategic importance of the Caribbean in the past may be measured by the great bases at Havana, San Juan, Port Royal, Curaçao, and, later, English Harbour.

After the colonial hold of France and Spain had been loosened, the United States came in to stake strategic claims in Puerto Rico and the Panama Canal. The importance of the West Indies in the second World War can be measured by the string of American bases from Atkinson Field in British Guiana northwards through the islands. The continuing, if diminished, United States base rights at Chaguaramas and other Antillean points have been the subject of recent negotiations. The impact of a Communist revolution in Cuba has driven home to every American the proximity of that island to the United States, and the fear of a possible extension of Communism is ever present to American statesmen. Events in Venezuela and British Guiana today receive a measure of publicity which at one time would have seemed incredible.

Nationalist feeling began to gain force in the Caribbean area after the disturbances in the years immediately preceding the second World War. The European colonial Powers have met the challenge in varying ways. For Britain the traditional solution of establishing a Dominion within the Commonwealth incorporating all the British territories was frustrated, however, by the reluctance of British Guiana and British Honduras to enter, and of Jamaica and Trinidad to remain within, the West Indies Federation.[1] The rapid rise and collapse of the West Indies Federation has been the most significant recent event in the Caribbean area. At a time when other countries are moving into large, closely knit blocs, as may be seen in Europe and in embryonic form in Central America, separate new nations are emerging in the Caribbean following the fragmentation of the

[1] See 'The Failure of the West Indies Federation', in *The World Today*, June 1962.

West Indies Federation. Jamaica and Trinidad have achieved independence; Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands appear to be following the same path; likewise British Guiana and British Honduras. As Lord Hailes pointed out in his farewell broadcast as Governor-General,[1] the dissolution of the West Indies Federation cannot be the end of the story. Yet the position is a delicate one for Great Britain. If further moves towards some form of closer association of the British territories are to be made, they must originate within the territories themselves.[2] Dr Eric Williams, the Premier of Trinidad, has suggested the inevitability of the 'Little Eight'—Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands—joining Trinidad in a unitary State,[3] notwithstanding their present reluctance. He has been active in commercial approaches to Venezuela and Surinam (Dutch Guiana).[4] Premier Cheddi Jagan of British Guiana clearly is conscious of the importance of his country's role in the British Commonwealth and also in association with South America.

In the Dutch territories a different political solution has been found. In December 1954 Queen Juliana of the Netherlands promulgated the Statute of the Realm, which granted complete internal autonomy to Surinam (Dutch Guiana) and the Netherlands Antilles (Aruba, Curaçao, Bonaire, St Eustatius, Saba, and the Dutch part of St Martin). These territories now form with Holland the tripartite kingdom of the Netherlands. The 1954 Statute confirmed, with only slight modifications, the substantial measure of autonomy over internal affairs which had been granted to Surinam in 1950 and to the Netherlands Antilles in 1951; and was the result of negotiations dating from the opening of a round-table conference at The Hague in 1952. The arrangement in the tripartite kingdom is highly complicated. Complete autonomy obtains in the internal affairs of Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles; for external affairs and defence, the two overseas partners each have a Minister Plenipotentiary who sits with the Dutch Cabinet as a body representing the whole kingdom when any matter that might concern all parties arises. It would be incorrect to say that Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles have a status equivalent to, say, Jamaica. Probably in

[1] On 31 May 1962 at Port-of-Spain, Trinidad.

[2] The suggestion has been made, notably by Sir Jock Campbell, that it is Great Britain who should take the lead in promoting this association. See 'Facing up to Facts in the Caribbean', in *The Times*, 9 May 1962.

[3] At a public meeting in Arima in Trinidad on 10 May 1962.

[4] *Suriname Nieuwsbrief*, 21 May 1962.

practice they have not made a bad bargain, and they receive plenty of financial aid from the Netherlands.

The French Caribbean territories of Martinique, Guadeloupe, and French Guiana stand out in contrast. In 1947 the three colonies were established as overseas departments of metropolitan France. In theory, therefore, they are part of France, but in practice they have not enjoyed the same social service benefits and this has caused considerable irritation, since unemployment is heavy. The riots in Martinique in January 1960 indicated real dissatisfaction. Following these riots somewhat greater authority was granted to the Prefects and the General Councils of these overseas departments to make decisions, for instance, on the spending of money allocated from the metropolis. The whole system is highly centralized: for example, many of the police are French. The same is true in the Dutch territories, whereas in Jamaica and Trinidad there are only a few remaining British (senior) police officers.

To compare the political systems of the different territories is interesting. Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands have, sometimes unconsciously, influenced their territories by their own traditions. Thus Jamaica, Trinidad, and British Guiana have a predominantly two-party system, while in the Netherlands Antilles and the French territories there are a variety of parties. A tendency for the political parties to ally themselves with trade unions, which can supply both funds and votes, is also to be noted. This is particularly marked in Jamaica, where the Jamaica Labour Party received full backing during the recent general election from the Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, while the People's National Party was supported equally fervently by the Trades Union Congress.

A few years ago the Caribbean area appeared likely to provide an outstanding example of racial harmony. Yet this optimism may well be premature. Events, including the racial background of politics in Trinidad and the riots in British Guiana, give serious grounds for anxiety. In adjacent Surinam, where there are perhaps the greatest number of different racial groups, extreme racial feeling has so far been avoided. A coalition Government has been in power under the capable leadership of Mr S. D. Emanuels since 1958. However, with political representation weighted in favour of the African creoles,[1] notwithstanding their minority position, the risk of an increase in racial tension cannot be ruled out and is even feared by some observers. People of African stock predominate in Jamaica,

[1] Creoles are strongly entrenched in Paramaribo.

Barbados, the Leeward and Windward Islands, and the French islands, with much intermarriage on the part of the small minority groups; racial tensions in these territories are not of great significance.

Much will turn in the future on economic events. The rapid increase in population, arising partly from the elimination of malaria in some areas and its heavy reduction in others, together with other improvements in health services, presents urgent problems. With the outstanding success of industrialization in Puerto Rico, all eyes in the Caribbean have been directed to the policies of the Governor, Luis Muñoz Marín. Today this island has probably the highest standard of living in Latin America.[1] Yet the very success of Puerto Rico, associated as she is with the United States and enjoying the right of free entry into the U.S. for her goods and citizens while at the same time being absolved from many of the financial burdens of statehood, makes comparison with other territories extremely dangerous. Neither Great Britain, France, nor the Netherlands can offer equivalent attractions, not the least of which is the proximity of an enormous market. Gallant efforts to industrialize are being made in Jamaica, Trinidad, and elsewhere. Yet it may be doubted whether large-scale export industries can be built up to reduce unemployment significantly, despite the differential in wage rates which has assisted many Puerto Rican industries to compete successfully in the United States market.

The European Powers have contributed substantially to the economic advance of the Caribbean area. Great Britain has used as her instrument the Colonial Development Corporation, which after a rough start is now moving in smoother waters. The Commonwealth system of a guaranteed price for sugar is saving that industry in the British islands. The Netherlands has poured money into her Caribbean territories. France subsidizes the basic sugar industry in her Antillean departments.

The vital question for the West Indies is how to raise the standard of living quickly, while maintaining an acceptable level of employment. The Antilles are densely populated. Barbados has more than 1,400 persons to the square mile. In other islands such as Jamaica and Martinique, where the density is less, the problem of overpopulation is heightened by the fact that a high percentage of the land area is economically useless. Of the territories still associated with the European Powers, only those on the mainland, the three

[1] During the fiscal year 1959–60 the *per capita* income in Puerto Rico was $571.

Guianas and British Honduras, have much possibility of further effective agricultural development. A fair charge against the colonial Powers could be their encouragement of the growth of export crops. The economy of the area was originally based on sugar. The slaves who worked the plantations were fed on imported salt-fish and cheap dried beef, together with locally grown crops. Changes in diet have created a demand for many foods which cannot be grown in the tropics, one of the chief of which is bread. Today the Caribbean is not self-supporting in meat or vegetables.

The economic foundation upon which the future of the West Indies depends is precarious. The weakness of raw material prices is an ever-present danger, and many consider it one of the gravest economic problems of the day. From this hazard there is no easy road of escape. The very improvements that are being introduced, such as mechanical cultivation, the introduction of weedicides, the aerial spraying of crops, and the use of heavier equipment in transport, all result in a decreased demand for labour. This presents a critical problem in the West Indies, where the unemployment rate in Jamaica, for example, is at present about 18 per cent.[1] A changing economy demands mobility of labour, but the field for manœuvre is tiny in a West Indian island. Though free movement is permitted into France and the Netherlands from their respective West Indian territories, and from Puerto Rico into the United States, Great Britain, faced as she is with a far wider problem, has imposed restrictions with her Immigration Bill which will undoubtedly militate against the surplus of West Indian unskilled labour.

On the other hand, Jamaica and Trinidad each have a reasonably sound economy, and one that is at least stronger than that of many emerging African self-governing territories. The production of bauxite and alumina, together with the tourist industry, have transformed the economy of Jamaica. Her sugar sales, dependent on substantial subsidies, are guaranteed for several years ahead, even if the banana trade may be entering a period of increasing difficulties. However, a continuance of heavy overseas capital investment may be necessary to avoid a deterioration in her imbalance of payments. Trinidad is also prosperous with an economy based mainly on oil and on agriculture.[2] Heavy Dutch expenditure in Curaçao and

[1] Mr Edward Seaga, Jamaica Minister of Development and Welfare, said in London recently that unemployment in Jamaica had reached 100,000 and that his island would have to export about 16,000 people a year to master the population problem. *Daily Gleaner*, Jamaica, 2 July 1962.

[2] See 'The Trinidad Scene: A Prosperous Approach to Independence', *Financial Times*, London, 29 June 1962.

Aruba is making the oil-refining industry increasingly efficient there, while secondary industries are beginning to appear. More than 90 per cent of the population of the six Dutch islands is concentrated in Aruba and Curaçao, where employment can be found in the huge oil refineries, working with crude oil brought from Venezuela. France has poured money into her Caribbean overseas departments and continues to subsidize and provide an assured market for the sugar and banana trades of her Antillean departments.

The smaller British islands remain a major problem. Even the Cayman Islands, however, have for long supplied seamen for the shipping industry and thus found a valuable source of remittances home. They seem also to be aware of the success of the Bahamas and Bermuda in attracting tourists, residents, and capital by judicious financial policies.

Of the mainland territories associated with the European Powers, Guyane (French Guiana) is the least developed. Ill fortune dogged France's varied attempts at promoting colonization. During the French Revolution, political opponents of the regime were sent there. Napoleon had plans for expansion which came to nothing. The short-lived gold-rush in 1858 created an inflow of immigrants and incidentally helped to depopulate the plantations, since workers on the plantations left the land for the workings at Le Haut Approuage. In modern times, the territory gained notoriety from the penal settlement, now closed down, on Devil's Island. Prosperity has still eluded this isolated French department.

Surinam (Dutch Guiana), on the other hand, is prospering. Though smaller in area than British Guiana, the flat land in the north of the territory provides opportunities for agricultural development. After the abolition of slavery, the Dutch brought in Indian and Javanese labour to work the plantations, and the agricultural labourers today are mainly the Hindustani and Javanese sections of the population. In the post-war period there was an attempt, with no marked success, to establish farmers from the Netherlands. The population is one of the most mixed in the Caribbean, with Negroes[1] forming a majority in Paramaribo, as they do in Georgetown, British Guiana. Unlike British Guiana, Surinam does not cultivate sugar on a large scale, though there is a substantial sugar factory near Paramaribo across the Surinam river. Rice production is very important. Secondary industries are beginning. The Bruynzeel Company,

[1] Locally known as 'creoles'.

which manufactures plywood, has a large factory on the outskirts of the capital city. Bauxite is of very great importance, the largest producer being the Surinam Aluminium Company. The Brokopondo Dam is being constructed across the Surinam river to generate power, nearly all of which will be used in the manufacture of aluminium.[1]

Few territories of the British Commonwealth have had a stormier recent history than British Guiana. The first attempt at self-government, with an administration headed by Dr Cheddi Jagan, ended in disaster in 1953 with the suspension of the Constitution, the dispatch of British troops to the colony, and the imprisonment of Dr Jagan and his influential wife. The second attempt to set British Guiana on the road to independence resulted in August 1961 in another victory for the People's Progressive Party, almost entirely based on East Indian support, and once more Dr Jagan headed the Government. A split between him and Mr Forbes Burnham, leader of the Negro party, the People's National Congress, had led to a bitter election with a third party in the field led by Mr Peter D'Aguiar. In February 1962 Dr Jagan's attempt to introduce heavy additional taxation, which may have been necessary but which was clumsily put forward, led to racial riots in which an important area in the centre of Georgetown was burnt to the ground. With Dr Jagan's opponents claiming that he is a Communist, tensions remain strong.

This small community of little more than half a million people, concentrated for the most part in the northern coastal strip of the territory, depends for its livelihood mainly on sugar-cane, rice, and bauxite. The vast hinterland is little developed. How far it could be opened up for settlement is problematical. The upland cattle-raising areas have for the most part indifferent pasture. Independence is demanded, yet it is hard to be sure that it will work with an impoverished exchequer and racial strife.

With a population no larger than a single British political constituency, British Honduras also seeks independence. Guatemala, on the other hand, claims sovereignty over the territory, based on rights which she claims to have inherited from Spain. The tension over this issue has been reduced following a meeting in April 1962 at San Juan, Puerto Rico, when the Earl of Dundee, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, headed a British mission which discussed the issues with a Guatemalan delegation.

[1] *Suriname Nieuwsbrief*, 11–18 May 1962.

British Honduras has had more than her quota of recent disaster, with two hurricanes in the last eight years. The 1961 hurricane wrecked Belize and the second town, Stann Creek. Citrus orchards and new cacao plantations were also heavily damaged, and thousands of acres of valuable forests were destroyed. Yet with help forthcoming and talk of a new capital to replace Belize, the country remains optimistic. Mr George Price, the First Minister, has the distinction of having led his party, the People's United Party, to victory at the last three general elections in 1954, 1957, and 1961, in the last two cases winning every seat.

To speculate on the future of the Caribbean is far from easy. Europe has stamped its institutions on people who are in origin mainly from Africa, but also in some areas from Asia; there are many minority groups. The geographical pattern of territories in the Antilles is equally remarkable, with the Netherlands Windward Islands among the British Leeward Islands, while the British Windward Island of Dominica is sandwiched between French Guadeloupe and Martinique. The whole is set in the framework of mainland and island countries which were once part of Spain's empire, and which have continued to speak Spanish. It might be described as a kaleidoscope of nationalism. Clearly the final picture has not yet emerged.

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Notes of the Month

Communist Comment on the India–China Dispute

THE reactions of Communist Parties and allied organizations to the fighting on the Indian-Chinese frontier have been far from monolithic. They range from open disapproval of China's policy, emanating, perhaps reluctantly, from the Indian Communist Party, to fervent support from Albania, North Vietnam, and North Korea. Although the Chinese, in their press and speeches, claim that 'all honest and progressive people' in Asia, Africa, and Latin America understand and approve Peking's actions, they bring little supporting evidence.

One Somali weekly, published in Arabic, is quoted as condemning India for 'taking arms from the imperialists', and applauding China's 'reasonable' proposals. But if, as is widely believed, the Chinese have invested substantial sums in certain African newspapers, they do not appear to have yielded high dividends so far. Two Iraqi papers (*Sawt Ahrar* and *Fourteenth July*) have condemned India's refusal to negotiate, while the Iraqi branch of the Afro-Asian solidarity committee went no farther than urging a peaceful settlement.

In Latin America, Ecuadorean Communists have been most outspoken in support for Peking. Their central committee denounced 'Indian aggression'; the U.S. monopolies were working hand in glove with Indian reactionaries to launch an attack on China; the 'submissive attitude' of the Ecuadorean Foreign Ministry in siding with India would 'please the provokers of war and the enemies of freedom'. A spokesman for the 'Association of Democratic Journalists' described Mr Nehru's policy as 'provocative'; U.S. imperialism was 'working through reactionary Indian groups' to split the Asian peoples. The chairman of the Ecuadorean 'writers for peace' association echoed these words, and the chairman of the 'Union of revolutionary youth' announced that body's 'full support' for China.

The Chilean *El Siglo* (a Communist paper) explained that India had rejected the Chinese proposals because, 'in collusion with foreign capital', she aimed to provoke conflict and hatred among the Asian Powers. The 'U.S. extremists' were trying to open a new war

front. In Brazil *Liga* deplored Mr Nehru's 'strange type of neutralism'; his rejection of the Chinese proposals was 'shameless', his provocation 'vicious'. This, judging from the Chinese press, appears to be all the comfort that Peking has found in Latin America.

It is in two of China's Communist neighbours that support has been most vocal and the attacks on India most vituperative. India, say the North Vietnamese, is looking for dollars, and Washington wants to stir up strife. The shipment of U.S. arms to India from Thailand showed how necessary it was for the cause of peace to force the United States to withdraw her troops from South-East Asia. 'The Afro-Asian peoples who are united as one in their opposition to imperialist aggression could not but oppose the Indian warlike expansionists.' The Indian authorities were moving from the policy of non-alignment and becoming a tool of U.S. imperialism, out to undermine Asian solidarity. These sentiments are exactly paralleled in statements from North Korea.

The Japanese Communist Party has also come down to China's side, and has urged India to agree to negotiate on the basis of the Chinese proposals. After a three-day conference it called on the Indian Government 'to abandon its unilateral claims and settle the issue through negotiation'. India had encroached on Chinese territory and the Chinese counter-attack was 'proper and timely'. India, violating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, was using the border trouble to get more dollars.

The Communists of Ceylon appealed for renewed efforts to settle the dispute; their party secretary described the Chinese proposals as 'constructive'. The Burmese Communist Party published its approval of 'the consistently peaceful and good-neighbourly policy' pursued by China, whereas the Indian ruling classes 'oppress the people of their country and collaborate with the imperialists'. In Singapore the newspaper *Barisan* attributed the conflict to 'imperialism' in an effort to 'split the Asian peoples'. *Harian Rakjat*, the Indonesian Communist paper, was 'disappointed with India's attitude', which was incompatible with the five principles.

The North Vietnamese were the most explicit in linking the present Communist dilemma to the older dispute represented on the one side by Albania, China's European ally, and on the other by Yugoslavia, standing in for Moscow. 'The Indian expansionist group', stated an editorial in the leading Hanoi paper, was backed by American and British imperialism, 'as well as by all imperialist lackeys, including the Yugoslav revisionists'. The Albanians them-

selves write of India's 'criminal acts of provocation', her 'premeditated, planned, and systematic' aggression. 'The modern revisionists, renegades to communism' had joined the imperialist chorus. 'The Yugoslav revisionists have degenerated into fawning henchmen and brokers of the reactionaries throughout the world and of U.S. imperialism.'

In fact, the Yugoslavs have, like the Soviet Communists, handled the dispute very cautiously. If anything, they implicitly condemned India's refusal to negotiate, on the ground that hostilities were bound to make the situation worse; on the other hand, their press has suggested that the MacMahon line, hitherto respected by both sides, must be the starting-point of negotiations.

The Chinese press also claims that Peking has the support of the Communist Parties of Canada and Sweden. In London the *Daily Worker* is uneasily trying to sit on the fence, though leaning very markedly towards Peking. Two great peoples, anxious for peace, were being pushed by Washington into war; 'the spirit of John Foster Dulles stalks the passes of the Himalayas.' China could not renounce territory, nor could India accept encroachments. The reason why China had not been able to reach agreement with India, as she had elsewhere, lay in Washington. India was very anxious for U.S. credits, and between them Washington and Indian big business were out to 'misrepresent and blacken China' in the eyes of the Indian masses. One reader suggested that it might be the Chinese who had 'driven the Indians into the arms of America', and another deplored China's failure to play the game. If they wanted to regain territory they claimed as their own, why didn't they try someone their own size? What about Hong Kong and Formosa?

Peking does not claim support from any other European Communist Party. It does not mention the Soviet Union in this context. Incidentally, none of those who condemn India for accepting arms from 'imperialism' refer to her willingness to accept arms from the U.S.S.R. as well.

It is interesting to compare the present Communist line-up with the positions taken after the attack on Albania just over a year ago. The change is most marked in Latin America, where previously the Communist Parties had always fallen into line with Moscow. The attitude of the British Communists has also changed, though less decisively; here personal dislikes may well have played their part. For the rest, the alignment appears to have remained steady; most Communist Parties have refrained from expressing an opinion.

The Problem of Aden

In recent months Aden has been very much in the news. This unusual prominence was occasioned first by the constitutional proposals for a merger between the Colony of Aden and the Federation of Southern Arabia,[1] and secondly by the military *coup* in the Yemen.

Preparatory talks between the Governor and Ministers of the Colony and the Federation began in London and Aden in the summer of 1961 and continued during the earlier part of 1962. A constitutional conference was held in London in July on the basis of the agreement reached and on 16 August 1962 a draft treaty was signed and published four days later.[2] Considerable opposition to the proposals was apparent, however. One Aden Minister was forced to resign in May of this year, because he refused to sign a secret preparatory agreement on the merger,[3] and on the day the talks began in London, a general strike was called in Aden to protest against it. On 24 September, when the debate opened in the Legislative Council, riots and strikes broke out, paralysing the Colony and closing down the airport and harbour, despite the ban on all demonstrations passed by the Governor earlier in the month.

At this point events in the Yemen began further to complicate the issue. On 19 September it was announced from San'a that the Imam Ahmed had died of natural causes at the age of seventy-one and that his son, Crown Prince Muhammed al Badr, had succeeded to the Imamate. However, on 27 September, the day after the merger proposals had been passed, San'a radio announced that Imam Muhammed al Badr had been overthrown in a military *coup* and that a republic had been proclaimed. In the Aden protectorate, which shares a long frontier, much of it undefined, with the Yemen, the overthrow of the Imam immediately resulted in the sudden departure of three Federal Ministers to London to see the Colonial Secretary. They were worried not only about events in the Yemen, but, more important, about the attitude likely to be adopted towards the revolutionary regime by the U.K. Government. Moreover, the eleven sheikhs, for whom federation is a means of safeguarding their position, were anxious about whether the Yemen uprising would affect the proposals for Aden's accession to the Federation.

A week later Aden Colony's Minister for Education and Infor-

[1] Consisting of eleven sheikhdoms of the Western Protectorate.
[2] Cmnd. 1814. [3] *The Observer*, 22 July, *The Guardian*, 22 August.

mation, Mr Husseiny, came to London, ostensibly to consider television plans but in reality to discuss the Colony's constitutional future. The atmosphere there had so deteriorated in the previous two weeks that he and two of his ministerial colleagues, although still favouring the principle of a merger, felt that the specific arrangements were no longer satisfactory in view of the recent events in the Yemen and should be postponed. The U.K. Government decided, however, not to postpone the plan, and the Bill was passed in the House of Commons on 13 November.[1] The day after, Mr Husseiny resigned; Mr Sandys, in accepting his resignation, implied that he had been forced to resign through intimidation,[2] which without doubt to some extent had occurred in the Colony. Mr Husseiny replied that this was not so and that his resignation was due 'to my conviction of imminent danger to general interests, if the British Government were to insist in rushing the merger plan. . . The federation and merger plans have often been presented as steps to Arab unity, but I have pointed out to you that to dissociate or separate any of the people of the south is practically impossible. . .'[3] This was the statement of one of the moderate members of the Legislative Council, who had in fact voted for the proposed merger on 26 September.

What then are the constitutional proposals? Basically the plan to link the U.K.'s two colonial responsibilities in Southern Arabia (the Crown Colony of Aden and the twenty-four protected States, which for administrative purposes are divided into the Eastern and Western protectorates) into some sort of federation has everything to recommend it. Certainly few in the Colony would dispute this. As the Ministers of Aden and the Federation of Southern Arabia (which at present consists of eleven States) wrote in a letter to Mr Sandys proposing Aden's accession to the Federation, the inhabitants of the Colony and the protectorates share a common race, religion, and language and 'regard themselves a one people'; 'the port of Aden is the main outlet for the surrounding territories'; and 'the economic interests of both are closely interwoven.'[4] Much of this could, of course, equally be applied to union with the Yemen. The terms of the draft treaty provide that the Colony of Aden should become a State of the Federation by 1 March 1963 or earlier (Article III). Although nothing in the treaty would affect British

[1] House of Commons Debate, Vol. 667, No. 11.
[2] *The Times*, 15 November. [3] *The Times*, 16 November.
[4] Cmnd. 1814.

sovereignty over Aden (Article II), the U.K. 'undertakes that it will not exercise its sovereign powers so as to withdraw Aden at any time from the Federation during the currency of this treaty' (Article VIII), except that it may 'exclude or withdraw at any time from the Federation any area or areas within Aden, if it considers this desirable for the purposes of its world-wide defence responsibilities' (Article IX). Article X establishes a procedure for (but not a right to) secession.

Aden is to 'be represented by twenty-four Members in the Federal Council', which at present consists of six representatives of each member State. Therefore the Colony, which has something like half the population of the eleven States, is only to have just over a quarter of the seats in the Council. It is proposed also to change the requirement for a quorum from two-thirds to one-half, which means that the Council could continue to function even if the Aden representatives decided to boycott it. Among certain provisions specifically applicable to Aden are the following: that 'the executive and legislative authority of the Governor will prevail over that of the Federation on matters concerning defence, external affairs, and internal security (including defence and security forces)'; that the Privy Council shall be the final court of appeal in most cases affecting Aden; and that 'the Constitution of the Federation shall be subject to the code of fundamental human rights established by the Constitution of Aden.' At the time of union it is provided that all the *ex officio* members, except the Attorney-General, should retire from the Executive and Legislative Councils and that the Governor, to be called High Commissioner after the union, should appoint a Chief Minister to advise him on the composition of a Council of Ministers, on whose advice he would act on all matters apart from those under his specially reserved powers.

Financial arrangements between the Colony and the Federation have yet to be settled, but many Adenis believe that the Colony will in the future be compelled to subsidize the backward States of the protectorate.

The moderate opposition in Aden urges that there should be elections on a revised franchise before the federation, with its very limited provisions for Aden's secession, takes place. The elections due in January 1963 are being postponed for one year, and in the meantime the Legislative Council is to co-opt four new members without consulting the people. The opposition to a merger between what is the most politically advanced State in Arabia and the sheikh-

doms is all the stronger since, in the last elections in 1959, there were only some 21,500 registered voters (women are ineligible) out of a total population of some 180,000 (now 220,000). Arab discontent at the limited franchise was then expressed by their almost complete boycott of those elections. Quite apart from certain financial qualifications, those eligible to vote must be either British subjects born in Aden (of which there are approximately 60,000) or British subjects or protected persons who have resided there for two out of the three years immediately before application for registration. Many Indians (who together with some Pakistanis number about 20,000) qualify by virtue of Commonwealth citizenship as well as their commercial activities, and in the last elections some Somalis (there are about 20,000 in the Colony) were also eligible. What angers the Arabs is that these people are eligible for the vote, whereas the great majority of Arabs are not, either because they cannot meet the financial requirements or because they come from the Yemen (about 80,000). Sixty thousand of the disenfranchised Arabs come from the protectorate.[1]

The White Paper on the proposals states that changes are to be made in the franchise, but does not mention when or what they are to be. Something on the lines of adult male suffrage for those born in Aden and those who have lived there for a certain minimum period has been advocated by members of the Legislative Council, even though they themselves can hardly be said to be representative as matters now stand. Nor were they elected with a mandate to negotiate the merger. Moreover, it was only in 1959 that the six original protectorate States agreed to form a federation amongst themselves, and signed a Treaty of Friendship and Protection with the U.K.[2]

Of the present elected members of the Legislative Council only four out of twelve voted for the merger proposals on 26 September; the other eight abstained, seven because they opposed the proposals and one because he felt he had been insulted during the debate. The five official and six nominated members and the Speaker voted for the proposals. Six of the elected members favoured immediate self-government for Aden in place of, or certainly before, federation.[3] Since the voting in the Council, one elected Minister has resigned (Mr Husseiny) and two others have threatened to do so. Even Mr Bayoomi, who is expected to be Aden's first Prime Minister, is

[1] House of Commons Debate, Vol. 667, No. 11, Col. 269. [2] Cmnd. 665.
[3] *The Times*, 27 September.

reported to be having second thoughts about the merger, all the more so since six of his United National Party candidates were soundly beaten in recent local municipal elections.

In the House of Commons debate there was also considerable opposition. Mr Sandys said, however, that he did 'not believe that if we were to postpone the merger by waiting for elections the Federal Government would be willing to reopen these difficult negotiations with any new Aden government'.[1] But if the union is, to quote Mr Healey in the opposition reply, 'so fragile and delicately poised that a delay of three, four or six months would wither their [the sheikhs] enthusiasm for union with the Colony',[2] then there would seem to be something wrong with the whole idea.

The U.K. Government has the means to force the hands of the sheikhs, who are dependent for 85 per cent of their income on the British taxpayer, and who have been disturbed by recent events in the Yemen. The protectorates are about the size of the U.K., very thinly populated, 98 per cent uncultivable, and with very few resources. Only the wealthiest State, Quaiti, has an annual revenue of some £½ million (Aden Colony has an annual revenue of some £4 million), and most have very small sums to dispose of. Much of the British subsidy (£4 million per annum) is spent on local security forces.[3]

Lack of space precludes any discussion of the strategic importance of Aden, but what must be questioned is whether the merger with the Federation as proposed will best serve the U.K. interests in the base, quite apart from those of the local people. One lesson of Suez and Cyprus is that a base cannot be held in the face of strong local opposition. It is doubtful whether the base at Aden could be properly maintained without the local Arab labour force. The airfield at Khormaksar, for example, which can in fact handle all types of aircraft, is nevertheless small and, in a Kuwait-type emergency operated from Aden, it is likely that not more than the first wave of aircraft would be able to leave the airfield without the co-operation of the local Arab staff. And of course in the event of active hostile opposition to the military installations, a large proportion of the 7,000-odd men stationed in Aden would have to be deployed on local security duties.

At present, however, there is little violent anti-British sentiment,

[1] House of Commons Debate, Vol. 667, No. 11, Col. 253. [2] *ibid.*, Col. 256.
[3] See 'The Emergence of Aden since 1956', by A. P. Cumming-Bruce, in *Royal Central Asian Journal*, July–October 1962.

despite the hostile propaganda emanating from Cairo and San'a. Quite apart from the jobs provided by the British forces (there are some 7,000 Arab workers, 2,000 of them Yemenis, employed in British military installations, excluding casual labour), they spend about £11 million per annum in Aden, plus expenditure on public works and services.[1] Another lesson of Cyprus and Singapore is that opposition to a military base as a symbol of political status decreases with political advance. At the present time the Federal and Colony Minister specifically recognize that Britain's military presence in Aden is essential, but if the merger as planned is put into effect, how long will the people of the Colony continue to think so?

Whatever the reasons behind the merger, whether it is a short-term political expedient which will guarantee a military base if desirable on British soil, or whether it is some dream of an independent Arab State within the Commonwealth, the present proposals and their timing do not seem to be the right solution. Legal political expression is denied at present to the majority of the population of Aden, and the tendency will surely be for the more extreme nationalist trade unions[2] to gain sympathy and support among the mass of the people. Strikes, which in the past were frequent[3] and often irresponsible, are now restricted by the Industrial Relations (Conciliation and Arbitration) Ordinance of 1 August 1960, but it is none the less clear that non-co-operation by a largely Arab labour force could quickly close down the port and oil refinery and seriously hamper the U.K.'s military potential.

GILLIAN KING

U.N. Action for Peace

II. Law and Order Forces

IT was suggested in last month's issue of *The World Today*[4] that United Nations holding forces may be regarded as a species of U.N. presence. Like other presences, a holding force only enters a State with its permission, and it is not designed to fight against States

[1] House of Commons Debate, Vol. 667, No. 11, Col. 328.
[2] The left-wing T.U.C. numbers 17,000. Its leader is now in prison.
[3] In the first six months of 1960 there were twenty-four strikes causing a loss of 120,000 man days. See *Commonwealth Survey*, 14 February 1961, p. 200.
[4] 'U.N. Action for Peace: I. Barrier Forces.'

hostile to its host, or to interfere in domestic disputes. But a holding force is distinguishable from other kinds of presence by its military composition: it comprises a force, and not a group or an individual. It was further suggested in the previous article that, when classified on the basis of their immediate functions, the three such forces which the U.N. has so far established fall into two categories. The first encompasses those holding forces whose job is to act as a human barrier between quarrelsome States, of which type of force there is as yet only one example, the United Nations Emergency Force (Unef), which is stationed along the Egyptian side of the Egypt–Israel border. The second category contains those holding forces whose task has to do with the maintenance of law and order within a State or territory.

The two forces which, to date, make up the second category are the *Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo* Force (Onuc) and the United Nations Security Force for West New Guinea (Unsf), both of which are still in being. There was considerable dissimilarity between the nature of the law and order problems which each of these forces was dispatched to deal with, and, more significantly from the point of view of this endeavour to assess the potentialities of holding forces, Onuc and Unsf also differ in the ways in which they are meant to contribute towards international peace. They will therefore be discussed separately.

THE CONGO TYPE OF FORCE

Onuc was sent to the ex-Belgian Congo in pursuance of a Security Council resolution of 14 July 1960. Following the breakdown of order in the newly independent State and the intervention of Belgian troops (only, Belgium said, to protect her nationals), the Government of the Congo appealed first, and unsuccessfully, to the United States and then to the U.N. for help against the 'Belgian act of aggression'. The Security Council agreed to give the Congo military assistance until her security forces were able to keep order on their own, and Onuc began to arrive almost immediately. Within four months the size of the Force had reached approximately 20,000 troops, drawn from fourteen countries. This strength was not maintained, but for the past eighteen months the number of troops has been kept in the region of 15,000 (contributed, currently, by eleven countries[1]), with supporting forces and personnel bringing the total size of the Force up to about 17,000.

[1] At 10 October 1962 these were, in decreasing order of magnitude of their con-

Onuc's efforts to restore and maintain order throughout the Congo have been attended by considerable success, and many people regard this as a valuable end in itself and as an example of the sort of activity in which the U.N. may very properly engage. But it has been widely claimed, especially in the West, that Onuc's work, as well as having local significance, has prevented a drastic deterioration in East–West relations. The Soviet Union has been pictured as prepared to play fast and loose with international peace by threatening to intervene on a large scale in the Congo under cover of the general disorder. It has been suggested that such a move could not but have led to a Western response in kind, and so to an armed conflict of potentially world-wide dimensions, and that this threat to the peace was averted only by the effectiveness with which Onuc grasped and held the ring of civil order in the Congo, so removing temptation from the Soviet Union's way.

Soviet policy during the early stages of the Congo crisis appeared, on the face of it, to lend support to the argument that she was seriously contemplating massive intervention. Not only did the Soviet Union give the Lumumba Government powerful diplomatic support, but she also made vague references on two occasions in July 1960 to the strong action which she would take if the U.N. failed to stop 'imperialist aggression' in the Congo. Onuc's subsequent refusal to place itself, in effect, under Mr Lumumba's control was quickly followed by the Soviet Union delivering 100 military trucks and twenty-nine Ilyushin transport planes, together with 200 technicians[1] direct to the Lumumba Government. This verbal and physical activity was accompanied by the arrival in the Congo of numbers of diplomats from Communist countries.

However, the contention that these measures were the preliminary stages of a much larger intervention, which was nipped in the bud by the continued build-up of Onuc and its immediate partial success in restoring order, seems less weighty than that which suggests that they represented about the maximum measure of meddling in these troubled waters which the Soviet Union was prepared to engage in. It is the case that, had she been of a mind to intervene in a big way in the Congo, the presence of Onuc (which she had helped to secure) would have been a deterrent factor. But, while the

tingents: India, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Malaya, Tunisia, Ghana, Ireland, Sweden, Congo (Leopoldville) (her contingent joined the Force in the summer of this year), Liberia, and Sierra Leone.

[1] These figures are taken from *Congo Disaster* by Colin Legum, p. 141 (Penguin Special, 1961).

Soviet Union was very ready to try to use Onuc in her own interests, even endeavouring to get it to support Mr Lumumba by brandishing a letter from him saying that the Congo might be forced to ask for Soviet help, it seems most unlikely that, when Onuc failed to do what the Soviet Union wanted, she was only deterred from doing it herself by the fact that Onuc was already in the Congo. For the Soviet Union had no important interests to protect in that country, and while she would probably not have been averse to the easy acquisition of an African satellite, there are a number of good reasons for supposing that large-scale intervention in the Congo, even if Onuc had not been there, was not regarded by her as profitable.

The prospect in the Congo was not very inviting, for the disordered state of the country would have made the gaining of effective control a difficult undertaking, and the absence of much local support for the Communist cause would not have made it easier. If, nevertheless, the Soviet Union had thought to go ahead, she would then have been faced with the physical difficulties of intervention in a State which was about 5,000 miles away and surrounded by countries unsympathetic to herself. Supplying and defending a satellite regime in the Congo would have made these difficulties into a permanent headache, which would probably have been worsened by the problem of keeping the distant regime in line with Soviet policy, a task which might very possibly have been additionally complicated by the difference in colour of the fellow Communists' skins. Further, the dispatch of a large Soviet expedition to the Congo would have been sure to have alienated large sections of opinion in Africa and Asia, and might also have provoked discontent in the Soviet Union.[1] To all of which would have to have been added the possibility that Soviet intervention might elicit a similar response from leading Western Powers, who, on account of geographical factors, were much better placed than the Soviet Union to conduct a conflict in the Congo.

It therefore seems plausible to argue that, despite her bold words and such action as she took, the Soviet Union did not intend to intervene on a large scale in the Congo, and that she had ample grounds for this decision quite apart from considerations arising from the presence of Onuc. Even, however, if the Soviet Union had decided to the contrary, it is not to be assumed that this would inevitably have brought the world to the brink of war. Had a Soviet in-

[1] On this last point see Alexandre Metaxas, 'The Soviet Union and Foreign Policy', in *The Listener*, 8 September 1960.

tervention been followed by troops from some Western countries, this might have been the consequence, although it is quite possible that the fighting between the forces of East and West might not have spread beyond the Congo; there would certainly have been strong incentives to localize it. But whether the West would have counter-intervened is not at all certain. It does not seem likely that the United States and Britain, for example, would have been prepared to risk a world-wide conflict in an effort to remove the Soviet Union from the Congo. Even if there had seemed to be a good chance that fighting would be kept within the Congo's boundaries, it is probably more likely than not that they would still have considered the cost in men and money too high and have preferred to leave the Soviet Union to get on as badly as she might, loudly drawing the appropriate moral. Such a course would by no means necessarily have entailed inaction: the establishment of the Congo as a Soviet satellite might well have led to the stationing of Western troops in other, especially adjacent, countries of the continent, but this would probably have been a far cry from world war.

Too much should not, therefore, be claimed for Onuc. By restoring order over much of the Congo it has done work which is generally recognized to be most valuable inasmuch as it has permitted the withdrawal of Belgian troops, thus considerably reducing one source of international tension, and has also made life easier for many Congolese. But it is very doubtful indeed whether its presence has prevented large-scale Soviet intervention in the Congo. And, even if it is thought to have done that, it does not follow that it has thereby kept world peace.

It seems unlikely that there will be very many examples of U.N. holding forces with tasks akin to those of Onuc. This is not because the occasions when governments would be glad to have help in quelling disobedient subjects are likely to be infrequent. But what will probably be relatively rare, even shortly after the birth of a State, when it is more likely to happen than at most other times, is the sort of situation which occurred in the Congo: the disintegration of the armed forces, the complete breakdown of the Government's authority, and the absence of any indigenous body or bodies claiming, with some show of effectiveness, its place. The typical consequence, when a government is in dire trouble, is either its quick replacement by the forces capable of preserving order or by a group acceptable to them, or a situation which takes on the aspect of a civil war. In the latter event a variety of considerations, legal, prudential,

political, and practical, would probably combine to ensure that a U.N. holding force was not sent to the scene.

From the point of view of the prospects for an independent Katanga it was Mr Tshombe's misfortune that, initially, the civil conflict aspect of the Congo situation was obscured by the general disorder, otherwise Onuc would probably never have been dispatched to the Congo; and, subsequently, that the U.N. force on the spot had at its back an Organization which, for various reasons, was very strongly opposed to the break-up of the Congo.

Where there is a breakdown of order on the Congo pattern it should not be assumed that the U.N., because it is 'eligible' to assist, will necessarily do so. It may not, for any of three reasons. In the first place, someone else may forestall the U.N. with a speedy intervention. There is no natural order of things in international relations which, on the popular analogy of a vacuum, compels States to engage in armed intervention in a disordered fellow. Indeed, the cost and trouble of doing so, and the likelihood of adverse international repercussions, may be expected to deter rather than encourage such a course. But sometimes the collapse of a State's governmental apparatus may provide a very strong incentive to another State to send in its forces. The leading State of an alliance might well intervene in one of its allies if disorder there gave rise to the possibility of power being taken over by a group with markedly different ideological affiliations: the Soviet action in Hungary in 1956 is a case in point. Intervention might also be the response of a significant Power to disorder in a country in which a number of its nationals were, on account of the breakdown of government, in danger. In such a situation it might be possible for a U.N. holding force of the law and order type to play a helpful role. For, as the intervener is not likely to relish its task, it would probably be prepared, if the U.N. could muster an obviously adequate force, to effect a tension-lowering substitution with the U.N., as Belgium did in 1960. Another type of situation in which intervention in a disordered State would not be unexpected (and here the intervener would be not at all disposed to invite the U.N. to take its place) would be the case of a neighbour taking the opportunity to pay off old scores by annexing all or part of the State which was in confusion.

A second possibility which would exclude the U.N. would be the lack of an invitation from the disordered State. A helpless government is likely to turn to the U.N. only if it has no powerful patron willing to assist. Should, for example, the East German Govern-

ment find itself unable to control its populace it would be unlikely to turn to the U.N., just as the State of, say, Costa Rica, faced with a similar domestic situation, would in all probability look to her Great Power ally for help.

Thirdly, even if the U.N. is invited to help, one can envisage several reasons which might lead it to take no action.[1] Many members, including some of the most influential, might be opposed to bolstering up the appellant government, preferring to see it suffer some further disorder in the hope that the outcome might be its replacement by a more acceptable regime. Should Cuba become disordered it is not likely that the U.N. would speedily come to the aid of its present Government. Another situation which might well produce U.N. inactivity would be one where the task of restoring order was very formidable: a number of over-mighty and well-armed subjects scattered about the country in question might lead the U.N. to the view that the situation was beyond remedying with the capabilities it was able to command. Or the U.N. might be given pause by the apparent imminence of substantial intervention from an extra-U.N. source. Action might also be prevented by the practical obstacles which have already been mentioned in the previous article in connection with barrier forces.

However, if such difficulties are absent or surmountable, the U.N. may be expected readily to agree to requests for help from disordered States and will probably assist them effectively, giving the population of the countries concerned reason to be grateful to it. But to say that a U.N. force has restored order is not to say that the State in question has thereby been insulated against independent intervention: the very presence of a U.N. force will probably be a reliable indication that the assisted State was never in serious need of insulation, for a State possessed of important interests in the disordered country and the ability to intervene in it could be expected to have done so in advance of the U.N. If, however, it did seem that a U.N. holding force had deterred intervention, or if the availability of such a force allowed or caused an intervener to withdraw, it would not necessarily or even probably follow that the peace, local or world-wide, had on account of this been kept. The U.N. could only claim credit for that if it seemed that the interven-

[1] It should perhaps be emphasized that the situation being considered here, that of a Government needing a military force to do for it the job of keeping order, is quite distinct from the case of a State seeking technical assistance from the U.N. in the governing of its country, including, perhaps, assistance in the organization of its law and order forces.

tion which it frustrated or finished would, if unchecked, have led to war. An intervention might have this result in consequence of the intervening State being resisted by the intervenee, but this is not very likely, for the intervenee, being in disarray, would hardly be in a position to wage war. If it did try to do so, the war would probably be both local and short, for a State is unlikely to intervene in another unless it is fairly confident of being able to do so successfully. Intervention might also lead to war, perhaps on a wide scale, by provoking a third State to counter-intervene, in which case, if the U.N. had prevented the initial intervention it would have averted war. But an intervention followed by a counter-intervention is in any event not very likely, and it is particularly improbable that there will often be situations in which it would have happened but for the introduction of a U.N. holding force. For such a force is most likely to be present either in circumstances in which there was little likelihood of an initial intervention, in which case the question of a counter-intervention would not have arisen, or when intervention has taken place (the intervener being prepared to withdraw in favour of the U.N.) but a counter-intervention has not. Hence, while U.N. forces of the Onuc type may be of great value in restoring order, it is desirable to recognize that they are not likely to be used very frequently, and that when they are employed they are likely only to have a limited peace-keeping potentiality.

THE WEST NEW GUINEA TYPE OF FORCE

The third U.N. holding force, the United Nations Security Force for West New Guinea (Unsf), was established in pursuance of the adoption by the General Assembly on 21 September 1962 of a resolution consenting to a joint request by Indonesia and the Netherlands that the U.N. should administer West New Guinea for a short period at their expense. These two States had, on 15 August 1962, brought their thirteen-year-old dispute over West New Guinea to a formal end by signing an agreement providing for the transfer of the territory from the Netherlands to Indonesia. The transfer was not, however, to take place directly, but via the U.N., to which the Netherlands agreed to surrender West New Guinea in the immediate future and from which Indonesia is to receive it on or as soon as possible after 1 May 1963. In return for this very considerable Dutch concession, Indonesia promised that, between the time when she obtained sovereignty over West New Guinea and the end of 1969, and with the help of the U.N. in the shape of a representa-

tive (and staff) appointed by the Secretary-General, she would arrange a plebiscite in which the 700,000 Papuan inhabitants of the territory could exercise their right of self-determination.

West New Guinea was handed over to the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority (Untea) on 1 October. At the Authority's head, and directly responsible to the Secretary-General, is an Administrator, and under him is Unsf, consisting of about 1,400 members of Pakistan's armed forces (chiefly drawn from her army but including a naval contingent) and a small United States and Canadian air contingent; the Force is supplemented by the existing Papuan police, so far as that proves feasible, and, at the Administrator's discretion, by the Papuan Volunteer Corps and by the Indonesian armed forces in the territory. Unsf's task is to maintain civil peace on Untea's behalf, and therefore, like Onuc, it may be regarded as a holding force of the law and order type. But it differs markedly from Onuc, not only on account of its being under the control of the local political authority, the U.N., but also in the fact that it has not to restore order out of chaos but to maintain order in an already well-ordered area. So far Unsf has done this effectively and without incident, and there is no reason to suppose that it will meet with serious problems during the remaining months of the U.N.'s administration of West New Guinea.

Without Unsf the agreement to end the bitter dispute might not have been made. However unpalatable the consequences of refusing to do so, it seems unlikely that the Netherlands would have agreed to the direct conveyance of her colony to Indonesia, for that would have been exceedingly humiliating. If, therefore, it was to be relinquished, an intermediary acceptable to both disputants had to be obtained, and they might have found it very difficult to agree on anyone other than the U.N. (and if they had so agreed, the chosen State might not have been prepared to oblige). But for the U.N. to be a satisfactory face-saver for the Netherlands there had to be some assurance that the U.N. administration in West New Guinea was going to be able to make at least a plausible pretence of controlling events there during its brief period of authority. Otherwise the Netherlands might have found Indonesia overtly taking over effective control of the territory immediately the Dutch troops had departed. The likelihood of the U.N. being able to muster a security force which the Netherlands would regard as satisfactory, and its actual success in recruiting it, provided this assurance, and so paved the way for the signing and ratification of the agreement of 15

August. It may therefore be said that the peaceful settlement of the dispute was facilitated by and perhaps dependent upon the possibility of Unsf's presence.

In the events leading to a settlement, however, the availability of a force such as Unsf was not a decisive factor. The U.N. would in all probability have been prepared at any time during the dispute to assist in settling it by sending a security force to West New Guinea, especially as for this type of force, unlike Unsf and Onuc, there were precedents.[1] But the involvement of the U.N. in this way was dependent on the agreement of the disputants, for the permission of the Netherlands was necessary for a U.N. holding force to enter West New Guinea, and, at least in recent years, the U.N. would have been most unlikely to agree to the dispatch of such a force without the consent of Indonesia. Hence the Netherlands proposal of a year ago[2] that West New Guinea become, in effect, a Trust territory governed by the U.N. came to nothing because it was not acceptable to Indonesia and her supporters. An accord between the parties was reached only when the worsening diplomatic and military position of the Netherlands in respect of her colony and the increasing bellicosity of Indonesia combined to make it increasingly likely that the dispute would be brought to a violent and, from the point of view of the Dutch, ignominious end. This led the Netherlands to decide that, provided it could be done in not too mortifying a manner, she would cede the territory to Indonesia. The U.N., by offering to provide a holding force, was then able to render significant assistance, but that stage was not reached as a result of the Organization's existence or activity.

The use of Unsf in West New Guinea illustrates the potentialities and limitations of U.N. holding forces of this kind. If, in order to settle a territorial dispute, the parties require a neutral force to keep order temporarily in the area in question, so that a plebiscite may be held, or an orderly or face-saving transfer of sovereignty effected, the obvious source to look to is the U.N. In the arrangement of this type of operation there is not likely to be great difficulty over finance, for, as in the case of Unsf, the parties concerned will probably be prepared to meet the expenses of the force which enables them

[1] As part of the settlement of a quarrel between Colombia and Peru over the district of Leticia, a League of Nations Commission administered the disputed area in 1933–4 and had a detachment of troops under its command to keep order. An international force drawn from four countries performed the same function during the plebiscite which, in 1935, ended the League's fifteen-year rule in the Saar.

[2] See 'The West New Guinea Problem', in *The World Today*, November 1961.

to settle their dispute. Nor is the provision of the necessary troops likely to be an insuperable obstacle, for the number needed will probably be small and their task neither very exacting nor dangerous. Hence, and provided also that the disputed territory does not lie within the sphere of dominant military influence of a Great Power who strongly objects to the plan, which is not likely, the U.N. may be expected to be both willing and able to respond to requests for law and order forces arising out of circumstances similar to those which produced the request for Unsf. But the very fact of the activity of such forces being non-controversial is indicative of the limited role which they are able to play. They are essentially adjunctive to a settlement, of significance only when an agreement is likely. Then they may have a valuable place in the conciliatory scheme, but prior to that point they have no part, and international disputation will no more be stilled through the advertisement of such settlement facilities and the passage of U.N. resolutions urging their use than it will arise through their absence.

CONCLUSION

U.N. holding forces have often been spoken of as examples of the Organization's ability to engage in preventive diplomacy: the analogy of the fire-engine has frequently been used to illustrate the point. To the extent that this suggests a capacity on the part of the U.N. to take independent, peace-keeping action in threatening situations, it is thought to be misleading. It obscures the fact that holding forces go to trouble spots only by invitation and that their part in the prevention of war will probably be a small one. The establishment of a U.N. barrier on a frontier mirrors rather than moulds a disposition to live at peace; the restoration of order for a particular government is likely to have little bearing on the question of international peace or war; and the maintenance of internal security in an area temporarily administered by the U.N. is consequential upon and not contributory to a readiness to settle a dispute peacefully. The types of function which U.N. holding forces can fulfil may not have been exhausted by Unef, Onuc, and Unsf, but, while future forces may have different tasks, they are unlikely, in view of their nature, to have more significant ones. Therefore, so far as it has to do with the maintenance of peace, the diplomacy which the U.N. displays in its holding forces supplements a pacific intent rather than checks a warlike one.

ALAN JAMES

Power Politics in Laos

In late December 1960, after the recapture of the capital city of Vientiane by the right-wing forces of Prince Boun Oum and General Phoumi Nosavan,[1] international attitudes towards Laos were in a state of considerable confusion. The Western Powers recognized the Government of Prince Boun Oum which, by 5 January 1961, had been established through constitutional procedures, albeit by a complaisant section of the National Assembly, which had been transferred to the southern town of Savannakhet held since September by the forces of Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan. The United States Administration, still that of the outgoing President, General Eisenhower, backed a military solution in favour of the right-wing group. This had the strong support of Thailand. France had long favoured the neutralist leader Prince Souvannaphouma. British policy had moved towards support for the idea of a Government of national union, as the dangers of the swing to the right became evident during the previous two years.

As a means of controlling the increasingly dangerous situation, India proposed on 15 December 1960 the reconvening of the International Control Commission (ICC) which had administered the 1954 agreement. The British Foreign Secretary supported this move on 19 December, expressing the view that a non-aligned Laos was desirable but that if the ICC was to work effectively it would need the support of all parties in Laos.[2] Boun Oum rejected the plan to reconvene the ICC on 20 December, the day on which the resumption of U.S. military aid to his Government was officially announced.

The neutralist Government of Souvannaphouma, although declared illegal by the King of Laos on 12 December, claimed still to be in existence though its members were scattered between Rangoon, Phnom Penh, whither Souvannaphouma himself had retired, and Khang Khay on the Plain of Jars near Xieng Khouang in north-eastern Laos, where urgent efforts were being made in alliance with the Communist Pathet Lao to establish a new centre of administration. This Government was recognized by the Communist Powers.[3] The capture of the airfield on the Plain of Jars by

[1] For an account of earlier events see 'A Cycle of Political Events in Laos' in *The World Today*, February 1961.

[2] *Hansard*, Lords, Vol. 227, Col. 693, 1960–1.

[3] It was reconstituted on 31 January 1961 with Quinim Pholsena as one of three chief ministers and Kong Lae as head of the military committee.

neutralist and Pathet Lao forces on 30 December provided a suitable new point of entry for military aid which was being flown in by the Soviet Union via North Vietnam, and a base of operations, and also a region of the country over which the neutralist Government could claim at least *de facto* administration.

The apparently increasing success of American-supported forces roused China to take a more direct interest in Laotian affairs than she had shown theretofore. In late December China, the Soviet Union, and other Communist Powers proposed that the ICC should be reconvened but with the stipulation, unacceptable to the West and the Asian allies in SEATO, that it should deal with the Souvannaphouma Government. In default of this a new conference of the participants of the Geneva Conference of 1954 was demanded. On 1 January 1961, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, head of the Cambodian State, who had raised the question of a conference in a speech delivered in Peking on 19 December, put forward proposals for an enlarged conference of fourteen nations to include the signatories of the 1954 Agreement, the United States, the ICC Powers: Canada, India, and Poland, and three additional neighbours of Laos: Burma, South Vietnam, and Thailand. Norodom Sihanouk had the support of Souvannaphouma, and it seemed that the two statesmen were thinking in terms of a buffer zone, comprising Laos and Cambodia, supported by an international guarantee, following the formula suggested by the Cambodian leader in the General Assembly of the United Nations during the fifteenth session.[1] Both Norodom Sihanouk and Souvannaphouma agreed that a return of the ICC was an inadequate measure under the circumstances.

The Communist Powers made a rapid and favourable response to the Cambodian initiative, Russia suggesting that the conference be held in Phnom Penh. The attitude of the SEATO countries was at best lukewarm. Although Dean Rusk's support for the idea of a peaceful Laos without commitments in any direction[2] heralded a change in American thinking, at least at the highest level, President Kennedy's first response, after he had taken office, was to try to persuade Norodom Sihanouk to accept the appeal made by King Savang Vatthana on 19 February, for an inspection commission composed of Burmese, Cambodian, and Malayan representatives. At this point Norodom Sihanouk temporarily withdrew his con-

[1] Text: U.N. General Assembly 15th Session. Report of the 877th Plenary meeting, 26 September 1961.

[2] *New York Times*, 7 February 1961.

ference proposal and, on 12 March, expressed his disquiet at Western hesitations. He was well aware that delay over a settlement in Laos would aid only Pathet Lao and their Communist backers. A widespread suspicion existed that Norodom Sihanouk was playing the Chinese game in the matter of a conference. Whether this was so or not a compromise agreement could be seen as essential from the Cambodian point of view. Norodom Sihanouk had long shown himself to be anxious about the Chinese and North Vietnamese threat to stability in the region and his policy of scrupulous neutrality depended entirely on the avoidance of a common frontier with a Communist Power.[1]

Point was given to Norodom Sihanouk's sense of urgency by the nature of the military situation in Laos during the early months of 1961. The right-wing success at Vientiane had lost much of its significance within a few days because of the loss of the Plain of Jars airfield. The neutralist Government established there, in an association, perhaps too close for its liking, with Pathet Lao, aimed to extend its influence westwards towards the royal capital of Luang Prabang and also to fight its way back to Vientiane. Pather Lao however were more interested in establishing firm territorial links to the north with China and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. In this endeavour they could count especially on the D.R.V., whose aid with troops and training and political cadres had been the one constant factor in the post-war situation in Laos. The ugly framework for, at best, a partition of Laos was being rapidly erected.

The Boun Oum–Phoumi Nosavan forces, enjoying increased aid from the United States and her Asian allies in military advisers, weapons, and supplies, achieved some temporary successes particularly in the vital Phou Khoun sector of the Xieng Khouang–Vientiane road. Nevertheless the neutralist and Pathet Lao forces succeeded, between January and April 1961, in establishing military control over all strategically important areas of the country with the exception of the Mekhong valley towns and their immediate hinterlands of rice-plain.

During March Souvannaphouma, having failed in attempts at direct negotiation with Phoumi Nosavan, set out on a world tour with the aim of persuading the foreign Powers concerned with Laos of the usefulness of an agreed settlement by international conference on the basis of a coalition Government led by himself. He visited

[1] Cambodia's attitude is discussed by Roger Smith in 'Cambodia's neutrality and the Laotian crisis', *Asian Survey*, July 1961, pp. 17–22.

Burma, India, Egypt, Britain, France, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, China, and the D.R.V. but proposals to go to Washington came to nothing. The mistrust that had arisen between himself and the U.S. Government still existed. His policies had long been anathema also to the Thai.

In a deteriorating military situation Britain continued her efforts to find a basis of agreement with her co-chairman of the 1954 Geneva Conference, the Soviet Union, for the return of the ICC to supervise a cease-fire. The fact that these two Powers recognized different Governments in Laos created initial obstacles. In February Mr Hammarskjöld lent his influence in favour of the formation of a Government of national union as a first step. British proposals to this effect were made early in March. These were supported by the United States; the communiqué issued after the Kennedy–Macmillan meeting of 26 March showed that the British and American positions were now close. The SEATO meeting of 27–29 March declared its belief in a non-aligned and independent Laos. The Government of Thailand did not now oppose a neutralist Laos free from outside pressures but maintained its reservation about the ability of a Government under Souvannaphouma to fulfil this condition.

On 24 April the co-chairmen finally agreed to call on all parties in Laos for an immediate cease-fire and for co-operation with the ICC. Invitations to the fourteen-nations conference were issued on the same day. Although the Laotian parties approved the cease-fire proposal, the Boun Oum representatives at first refused to meet in the territory held by their opponents, who had reached by this time the Nam Lik, the last river barrier before the capital. Eventually a series of parleys were held at Ban Hin Heup on the Nam Lik and farther north at Ban Na Mone, commencing on 5 May. A demand by Pathet Lao that the formation and composition of a coalition Government should be discussed held up proceedings until 13 May when a cease-fire agreement was signed.

The ICC returned to Laos on 8 May. Though it had neither the time nor the facilities to undertake a thorough inspection it reported, on 12 May, that organized fighting had ceased. In fact certain operations continued. Pathet Lao were determined, for political rather than military reasons, to reduce a rightist strongpoint at Ban Pa Dong near Xieng Khouang and they attacked it until it fell on 6 June. Thus a military defeat for the West was secured to mark the opening stages of the negotiations at Geneva which had commenced on 16 May.

Procedural difficulties, concerning Laotian representation, bedevilled the early plenary sessions of the conference. The co-chairmen at length obtained acceptance by the conference of a formula which allowed the presence with equal status of all three Laotian parties. Even so the Boun Oum delegation refused to sit in company with the others for some time.

The opening statements of the delegations made between 18 and 23 May and the presentation of drafts by France, India, and Russia in the next stage of the conference revealed wide differences in the views of the Communist and non-Communist Powers. The West was in favour of a high degree of international control over the situation in Laos. This control was not to be limited to the immediate phase after agreement at the conference but was to extend into the future until peace and genuine neutrality were assured. The United States proposed also an international body to control economic aid to Laos.

The Communists held that all this was tantamount to interference in the internal affairs of Laos. They proposed very limited tasks for the conference as far as Laos was concerned. It should declare support for a neutral Laos but should not guarantee it. The detailed establishment of a state of neutrality should be left entirely in the hands of a Government of all parties and nationalities. Very restricted powers were proposed for the ICC who were to be made dependent on the Lao Government and hamstrung by a unanimity rule which was to apply to all decisions of the Commission. By contrast the Communists wanted to extend the function of the conference to consider such questions as the total abolition of SEATO. On this point the Western Powers were willing only to concede that Laos should not be drawn into military alliances. The Communist interest was clearly to obtain as open an agreement as possible and they cleverly gained a psychological advantage by making the Western proposals for control against trickery and subversion appear to be a challenge to Laotian independence and an infringement of sovereignty.

The conference moved to a more profitable stage after the Khrushchev–Kennedy meeting at Vienna in June. Though the Communists at first resisted the attempt to move away from plenary sessions, two drafting committees were set up to work out an agreed statement on neutrality and a protocol on the method of its establishment and the function of the ICC.

During the following six months, by a series of compromises,

judicious postponement of discussion on crucial points, and concessions more apparent than real by the Communist side, the drafting committees, representing thirteen nations, moved slowly towards agreement. By 12 December this was in sight and no further progress could be made without the participation of a Lao delegation representing a Government of national union who were to insert into the agreement a statement of their own on neutrality.

The three parties in Laos had shown the utmost reluctance to come together to form a coalition Government. The Boun Oum–Phoumi Nosavan group maintained for as long as possible their claim that they were the sole legally established Government. Although a detailed statement on the formation and policy of a Government of national union was agreed by the three princes, Boun Oum, Souvannaphouma, and Souphanouvong of Pathet Lao, at Zurich on 22 June, no Government emerged.[1] At Ban Hin Heup on 8 October it was agreed that the King should appoint Souvannaphouma as Prime Minister and that a council of ministers should be set up composed of eight neutralist, four Pathet Lao, and four Boun Oum ministers. The distribution of portfolios was not agreed however. The Boun Oum group demanded the key ministries of Defence and the Interior throughout a series of meetings held in Laos in November and December. Even the agreement of 19 January 1962 made by the princes at Geneva in response to a direct request from the conference turned out to be illusory. In February the United States applied pressure by suspending economic aid to Laos and in March Mr Averell Harriman failed in a personal effort to influence Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan to agree to enter a coalition.

It was a matter of some doubt whether this group was maintaining its intransigence for personal reasons of dislike and rivalry or whether it was ably abetted by Thailand and, as was suggested from time to time in responsible European journals, by extremist American officers in Laos who were reluctant to follow the change of emphasis in official policy.[2] It is possible that Phoumi Nosavan hoped to achieve some military success in order decisively to influence the composition of the coalition Government or even the conclusions of the Geneva conference.

At intervals since July 1961 the ICC had given warning that the cease-fire agreement was not proving effective and that foreign sup-

[1] Text: Cmnd. 1828, pp. 13–15.

[2] See, for example, *Le Monde*, 17 December 1961, *The Economist*, 13 January 1962, *The Times*, 24 and 31 May 1962.

port for the troops of all three sides was continuing. The civil war had continued without any real break except that imposed by the rains, but a political solution had now been delayed until another campaigning season had come round. The neutralists and Pathet Lao had maintained and reinforced their bases at the Plain of Jars and Tchepone, a strategically important airfield near the junction of the Lao-Vietnamese frontier and the 17th parallel. From the military point of view the right-wing activities appeared less purposeful but their forces had had some success in limited engagements in central and south Laos. Early in 1962 they commenced a large build-up of forces at Nam Tha near the Chinese border.

In May Boun Oum and Phoumi Nosavan were engaged in a tour of Taipeh, Bangkok, Manila, and other Asian capitals in a last attempt to gain support for their regime, which the United States was now hesitating to underwrite. The neutralist leaders Quinim Pholsena and Kong Lae were absent in Peking and Moscow. Mr Malcolm Macdonald was visiting Laos. This was the moment chosen by Pathet Lao to launch an attack on Nam Tha, which fell with hardly a fight to less numerous forces on 6 May. The routed right-wing troops fell back on the Mekhong river which divides Laos and Thailand in this region.

Victory had come not to the right but to the left. It was probably carefully planned to improve the Pathet Lao position *vis-à-vis* the neutralists and to shock the nations into renewed action at Geneva. In the Indochina theatre the Communists have always integrated military and political strategy. The proof lies in the record—Dien Bien Phu, the Xieng Khouang successes of December 1960, the advances of April and May 1961, Ban Pa Dong, and finally Nam Tha. Great store is set by this type of politico-military action.[1]

The United States, though perhaps not deeply concerned about the tactical aspects of the Nam Tha defeat, took immediate steps to ensure the security of Thailand by the dispatch of her Seventh Fleet and the landing, from 17 May, of marines and army and air force units at Bangkok. Britain and New Zealand also sent small token forces. The action of the United States was of great importance. It was not merely a question of giving immediate support to Thailand. The all-out backing by Thailand of the Boun Oum -Phoumi Nosavan Government was motivated partly by the re-

[1] In 'Some results of the Laos Conference' in *International Affairs*, Moscow, September 1962, pp. 49–55, the writer, M. Yegorov, italicizes the following passage: 'the victory of the internal patriotic forces was the principal factor which determined the success of the Geneva Conference' (p. 50).

emergence of 'Pan-Thai' ambitions and to a great extent by a desire to maintain a defensive position against Communist military advance and political subversion at a distance from the home territory. But a significant aspect of this Thai policy was that it acted as a probe into U.S. intentions in the region. U.S. policy is now undergoing the testing that was applied to British policy in the 1930s when Japan was the threat to Thailand. SEATO has failed in Thai eyes and the promise of unilateral U.S. support implied in a statement issued by Dean Rusk and the Foreign Minister of Thailand[1] on 6 March 1962 was a first reassurance which Thailand would like to see more formally confirmed.

Under the influence of the new sense of urgency the three Lao princes at last reached agreement on a Government of national union with representation of all parties but with the key ministries in neutralist hands. This agreement was signed on the Plain of Jars on 12 June and approved by the King of Laos on the 23rd.

On 2 July the conference at Geneva was able to convene for its final session. The Statement of Neutrality by the new Royal Government of Laos was presented for incorporation on 9 July and on the 23rd the texts of the Declaration of Neutrality and the Protocol, agreed at the final plenary session of the 21st, were signed.[2] Among the generally moderate statements made at the close of the conference, the strident attack on U.S. policy by the D.R.V. ministers and Marshal Chen Yi's warning that peace in Laos could not be regarded as consolidated while war continued in Vietnam stood out ominously.

The present agreement made at Geneva is couched in very different terms from that of 1954. The control of the cease-fire, which was previously, at least in theory, firmly in ICC hands, is under the 1962 agreement the final responsibility of the Lao parties. The ICC has greatly reduced powers of inspection in the new agreement, and the unanimity principle, invoked in 1954 only in decisions about violations on the part of foreign armed forces, now covers all significant reports and conclusions of the ICC and can still be used as a formidable veto. The articles on withdrawal are now couched in more general terms; the Vietnamese People's Volunteers were specifically mentioned in 1954. Reduction of armaments has no place in the 1962 agreement.

Upon the expiry of the period of seventy-five days allowed for the withdrawal of foreign forces, the ICC reported that 1,069

[1] U.S. Information Service, 7 March 1962. [2] Full texts in Cmnd. 1828.

American and Filipino troops and technicians had withdrawn from Laos but that only forty North Vietnamese had passed the control points. The Communist Powers have never acknowledged the presence of D.R.V. personnel in Laos, the numbers of whom have been variously estimated between 6,000 and 10,000. In October and November the Western Powers were still taking a moderate line about this problem. However, from Peking and Hanoi a stream of accusations poured out, from August onwards, charging the West and its allies with cease-fire violations and with allowing the re-entry of Western and Asian military personnel and aircraft in civilian guise.

In Vientiane rapid moves were made, initiated by the Pathet Lao Ministers of the new Government, to open diplomatic relations with six additional Communist Powers. The three factions were still in being and it appeared that the two extremes of right and left were already consolidating their positions, the first in Vientiane and the second on the Plain of Jars. The neutralist forces of Kong Lae, operating in a Joint Military Council with Pathet Lao, seemed from their pronouncements to be scarcely distinguishable from the latter.

The successful politico-military strategy of the Communist Powers enabled them to reach an agreement at Geneva without making any significant concessions, in fact they did little more than show a willingness to negotiate. There has been a difference of emphasis in the support offered by the Soviet Union and China to the neutralist and Pathet Lao groups in Laos, but, at Geneva, these two Powers seemed to be working in reasonable harmony. The challenge to the non-Communist world obviously remains formidable.[1]

It is probable that the last real chance of establishing a relatively stable neutrality in Laos was lost when the Western Powers failed to give concerted support to the Souvannaphouma Government that followed the Vientiane Accords of 1956. The dream of creating a Western-committed State on the borders of China by military means persisted far too long. This time the West has no alternative but to support Souvannaphouma. As in Cambodia, battle will now be joined in the political and economic spheres. The dire need of Laos for economic aid and the necessity of drawing it from States on both sides of the cold-war barrier could become an important factor in drawing the rival parties in Laos together round the centre.

[1] China's increasing involvement in Laos is described by Brian Crozier in 'Peking and the Laotian Crisis: an interim appraisal', *China Quarterly*, July–September 1961, pp. 128–37 and '. . . a further appraisal', *C.Q.*, July–September 1962, pp. 116–23.

Despite the recent polarizing effect of cold-war politics, there still exists in Laos a predilection, deriving from traditional attitudes to the outside world, for a policy of 'absolute neutrality'. A clear reflection of this traditional outlook is to be seen in the willingness of the new neutralist Government to recognize Peking and Taipeh and both regimes in Vietnam and Germany, which caused serious diplomatic tangles in Vientiane in August 1962.

If Laos is to survive there must be some genuine *rapprochement* among her leaders. If this does not occur Laos will become divided into what will be, in effect, unstable spheres of influence of Thailand and the D.R.V. The best hope lies, perhaps, in the Laotian reaction to such a prospect. Throughout history Laos has always had to face trouble from her immediate neighbours, the most dangerous of whom have been the Thai and the Vietnamese. They could well appear to her to be a more direct menace than China and the other more distant Great Powers, whose influence might be used by Laos to check Thai and Vietnamese ambitions. Thus Laos could continue her existence as a buffer State in the interests of Great Power disengagement.

E. H. S. SIMMONDS

Nigeria Two Years After Independence

II. Issues for the Future

NIGERIA is not a country where riches and poverty are to be seen in their most extreme contrast, but these contrasts are nevertheless present. In the towns, and above all in Lagos, the Federal capital, poverty and riches can be found in close proximity. There the houses of Ministers and senior civil servants in Ikoyi and the new European-style night-clubs contrast strongly with the slums and bars of an area like Mushin, where newcomers to the city tend to congregate. Twenty years ago such contrasts might have been essentially racial in character, with Europeans predominating among the rich. Increasingly since the second World War, however, Nigerians have joined the ranks of the wealthy, making their way to the top through politics, business, or the civil service. In Marxist terms, the

nationalist movement in Nigeria was a 'bourgeois nationalist' movement. It put a new *élite* into power, men (and women) who had been able to take advantage of access to Western education to improve their own position in life. A boy from the Benin river in Warri Division might by virtue of his education become a clerk for a European shoe-manufacturing firm with shops in Nigeria, rise to be a manager, go into business on his own, enter politics, and end as Federal Finance Minister. Yet the majority of his fellow countrymen face a life of hard work and poor food, inadequate sanitation and water supplies, intestinal parasites, and even worse diseases. Four out of ten children die before puberty; a man or woman might be old and bent at forty.

Not only that, but consumption by the wealthy in Nigeria is conspicuous. Large cars, fine clothes, big houses, the possession of refrigerators and radiograms all point to a man's success in life. In some ways this is expected of him, and the class structure in Nigeria still appears open enough to allow anyone to attain these dizzy heights of opulence. Nevertheless the strata are hardening. Education, for instance, is already showing signs of division into that available for the privileged few on the one hand, and the less fortunate many on the other. Private schools are numerous and often get the best of both worlds, subsidized by the Government and at the same time charging fees high enough to restrict attendance to the children of the rich.

Governments and individual politicians are aware of this problem of contrasts. 'Austerity' has now become a frequently heard catchword, and cuts in salaries and allowances for Western and Northern Ministers, parliamentarians, and civil servants have been announced. Such a policy, however, is likely to offend the civil servants, who are key personnel, and does little to reduce the overall gap between the few and the many. Politicians in particular are almost universally regarded as corrupt and are generally disliked; photographs in the newspapers of Western legislators fleeing in panic before the police tear-gas at the end of May were received with widespread glee. The gulf between rich and poor is not yet serious enough to cause a crisis, and is mitigated—above all perhaps in the North—by social relationships which are difficult to explain in terms of 'class'. Nevertheless, discontent will increase if the rich appear to be getting richer and the poor poorer. When the reaction of traders and transport owners to new taxes is immediately to increase prices of basic foodstuffs and fares far out of proportion to

the new expenses to themselves, as happened after the last Federal Budget, they are making a mockery of 'austerity'.

The Governments of Nigeria are of course aware of all this. The National Plan, discussed in the previous article, has as its main purpose the raising of the standard of living of the people of Nigeria. It is unfortunate for the economic planners—and this applies to any 'under-developed' country—that the patience of the average man is not great enough to permit him to wait for a series of plans to be completed before finding himself considerably better off, especially when he can already see rich men pass his door. In the case of Nigeria the sheer magnitude of the task—in African terms—is daunting. Some 40 million people, with a population growth of something under 2 per cent each year, have to be mobilized and their standard of living appreciably improved. It has been estimated that an investment of £70 million annually will be needed just to meet the increase in population, in other words the entire investment envisaged by the Federal Government and its agencies during the present Plan.

Another feature of the present Plan which warrants comment is its emphasis on industrialization, and thus upon the towns as opposed to the rural areas. The Plan for the East presents us with a good example here. Admittedly £36 million out of a total capital investment of £75 million is to be devoted to agriculture, and only £13½ million to industry. Yet the outside observer is left wondering how effective will be the establishment of six farm-settlements, at a cost of about £7 million, which are to serve as models for other peasant farmers. It is tempting to speculate what might have been accomplished if this sum were used to foster local co-operatives, and an instructive comparison might be drawn here with the Senegalese development plan, which places its main emphasis on the rural areas and co-operatives.

For the Eastern Plan envisages the establishment, with Government money and private investment, of numerous factories. A £12 million Shell-B.P. oil refinery near Port Harcourt is due to begin the production of 1½ million tons of oil a year in 1964. Port Harcourt is to have a £3 million tyre factory, a £1½ million aluminium rolling mill, a £1 million galvanizing industry, a £1 million flour mill, a £1 million glass industry, and a £¾ million bicycle factory. Enugu, Umuahia, Aba, and possibly Onitsha are to get their share—breweries, textile mills, and the like. Industrial development tends to be concentrated in or near towns, and the new source of work which such development provides is a powerful attractive force

to people in the rural areas. All over Africa the development of industry in the towns has led to a migration from the countryside, and Eastern Nigeria already has one of the densest rural populations in Africa, with a totally inadequate supply of land in many areas. People will flock into the towns looking for work. Either they will find it or they will be left unemployed and far from their home villages. In the former case the contrast in development between town and country will be further accentuated. In the towns there will be work and wages, access to a wide range of consumer goods, the cinemas, and bars: in the villages there will be a relative shortage of money and what it can buy, and general depression occasioned by the departure of the more enterprising to seek their fortunes elsewhere. To the contrast between rich and poor will be added the contrast between urban and rural areas. With the majority of people still living on the land, even after extensive migration to the towns, and with the rural constituencies having a vast preponderance in the various legislatures, the political implications of widespread dissatisfaction in the villages could be enormous.

In fact, the second possibility, that of urban unemployment on a large scale, is much more probable. It is most unlikely that the new industrial establishments can create enough work to absorb more than a small proportion of those who will seek it. The oil refinery mentioned above is intended to employ only eighty senior staff and 300 others—a cost of over £30,000 for each man permanently employed. Moreover, it must be remembered that a modern factory using the latest machinery—the kind which will be established in Nigeria in the next decade—is in fact designed to employ less operatives rather than more.

The potential problem of unemployment is made even worse by the fact that it is the literate young men and women who will be coming to the towns seeking work. During the period of the National Plan, 1962–8, nearly 800,000 school-leavers will be turned out from the primary schools in the East, and 15,000 from secondary schools. In the West an average of 160,000 a year will leave primary schools and there will be about 25,000 secondary school-leavers. The fact that they have been given an education will lead them to believe that there is something humiliating about living and working in their home villages, and the great majority of them will head for the towns to seek employment there. This has been the experience so far, and there seems little likelihood of any revolutionary change in attitude in the foreseeable future. The Regional Governments are

trying to encourage such a change of attitude by means of the farm-settlements, which are to be found in the West as well as in the East.

In the West they are in fact even more highly developed; during the Plan period twenty-two more are to be added to the present thirteen, at a cost of £5,582,000. It is hoped in the West that these, along with farm institutes, will absorb about 24,000 school-leavers, although it should be pointed out that the farm-settlements are costing up to £4,000 for each settler at the moment, while those in the East are reckoned to cost £1,700, and will absorb less than 5,000 school-leavers. The object of the settlements is not, of course, to absorb all school-leavers. Their prime purpose is to persuade school-leavers that there is nothing essentially degrading about work on the land, and that rural standards of living need not be lower than in the towns. Thus it is hoped that schemes will be started voluntarily following this model; in the West it is hoped to absorb 200,000 young men and women into agricultural schemes in this way. Even if this can be done (and there are already rumours that many are resigning from the Western settlements), and if private investment absorbs another 300,000 school-leavers in the West—as is hoped—that still leaves another 300,000 who will have left school and will be seeking work by the end of the Plan period. The position in the East can hardly be any better.

In the North the position will be somewhat different. There, universal primary education is still a long way off, but it is hoped to have at least 25 per cent of children of school age attending school by 1970. There is a chance that economic development may proceed quickly enough to cope with this, but it is to be wondered how far relatively widespread literacy will be compatible with the preservation of the traditional authority of emirs and their district and village heads in the states of the far North, an authority which at present is the chief strength of the Northern People's Congress. This, however, raises a whole new question, that of the potential political affiliations of the young people who leave school during the period of the National Plan.

The contrasts between rich and poor and the feeling that the present ruling group is corrupt and unrepresentative would be enough in themselves to encourage many young people to adopt a radical attitude to politics in contemporary Nigeria. If widespread unemployment is added to this the demand for radical changes in the present political system is bound to grow. It is difficult to express

the content of this 'radicalism' in concrete terms. Its main foundation is the feeling that something is wrong at the present time and that sweeping changes should be made. Debate about these changes and what exactly should be done is beginning but has not gone far yet. Ideas are beginning to be bandied about, however, and the younger men and women are looking with great interest at the U.S.S.R., Eastern Europe, and China. On 1 December 1961 the ban on thirty-three items of Communist literature imposed in 1955 was lifted, and Chinese and Russian magazines and pamphlets are now on sale in most large towns. The meteoric career and tragic death of the late Patrice Lumumba caught the imagination of many young Nigerians, and he has in some ways become the 'patron saint' of Nigerian radicals. The first serious anti-European riots in Nigeria, when cars were stoned in Lagos and individual Europeans were attacked, were occasioned by the news of his murder in February 1961. A few months before in the same city students from the University College at Ibadan had led demonstrations against the Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement, which had been negotiated as part of the grant of independence. It is a measure of the seriousness with which the Federal Government viewed such manifestations in its capital that public meetings in Lagos have been banned for several extended periods since that time. It is also significant that in February of this year the Defence Agreement was abrogated by mutual consent of the British and Nigerian Governments.

These confused feelings of discontent can only be focused, however, and actions made positive rather than negative, if an organization exists which is capable of doing this. There can be little doubt that Chief Awolowo had hoped to mobilize radical opinion behind the Action Group with his new policy of Democratic Socialism. Events seem to have overtaken him, however, and if a 'radical' party does emerge it is not likely to be one of the old ones refurbished, but something quite new.

Attempts have already been made to found such a movement. A few months before independence in 1960 a group of young intellectuals and trade-union leaders, who regarded themselves as left-wing progressives, came together in an attempt to form a new party which could give a lead to the demands for change which they felt were becoming increasingly strong. A common agreement could not be reached, however, and several groups came into existence, among them the Nigerian People's Party, led by Gogo Nzeribe, a prominent trade unionist of long standing, and the Nigerian Youth Congress,

led by Dr Tunji Otegbeye. Many other groups have come into being during the last two years—the Communist Party of Nigeria (apparently unaffiliated to the world Communist movement), the Socialist Group, the Socialist Labour Party, and so on. Most such groups are distinguished by smallness of size and vagueness of aims, and the most significant of them is undoubtedly the Nigerian Youth Congress. This has branches in most of the large towns in the South and some in the North and is strongest in Lagos, where its influence is increased by its association with the tenants' organization which is attempting to fight rack-renting by landlords in that grossly overcrowded city. The Congress does not contest elections, regarding itself at this stage as a disseminator of ideas rather than a political party which seeks to gain immediate power. The view of its leaders seems rather to be that when radical ideas are sufficiently well spread it will be time to consider what tactics to adopt next. The radical movement is still gravely handicapped by its division into many rival groups, though recently the Congress has apparently taken steps to persuade the others to enter a united front, with success in the case of the Nigerian People's Party.

The future development of the radical movement, and indeed the whole political future of Nigeria, will depend, however, upon the events of the next few months. In September the Federal Government, alleging the discovery of a plot against it, began searching for arms stores and incriminating documents. It was obvious that the Action Group was held to be deeply involved in this, and rewards were announced for information leading to the arrest of Sam Ikoku, the Federal Secretary of the party, who had fled to Ghana when the Emergency was declared in May, Anthony Enahoro, a former Western Minister also reported to be in Ghana, and a third man, an Action Group lawyer. Nevertheless, the party, despite the heavy pressure upon it, won a convincing victory in the local elections in the Federal capital, Lagos, on 15 October. On 2 November Chief Awolowo and twenty-six other people were charged with treasonable felony and conspiracy. Most of those charged were leaders or supporters of the Action Group, but the list also included Dr Chike Obi, leader of the Dynamic Party. A considerably older party than the Nigerian Youth Congress, its policy of 'Kemalism' and emphasis upon the need for strong government puts it rather outside the main radical stream, but its attacks on corruption and ostentation had won it five seats unexpectedly in the Eastern parliamentary election in November 1961.

In that election the N.C.N.C.[1] had won 106 seats. Its position in the East hardly seemed threatened, therefore, while the present parlous condition of the Action Group seems substantially to reduce its threat to the N.C.N.C.–N.P.C.[2] coalition Federal Government. Why then should that Government be making strenuous efforts to eliminate the Opposition? The charges of treason are, of course, *sub judice*, and the verdict cannot be predicted, but it would appear that Sir Abubakar's Government has convinced itself that the continued activity of the Action Group, even under the handicaps of the detention of its leaders and an inquiry into its financial relations with the Government of the Western Region, would constitute a threat to stability in Nigeria. Meanwhile, the other radical leaders are waiting to see what will happen to Dr Obi, and speculating on whether the Government's new strong line will be extended to them.

All of this is bound to affect Nigeria's image abroad, yet successful implementation of the National Plan in the next six years is dependent upon the ability to raise money overseas. Nigerian reserves abroad stand at about £150 million, but obviously these cannot be run down too far. It is hoped, as was pointed out in the previous article, to raise half of the capital needed internally, but there must be some doubt as to the possibility of this. Federal Government securities have raised over £19 million since 1959, but these have been bought mainly by institutions and it is doubtful if a significant number of individuals will be persuaded to use their capital in this way. This sum, raised in three years, also represents little more than a twentieth of what must be raised in the next six. Nigeria also has an adverse balance of trade. In 1960 imports exceeded exports by £46,177,286, and in 1961 by £48,516,776—and these imports are not luxuries which could be sacrificed. Except for textiles, the largest imports are of things like vehicles and machinery, which are essential to an expanding economy and which will be imported in increasing amounts as the Plan gets under way.

Thus Nigeria is likely to be more dependent upon foreign capital for the £676½ million that is needed than the Federal Government would like to be. In the period 1955–61 about 85 per cent of public investment in Nigeria was money raised abroad. The proportion is certain to be less in the period 1962–8, but it will still be high. Offers of loans and gifts have so far been disappointingly few. The United States has promised £80 million and the Federal German Republic

[1] National Convention of Nigerian Citizens.
[2] Northern People's Congress.

£8½ million, while Britain has made a grant of £5 million for educational development. The tour undertaken by Chief Festus Okotie Eboh, the Federal Finance Minister, in May and June of this year in Europe and the Middle East has not as yet yielded any large dividends; and in a speech given in London shortly after his arrival for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' talks early in September, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa expressed his disappointment at the slowness of the countries of the West to invest in Nigerian development.

In these circumstances the example of Ghana must constantly be before the eyes of the Nigerian leaders. The hesitation of the World Bank and the U.S. Government over their financial participation in the Volta Dam scheme because of uncertainty about Ghana's 'neutralism' is a warning to all African leaders that the development of their countries is in the last resolve dependent upon the circumstances of a 'cold war' which has little, if any, relevance to African conditions. President Nkrumah got his guarantee of funds in the end, but the Nigerian leaders know that one of the main reasons for this was a desire on the part of the U.S. Government not to throw Ghana completely into the arms of the Soviet bloc.

Nigeria is, however, far more firmly committed to the West than is Ghana. Relations with Ghana are in fact poor. The Ghanaian Government is accused in Nigeria of sending money to the Dynamic Party, the Youth Congress, and the trade-union wing, led by Michael Imoudu, which favours affiliation to the All-African Trade Union Federation in which Ghana plays a prominent part and opposes the United Labour Congress of Nigerian unions, which are affiliated to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The Nigerian political leaders—those in power at any rate—do not share the enthusiasm of President Nkrumah and the Nigerian radicals for militant Pan-Africanism and neutralism, although Nigeria's official policy is one of 'neutrality'. At times the two countries have held very similar positions—with regard to French nuclear tests in the Sahara, for instance, or the South African Government's policy of *apartheid*—but Nigeria, as a leading member of the 'Monrovia' group, stands in opposition to Ghana's 'Casablanca' group on the question of the means by which African unity should be attained, even if there is agreement on the desirability of the end. The more cautious 'Monrovia' approach and its accompanying closer identification with the Western bloc has enormous implications for Nigeria's future in terms of patterns of trade, relations with the Common Market, and above all of investment. For without this invest-

ment the new National Plan will fail, the high hopes of raising the standard of living of the ordinary people will be dashed, and the great bitterness which will follow may sweep away the present leaders, establish a new regime in Nigeria, and realign her international position. Even if the Plan succeeds there may still be social forces, as we have seen in this article, which will cause radical political change. The gulf between rich and poor, between town and country, the dissatisfaction with the present system, growing radicalism among the young, all these issues underlie events in Nigeria today, and it behoves political leaders both in that country and outside it to consider them when they draw up their plans for the future.

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Brazilian Foreign Policy and Africa

BRAZILIANS have never heard so much about foreign policy as during the last two years. For the first time in their history, international problems, and the question as to what position the country should take in the world, have been brought on to the stage of public life. For the first time also, the problem of reform in the whole structure of the State—a demand backed by a majority of the Brazilian people—is discussed in relation to foreign policy.

RELATIONS BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN POLICY

In spite of her 140 years of life as a nation, Brazil has never had an autonomous foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the Western Powers. This is easily explained historically. Brazil's economy was of the colonial type, and therefore dependent on distant consumers. Brazilian society was dominated by a minority of landowners and exporters closely tied to the international market. Thus the country's evolution and her foreign policy were determined by the Powers that set the rhythm of history—Great Britain and France in the nineteenth century, the United States in the twentieth.

At present, however, when Brazil is in the throes of a process of industrialization and urbanization, new social forces are emerging and the conflict between new and old ideas has become hinged

upon foreign policy. The process of industrialization and urbanization, which was begun gradually at the time of the first World War and accelerated during the second, has finally speeded up to an almost violent rate during the last ten years. It attained great proportions during the administration of President Juscelino Kubitschek (1956–61), so that a class of Brazilian industrialists from the south-central region (where all investments based on official incentives are concentrated) not only began to demand nationalistic measures in self-defence against foreign capital and the outflow of profits, but also, in association with other sectors of Brazilian life identified as 'leftist' (shop workers, intellectuals, part of the armed forces, students, etc.), began a struggle for reforms in the whole social structure: agrarian reform, banking reform, constitutional reform, university reform, and so on. In the sphere of foreign policy it became clear that a change of direction was also needed, that Brazil ought to abandon her traditional passive attitude in the field of international affairs and seek positions in keeping with her own national interests. More elasticity for contacts abroad was needed so that new markets might be opened, both for her traditional tropical products (coffee, cacao, vegetable oils) and for the more recent industrial products (metal, textile, and non-metallic mineral manufactures, etc.; chemicals; machinery and vehicles; and others) which could not be absorbed by the domestic market. The forces of the 'right' and 'left' took their stand on these issues; on the one hand the past, the anti-reformist agrarian tradition identified on an international plane with the so-called 'Western bloc', of which it is historically a client, and on the other hand the future, industrial in character, reformist, keen to adopt a new attitude of independence with regard to the cold war and disposed to support 'nationalist' movements in other areas of the world.

Brazil is a land of continental proportions, with an area of 3,286,169 square miles and a population of 72 million, half of them under the age of eighteen, and with one of the highest indices of population increase in the world—3·5 per cent. She is in the grip of an inflationary economy characterized by regional disparities that grow worse day by day, by budget deficits, shortage of exchange, and shortage of investment and internal savings. Thus, as far back as the middle of the Kubitschek administration, public opinion has been faced with the issue of fundamental reforms that would provide an expansion of general purchasing power as well as that of expanding the area of foreign trade so as to obtain exchange

and savings, all within a programme of economic development.

The possibilities for a change of orientation in foreign policy opened up in three main fields. First on a continental plane and still on a restricted scale, there was the OPA ('Operação Pan-americana') launched in 1958. Its purpose was to bring together the Latin American countries in a joint campaign of economic planning, thus remodelling the worn-out concept of Panamericanism *vis-à-vis* the United States and the nascent bloc of the European Common Market. (It is interesting to note that when the creation of a European Common Market was taken up by GATT in 1957, Brazil protested against the threat to Brazilian products represented by the inclusion of the then French colonies in Africa.) Secondly, with relation to the Socialist area, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the first Brazilian missions were sent over in 1959 and 1960 to sound out the possibilities of establishing commercial relations. Thirdly, as regards Africa, despite the 'Treaty of Friendship and Consultation' signed between Brazil and Portugal in 1955 and subsequently reinforced at intervals, a first tentative move in opposition to Portuguese colonialism in Africa was discreetly put forward at the 15th Assembly of the United Nations in 1960, when Brazil supported the Declaration on the Concession of Independence to Colonial Peoples and Countries.[1] This was the first attempt at an anti-colonialist stand on the part of a Brazilian delegation. Up to then, and even including 1960, Brazil had voted systematically against Algeria in favour of France, against the Africans in favour of Portugal, against Indonesia in favour of Holland, against China in favour of Formosa, and against Egypt in favour of intervention in the Suez Canal area.

It fell to Dr Janio Quadros, elected President in October 1960 and inaugurated in January 1961, to express more clearly the aspirations of considerable sectors of the Brazilian industrial bourgeoisie, identified with popular nationalist ideals, by his formulation, in theatrical gestures and eloquent words, of a foreign policy freed from links and commitments to either of the two politico-military blocs that face each other in the cold war. But this was too much. The timid steps taken in all diplomatic caution by the departing Kubitschek administration had provoked violent protests from the reactionary groups represented in the press, in the Church, in Congress, and in the organizations of the traditionalist so-called 'Conservative classes' as well as in the neo-fascist groups that oper-

[1] General Assembly Official Records, Resolution 1514 (xv), 14 December 1960.

ated under the slogan of the 'struggle against Communism'; an earthquake was therefore caused by the repeated pronouncements of Dr Quadros, in his characteristic theatrical manner.

He proclaimed a policy based on respect for the principles of self-determination, non-intervention, pacifism, and coexistence—all formulae traditionally accepted but never before put into practice. He advocated for Brazil, in a most emphatic way, the right of any sovereign people to trade with all areas of the globe. In the American sphere he abandoned the multilateral approach of OPA, but took an intransigent stand as regards the self-determination of Cuba. Speaking out against imperialism and colonialism, he not only made it clear that he would denounce the 'Treaty of Friendship and Consultation' with Portugal, but also stated the necessity of establishing links of friendship between Brazil and the young African and Asian nations, aimed at a joint effort of all under-developed peoples in the common struggle for 'liberty and well-being'. Thus foreign policy became an unprecedented issue in Brazilian domestic politics, and ultimately Quadros was led, on 25 August 1961, to his unexpected gesture of resignation. This in turn generated the greatest socio-political crisis in Brazil's history and demonstrated to the right-wing conservatives that the popular forces, even though they were not regimented along rigid leftist lines, represented a factor in Brazilian public life that could not be ignored. Public opinion, as expressed in various organs of the press, as well as repeated statements by trade union leaders, members of Congress (independently of political parties), and intellectuals of the most varied currents of thought, supported the new orientation in foreign policy with regard to respect for non-intervention in Cuba, relations with the socialist countries of the Soviet bloc, and the need for an African policy. With regard to the first two, the succeeding administration has been able to carry out successfully, and at times more thoroughly, the policy previously laid down. As regards Africa, the problem is somewhat more complex.

AFRO-BRAZILIAN POLICY

The emergence of the new Africa towards the end of the 1950s coincided in Brazil with the first concrete steps towards an autonomous foreign policy resulting from the momentum of economic development. The countries of Africa were graduating into independence at the same time that industrialization was reaching the point of inducing Brazil to want to stand on her own feet. Nationalist

sectors of the left, moreover, were seeking to identify the struggle against Brazilian under-development with the struggle for emancipation of the countries just emerging from colonialism.

There are three tendencies to be noted concerning the formulation of a Brazilian policy on Africa. The first, economic in content, is typical of the industrialists and business men who, after 1958, began to look upon Africa as a market for their products. There was vague talk in the press, meanwhile, about competition from African tropical products. Up to the present, however, not a single serious economic study has been published on the degree of competition between Brazilian and African products; and even fears of the European Common Market, widely publicized in recent months, have been restricted to those government circles which have foreseen the danger since 1958.

The second tendency has a romantic flavour: it attempts to justify an Afro-Brazilian policy on historical grounds. Various theses have been put forward in support of this idea, of which the following may be noted: (1) since Brazil is the most 'Africanized' of the American countries, as a result of contacts maintained during centuries of slavery, it is in a better position than any other to understand Africa and therefore to establish relations with African countries; (2) Brazilian miscegenation is a typically Brazilian phenomenon, and there is nothing Portuguese about it. The theory of Luso-tropicalism[1] put forward by the Brazilian sociologist, Gilberto Freyre, has no scientific basis, and the claim that Portugal has repeated the Brazilian experience in Africa is therefore an illusion. This tendency towards a historically based Afro-Brazilian policy has been widely accepted in Brazil among representatives of the more progressive currents of social thought.

The third tendency is clearly related to groups of the extreme left, the majority of them with an orthodox Marxist political orientation. They would turn the whole issue of African policy into a question of political choice, of capitalism versus communism, or, on a more immediate plane, of imperialism versus the Soviet Union. Further, they would measure the significance of Brazilian relations with Africa in so far as they serve to weaken the capitalist bloc.

In the scheme as briefly set forth above, two fundamental points stand out: (*a*) African markets are a possibility for Brazilian manufactured products, in spite of the threat that African tropical pro-

[1] The theory of the projection of Portuguese civilization into a tropical country.

ducts represent in the world market, and in spite of the restricted types of goods that might be imported into Brazil in exchange for Brazilian exports; (*b*) the population of Brazil is of mixed blood, a large portion of it African, and its civilization is profoundly influenced by Negro culture.

For an objective analysis of the problem it is important to note that Brazilian ideas on the subject are based on knowledge of a given reality—namely of Brazil. The thesis of Luso-tropicalism, which exalts the Portuguese system of colonization, is partially responsible for the commitments Brazil has assumed *vis-à-vis* Portugal in defence of Portuguese interests, thus prejudicing the more objective and realistic position that she should take on the specific issue of the independence of Angola. The existence of a large Portuguese colony in Brazil, as well as the traditional affection that unites the Portuguese and Brazilian peoples, explains the sentimentalism of the concept of a 'Luso-Brazilian Community' as built up during the Kubitschek regime, although it does not correspond to any real material or cultural interest in Brazil. On the other hand, Brazilian miscegenation, her attitude of anti-colonialism *vis-à-vis* the newly formed nations, her general identification with the under-developed world, and her clean record as regards colonialism might perhaps constitute factors favourable to an Afro-Brazilian policy, but only if the realities of the situation in Africa are taken into consideration. But in so far as they have been presented in Brazil, these factors are only the ingenuous components of a wish—which is at the same time an illusion—for leadership in Africa.

The intentions of industrialists may be legitimate, and the fears awakened in government circles by the European Common Market may be justifiable, but the fact is, nevertheless, that Brazilian conceptions regarding Africa are formulated in Brazil and are based on Brazilian problems and Brazilian points of view. Brazilian authors who have written on the subject of Africa in recent years do not know Africa; they write as Brazilians, and their thoughts are centred on Brazil.[1] A lack of adequate specific knowledge explains the caution of the Ministry of Foreign Relations in executing the broad theoretical plans that were opened up by Dr Quadros. If adequate African studies had existed in Brazil, the former President would not have made the mistake of stating:

[1] A. J. Bezerra de Menezes should be mentioned as one of the rare exceptions. He is a diplomat who knows Africa and Asia and wrote in 1956 a pioneering book: *O Brasil e o Mundo Afro-Asiático.*

I believe it is precisely in Africa that Brazil can perform the gre
service to Western concepts of life and political methods. Our cou
should become the link, the bridge between Africa and the West, ;
we are so intimately tied to both peoples.[1]

The facts are quite different on the other side of the Atla
First of all, there are many Africas, historically and cultu
speaking, but the only one Brazil had connections with in the
through the supply of slave labour by the European traders,
that of the Gulf of Guinea and Angola. The present-day inhabit
of Ghana, Nigeria, or Angola have nothing in common with
Africans who came to Brazil centuries ago, and the descendan
the latter are so completely Brazilian that it would never occu
them to remember their African ancestors.

Brazilian miscegenation means little or nothing to the Africa
today. Such a mixture of races, which is a matter of glory and p
to Brazil, has no significance in Africa; what is of importance t
is the capacity of the Negro race as compared, under equal
ditions, with the productive capacity of the whites. The absen
racial discrimination in the two great colonial metropolitan cen
London and Paris, whose universities were and are open to A
cans in the best fraternizing spirit, demonstrates to this new Af
through its educated and westernized *élite*, that the fact of Brazi
non-discrimination, which is after all more theoretical than rea
not a sufficient motive to make Brazil beloved of all Africans, no
south, east, and west.

As to the question of leadership—a thesis that the Ministr
Foreign Relations, prudent as always, has never espoused—thi
the type of error that many Brazilian intellectuals still fall into,
cause they do not know the realities of Africa from within. If Br
is ignorant of Africa, it is precisely because Brazil has never d
anything concrete in that part of the world. It is a mistake to th
that the African *élite*, much less the tribal populations, desire
break off their remaining ties with France and Great Britain. Su
ties are in fact quite solid, even in the case of a country like Gha
that is known in the Western world for its position of diplomatic
dependence. What the man from Ghana wants, for example, a
seeks to achieve with the scant means at his disposal, is to defe
his right to be independent within his own country. He has no gr
desire to oppose, much less deny, the British contribution. Th

[1] Quoted from the Portuguese version of an article written by Preside
Quadros for *Foreign Affairs*, October 1961, also published in *Jornal do Brasil*, R
de Janeiro, 27 September 1961, p. 2.

being the case, the men from Ghana, or from Nigeria (to mention only two examples) wish to improve the standard of living of their peoples; they are open to understandings, free and sovereign, with Brazil—provided that Brazil has something to offer and is willing to receive something from them.

Up to now the presence of Brazil in Africa has been signalized by a few embassies, the most recent being in Morocco, Tunisia, Senegal, Ghana, and Nigeria, and the oldest in the U.A.R., all of which are still poorly equipped. The most substantial work in Africa, praiseworthy for the personal effort involved, has been done by three professors of the University of Bahia stationed in Dakar, Accra, and Lagos. Government initiative, under the Quadros regime, was responsible for setting up the Brazilian Institute of Afro-Asiatic Studies (today an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Relations and still in process of organization); for the sending to various African ports of a Brazilian training ship staffed with young midshipmen on a pilot voyage with a display of Brazilian industrial products; and the granting of twenty scholarships at Brazilian universities to students from various African countries.

On the commercial level, Brazil has two traditional customers in Africa, South Africa and Morocco, which alone absorb more than half her exports to Africa. It should be noted, however, that Afro-Brazilian trade decreased, in round numbers, from 20 million dollars in 1958 to 12 million in 1960 (exports) and from 5 million to 3·5 million (imports); and that this represents an insignificant percentage of the foreign trade on both sides (in the case of Brazil it represents, on the average, 1 per cent of exports and 0·2 per cent of imports). There is a notable absence of imports from Africa, with the exception of non-ferrous minerals from the Confederation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and for this reason Brazil's balance of trade with the African countries is always favourable.

This means that there is a whole economic policy, of advantage to both sides, to be developed in Africa. This is particularly true now, in view of the European Common Market, which at the moment is limited in Africa to the countries of 'l'expression française'. Such a policy could lay the foundations for a broad and permanent interchange. Toward this end a Brazilian shipping line was inaugurated last August with ports of call in Ghana and Nigeria; and a Brazilian airline is soon to establish a service between Rio de Janeiro and Beirut via several African capitals.

There are a number of ways in which Brazil might take the in-

itiative in Africa, at least as regards those countries that wish to establish permanent relations with her and whose interests coincide with her own. The first is economic and commercial in nature, through bilateral agreements. On this point the myth of African competition could be destroyed by establishing an association of all the producing countries; although difficult, this is possible, as has been demonstrated by the beginnings that have been made with cacao. The second concerns a certain type of technical assistance, particularly in the field of tropical medicine, where Brazilian scientists have so notably distinguished themselves. The third, on the cultural plane, aims at mutual knowledge and understanding through co-operation at the university level; otherwise Brazilians will continue to expatiate about Africa on the basis of generalizations. And last but not least, there is the question of Angola.

On this last point, Brazil took a step forward at the 16th General Assembly of the U.N. when she voted in favour of self-determination for Angola.[1] In this field Brazil might develop a really constructive and immediate line of action on the African continent, if she wishes in fact to obtain the respect and admiration of the African peoples. It could be a double mission: to intervene with Portugal and with the nationalist leaders of Angola to bring about the birth of a nation, and thus to preserve a Portuguese-language culture in Africa. Further, Brazil might do in Angola what Portugal has not done, namely help the Angolans to integrate themselves into the new Africa, from which they are at present isolated. For this purpose Brazil can count on the sympathy of broad sectors of the Angolan *élite*. The mission is no doubt difficult, but it could be a glorious one, depending on the purposes and practical capability of Brazil. The skill of Brazilian diplomacy to do this is not in doubt; the question is whether it is possible.

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[1] G.A.O.R. Resolution 1742 (xvi), 30 January 1962.

CORRIGENDUM

The World Today, November 1962, in the article 'U.N. Action for Peace', p. 485, line 38 should read: 'This is a factor which would probably carry a good deal of weight at the U.N.'

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